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THE UNITED STATES 

AND 

LATIN AMERICA 




no* ioo° w 



60* 50° 40 • 30- 80' 19 



SOUTH AMERICx\ 



THE UNITED STATES 

AND 

LATIN AMERICA 



BY 
JOHN HOLLADAY LATANE 

PH.D., LL.D. 

PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND DEAN OF THE 

COLLEGE FACULTY IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 

Author of "From Isolation to Leadership^" 

1 ' America as a World Poiver, ' ' etc . 




GARDEN CITY NEW YORK 

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 

1920 



R*fl8 
.1_35 



COPYRIGHT, I92O, BY 

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF TRANSLATION 

INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN 




■CLA576091 



TO THE MEMORY OF 
MY FATHER 
WHOSE DAILY COMMENTS ON PUBLIC QUES- 
TIONS WERE MY FIRST LESSONS IN THE STUDY 

OF POLITICS 

AND TO 

MY MOTHER 

WHO IMPARTED TO ME A LOVE OF HISTORY 

AND WHOSE APPROVAL IS STILL THE RICHEST 

REWARD OF MY EFFORTS 



/ 



PREFACE 

This book is based on a smaller volume issued by 
the Johns Hopkins Press in 1900 under the title " The 
Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish 
America," which contained the first series of Albert 
Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History. That volume 
has been out of print for several years, but calls for 
it are still coming in, with increasing frequency of late. 
In response to this demand and in view of the wide- 
spread interest in our relations with our Southern 
neighbors I have revised and enlarged the original 
volume, omitting much that was of special interest at 
the time it was written, and adding a large amount of 
new matter relating to the events of the past twenty 
years. 

Chapters I, II and V are reprinted with only minor 
changes; III, IV and VI have been rewritten and 
brought down to date; VII, VIII and IX are wholly 
new. 

J. H. L. 

Baltimore, 

May 7, 1920. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I The Revolt of the Spanish Colonies . 3 

II The Recognition of the Spanish-Ameri- 

can Republics 48 

III The Diplomacy of the United States in 

Regard to Cuba 83 

l/'lV The Diplomatic History of the Panama 

Canal 144 

V French Intervention in Mexico . . 193 

VI The Two Venezuelan Episodes . . . 238 

VII The Advance of the United States in 

the Caribbean 261 

VIII Pan Americanism 292 

IX The Monroe Doctrine 320 

Index 335 

MAPS 

South America Frontispiece 

The Caribbean Facing page 262 



II 



THE UNITED STATES 

AND 

LATIN AMERICA 



THE UNITED STATES AND 
LATIN AMERICA 

CHAPTER I 

The Revolt of the Spanish Colonies 

The English colonies of North America renounced 
allegiance to their sovereign more through fear of 
future oppression than on account of burdens actually 
imposed. The colonies of Spain in the southern hemi- 
sphere, on the other hand, labored for generations 
under the burden of one of the most irrational and 
oppressive economic systems to which any portion of 
the human race has ever been subjected, and remained 
without serious attempt at revolution until the de- 
thronement of their sovereign by Napoleon left them 
to drift gradually, in spite of themselves, as Chateau- 
briand expressed it, into the republican form of gov- 
ernment. To carry the contrast a step further, when 
the conditions were ripe for independence, the Eng- 
lish colonies offered a united resistance, while the 
action of the Spanish colonies was spasmodic and dis- 
concerted. The North American revolution gave 
birth to a federal republic, that of the South to a 
number of separate and independent republics, whose 
relations with one another have at times been far 
from amicable. The causes for these striking dif- 

3 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

ferences are to be explained not alone by race psy- 
chology, but by a comparison of the English and 
Spanish colonial systems and of the two revolutions as 
well. The history of the English colonies and of their 
revolt has been pretty well exploited, but information 
in regard to the Spanish-American revolution and its 
causes, although the sources are abundant, is not easily 
accessible to English-speaking people. 

By virtue of the celebrated Bull of Pope Alexander 
VI, the Spanish-American colonies were looked upon 
as possessions of the crown, and not as colonies of 
Spain. Their affairs were regulated by the king, with 
the assistance of a board called the Council of the 
Indies. This council, which was on a footing of 
equality with the Council of Castile, was established 
by Ferdinand as early as 1511, and was modified by 
Charles V in 1524. It was to take cognizance of all 
ecclesiastical, civil, military, and commercial affairs re- 
lating to the colonies. From it proceeded the so-called 
Laws of the Indies, and all colonial offices in the gift 
of the crown were conferred by it. In the course of 
time, however, the personnel of this council became 
merged with that of Castile, and for all practical pur- 
poses the colonies became dependencies of the Spanish 
nation. 

There were from the first establishment of Spanish 
rule in America, two viceroyalties on the continent. 
The viceroy of New Spain ruled over Mexico and 
Central America, whilst all South America subject to 
Spanish control was for about two centuries under 
the viceroy of Peru. In regions too remote to be 
under his immediate control, audiencias, or courts of 
justice, were established, the president of the audiencia 

4 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

being known by the title of captain-general. Thus 
audiencias were established at Quito in 1542, at Char- 
cas (in modern Bolivia) in 1559, in New Granada in 
1564, in Chile in 1568, and later at Caracas and at 
Buenos Aires. In 1740, New Granada was raised to 
the rank of a viceroyalty, with its capital at Bogota; 
and in 1776 the same dignity was conferred on Buenos 
Aires. There were thus on the southern continent 
three viceroyalties widely separated : one on the Main, 
one on the Atlantic, and one on the Pacific. 

The powers of the viceroy, or captain-general, as 
the case might be, were limited only by the audiencia, 
consisting of from three to five members, always of 
Spanish birth, whose functions were largely advisory, 
but who had the privilege of corresponding directly 
with the Council of the Indies, and who in case of 
emergency sometimes went so far as to depose the 
viceroy. 

It should be borne in mind that in Spanish America 
the native Indian races were not driven beyond the 
frontier of civilization, as they were by the English 
settlers, but became, and remain to this day, an in- 
tegral part of the population. There was thus in the 
Spanish colonies an unusual admixture of races. 
There were (1) European Spaniards; (2) Creoles, or 
children born in America of Spanish parents; (3) 
Indians, the indigenous race; (4) Negroes of African 
race; (5) Mestizos, children of whites and Indians; 

(6) Mulattoes, children of whites and negroes; and 

(7) Zambos, children of Indians and negroes. 

The maladministration of Spain's colonies may be 
summarized under two heads : ( 1 ) acts of oppression 
against the native Indian race, and (2) regulations of 

5 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

a commercial and political character, which acted in 
restraint of the economic and social development of 
her own offspring in America. 

Under the first head may be mentioned the mita, or 
forced labor in mines, farms, and factories, and the 
repartimiento, or encomienda, which was an allotment 
to Spaniards of territory including the native inhabi- 
tants as peons or vassals. In spite of humane re- 
strictions placed by law upon them, these institutions 
degenerated into systems of fearful oppression, which 
led, in 1781, to the heroic but unsuccessful efforts of 
Tupac Amaru, the last of the Incas, to free the land 
of his fathers from the cruel rule of the Spaniard. 
So deep-seated was the dissatisfaction and so formid- 
able the revolt, that it was not suppressed for more 
than two years. The unfortunate Inca and most of 
his family were cruelly put to death. 

The economic and commercial restrictions imposed 
upon the colonies require fuller notice. The whole 
object of Spain's colonial policy was to extract gold 
and silver from America and to force Spanish manu- 
factures and products upon that country. Commerce 
was confined to Spain and to Spanish vessels. 

No South American could own a ship, nor could a cargo 
be consigned to him ; no foreigner was allowed to reside in 
the country unless born in Spain; and no capital, not Spanish, 
was permitted in any shape to be employed in the colonies. 
Orders were given that no foreign vessel, on any pretence 
whatever, should touch at a South American port. Even 
ships in distress were not to be received with common hospi- 
tality, but were ordered to be seized as prizes, and the crews 
imprisoned. 1 

1 Hall's " Journal on Chili, Peru, and Mexico," 2 Vols. Edinburgh, 
1824, Vol. I, p. 249. 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

As late as 1816, when the United States protested 
against the blockade established by General Morillo, 
as contrary to international law, M. Onis, the Spanish 
minister, replied that the object of the blockade 
was to maintain the laws of the Indies, which dur- 
ing the Napoleonic wars had been somewhat relaxed, 
adding: 

You are aware that, agreeably to those laws, no foreign 
vessel was allowed to trade with the dominions of his majesty 
on that continent without a special license, and that vessels 
found near or evidently shaping a course towards them were 
liable to confiscation as interlopers. 

When, later in the year, a United States commissioner 
was sent to Cartagena to reclaim American vessels so 
seized, the Spanish viceroy gave him to understand 
that he did not pretend to be acquainted with the law 
of nations. 2 

Not only were the colonists prohibited from en- 
gaging in manufactures which interfered with those of 
Spain, but restrictions were even placed on agriculture 
in the interests of the Spanish producer. Thus the 
cultivation of flax, hemp, and saffron was forbidden 
under severe penalty; the cultivation of tobacco was 
not allowed; and grapes and olives could be raised 
only for table use, so that oil and wine had to be 
imported from Spain. Upon one occasion (in 1803) 
orders were sent " to root up all the vines in certain 
provinces, because the Cadiz merchants complained of 
a diminution in the consumption of Spanish wines." 3 

The carrying out of this commercial system in all 

2 Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 156-159. 

* Hall's " Journal," Vol. I, p. 296. See also Rodney's report on South 
America, in Vol. IV, Am. St. Pap., For. Rel. 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

its details was entrusted to the Casa de Contratacion, 
or House of Trade, which was located at Seville until 
17 17, when it was transferred to Cadiz. The India 
House, as it was called, was established by warrant of 
Queen Joanna in 1503. 4 To this house were to be 
brought all merchandise for the colonies and all prod- 
ucts from them of whatever character. The colonial 
trade was thus limited to one Spanish port. The af- 
fairs of the house were in charge of three commis- 
sioners or judges, who had jurisdiction, civil and crim- 
inal, over all cases arising out of the trade with Amer- 
ica. Their authority was subordinated to no other 
court or council but that of the Indies. 

Not only were no foreigners allowed to go to the 
Spanish colonies, but careful restrictions were placed 
on the movement of Spaniards to and from America. 
In 151 1 King Ferdinand had by a special order per- 
mitted all subjects of Spain without distinction to go 
over to the Indies upon entering their names at the 
India House; but in the years 15 18, 1522, 1530, and 
1539 several orders were passed "that no person 
reconciled, or newly converted to our holy Catholic 
faith, from Judaism or Mahometanism, nor the chil- 
dren of such, nor the children or grandsons of any 
that had worn the St. Andrew's Cross of the Inquisi- 
tion, or been burnt or condemned as heretics, or for 
any heretical crime, either by male or female line, 
might go over to the Indies, upon pain of forfeiting 

* A full history of the India House and an account of its regulations 
is given by_ Veitia Linage in his " Norte de la Contratacion," Seville, 1672; 
translated into English by Captain John Stevens under the title, " Spanish 
Rule of Trade to the West Indies," London, 1702. Linage was for a 
number of years Treasurer and Comptroller of the India House. A 
good summary of the history and regulations of the House is given by 
Prof. Bernard Moses in his "Casa de Contratacion" in the "Papers of the 
Am. Hist. Ass. for 1894, and in the third chapter of his '"'Establishment 
of Spanish Rule in America." 

8 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

all their goods, of an hundred lashes, perpetual ban- 
ishment from the Indies, and their bodies to be at the 
king's disposition." 5 

The commissioners might " grant passes to mer- 
chants to go over, or return if they came from thence, 
including married merchants, provided they have leave 
from their wives, and give 1,000 ducats security to 
return within three years." 6 

There were also strict rules about passing from one 
province in America to another. This could not be 
done without special leave from the king. 7 " The 
inhabitants of the Indies may not come to Spain with- 
out leave from the viceroys, presidents or governors 
of the places of their habitation, in which they are to 
express the causes of their coming, and whether it is 
to stay here or return." 8 " In the Indies, the mag- 
istrates are directed to apprehend any persons they 
find are gone over without leave, to imprison them 
till they can send them back into Spain, upon pain of 
losing their employments." 9 In 1594 and 1602 it was 
decreed that persons going over without leave should 
be sent to the galleys for four years. In 1622 King 
Philip IV decreed that a person simply going aboard 
a ship bound for the Indies without leave should be 
immediately sent to the galleys for eight years. 10 
Other decrees equally severe were issued from time 
to time. 

/ In order to keep the trade strictly under control 
and to properly protect it, intercourse with the colo- 
nies was held only once a year. Two squadrons, con- 
sisting of merchant ships and convoys under com- 

B Linage, "Norte de la Contratacion," p. 107. s Ibid., p. 114. 

* Ibid., p. no. 8 Ibid., p. 109. 

7 Ibid., p. 113. l0 Ibid., p. 109. 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

mand of an admiral and vice-admiral, made the trip 
each year. The fleet for New Spain (Mexico) sailed 
in the spring, and that for the mainland in the early 
fall. The first touched at some of the islands and 
then went to Vera Cruz; the latter touched first at 
Cartagena and passed on thence to Porto Bello, where 
the fair was held about the middle of March. This 
fair was the great event of the year, and lasted forty 
days from the time of the arrival of the fleet. From 
this point goods were distributed by way of Panama 
to Peru, Chile, and even across the continent to 
Buenos Aires. The gold bullion was sent in turn to 
this point by the viceroy of Peru. It came in fifteen 
days from Potosi to Arica, thence by sea in eight days 
to Callao, and in twenty days from Callao to Panama. 
The viceroy of Peru was to take care to have the 
plate at Panama by the middle of March. At Porto 
Bello it was taken aboard the galleons. About the 
middle of June the galleons met the fleet from New 
Spain at Havana, and from that point the two fleets 
with their convoys proceeded in greater safety to 
Spain. Thus for two centuries all intercourse be- 
tween Spain and her colonies at one end of the line 
was limited at first to Seville, and then to Cadiz; and 
at the other to Vera Cruz and Porto Bello. 11 At a 
later period this arrangement was modified to some 
extent, and Buenos Aires was made a port of entry. 
The reason for not permitting trade with Buenos 
Aires during the earlier period was the fear that the 
British and Dutch would smuggle through that port. 
While the relations of the colonies with Spain were 
kept under the strictest control, intercourse with for- 

11 Linage, " Norte de la Contratacion," pp. 191-193. 

IO 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

eign nations, although absolutely prohibited under the 
severest penalties, could not be entirely prevented. In 
speaking of Spain's restrictive policy, a British naval 
officer, who was on the South American station during 
the revolution, says : 

Unfortunately, however, for that system, the South Ameri- 
cans, notwithstanding the network of chains by which they 
were enveloped, had still some sparks of humanity left, and, 
in spite of all their degradation, longed earnestly for the 
enjoyments suitable to their nature; and finding that the 
Spaniards neither could nor would furnish them with an 
adequate supply, they invited the assistance of other nations. 
To this call the other nations were not slow to listen; and, in 
process of time, there was established one of the most ex- 
traordinary systems of organized smuggling which the world 
ever saw. This was known under the name'of the contra- 
band or forced trade, and was carried on in armed vessels, 
well manned, and prepared to fight their way to the coast, 
and to resist, as they often did with effect, the guarda costas, 
or coast blockades of Spain. This singular system of warlike 
commerce was conducted by the Dutch, Portuguese, French, 
English, and latterly by the North Americans. In this way 
goods to an immense value were distributed over South 
America; and although the prices were necessarily high, and 
the supply precarious, that taste for the comforts and luxuries 
of European invention was first encouraged, which after- 
wards operated so powerfully in giving a steady and intelli- 
gible motive to the efforts of the Patriots in their struggle 
with the mother-country. Along with the goods which the 
contraband trade forced into the colonies, no small portion 
of knowledge, found entrance, in spite of the increased ex- 
ertions of the Inquisition and church influence, aided by the 
redoubled vigilance of government, who enforced every 
penalty with the utmost rigor. Many foreigners, too, by 
means of bribes and other arts, succeeded in getting into the 
country, so that the progress of intelligence was gradually 
encouraged, to the utter despair of the Spaniards, who knew 
no other method of governing the colonies but that of mere 

II 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

brute force, unsupported by the least shadow of opinion, or 
of good will. 12 

The trade carried on by foreign interlopers grew to 
such alarming proportions that before the middle of 
the eighteenth century Spain found it necessary to 
relax the restrictions upon the private trade of her 
,,own subjects. This led, about 1748, to the discon- 
tinuance of the annual fleets or galleon trade. 

The political administration of the country was 
absolutely in the hands of Spaniards, who as a rule 
were not allowed to marry, acquire property, or form 
any permanent ties in America. In the summary of 
charges against Spain appearing in the Argentine 
Manifesto of 1817, one of the specifications is, that of 
one hundred and sixty viceroys who had governed in 
America, four natives of the country alone were num- 
bered ; and of six hundred and two captains-general, 
all but fourteen had been Spaniards. 

The monopoly of Spanish trade in South America 
was partially surrendered by the treaty of Utrecht, 
signed in 1713, at the close of the War of the Spanish 
Succession. By this treaty England agreed to recog- 
nize Philip V as king of Spain and the Indies, and in 
turn was granted the assiento, or contract for supply- 
ing the Spanish colonies with African slaves. 13 The 
importation of negroes into the Spanish possessions 
had been carried on under contract from the very first. 
The assiento, which had been previously granted to 
Spanish subjects, was, in 1696, granted to the Portu- 
guese Company of Guinea, and in 1702 to the Royal 

12 Hall's " Journal," Vol. I, pp. 253-254. 

11 " The Assiento; or Contract for Allowing to the Subjects of Great 
Britain the Liberty of Importing Negroes into the Spanish America." 
Printed by John Baskett, London, 1713. 

12 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

Guinea Company of France; but in 1713 England 
secured this lucrative monopoly and became the great 
slave-trading power of the world. 

The assiento of 1713, which was very carefully 
drawn up in 42 articles, granted to an English com- 
pany the sole right of supplying slaves to the Spanish 
West Indies and to South America for the period of 
thirty years from May 1, 1713. By it the Queen of 
England undertook to see that the company chartered 
by her should introduce into the Spanish West Indies, 
including South America, 144,000 negroes of both 
sexes and all ages within thirty years, at the rate of 
4,800 a year. The company was to pay a duty of 
33% pieces of eight (dollars) for each negro im- 
ported. In addition to the 4,800 a year, other negroes 
might be imported at a duty of 16% dollars each, thus 
encouraging larger importations. The negroes could 
be brought in either Spanish or English vessels, 
manned with English or Spanish sailors, provided only 
no cause of offense be given to the Catholic religion. 
The majority of the negroes were to be taken to 
Cuba and Porto Rico, and to the ports on the Main; 
but of the 4,800, the company had the right to take 
1,200 to Buenos Aires, 800 to be sold there and 400 
to be carried to the provinces up the Plata and to 
the kingdom of Chile. They were also allowed to 
carry negroes across the isthmus from Porto Bello 
to Panama, and there re-ship them to Peru. Either 
Englishmen or Spaniards could be employed in the 
business, provided that there were not more than four 
or six Englishmen in any port, and that these should 
be amenable to the laws in all respects as Spanish 
subjects. By no means the least remarkable provision 

13 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

of this treaty was that their British and Catholic ma- 
jesties were each to receive one-fourth of the profits 
of this traffic. 

Ships engaged in this trade were to be searched on 
arrival at port, and all merchandise found on board 
was to be confiscated and heavy penalties inflicted. 
On condition, however, that the company should not 
attempt any unlawful trade, his Catholic Majesty 
granted them the privilege, during thirty years, of 
sending annually a ship of 500 tons to the fair at Porto 
Bello. The Spanish king was to be concerned one- 
fourth in the profits. 14 It seems that the company 
stretched this privilege to the utmost. The ship always 
stopped at Jamaica, took on all the goods she could, 
and carried along with her five or six smaller vessels 
laden with goods. When she got near Porto Bello, all 
her provisions were put in the tenders and the goods 
these bore taken aboard. She then entered the harbor 
laden down to the water's edge. Thus this single ship 
was made to carry more than five or six of the largest 
galleons. 15 

' Thirty years before the Spanish colonies began their 
war of independence, the British government had en- 
tertained the idea of revolutionizing and separating 
them from Spain. This idea seems to have arisen in 
1779, during the administration of Lord North, when 
Spain joined France in the alliance with the American 
colonies against Great Britain. 16 It was suggested at 



14 "The Assiento; or Contract for Allowing to the Subjects of Great 
Britain the Liberty of Importing Negroes into the Spanish America." 
London, 1713. 

16 Ulloa, " Voyage to South America." English translation, London, 
1806, Vol. I, p. 105. 

•""Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII, p. 266 ff. This 
volume is rich in information in regard to England's Spanish-American 
policy. 

14 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

first, no doubt, as a measure of retaliation, but was 
frequently agitated in later years with the avowed 
object of opening up South America to British com- 
merce. The same idea was the basis of Miranda's 
scheme for the liberation of his native land. 

Francisco de Miranda 17 (1754-1816), a native of 
Caracas, Venezuela, was the first Spanish-American 
patriot. He was with the American army for a time 
during the Revolutionary War, but in what capacity 
is not quite settled. It is stated by some writers that 
he held a commission under LaFayette. The success 
of our war inspired him with the hope of freeing his 
own country from Spanish control. He confided his 
views to his friends in the United States, particularly 
to Alexander Hamilton, " upon whom he fixed his 
eyes as a coadjutor in the great purpose of his life." 
Shortly after Miranda had returned to his native land 
his schemes were discovered. He fled to the United 
States, and later to England, where he had repeated 
conferences with Pitt. Finding no help for his revo- 
lutionary schemes in England, he went to the conti- 
nent and traveled through France, Germany, Turkey, 
and Russia. At the Russian court he was warmly 
received, but was soon dismissed at the demand of the 
Spanish minister. At news of the dispute between 
England and Spain about Nootka Sound in 1790, he 
hastened to England and communicated his scheme 
to the British ministry. Pitt lent a ready ear to his 
views as long as the dispute lasted, with the intention 
of making use of him in the event of a rupture with 
Spain. But when the dispute was peaceably settled, 



17 W. S. Robertson, "Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of 
Spanish America" (1909). 

15 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

Miranda's hopes fell to the ground and he left Eng- 
land. His scheme was only temporarily abandoned, 
however. He considered himself to have been ill-used 
by Pitt on this occasion, as he subsequently stated to 
Rufus King, the American minister to England. 

The French Revolution was now well under way, 
and the wars upon which the republic was entering 
offered an attractive field for a soldier of republican 
ideas. In April, 1792, Miranda went to Paris with 
introductions to Petion and the leading Girondists, 
hoping that the revolutionary party might help him in 
his plans. He was given a commission as brigadier- 
general in the French army, and served in responsible 
posts under Dumouriez on the eastern frontier. He 
conducted the siege of Maestricht and commanded the 
left wing of the French army at the disastrous battle 
of Neerwinden, March, 1793, in which Belgium was 
reconquered by the Austrians. Dumouriez now de- 
clared against the Convention, but his troops having 
refused to follow him, he went over to the Austrians 
in company with the Duke of Chartres, Louis 
Philippe. Miranda fell under suspicion of treason 
and was forced to undergo a court-martial, but was 
acquitted. For some unexplained reason he was 
shortly after thrown into prison. He soon secured 
his release, but for several years disappears from pub- 
lic view. His services in behalf of the republic re- 
ceived in time due recognition. His name appears on 
the Arc de Triomphe in Paris in the list of the heroes 
of the Revolution. 

In January, 1798, Miranda returned to England. 
As Spain was now the close ally of France, he hoped 
to secure the cooperation of Great Britain in his 

16 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

scheme. He also hoped to secure aid from the United 
States. The people of Kentucky and Tennessee were 
far from satisfied with the provisions of the Spanish 
treaty of 1795 in regard to the navigation of the Mis- 
sissippi River. Then, too, just at this time, war be- 
tween the United States and France seemed inevitable, 
on account of the resentment by France of the Jay 
treaty and her treatment of the American representa- 
tives. Washington had been called from his retire- 
ment at Mt. Vernon to assume the post of commander- 
in-chief of the army, while the active command was 
to be given to Hamilton. Hamilton had expressed 
great interest in Miranda's projects and was a man of 
known ambition. His appointment, therefore, as the 
virtual commander-in-chief of the American army 
made Miranda hopeful of his cooperation. 

Mr. King, the American minister at London, en- 
tered heartily into the plans of General Miranda, and 
his correspondence on that subject, during the year 
1798, with his government and with Hamilton is quite 
voluminous. 18 For a time it seemed as if Great Britain 
and the United States would cooperate for the pur- 
pose of revolutionizing Spanish America. The plan, 
as entertained by Miranda and Hamilton, was for Eng- 
land to supply the naval force and the United States 
the land forces. Miranda believed that six or eight 
vessels of the line and four or five thousand troops 
would be sufficient, 19 though Hamilton thought it 
would require ten thousand troops. England's partici- 
pation in the scheme depended upon the relations be- 

18 " Life and Correspondence of Rufus King," New York, 1894, Vol. II, 
•A pp. 5. For further information regarding his relations with Miranda, 
see extracts from his Memorandum Book, in Vol. Ill, App. 3 

19 See Miranda's letter to President Adams, March 24, 1798. " Life 
aad Corresp. of King," Vol. II. p. 654. 

17 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

tween France and Spain. Mr. King wrote to his gov- 
ernment, February 26, 1798: 

Two points have within a fortnight been settled in the 
English cabinet respecting South America. If Spain is able 
to prevent the overthrow of her present government and to 
escape being brought under the entire control of France, 
England (between whom and Spain, notwithstanding the 
war, a certain understanding appears to exist) will at present 
engage in no scheme to deprive Spain of her possessions in 
South America. But if, as appears probable, the army 
destined against Portugal, and which will march through 
Spain, or any other means which may be employed by France, 
shall overthrow the Spanish government, and thereby place 
the resources of Spain and of her colonies at the disposal of 
France, England will immediately commence the execution of 
a plan long since digested and prepared for the complete 
independence of South America. If England engages in this 
plan, she will at Philadelphia propose to the United States to 
cooperate in its execution, Miranda will be detained here, 
under one pretense or another, until events shall decide the 
conduct of England. 20 

England's policy in regard to South America for the 
next twenty years substantially confirmed the inter- 
pretation of her motives here given by Mr. King. 

During the summer of 1798 Mr. King had several 
conferences with the British ministry in regard to the 
Spanish-American question, but it was always under- 
stood that they were personal and wholly unauthor- 
ized. What occurred at these interviews was, of 
course, always communicated to the American govern- 
ment, but as they were unofficial and communicated 
merely in the nature of information, the State De- 
partment preferred to keep the matter on the same 

39 *' Life and Corresp. of King," Vol. II, p. 650. 

18 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

basis and did not refer to the matter in its dispatches 
to Mr. King. This caused him no little annoyance. 21 
In the same way no notice was taken of General 
Miranda's letter to President Adams. 

Hamilton, however, was very frank in the expres- 
sion of his views both to General Miranda and to Mr. 
King. Under date of August 22, 1798, he wrote to 
the latter: 

I have received several letters from General Miranda. I 
have written answers to some of them, which I send you 
to deliver or not, according to your estimate of what is 
passing in the scenes where you are. Should you deem it 
expedient to suppress my letter, you may do it and say as 
much as you think fit on my part in the nature of a com- 
munication through you. With regard to the enterprise in 
question, I wish it much to be undertaken, but I should be 
glad that the principal agency was in the United States — 
they to furnish the whole land force necessary. The com- 
mand in this case would very naturally fall upon me, and I 
hope I should disappoint no favorable anticipation. 

The United States, however, succeeded in coming 
to an understanding with France, while England was 
unwilling to deal such a serious blow to Spain as long 
as there was a chance of arraying her against Na- 
poleon. The communication of the views of the Brit- 
ish government at Philadelphia, to which Mr. King 
referred as a preliminary, was never made. Miranda's 
hopes finally fell through at the reestablishment of 
peace in Europe by the treaty of Amiens, which lasted 
until 1803. He lingered in Europe some time longer, 
until, wearied out by years of fruitless negotiation 
with the British government, he, for the time being, 

31 See King's letter to Hamilton, March 4, 1799. "Life and Corresp.," 
p. 662. 

19 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

gave up all hope of success in that quarter and re- 
turned once more to the United States. 

Arriving in New York from England in November, 
1805, Miranda proceeded to lay his cause once more 
before Mr. King, who had so warmly befriended him 
in London, and to solicit his cooperation in fitting 
out an expedition for South America. While express- 
ing his full sympathy with the cause, Mr. King stated 
emphatically that he could render him no assistance, 
nor could any individuals safely do so, without the 
countenance of the government. He, therefore, ad- 
vised Miranda to go to Washington and lay his plans 
before the administration. This Miranda did. He 
was admitted to informal conferences both with Presi- 
dent Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison. Upon 
his return to New York he represented to those in- 
terested in his schemes that he had secured from the 
government a secret sanction of his project, and that 
the administration, though unwilling to take the ini- 
tiative, would support the undertaking so soon as the 
standard of revolution should once have been raised 
on the Spanish Main. Miranda's chief supporter was 
Colonel Smith, surveyor of the port of New York, 
whose influence as a public official in close touch with 
the administration was decisive in persuading many 
adventurous spirits to join the expedition with the be- 
lief that it was really secretly backed by the govern- 
ment of the United States. 

Miranda left New York in the early part of Feb- 
ruary, 1806, in the Leander, with an imperfectly 
equipped force of about 200 men, most of whom were 
commissioned as officers and promised commands in 
the South American army, which was expected to 

20 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

spring from the soil at the magic touch of Miranda's 
step upon the shores of his native land. The ship 
proceeded to Jacquemel, San Domingo, where Mi- 
randa expected to get the necessary supplies and re- 
inforcements. Here disappointments awaited him, 
disputes with the ship's captain ensued, and over a 
month was fruitlessly spent, while the Spanish au- 
thorities on the Main had time to put themselves on 
the alert. It was not until the last of April that the 
expedition, reinforced by two schooners, appeared off 
the coast of Venezuela near Porto Cabello. They 
were attacked by two Spanish vessels, which captured 
the schooners with about sixty men and large stores, 
while the Leander ignominiously took to flight. 

Miranda then sailed for Barbados, where he 
solicited aid from the British admiral, Lord Cochrane, 
in command on the West Indian station. Lord 
Cochrane, without definite instructions from his gov- 
ernment, but acquainted with its general policy in 
regard to South America, and knowing of the close 
relations in which Miranda had stood for years with 
the British ministry, decided to assist him in landing. 
With this understanding he signed with Miranda an 
agreement to the effect that in the event of the success 
of the expedition, Great Britain should always be held 
on a footing with the most favored nation, and that 
British ships should receive a deduction of ten per 
cent, upon duties paid by all other nations, except the 
United States. 22 On the twentieth of June, the ex- 
pedition left Barbados under convoy of a part of 
Admiral Cochrane's squadron, and on August 2, 1806, 
effected a landing near Coro, Venezuela. They easily 

23 " Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII. 

21 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

took possession of the town, the unarmed inhabitants 
fleeing before them. Here Miranda remained about 
ten days, issuing proclamations and vainly waiting for 
the natives to join him. His position, meanwhile, was 
becoming unsafe, so he abandoned it and took posses- 
sion of the little island of Aruba off the coast. Lord 
Cochrane, seeing that the expedition was a failure, 
and not wishing further to compromise his govern- 
ment, sent no reinforcements and finally ordered the 
withdrawal of the ships that had accompanied the ex- 
pedition. Miranda was offered a convoy back to 
Trinidad, which he accepted, leaving Aruba, Septem- 
ber 2j, 1806. At Trinidad the members of the expedi- 
tion dispersed. 23 

The Americans who had taken part in the expedi- 
tion and survived were prosecuted in the United States 
courts for violation of the neutrality laws. They 
claimed that they had enlisted in the undertaking with 
the connivance of the government at Washington. 
Jefferson's enemies made great political capital of the 
affair. Members of the cabinet were summoned as 
witnesses, but refused to appear. Privately Jefferson 
and Madison both denied most emphatically having in 
any way committed the government to Miranda's 
undertaking, or having acted in any way in disregard 
of our obligations to Spain. 24 

Aside from accomplishing nothing, the expedition 
of 1806 was a great injury to Miranda's cause. He 
himself lost prestige as a military leader and brought 
his character into question as having misrepresented 
his connection both with the British and United States 



21 See Sherman, " General Account of Miranda's Expedition," N. Y., 1808. 
24 H. A. Washington, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. V, p. 474; 
" Madison's Writings," Vol. II, pp. 220, 225. 

22 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

governments. However, upon the occupation of 
Spain by Napoleon in 1808, Miranda again hastened 
to England and urged upon the ministry the claims 
of his country, in whose interests he had now been 
laboring incessantly as an exile for more than twenty 
years. We cannot but admire his tenacity of purpose 
in the face of the most disheartening failures. 

Not only did the British government lend its en- 
couragement, through Lord Cochrane, to the filibuster- 
ing expedition from the United States with which 
Miranda hoped to revolutionize Venezuela, but about 
the same time it sent an expedition against the prov- 
inces of the Plate. This attack, like the assistance 
given to Miranda, was ill-timed and not properly fol- 
lowed up. The policy seems to have been outlined by 
Pitt, but was put into execution after his death by the 
short-lived ministry of Grenville and Fox. The gov- 
ernment of the Duke of Portland, which succeeded 
after a few months, and in which Castlereagh and 
Canning were the most conspicuous figures, did not 
deem it expedient to follow up the undertaking. 25 In 
fact, the fate of the expedition was already sealed 
when Portland came into power. 

The victory of Trafalgar had given the English 
control of the Atlantic. A force of some 6,000 men 
was dispatched to the South Atlantic without its desti- 
nation being known. It proceeded to Rio Janeiro, Por- 
tugal then being in alliance with England. The vice- 
roy of the Plate became alarmed and prepared to 
defend Montevideo, which he thought would be the 
first point of attack. The expedition, however, passed 
by and proceeded to the Cape of Good Hope, which 

25 " Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII, p. 314 #• 

23 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

it wrested from the Dutch. In 1806 a dash was made 
from the Cape for the river Plate. Sir Home Popham 
commanded the fleet, and General Beresford the land 
force, which amounted to 1,635 men - On June 6 the 
squadron arrived at the mouth of the Plate. The 
ships had some difficulty in ascending the river, but 
on the 25th they came to anchor at a point fifteen miles 
below Buenos Aires. The city was captured with 
little or no resistance, the inhabitants having been 
led to believe that the British had come to liberate 
them. The contents of the public treasury were 
handed over to the invaders. The inhabitants were 
required to swear allegiance to George III, private 
property was respected, the free exercise of their re- 
ligion was allowed, and all officials who took the oath 
were continued in office. When Beresford refused to 
proclaim the independence of the province, or to give 
any assurance for their future independence, the in- 
habitants, who had now learned how insignificant the 
invading force really was, began to prepare for re- 
sistance. A leader was readily found in the person 
of Jacques Liniers, a Frenchman, who had been for 
thirty years in the service of Spain. He and Juan 
Martin de Puyrredon began an organized movement 
for the expulsion of the English. On the 12th of 
August, Beresford, who had remained all this time 
without reinforcements, was compelled to surrender. 
Troops ordered to his support from the Cape did not 
arrive until later. 

Sobremonte, the viceroy, had deserted Buenos 
Aires and established himself at Montevideo. The 
people of Buenos Aires, therefore, deposed him and 
chose Liniers in his place. 

24 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

During the fall other English reinforcements ar- 
rived, and in January, 1807, Montevideo was taken by 
assault. As soon as the defeat of Beresford was 
known, General Whitelocke was sent to take com- 
mand of the united English forces of the Plate, now 
some twelve thousand in number. He arrived in the 
spring. The reconquest of Buenos Aires now seemed 
an easy matter. It had been taken in the first instance 
by sixteen hundred men ; there were now ten thousand 
available. On June 28 the British landed at the small 
port of Ensenada, forty-eight miles below Buenos 
Aires. The fighting continued on the outskirts of the 
city in a desultory maner and without any decisive 
action for several days. But finally, owing to the bad 
generalship and incompetency of Whitelocke, his 
troops got into such a muddle that half the force was 
captured or disabled. On July 6, Liniers decided to 
send a flag of truce with the proposal to surrender all 
the English prisoners, including those taken with 
Beresford, provided Whitelocke would evacuate the 
territory of Buenos Aires. One of Liniers' asso- 
ciates, Alzaga, insisted that the terms of surrender 
should include Montevideo. This demand seemed pre- 
posterous, but the clause was finally inserted, and to 
their surprise agreed to, so complete was the demorali- 
zation of the English. On July 7 the terms of capitu- 
lation were signed. 26 Thus through a lack of decision 
in the cabinet and a display of incapacity in the field, 
without parallel in British annals, the empire of the 
Plate was lost. 27 

With Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808, the 

20 See Watson, " Spanish and Portuguese South America." 2 Vols. 
London, 1884, Vol. II, p. 271 ff, 

37 §ee " Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol, VII, p. 316 ff. 

2 5 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

Spanish-American question came to the front once 
more. Miranda returned to London and was de- 
tained there by the cabinet, as before by Pitt, with a 
view to using him if occasion should require. At the 
same time Castlereagh, now Foreign Secretary, had 
other solutions of the question in view. It was pro- 
posed, and the matter seriously discussed in the cabi- 
net, to alienate the colonies from Spain, if possible, 
without revolution; and, instead of establishing repub- 
lics according to Miranda's plans, to unite them all 
under a prince of the House of Bourbon. Louis 
Philippe, Duke of Orleans, was suggested as the most 
suitable person for the new crown. Some thirty years 
prior to this, immediately upon the recognition by 
Spain of the independence of the United States, Count 
de Aranda had advised Charles III to forestall the 
movement for independence, which must inevitably 
come in his own provinces, by establishing among them 
three great empires — one in Mexico, one in Peru, and 
one on the Main — each to be ruled by a prince of the 
royal family of Spain. 28 

Chateaubriand brought forward a similar plan sev- 
eral years later at the Congress of Verona. The present 
scheme was suggested by General Dumouriez in the 
interests of his friend, the Duke of Orleans. Several 
memorials on the subject, both by Dumouriez and the 
duke, were presented to the British government in 1807 
and 1808. 29 

Napoleon's invasion of Spain constitutes at once 
the most contemptible and the most disastrous chapter 
in his career. In 1807, under the terms of an agree- 



" Romero, " Mexico and the United States," Putnam, 1898, p. 287. 
»• " Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII. 

26 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

ment with Godoy, the unworthy favorite of the queen 
and the virtual ruler of Spain, a French army was 
introduced into the kingdom for the nominal purpose 
of punishing Portugal for her refusal to join the 
continental system. The Portuguese royal family, 
fully appreciating the danger in which they stood, fled 
to America and founded the empire of Brazil, which 
in 1815 was declared independent of Portugal. The 
Spanish rulers attempted to follow their example, but 
their intended flight became known and they were pre- 
vented by the populace from leaving the capital. In 
the meantime a disgraceful quarrel having arisen be- 
tween the old king, Charles IV, and Prince Ferdinand, 
Napoleon, whose troops were now firmly established in 
Spain, stepped in as arbiter between father and son 
and summoned them both to meet him on the northern 
frontier. Having purposely linger ed in f^ranceJjeyond 
the a^oint^Ji^e7 : he-suc r ce"ecTed in enticing them over 
the border "to Bayonne, where he compelled both to 
renounce forever the crown of Spain and the Indies, 
which he forthwith bestowed upon his brother Joseph. 
When the truth dawned upon them, the Spanish nation 
rose to a man. Napoleon had unwittingly aroused the 
latent principle of nationality; he had put into action 
a force which was new and one which the statesmen 
of Europe had hitherto left out of account, but which 
was to prove the most potent factor in the new epoch 
of political history introduced by the French Revo- 
lution. 

Provisional juntas were rapidly organized in the 
various provinces of the kingdom of Spain and affairs 
administered in the name of Ferdinand VII. The 
Junta, or as it is better known, the Regency of Cadiz, 

27 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

rapidly gained a position of national importance and 
became the chief executive body of the Spanish nation. 
The American provinces, which had long been restive 
under Spanish rule, now claimed the same right of 
self-government that the provinces of the Peninsula 
had assumed, and began to depose the Spanish gov- 
ernors and to set up juntas of their own, still acting 
in the name of Ferdinand VII. The Americans 
claimed that they were not politically a part of Spain, 
but connected only through the sovereign, and that 
with the removal of the sovereign the connection 
ceased. The Regency of Cadiz, on the other hand, 
maintained that the colonies were integral parts of 
Spain, and claimed, therefore, the right to govern them 
in the absence of the sovereign. 

The first throes of revolution were felt in 1809, 
almost simultaneously in Upper Peru, Quito, and 
Mexico. These movements were quickly suppressed 
with great cruelty. In the year 1810 the revolution 
opened upon a vast scale. All the Spanish colonies 
on the mainland, with the exception of Lower Peru, 
revolted at the same time and proclaimed their inde- 
pendence of Spain, although still professing allegiance 
to Ferdinand VII, the dethroned king. 

The colonial authorities were deposed in most cases 
by force of public opinion and without violence. The 
revolution was municipal in character, that is to say, 
the cabildos, or town councils, the only popularly con- 
stituted political bodies in the colonies, assumed the 
initiative in the work of revolution and named the 
juntas. The junta of the capital city in each province 
was usually recognized as the chief executive body 
for that province, and assumed for the time being 

28 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

all the functions of government. National conventions 
were then called in many cases to decide upon the form 
of government. These in most cases entrusted the 
executive power to regencies or triumvirates, almost 
all of which rapidly gave way to military dictatorships. 

The Regency of Cadiz had anticipated trouble from 
the colonies and had recognized their rights as free- 
men by inviting them to send deputies to the national 
Cortes, but at the same time had abridged those rights 
by allowing them only a very limited representation, 
absurdly out of proportion to their population and 
commercial importance. Upon the establishment of 
the provisional governments or juntas in the colonies, 
the Regency refused them the freedom of trade that 
had been promised, declined the proffered mediation 
of England, and proceeded to stigmatize the Ameri- 
cans as rebels and to declare them guilty of high 
treason, although they had been guilty only of the 
same conduct that the Spaniards themselves were pur- 
suing at home. 

Venezuela then (1811) declared herself independent 
of both the Spanish nation and of the Spanish mon- 
arch, and adopted a republican constitution. The pro- 
mulgation of the Spanish constitution of 18 12 further 
encouraged the spirit of independence in the colonies, 
but when Ferdinand was restored in 18 14, the colonies 
were still governed in his name, for the revolution of 
Venezuela, which alone had declared for independence, 
had been crushed out. Had Ferdinand acted with 
any moderation or judgment, his American posses- 
sions would have been saved to his crown. But the 
refusal of the colonies, which had now enjoyed prac- 
tical self-government for several years, to take upon 

29 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

them without conditions the yoke of absolute author- 
ity, was met with the proclamation of a war of re- 
conquest Reconciliation was thereafter no longer 
possible, and independence only a question of time. 
By the close of 1815 the revolution had been put down 
in all the provinces except La Plata. There it was 
never suppressed. For this reason we shall first trace 
rapidly the course of the revolution in the south, of 
which San Martin was the directing power. 

Jose de San Martin was born in 1778 in Paraguay, 
his father being the governor of Misiones. When 
eight years of age, his family went to Spain and he 
was entered as a pupil in the Seminary of Nobles at 
Madrid. At the age of twelve, he joined a regiment 
as cadet and saw his first service in Africa. He served 
in the Spanish army for more than twenty years, and 
won promotion as well as special distinction for brav- 
ery. In the battle of Baylen, where a detachment of 
Napoleon's disciplined troops was beaten by an army 
of recruits inspired by patriotism, San Martin, then a 
captain, won a gold medal and a commission as lieu- 
tenant-colonel for his conduct. Hearing of the 
struggle for liberty in his native land, he resigned his 
commission and returned to America. He was almost 
unknown personally, but his reputation as a brave sol- 
dier and a skilful tactician procured for him immediate 
employment. At this time the Argentine Republic had 
two armies in the field, the one operating near at home 
against the Portuguese in Uruguay and the Spanish 
in Montevideo, and the other in Upper Peru (Bolivia) 
against the forces sent by the viceroy of Peru to sup- 
press the Argentine revolution. San Martin was 
soon given the command of this army in the north, 

30 






REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

succeeding General Belgrano. He soon placed his 
army in an excellent state of discipline and put a check 
to the advances of the Peruvian army. 30 

On May 16, 1814, the Argentine naval force, under 
command of an Irishman named Brown, defeated and 
almost entirely destroyed the Spanish squadron sta- 
tioned at Montevideo, and that city soon after sur- 
rendered to the besieging army of Alvear, San 
Martin's old comrade in the Spanish army. Alvear, 
whose political influence was much greater than San 
Martin's, now aspired to the conquest of Peru, and 
therefore desired the command in the north. This San 
Martin willingly relinquished to him. He had other 
plans in mind, and the state of his health demanded 
rest. Upper Peru had been the high-road from Peru 
to Buenos Aires in times of peace, and was, therefore, 
naturally looked upon as the line of advance for the 
liberating army. San Martin, however, after a care- 
ful study of the question, had become convinced that 
this was not the strategic line of approach, that the 
Argentine Republic would never succeed in conquer- 
ing Peru from this quarter. His idea was to carry 
the war to the west, to cross the Andes, occupy Chile, 
and, having secured a naval base there, to attack Peru 
from the coast, continuing military operations in the 
north merely as a diversion. The success of this plan 
depended upon the performance of two apparently im- 
possible tasks — the passage of the Andes and the crea- 
tion of a navy on the Pacific. San Martin was by far 
too shrewd a man to advocate such an undertaking 
before maturing his plans. He, therefore, confided it 



30 Mitre, "The Emancipation of South America." Translated by 
Pilling. London, 1893. 

31 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

only to a few of his intimate friends, and, taking ad- 
vantage of his ill health, asked, as a favor for him- 
self, the government of the obscure province of Cuyo, 
where from its capital of Mendoza he could place him- 
self in communication with the Chilean patriots. 

On August 10, 1814, San Martin was appointed 
governor of Cuyo, and at once devoted himself to the 
development of the plans which led to the emancipa- 
tion of half a continent and gave him his place in the 
world's history. The revolutionary movement in Chile 
had just been crushed out. It was begun in 18 10 
and the general course of events had been somewhat 
similar to the Argentine movement, but it had fallen a 
victim first to disputes between the Patriot leaders and 
finally to the troops of the viceroy of Peru. It would 
require more space than we can give to trace the vary- 
ing fortunes of the cause in Chile through the stirring 
events that marked the leadership of Dr. Rosas, of the 
Carrera brothers, and of Bernardo O'Higgins. After 
the final collapse, O'Higgins, with a number of other 
Patriots, fled over the Andes to Mendoza and readily 
entered into the plans of San Martin. It took the 
latter two years to organize and equip an army and to 
convince the government of Buenos Aires of the prac- 
ticability of his plan. 

At length, on January 17, 1817, he began' the pas- 
sage of the Andes with about 5,000 men, 1,600 horses, 
and 9,000 mules, the latter carrying the field artillery, 
ammunition, and provisions. The summit of the 
Uspallata Pass is 12,700 feet above the sea-level, 5,000 
feet higher than the Great St. Bernard, by which 
Napoleon led his army over the Alps. In many other 
respects San Martin's achievement was more remark- 

32 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

able. Each piece of artillery had to be carried sus- 
pended on a pole between two mules, or, where the road 
was particularly dangerous, dragged by ropes. There 
were chasms that could be crossed only by cable 
bridges. The march over the Andes occupied three 
weeks. Both men and animals suffered greatly from 
soroche, the illness caused by rarefied atmosphere. 

At the foot of the mountain, at Chacabuco, the van- 
guard of San Martin's army defeatecTa body of 4,000 
Royalists, and thus opened the road to Santiago, which 
San Martin entered February 14, 18 17. The Chileans 
chose him Supreme Director of their government, but 
he declined the office, and O'Higgins was chosen. 

San Martin's great object was to crush the colonial 
power of Spain in its stronghold, Peru. Having by 
the successful passage of the Andes and the victory 
of Chacabuco in a measure justified his plan of cam- 
paign, he returned to Buenos Aires for reinforce- 
ments. The Royalists meanwhile retreated to the south. 
On February 18, 1818, the independence of Chile was 
proclaimed. A month later the Patriots were sur- 
prised at Cancha-Rayada and almost routed, but within 
two weeks the army was again ready for action, and 
on April 5, 1818, encountered the Royalists at Maipo. 
This battle was a complete victory for the Patriots 
and decided the fate of Chile. Only one or two for- 
tresses in the south were now held for Spain. Five 
days after the battle of Maipo, San Martin returned 
once more to Buenos Aires and began organizing an 
expedition for the liberation of Peru. Puyrredon, 
now Supreme Director, supported his undertaking. 

While San Martin was soliciting aid from the Ar- 
gentine Republic, the Chileans were not idle. They 

33 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

saw that the only way of insuring their independence 
was by the creation of a navy. Through its agent in 
London, the Chilean government secured the services 
of Lord Cochrane, an English naval officer of great 
distinction and remarkable talents, who by a curious 
turn of fortune had been brought into unmerited dis- 
grace and dismissed from the British service. 31 He 
reached Valparaiso in November and hoisted his flag 
on board the O'Higgins, December 22, 18 18. During 
the course of the next year, Cochrane made two at- 
tempts to take Callao, the seaport of Peru, but with- 
out success beyond harassing the enemy in some of 
the smaller coast towns. In February, 1820, by a bril- 
liant move, he captured Valdivia, a strongly fortified 
town still held by the Spaniards in southern Chile. 

San Martin returned to Chile in January, 1820, and 
began to assemble at Valparaiso the army destined for 
the invasion of Peru. Of the 5,000 men, two-thirds 
were from Buenos Aires, while nearly all of the offi- 
cers were Argentine or European volunteers. Of 65 
foreign officers, 37 were British and 3 were from the 
United States. There were, besides, 30 English officers 
in the Chilean navy. The expedition sailed on August 
21, 1820, on board the fleet commanded by Cochrane. 
San Martin landed his army at Pisco, to v the south of 
Lima, and sent an expedition into the interior under 
General Arenales, who had served the Patriots for 
years in Upper Peru. In October, San Martin re- 
embarked his troops and landed them again at Huacho, 
a point seventy miles north of Lima. Meanwhile the 
Spanish squadron, completely demoralized by the ap- 



51 See Cochrane (Earl Dundonald), " Service in Chili." 2 Vols. Lon- 
don, 1859. 

34 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

pearance on the Pacific of Lord Cochrane, whose dar- 
ing exploits were well known, was lying under the guns 
of Callao Castle. On the night of November 5, 1820, 
Lord Cochrane led a force of volunteers, consisting 
of 180 seamen and 100 marines, in open boats right 
under the batteries of Callao, surprised and over- 
powered the crew of the Esmeralda, the largest Span- 
ish frigate, and, cutting her loose, carried her off to 
his own squadron. 

After Cochrane's exploit at Callao, the moral effect 
of which was very great, he urged upon San Martin 
an immediate advance upon Lima, but San Martin had 
two campaigns before him, the one military, the other 
political. On first landing at Pisco he had issued an 
order to his army in which he said, " Remember that 
you are come not to conquer, but to liberate a people ; 
the Peruvians are our brothers." And in spite of the 
impatience and restlessness of his officers, he steadily 
adhered to his plan, to the no small loss of his military 
prestige and ultimately to his retirement from the 
scene of activity. His purpose was by the presence of 
the liberating army to give the people of Peru a chance 
to rise and throw off the yoke of Spain. To this end 
he scattered proclamations and addresses of a revolu- 
tionary character broadcast through the land and 
quietly awaited results. The contest in Peru, he said, 
was not a war of conquest and glory, but entirely of 
opinion; it was a war of new and liberal principles 
against prejudice, bigotry, and tyranny. 

People ask why I don't march to Lima at once ; so I might, 
and instantly would, were it suitable to my views, which it 
is not. I do not want military renown; I have no ambition 
to be the conqueror of Peru; I want solely to liberate the 

35 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

country from oppression. Of what use would Lima be to 
me if the inhabitants were hostile in political sentiment? 
How could the cause of independence be advanced by my 
holding Lima, or even the whole country, in military pos- 
session? Far different are my views. I wish to have aM 
men thinking with me, and do not choose to advance a step 
beyond the gradual march of public opinion. The capital is 
now ripe for declaring its sentiments, and I shall give them 
the opportunity to do so in safety. It was in sure expecta- 
tion of this movement that I have hitherto deferred advanc- 
ing; and to those who know the full extent of the means 
which have been put in action, a sufficient explanation is 
afforded of all the delays that have taken place. I have been 
gaining, indeed, day by day, fresh allies in the hearts of the 
people, the only certain allies in such a war. In the sec- 
ondary point of military strength, I have been, from the 
same causes, equally successful in augmenting and improving 
the liberating army ; while that of the Spaniards has been 
wasted by want and desertion. The country has now become 
sensible of its true interests, and it is right the inhabitants 
should have the means of expressing what they think. Public 
opinion is an engine newly introduced into this country; the 
Spaniards, who are utterly incapable of directing it, have 
prohibited its use; but they shall now experience its strength 
and importance." 

The campaign of Arenales in the interior was suc- 
cessful. In the presence of the liberating army, the 
people everywhere rose in revolt. San Martin's 
method of conducting the campaign was the correct 
one. Public opinion was soon aroused in the capital 
itself, and the Royalists finally decided to evacuate 
Lima. The viceroy retired with his forces to Cuzco 
in the highlands. In response to an invitation from 
the city authorities, the Patriots entered Lima July 6, 
1821. San Martin himself entered without ceremony 

" Hall's " Journal." Vol. I, p. 181. Report of Conversation with San 
Martin in CaHao Roads. 

36 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

after dark a few days later. The independence of 
Peru was proclaimed July 28 with imposing cere- 
monies in the great square of Lima. San Martin was 
proclaimed Protector of Peru. He proceeded to or- 
ganize a civil government, and established the cele- 
brated Order of the Sun, distinctively aristocratic in 
character. 

San Martin had played a great part thus far, but 
he had reached the zenith of his influence and power. 
Dissensions soon arose. The task he had undertaken 
was difficult in the extreme. It was much easier to 
acquire power than to use it. At the time of the evacu- 
ation of Lima by the Spaniards, he said to Captain 
Hall: 

For the last ten years I have been unremittingly employed 
against the Spaniards; or rather in favor of this country, 
for I am not against any one who is not hostile to the cause 
of independence. All I wish is that this country should be 
managed by itself, and by itself alone. As to the manner 
in which it is to be governed, that belongs not at all to me. 
I propose simply to give the people the means of declaring 
themselves independent, and of establishing a suitable form 
of government ; after which I shall consider I have done 
enough and leave them." 

When the time came he kept his word. 

While San Martin was leading the army of libera- 
tion from the Argentine Republic to Chile, and from 
Chile to Peru, Simon Bolivar, the liberator of the 
north, was pursuing his chequered career in Venezuela 
and Colombia, unfurling the standard of revolution 
wherever he could get a foothold. He was a man, in 
every respect, the opposite of San Martin, fiery, im- 

*• Hall's " Journal," Vol. I, p. 194. 

37 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 



</, 



7 



petuous, wholly given over to personal ambition, 
neither a statesman nor a soldier, but one of the great- 
est revolutionary leaders of any age or country. His 
ignorance of military affairs led him into undertakings 
from which an experienced soldier would have held 
back, but his indomitable pluck carried him safely 
through all calamities, and his wonderful enthusiasm 
fired his followers even in the midst of disaster. 

This remarkable man, whose reputation in the new 
world stands second to that of Washington alone, was, 
like Miranda, a native of Caracas. Sprung from a 
family of wealth and influence he had, like most young 
South Americans of his class, received his education 
abroad, and had for several years led a dissipated life 
in Paris. At first he held himself aloof from the revo- 
lutionary leaders, but after the accomplishment of the 
revolution of Caracas, April 19, 1810, he was per- 
suaded to join the Patriot cause, and was sent to 
London to solicit assistance from Great Britain. 34 

The junta of Caracas, like those subsequently 
formed in the south, professed to act in the name of 
Ferdinand VII, and fearing the influence of Miranda, 
then in London, whose advocacy of absolute indepen- 
dence had been open and avowed, they instructed Boli- 
var and their other agents not to allow him to come 
to Venezuela. Miranda came in spite of them,, how- 
ever, under an assumed name, and was everywhere 
received with enthusiasm. Under his influence a con- 
gress was elected which, on July 5, 181 1, declared 
Venezuela a republic, free and independent of all for- 
eign dominion. Miranda was appointed Director. 
This was the first South American declaration of inde- 



84 Holstein, "Life of Bolivar." Boston, 1829. 



38 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

pendence. The formal independence of the Argentine 
Republic was not declared until July 9, 1816, although 
the country had been self-governing for several years. 

The Patriot cause was ruined, however, by the 
earthquake of March 25, 1812, which almost destroyed 
the city of Caracas and several towns of importance. 
Twenty thousand people are supposed to have per- 
ished. As the disaster occurred on Holy Thursday, 
the clergy were not slow to turn it to political account 
and to persuade the people that it was a direct chas- 
tisement of Heaven upon them for their rebellion 
against Spain. The cause of the Patriots steadily lost 
ground until the fall of Porto Cabello, through the 
inefficiency of Bolivar, caused its complete collapse. 
Miranda was forced to sign with Monteverde the 
treaty of Vittoria, July 26, 18 12, on the basis of com- 
plete submission and a general amnesty. It is hardly 
necessary to add that the Spanish general did not 
abide by the terms of the capitulation. Miranda him- 
self was detained by Bolivar, as he was on the point 
of embarking for England, accused of having received 
bribes from the Spaniards and of being unwilling to 
share the fate of his followers, and treacherously 
handed over to the Spaniards. He was sent to Spain 
and after languishing for three years in a dungeon at 
Cadiz, .died July 14, 1816. His fate was a sad blot 
upon the reputation of Bolivar. 

The revolution in New Granada, which had been 
inaugurated July 20, 18 10, was still holding out and 
thither Bolivar proceeded to offer his services to the 
Patriots of that province. As soon as he had firmly 
established himself in influence and power, he per- 
suaded the government that their only safety lay in 

39 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

the reconquest of Venezuela. He was provided with 
troops, and in May, 1813 crossed the frontier and took 
several important cities. He now assumed a new atti- 
tude and became a self-appointed dictator. He pro- 
claimed a war of extermination against Spaniards and 
adopted a new system of dates: " 3d year of Indepen- 
dence and 1 st of the War to the Death." He entered 
Caracas in triumph August 6, 1813. He proclaimed 
himself dictator with the title of Liberator. Mean- 
while Marino, another Patriot leader, had landed in 
the eastern part of Venezuela near Cumana and de- 
clared himself dictator. There were thus two dic- 
tators and no cordiality between them. Before they 
could come to an agreement the enemy had recovered 
their position. In December, 18 14, the last Patriot 
force was defeated. 

Bolivar and Marino retired once more to New 
Granada. Bolivar was made captain-general of the 
forces of New Granada, his title of Liberator was 
recognized, and another, that of Illustrious Pacificator, 
bestowed upon him. A second time he undertook the 
conquest of Venezuela from the west. Dissensions 
soon arose between Bolivar and the other leaders. He 
was refused reinforcements and foolishly marched 
against the Patriot garrison of Cartagena. He was 
now forced to give up his command, and embarked for 
Jamaica, May, 1815. 

Meanwhile Ferdinand had been restored to the 
throne of Spain, and an army of 10,000 men, com- 
manded by Marshal Morillo, the ablest Spanish gen- 
eral of the time, had been sent to reduce the provinces 
on the Main. This expedition reached Cumana in 
April, 181 5, and before the end of the year all the 

40 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

colonies, with the exception of the provinces of the 
River Plate, were reduced to submission. 

Far from giving up hope, however, Bolivar pro- 
ceeded to Haiti, and from that island, in May, 1816, 
made a descent upon the eastern part of Venezuela, 
but was routed by the Spaniards in July, and soon 
returned to Haiti. A few of the Patriots still kept 
the field, and towards the close of the year Bolivar's 
partisans secured his recall. On December 21 he left 
Haiti with a second expedition for the relief of his 
native land. He determined now to direct all his 
efforts, not as hitherto, to the support of the Patriot 
cause in the capital, but to the holding of the great 
plains of the Orinoco. With this territory as a base, 
he carried on, during the year 18 17, in conjunction 
with the Llanero horsemen of General Paez, a des- 
perate struggle with the Spaniards. When the rainy 
season of 1818 began, Bolivar's army had been cut 
almost to pieces, he had lost prestige as a general, and 
his civil authority amounted to nothing. Only the 
cavalry of Paez maintained the Patriot cause. Still 
the position of the Spaniards was not much better. 
Morillo had 12,000 men scattered about, but neither 
money, arms, nor supplies. He reported to the viceroy 
of Peru: "Twelve pitched battles, in which the best 
officers and troops of the enemy have fallen, have not 
lowered their pride or lessened the vigor of their at- 
tacks upon us." 

In February, 1819, the second Congress of Vene- 
zuela convened at Angostura. The Dictator resigned, 
but was unanimously elected President and given abso- 
lute power in all provinces which were the actual 
theater of war, The army was reorganized by the 

4* 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

accession of foreign troops, in particular the British 
legion, consisting of 2,000 well equipped men, which 
achieved much of the success of the next year. Boli- 
var now conceived the idea of crossing the Cordillera 
and reconquering New Granada. General Paez was 
to attract the attention of Morillo on the plains in 
front, and a demonstration was to be made on the 
coast near Caracas, while Bolivar marched to the west. 
This movement changed the whole face of affairs and 
had a similar effect to the passage of the Andes by- 
San Martin. New Granada was won by the battle 
of Boyaca, August 7, 18 19. Morillo was now iso- 
lated in Venezuela. In December, 18 19, a congress of 
delegates from Venezuela and New Granada met and 
decreed the union of the two provinces in the Republic 
of Colombia. Bolivar was named provisional Presi- 
dent. An armistice was signed by Bolivar and Morillo 
in November, 1820, which gave the Patriots breathing 
time. The Spanish troops remaining in Venezuela 
were defeated by Bolivar in the battle of Carabobo, 
June 23, 1 82 1. Only a few fortresses on the coast 
were still held by the Spaniards. 

Bolivar entered Caracas once more in triumph and 
tendered his resignation, an act always considered by 
him necessary for giving the proper dramatic setting 
to such occasions. Congress took no notice of it, but 
drew up a constitution providing for a limited presi- 
dential term of four years. The Liberator, " as he 
feared," was elected President. He repeated his resig- 
nation, but added that he would yield if Congress per- 
sisted. Congress did persist. 

After the battle of Boyaca, Bolivar had sent General 
Sucre by sea to Guayaquil, nominally to aid the new 

42 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

state against the Royalists, but in reality to induce it 
to join the Republic of Colombia. Sucre met with 
reverses, and had to call on San Martin for assistance 
from Peru. Meanwhile Bolivar was advancing by 
land. On July n, 1822, he entered Guayaquil in 
triumph, and two days later, on his own responsibility, 
announced its incorporation with Colombia. The 
junta resigned and took refuge on board the Peruvian 
squadron in the harbor. On the 25th San Martin 
arrived by sea, and Bolivar sent two of his aides to 
welcome him " on Colombian soil." On the following 
day San Martin went ashore and he and Bolivar met 
for the first and last time. They had two private in- 
terviews, after which San Martin sent his baggage 
aboard his ship and announced that he would sail after 
attending the ball to be given that night in his honor. 
At the public banquet that evening Bolivar rose and 
proposed a toast : " To the two greatest men of South 
America — General San Martin and myself." San 
Martin also proposed a toast : " To the speedy con- 
clusion of the war ; to the organization of the different 
republics of the continent; and to the health of the 
Liberator of Colombia " — words which well con- 
trasted the personal and political aims of the two men. 
San Martin and Bolivar had been unable to agree upon 
any plan for the expulsion of the Spaniards from the 
highlands of Peru. The self-denying patriot gave way 
before the man of ambition. To O'Higgins he wrote : 
" The Liberator is not the man we took him to be." 
Upon his return to Peru, San Martin wrote to Boli- 
var : " My decision is irrevocable. I have convened 
the first Congress of Peru; the day after its installation 
I shall leave for Chile, convinced that my presence is 

43 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

the only obstacle which keeps you from coming to 
Peru with your army." On the 20th of September, 
1822, he laid his resignation before the Congress, and 
issued an address to the nation. " The presence of a 
fortunate soldier," he said, " however disinterested he 
may be, is dangerous to a newly founded state. I have 
proclaimed the independence of Peru. I have ceased 
to be a public man." These words, whether inten- 
tionally so or not, were prophetic of Bolivar's subse- 
quent career. San Martin wrote to O'Higgins: "I 
am tired of hearing them call me tyrant, that I wish to 
make myself king, emperor, the devil. On the other 
hand, my health is broken, this climate is killing me. 
My youth was sacrificed to the service of Spain; my 
manhood to my own country. I think I have now the 
right to dispose of my old age." 

Bolivar's jealousy of San Martin prolonged the war, 
which might have been brought to a close in a few 
months, for nearly three years. After the withdrawal 
of San Martin, Bolivar became Dictator of Peru. On 
December 9, 1824, was fought the last battle for South 
American independence. On the little plain of Aya- 
cucho, 11,600 feet above the sea, General Sucre de- 
feated and captured the forces of the viceroy. Upper 
Peru was organized as a separate republic, with the 
name of Bolivia. 

Bolivar had been proclaimed President of Peru for 
life, but the unpopularity of this measure led him to 
leave the country in 1826, never to return. That same 
year he summoned the Congress of Panama, but his 
plans for the union of South America in one republic 
failed. San Martin's idea finally triumphed. In 1829 
Venezuela separated itself from Colombia and passed 

44 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

a decree of perpetual banishment against Bolivar. In 
April, 1830, through pressure of public opinion, Boli- 
var resigned the presidency of Colombia and retired 
into private life. Congress voted him an annual pen- 
sion of $30,000. A month later Quito and Guayaquil 
separated from Colombia and formed the independent 
state of Ecuador. Even the name Colombia was 
dropped by the remaining state, and the old name of 
New Granada adopted. In 1857 the name Colombia 
was assumed once more. 

Bolivar died in a small house near Santa Martha, 
December 17, 1831, having witnessed the failure of 
his most cherished plans. San Martin had retired to 
Europe in 1823 with his only child, a daughter named 
Mercedes. They lived a retired life in Brussels. Once 
only, in 1828, he returned to his native land, but was 
received with such denunciation by the press of Buenos 
Aires that he quickly turned his face towards Europe 
again. He died at Boulogne, August 17, 1850. 
Thirty years later the Argentine people had his re- 
mains brought back to his native land. In May, 1880, 
with imposing ceremonies, they were laid to rest in the 
Cathedral of Buenos Aires. 

Mexico was twice revolutionized. The first struggle 
began in 1809 and 1810, and was carried on spasmodi- 
cally until 181 7. The second revolution broke out in 
1820 on receipt of the news from Spain of the revolu- 
tion of March, 1820, and the re-adoption of the con- 
stitution of 1812. The old revolutionists demanded 
the proclamation of this constitution in Mexico, but 
the Viceroy Apodaca opposed them. Augustin de 
Iturbide, a native Mexican, who in the first revolution 
had steadfastly adhered to the cause of the king, now 

45 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

defected to the popular side with a large body of 
troops which the viceroy had entrusted to his com- 
mand. On February 24, 1821, he issued the cele- 
brated document known as the Plan of Iguala, from 
the town of that name. In it he proposed the main- 
tenance of the Roman Catholic religion to the exclu- 
sion of all others, the independence of Mexico from 
Spain, and the establishment of a limited monarchy. 
The Imperial Crown of Mexico was to be offered first 
to Ferdinand VII ; in the event of his declining, to the 
younger princes of his house; and in the event of 
their refusal, the duty of naming an emperor was to 
fall to the representative assembly of Mexico. The 
personal and property rights of Spaniards in Mexico 
were carefully guaranteed. In securing the interests 
of Spaniards and of the clergy, those who had most 
to lose, this plan differed essentially from the revo- 
lutionary policy of the other Spanish colonies. On 
the other hand, the Creole element was satisfied with 
the promise of independence and a representative gov- 
ernment. The revolutionary army became known as 
" the Army of the Three Guarantees," these being ( 1) 
the maintenance of the religious establishment in its 
present form, (2) independence, and (3) the union of 
Americans and Spaniards. 35 This ingenious document 
received immediately the widest approval. 

The Viceroy Apodaca had practically abdicated 
when his successor, General O'Donaju, arrived from 
Spain. As the latter had come without troops, there 
was nothing left but for him to recognize the revolu- 
tion as an accomplished fact and make the best terms 
for his country he could. Accordingly he met Iturbide 

»• Hall's " Journal," Vol. II, p. 188. 

46 



REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES 

in conference at Cordova, and after a brief discussion 
signed the treaty bearing that name, August 24, 182 1. 
It was agreed that a provisional junta should be ap- 
pointed, that O'Donaju should be a member, and that 
the junta should proceed to carry into effect the plan 
of Iguala. O'Donaju then persuaded the Royalists to 
open the gates of the capital, and on September 27, 
182 1, Iturbide entered. Shortly thereafter O'Donaju 
died from the yellow fever, thus leaving Iturbide free 
to carry out his plans. The Spanish government, of 
course, repudiated the treaty of Cordova. 

The Congress, which assembled in pursuance of the 
program of Iguala, was divided between Imperialists 
and Republicans. In spite of the opposition of the 
latter, Iturbide had himself proclaimed emperor and 
his family ennobled. Congress soon fell into disputes 
with the emperor, who finally, in October, 1822, dis- 
solved it by force. A few months later Santa Anna 
inaugurated a counter-revolution from Vera Cruz, 
which resulted in the abdication of the emperor. Itur- 
bide was allowed to leave the country. He retired to 
Italy, where he resided until toward the close of 1823, 
when he went to London. In May, 1824, at the solici- 
tation of certain of his partisans, he sailed again for 
Mexico, 38 ignorant of the decree of perpetual banish- 
ment passed against him by the Congress a few weeks 
before. He landed at Tampico July 12, but was seized 
and executed a few days later. The new assembly 
then in session adopted a constitution, and the Republic 
of Mexico was launched upon what was to prove, for 
years to come, a career of turbulence and anarchy. 



,§ See the statement of Iturbide in regard to his political life published 
in the Pamphleteer, London, 1827. 

47 



CHAPTER II 

The Recognition of the Spanish-American 
Republics 

The struggle of the South American peoples for 
independence was viewed from the first with feelings 
of profound satisfaction and sympathy in the United 
States. From the commencement of the revolution 
South American vessels were admitted into the ports 
of the United States under whatever flag they bore. 
It does not appear that any formal declaration ac- 
cording belligerent rights to the said provinces was 
ever made, though a resolution to that effect was in- 
troduced into the House by committee as early as 
December 10, 1811. 1 Such formal action was appar- 
ently not deemed necessary and, as there was no 
Spanish minister resident in the United States at that 
time to protest, our ports were probably thrown open, 
as a matter of course. 2 The fact that they were ac- 
corded full belligerent rights from the first was after- 
wards stated by President Monroe in his annual mes- 
sages of 1817 and 1818 and in his special message 
of March 8, 1822. 3 

At an early date of the revolution commissioners 
arrived in Washington seeking recognition of inde- 
pendence, and agents were forthwith dispatched to 
South America to obtain information in regard to 

1 Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. Ill, p. 538. 

2 Wharton's Digest, Sec. 69, and Moore's Digest of Int. Law, Vol. I. 

P 177- 

* " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, pp. 13, 58, and 116. 

48 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

the state of the revolutionary governments and to 
watch the movements of England and other Euro- 
pean powers. Joel R. Poinsett was sent to Buenos 
Aires in 1811, and the following year Alexander 
Scott was sent to Venezuela. 4 In 1817 Caesar A. Rod- 
ney, Theodorick Bland, and John Graham were dis- 
patched as special commissioners to South America. 
They proceeded to Buenos Aires, where they arrived 
in February, 1818, and remained until the last of 
April. Rodney and Graham then returned to the 
United States while Bland proceeded across the con- 
tinent to Chile. Their reports were transmitted to 
Congress November 17, 1818. 5 In 1820 Messrs. J. B. 
Prevost and John M. Forbes were sent as commercial 
agents to Chile and Buenos Aires. Reports from 
them on the state of the revolutions were transmitted 
to Congress, March 8 and April 26, 1822. 6 

In the meantime a strong sentiment in favor of the 
recognition of South American independence had 
arisen in the United States. The struggling colonies 
found a ready champion in Henry Clay, who, for a 
period of ten years labored almost incessantly in their 
behalf, pleading for their recognition first with his 
own countrymen and then, as secretary of state under 
the Adams administration, with the governments of 
Europe. His name became a household word in South 
America and his speeches were translated and read 
before the patriot armies. 

In spite of the fact that our own political interests 
were so closely identified with the struggling republics, 
the President realized the necessity of following a neu- 

* Lyman, " Diplomacy of the United States*" 2 Vols. Boston, 1828, 
Vol. II, p. 432. Romero, " Mexico and the United States." 

e Given in full in Am. St. Papers, For. Rel.. Vol. IV, pp. 217-270. 
•Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 818-851. 

49 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

tral course, and in view of the aid the colonies were 
receiving from citizens of the United States, called 
upon Congress for the enactment of a more stringent 
neutrality law. Clay delivered a vigorous speech in 
opposition to this measure in January, 1817. His 
greatest effort in behalf of South America, however, 
was his speech of March 25, 1818, on the general 
appropriation bill. He moved an amendment appro- 
priating $18,000 for the outfit and year's salary of a 
minister to the United Provinces of the Plate. With- 
out waiting to hear the report of the three commis- 
sioners who had been sent to inquire into the state of 
the revolutionary governments, he urged that a minis- 
ter be regularly accredited to Buenos Aires at once. 
In a speech, three hours in length, he concluded the 
arguments he had begun the day before. Painting 
with even more than his usual fire and enthusiasm the 
beauties and resources of the Southern continent, he 
said: 

Within this vast region, we behold the most sublime and 
interesting objects of creation ; the loftiest mountains, the 
most majestic rivers in the world; the richest mines of the 
precious metals; and the choicest productions of the earth. 
We behold there a spectacle still more interesting and sublime 
— the glorious spectacle of eighteen millions of people strug- 
gling to burst their chains and be free.' 

He went on to say that in the establishment of the 
independence of the South American states the United 
States had the deepest interest. He had no hesita- 
tion in asserting his firm belief that there was no 
question in the foreign policy of this country, which 
had ever arisen, or which he could conceive as ever 

'Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI. p. 139. 

50 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

occurring, in the decision of which we had so much 
at stake. This interest concerned our politics, our 
commerce, our navigation. There could be no doubt 
that Spanish America, once independent, whatever 
might be the form of the governments established 
in its several parts, those governments would be 
animated by an American feeling and guided by an 
American policy. They would obey the laws of the 
system of the new world, of which they would com- 
pose a part, in contradistinction to that of Europe. 8 
The House turned a deaf ear to his brilliant rhetoric. 
The motion was defeated by a vote of 115 to 45, but 
Clay did not abandon the cause of South America. 

Two years later he reopened the question in a direct 
attack on the policy of the administration, which 
greatly disturbed President Monroe. On May 20, 
1820, he again introduced a resolution declaring it 
expedient to send ministers to the " governments in 
South America which have established and are main- 
taining their independence of Spain." His arraign- 
ment of the administration became more violent than 
ever: 

If Lord Castlereagh says we may recognize, we do; if not, 
we do not. A single expression of the British minister to 
the present secretary of state, then our minister abroad, I 
am ashamed to say, has molded the policy of our government 
toward South America. 

A charge of dependence upon Great Britain in affairs 
of diplomacy was as effective a weapon then as it 
has been since in matters financial. Clay's resolu- 
tion passed the House by a vote of 80 to 75, but 

8 Benton's " Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 142. 

51 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

still the executive arm of the government did not 
move. In 1817 and 1818 the question of South 
American independence was continually before the 
cabinet for discussion. President Monroe seemed 
strongly inclined toward recognition, but in this he 
was opposed by Adams and Calhoun, who were un- 
willing to act in the matter without some understand- 
ing with England, and if possible with France. Our 
relations with Spain in regard to the Indian troubles 
in Florida were in a very strained condition and any 
action taken at that time in recognition of South 
America would have involved us in war with Spain 
and almost inevitably with other European powers. 
The President, therefore, as a matter of expediency 
postponed the action which his sympathy prompted, 
and, in his annual message of November 16, 1818. ex- 
pressed his satisfaction at the course the government 
had hitherto pursued and his intention of adhering to 
it for the time being. 9 Under the President's direction, 
however, efforts were made to secure the cooperation 
of Great Britain and France in promoting the inde- 
pendence of South America. 10 

In 1819 an amicable adjustment of our differences 
with Spain seemed to have been reached by the nego- 
tiation of a treaty providing for the cession of the 
Floridas to the United States and the settlement of 
long-standing claims of American citizens against 
Spain. An unforeseen difficulty arose, however, which 
proved embarrassing to the administration. The Span- 
ish monarch very shrewdly delayed ratifying the 
treaty for two years and thus practically tied the 



8 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 44- 
10 " Adams's Diary," September. T817, to December, 1818, " Letters and 
Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, pp. 404 and 458, 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

hands of the administration during that time as far 
as the South American question was concerned. 

In spite of the awkward position in which the ad- 
ministration found itself, Clay, who was opposed to 
the treaty on account of its unwarranted surrender 
of our claims to Texas, continued to plead the cause 
of South America. Early in the year, 182 1, a decla- 
ration of interest in the South American struggle, in- 
troduced by him, was carried by an overwhelming 
majority (134 to 12), but the administration held 
back another year until the de facto independence 
of the colonies no longer admitted of reasonable doubt. 
Meanwhile the Florida treaty had been ratified. On 
March 8, 1822, President Monroe, in a special mes- 
sage to Congress, expressed the opinion that the time 
had come for recognition and asked for the appro- 
priations necessary for carrying it into effect. The 
President's recommendation was received with ap- 
proval, and in due course the sum of $100,000 was 
appropriated for " such missions to the independent 
nations on the American continent as the President 
of the United States may deem proper." In accord- 
ance with this act Mr. R. C. Anderson of Kentucky 
was appointed minister to Colombia, Mr. C. A. Rod- 
ney of New Jersey to the Argentine Republic, and 
Mr. H. Allen of Vermont to Chile, in 1824, and Mr. 
Joel R. Poinsett of South Carolina to Mexico in 1826. 

While the United States government was concern- 
ing itself with the political interests of the Spanish 
provinces, Great Britain was quietly reaping all the 
commercial advantages to be derived from the situa- 
tion and was apparently well satisfied to let things 
follow the drift they had taken. By the destruction 

53 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

of the combined fleets of France and Spain at Trafal- 
gar, in 1805, Nelson had won for Great Britain un- 
disputed control of the Atlantic and laid open the 
route to South America. Ever since the assiento of 
171 3 had placed the slave trade in her hands, Great 
Britain had realized the possibilities of South Ameri- 
can commerce, and the intercourse, which had been 
kept up with that country after the termination of 
the slave monopoly by smugglers, now that the dan- 
ger was removed, became more regular and profitable. 
During the changes of ministry that followed the 
death of Pitt, the policy of England in regard to 
South America was weak and vacillating. We have 
already called attention to the political indecision that 
marked the attack upon the provinces of the Plate. 
With Napoleon's invasion of Spain and the national 
uprising it occasioned, British policy became once more 
intelligible. It was wisely deemed of more impor- 
tance to spare the colonies and to win Spain over 
to the European alliance against Napoleon, than to 
take her colonies at the cost of driving her perma- 
nently into the arms of France. Meanwhile British 
commerce with the South American states was stead- 
ily growing and that too with the connivance of Spain. 
At the close of the Napoleonic wars, Spain, fearing 
that England, through her desire to keep this trade, 
would secretly furnish aid to the colonies in their 
struggle for independence, proposed to the British gov- 
ernment to bind itself to a strict neutrality. This 
England agreed to, and when the treaty was signed, 
there was, according to Canning, " a distinct under- 
standing with Spain that our commercial intercourse 
with the colonies was not to be deemed a breach of 

54 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

its stipulations." lx Notwithstanding this tacit com- 
pact, British commerce suffered greatly at the hands 
of Spanish privateers and even Spanish war vessels. 
Numbers of British merchantmen were captured by 
Spanish ships, carried into the few ports left to Spain 
on the Main, and condemned as prizes for trading 
with the insurgent colonies. Thus at the time of the 
acknowledgment of South American independence by 
the United States, a long list of grievances had ac- 
cumulated in the hands of the British ambassador at 
Madrid, and in spite of urgent and repeated remon- 
strances, remained unredressed. 

Canning was deterred from making final demands 
upon the government of Madrid by the consideration 
that he did not wish to hamper the constitutional gov- 
ernment of Spain, which had come into being by the 
revolution of March, 1820, and against which the other 
powers of Europe were preparing to act. The con- 
dition of affairs on the Spanish Main was, however, 
critical and demanded instant redress. He decided, 
therefore, to take matters into his own hands without 
harassing the government of Spain, and to dispatch a 
squadron to the West Indies to make reprisals. In a 
memorandum to the cabinet on this subject, Novem- 
ber 15, 1822, in which he outlines his policy, he com- 
mends the course of the United States in recognizing 
the de facto independence of the colonies, claiming a 
right to trade with them and avenging the attempted 
interruption of that right by making reprisals, as a 
more straightforward and intelligible course than that 
of Great Britain, forbearing for the sake of Spain to 
recognize the colonies, trading with them in faith of 

11 Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 10. 

55 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

the connivance of Spain and suffering depredations 
without taking redress. It was not necessary, he 
thought, to declare war against Spain, for " she has 
perhaps as little direct and available power over the 
colonies which she nominally retains as she has over 
those which have thrown off her yoke. Let us apply, 
therefore, a local remedy to a local grievance, and 
make the ships and harbors of Cuba, Porto Rico, and 
Porto Cabello answerable for the injuries which have 
been inflicted by those ships, and the perpetrators of 
which have found shelter in those harbors." In con- 
clusion, he says that the tacit compact, which sub- 
sisted for years, by which Spain was to forbear from 
interrupting British trade with the South American 
colonies having been renounced by Spain, and the old 
colonial system having been revived in as full vigor 
as if she had still a practical hold over her colonies 
and a navy to enforce her pretensions, " no man will 
say that under such circumstances our recognition of 
those states can be indefinitely postponed." 12 

While Great Britain was thus considering the ex- 
pediency of following the example of the United 
States in the recognition of Spain's revolted colonies, 
the powers of central Europe had taken upon them 
the task of solving the difficulties of that unfortunate 
country both at home and in America. The restored 
rule of the Bourbons in Spain had been far from 
satisfactory to the great mass of the people. In 
March, 1820, the army which Ferdinand had assembled 
at Cadiz to be sent against the rebellious colonies, sud- 
denly turned against the government, refused to em- 
bark, and demanded the restoration of the constitution 

12 Stapleton, " Official Correspondence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 48 ff. 

56 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

of 1812. The action of the army was everywhere 
approved and sustained by the mass of the people, and 
the king was forced to proclaim the constitution and 
to swear to uphold it. The March revolution in Spain 
was followed in July by a constitutional movement 
in Naples, and in August of the same year by a 
similar movement in Portugal; while the next year 
saw the outbreak of the Greek struggle for independ- 
ence. Thus in all three of the peninsulas of Southern 
Europe the people were struggling for the right of 
self-government. The movement in Greece was, it 
is true, of an altogether different character from the 
others, but it was a revolt against constituted author- 
ity and therefore incurred the ill-will of the so-called 
legitimists. The powers of Europe at once took alarm 
at the rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and pro- 
ceeded to adopt measures for the suppression of the 
movements to which these ideas gave rise, j The prin- 
ciple of joint intervention on the part of allied govern- 
ments in the internal affairs of European states had 
been developed in the years immediately following 
the overthrow of Napoleon and was the outcome of 
the wholly anomalous condition in which he had left 
the politics of Europe. In the hands of Prince Met- 
ternich, the genius of reaction against French revo- 
lutionary ideas, this principle had become the most 
powerful weapon of absolutism and now threatened 
the subversion of popular institutions throughout Eu- 
rope. 

The rapid development of this doctrine of interven- 
tion in the seven years immediately following the sec- 
ond fall of Napoleon not only seriously menaced the 
liberties of Europe, but also threatened to control the 

57 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

destiny of the new world. At the Congress of Vienna 
Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia 
had formed a close union and had signed the treaty 
upon which the peace of Europe rested for the next 
half century. The agreement made at Vienna was 
reaffirmed with some minor changes, after the second 
overthrow of Napoleon, at Paris, November 20, 181 5. 
France was now practically excluded from the alliance. 
This treaty undertook especially to guard against any 
further disturbance of the peace of Europe by Napo- 
leon or France. One of the most significant features 
of the treaty, or what was to prove so, was the agree- 
ment definitely laid down in the sixth article, provid- 
ing for meetings of the powers at fixed periods. 

The first conference held in accordance with this 
understanding was that at Aix-la-Chapelle in October, 
1818. France was readmitted as a member of the 
alliance and her territory evacuated by the allied 
armies. The quintuple alliance thus formed declared 
that it had no other object than the maintenance of 
peace; that the repose of the world was its motive 
and its end. The language of the declaration had 
been in a large measure neutralized to suit the views 
of the British government. Lord Liverpool had said 
to Castlereagh before the meeting of the conference: 
" The Russian must be made to feel that we have a 
parliament and a public, to which we are responsible, 
and that we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into 
views of policy which are wholly incompatible with 
the spirit of our government." The members of the 
British cabinet, except Canning, did not object seri- 
ously to the system of congresses at fixed intervals, 
but to the declarations publicly set forth by them. 

58 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

Canning, on the other hand, objected to the declara- 
tions and to the conferences themselves, " meetings for 
the government of the world/' as he somewhat con- 
temptuously termed them. 

It had been generally supposed that the question of 
the Spanish colonies would come up for discussion 
at Aix-la-Chapelle. Castlereagh assured the United 
States, through Bagot, the British minister at Wash- 
ington, that while England would act with the allied 
powers at Aix-la-Chapelle in mediation between Spain 
and her colonies, her mediation would be limited en- 
tirely to the employment of her influence and good 
offices and that she would not take any measures that 
might assume a character of force. 13 

The revolutions that took place in Spain, Naples, 
and Portugal in 1820 presented an occasion for another 
meeting of the allies. In November the representa- 
tives of Austria, Russia, and Prussia met in conference 
at Troppau, and issued a circular setting forth what 
they had already done for Europe in overthrowing the 
military tyranny of Napoleon and expressing the de- 
termination " to put a curb on a force no less tyran- 
nical and no less detestable, that of revolt and crime." 
The conference then adjourned to Laybach, where 
they could, with greater dispatch, order the move- 
ments they had decided to take against the revolution- 
ists of Naples. Austria, being more intimately con- 
cerned with the political condition of the Italian pen- 
insula than either of the other two powers, was en- 
trusted with the task of suppressing the Neapolitan 
revolution. The Austrian army entered Naples 



*• Bagot to Castlereagh, October 31, 1818. Mem. of a Conversation 
with Adams. " Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XII, p. 66. 

59 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

March 23, 1821, overthrew the constitutional gov- 
ernment that had been inaugurated, and restored Fer- 
dinand II to absolute power. The revolution which 
had broken out in Piedmont was also suppressed by 
a detachment of the Austrian army. 

England held aloof from all participation in the pro- 
ceedings at Troppau and Laybach — though Sir Charles 
Stuart was present to watch the proceedings. In a 
circular dispatch of January 21, 182 1, the British 
government expressed its dissent from the principles 
set forth in the Troppau circular. 

The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged 
for October, 1822, at Verona. Here the affairs of 
Greece, Italy, and, in particular, Spain came up for 
consideration. At this Congress all five powers of 
the alliance were represented. France was uneasy 
about the condition of Spain, and England had to send 
a delegate out of self-defense, as her interests were 
largely involved. Castlereagh was preparing to de- 
part for the congress, when his mind gave way under . 
the stress of work and more remotely of dissipation, / 
and he committed suicide. Canning then became sec- 
retary for foreign affairs, and Wellington was sent 
to Verona. 

The congress which now assembled at Verona was 
devoted largely to a discussion of Spanish affairs. 
Wellington had been instructed to use all his influence 
against the adoption of measures of intervention in 
Spain. When he found that the other powers were 
bent upon this step and that his protest would be un- 
heeded, he withdrew from the congress. The four re- 
maining powers signed the secret treaty of Verona. 
November 22, 1822, as a revision, so they declared in 

60 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

the preamble, of the " Treaty of the Holy Alliance." 
This treaty of the Holy Alliance, signed at Paris, 
September 26, 18 15, by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, 
is one of the most remarkable political documents 
extant. It sprang from the erratic brain of the Czar 
Alexander under the influence of Madame Crudner, 
who was both an adventuress and a religious enthusi- 
ast. Its object was to uphold the divine right of 
kings and to counteract the spirit of French revolu- 
tionary ideas by introducing " the precepts of justice, 
of charity, and of peace " into the internal affairs of 
states and into their relations with one another. No 
one had taken it seriously except the Czar himself and 
it had been without influence upon the politics of 
Europe. The agreement reached at Verona gave 
retrospective importance to the Holy Alliance, and 
revived the name, so that it became the usual designa- 
tion of the combined powers. The following alleged 
text of the secret treaty of Verona soon became cur- 
rent in the press of Europe and America. Although 
it has never been officially acknowledged and its 
authenticity has been called in question, it states pretty 
accurately the motives and aims of the powers. The 
first four articles are as follows : 

The undersigned, specially authorized to make some ad- 
ditions to the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, after having 
exchanged their respective credentials, have agreed as 
follows : 

Article I. The high contracting parties being convinced 
that the system of representative government is equally 
incompatible with the monarchical principles as the maxim 
of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right, 
engage mutually, and in the most solemn manner, to use 
all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative 

6l 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, 
and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where 
it is not yet known. 

Art. II. As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the 
press is the most powerful means used by the pretended 
supporters of the rights of nations, to the detriment of those 
of Princes, the high contracting parties promise reciprocally 
to adopt all proper measures to suppress it not only in their 
own states, but also, in the rest of Europe. 

Art. III. Convinced that the principles of religion con- 
tribute most powerfully to keep nations in the state of 
passive obedience which they owe to their Princes, the high 
contracting parties declare it to be their intention to sustain, 
in their respective states, those measures which the clergy 
may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating their own interests, 
so intimately connected with the preservation of the author- 
ity of Princes; and the contracting powers join in offering 
their thanks to the Pope, for what he has already done for 
them, and solicit his constant cooperation in their views of 
submitting the nations. 

Art. IV. The situation of Spain and Portugal unites un- 
happily all the circumstances to which this treaty has par- 
ticular reference. The high contracting parties, in confiding 
to France the care of putting an end to them, engage to 
assist her in the manner which may the least compromise 
them with their own people and the people of France, by 
means of a subsidy on the part of the two empires, of 
twenty millions of francs every year, from the date of the 
signature of this treaty to the end of the war. 

Signed by Metternich for Austria, Chateaubriand for 
France, Bernstet for Prussia, and Nesselrode for Russia. 14 

Such was the code of absolutism against which 
England protested and against which President Mon- 
roe delivered his declaration. 



14 For the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laybach, and Verona, 
eee "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XII; "Life of Lord 
Liverpool," Vol. Ill; " Political Life and Official Correspondence of 
Canning"; Chateaubriand's " Congres de Verone," and W. A. Phillips. 
" The Confederation of Europe, 1813-1823." The text of the treaty of 
Verona is published in Niles' Register, August 2, 1823, Vol. 24, p. 347, 
and in Elliot's " American Diplomatic Code," Vol. II, p. 179. 

62 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

The Congress broke up about the middle of Decem- 
ber, and the following April, the Due d'Angouleme 
led a French army across the Pyrenees. By October 
the constitutional party had been overthrown and 
absolutism reigned supreme once more in western 
Europe. In England alone was there still any sem- 
blance of constitutional government. 

The Congress of Verona was the last of the joint- 
meetings of the. powers for the discussion of the 
internal affairs of states. It marked the final with- 
drawal of England from the European alliance. 
Henceforth she took up a position distinctly hostile 
to the principles advocated by her former allies and 
her policy in relation to Spanish America practically 
coincided with that of the United States. 

The great majority of the English people sympa- 
thized deeply with the constitutional movement in 
Spain and were ready to take up arms in support of 
the Spanish people. The protest of England having 
been disregarded by the powers at Verona, it became 
necessary for the cabinet, in view of the preparations 
going on in France for the invasion of the Peninsula, 
to say what they contemplated doing. In February, 
1823, Lord Liverpool circulated among his colleagues 
a minute prepared by Canning, which gave at length 
the reasons, military and other, why it would be 
unwise for England to undertake the defense of; 
Spain. In the first place, the war against Spain was 
unpopular in France, and if Great Britain should 
take part in the war, the French government would 
avail itself of the fact to convert it into an English 
war and thus render it popular. Second, England 
would have to undertake the defense of Spain against 

63 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

invasion by land, and her naval superiority would 
not materially aid the Spaniards or baffle the French. 
Third, the continental powers were committed to the 
support of France. Fourth^ there was a possibility 
that the invasion of Spain would be unsuccessful. 
Fifth, on the other hand, it might meet with success, 
in which event France might assist Spain to recover 
her American colonies. Here, he says, England's 
naval superiority would tell, " and I should have no 
difficulty in deciding that we ought to prevent, by 
every means in our power, perhaps Spain from send- 
ing a single Spanish regiment to South America, after 
the supposed termination of the war in Spain, but 
certainly France from affording to Spain any aid or 
assistance for that purpose." Sixth, in case of the 
invasion of Portugal by France and Spain, he thought 
England would be in honor bound to defend her, in 
case she asked for aid. The military defense of Port- 
ugal would not be so difficult as a land war in Spain. 15 
In accordance with this determination Canning dis- 
patched a letter to Sir Charles Stuart, British ambassa- 
dor at Paris, March 31, 1823, in which he spoke of 
recognition of the colonies as a matter to be deter- 
mined by time and circumstances, and, disclaiming 
all designs on the part of the British government on 
the late Spanish provinces, intimated that England, 
although abstaining from interference in Spain, would 
not allow France to acquire any of the colonies by 
conquest or cession. To this note the French gov- 
ernment made no reply and England took this silence 
as a tacit agreement not to interfere with the colonies. 



18 " Life of Lord Liverpool," Vol. III. p. 231. " Official Correspond- 
ence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 85. 



64 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

The British government continued, however, to watch 
closely the movements of France. 16 

As the invasion of Spain drew near to a successful 
termination, the British government had reason to 
suspect that the allied powers would next direct their 
attention to the Spanish colonies with a view to forc- 
ing them back to their allegiance or of otherwise dis- 
posing of them, that is, by cession to some other Euro- 
pean power. It was already in contemplation to call 
another European congress for the discussion and set- 
tlement of this question. As this was a subject of 
vital interest to the United States, Canning invited the 
American minister, Mr. Rush, to a conference, August 
16, 1823, in which he suggested the expediency of an 
understanding on this question between England and 
the United States. He communicated to Mr. Rush 
the substance of his dispatch of March 31 to Sir 
Charles Stuart. Mr. Rush said he understood the 
import of this note to be that England would not re- 
main passive to any attempt on the part of France to 
acquire territory in Spanish America. Mr. Canning 
then asked what the United States would say to going 
hand in hand with England in such a policy. Mr. 
Rush replied that his instructions did not authorize 
him to give an answer, but that he would communi- 
cate the suggestion informally to his government. At 
the same time he requested to be enlightened as to 
England's policy in the matter of recognizing the inde- 
pendence of the colonies. Mr. Canning replied that 
England had taken no steps in the matter of recogni- 
tion whatever, but was considering the question of 
sending commissioners to the colonies to inquire into 

18 Stapleton, " Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 18. 

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UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

the condition of affairs. For the present these com- 
missioners would be sent to Mexico alone. 17 

Mr. Stapleton in his " Life of Canning " simply 
says that as Mr. Rush was not authorized to enter 
into any formal agreement, Canning thought the de- 
lay of communicating with Washington would render 
such proceeding of no effect, and so the matter was 
dropped. 18 This, however, we learn from Mr. Rush's 
dispatches, is not the whole truth. Several communi- 
cations passed between them after the conversation 
above given, which throw a totally different light 
upon the affair. 

In an unofficial and confidential letter to Mr. Rush, 
dated August 20, 1823, Canning asked again if the 
moment had not arrived when the two governments 
might come to an understanding in regard to the 
Spanish-American colonies. He stated the views of 
England as follows : ( 1 ) That the recovery of the 
colonies by Spain was hopeless; (2) That the question 
of their recognition as independent states was one of 
time and circumstances; (3) That England was not 
disposed, however, to throw any obstacle in the way 
of an arrangement between the colonies and the 
mother-country by amicable negotiation; (4) That 
she aimed at the possession of no portion of the colo- 
nies for herself; and (5) That she could not see the 
transfer of any portion of them to any other power 
with indifference. He added " that if the United 
States acceded to such views, a declaration to that 
effect on their part, concurrently with England, would 
be the most effectual and least offensive mode of 



17 Rush's " Residence at the Court of London," p. 406. 
11 " Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 24. 

66 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

making known their joint disapprobation of contrary 
projects; that it would at the same time put an end 
to all jealousies of Spain as to her remaining colonies, 
and to the agitation prevailing in the colonies them- 
selves by showing that England and the United States 
were determined not to profit by encouraging it." 19 

Prior to the formal recognition of South America, 
the United States had repeatedly expressed the wish 
to proceed in the matter hand in hand with Great 
Britain, 20 but that act placed the United States on an 
altogether different footing from England. Canning 
seemed to forget in the wording of his proposal that 
the United States had already, in the most formal 
manner, acknowledged the independence of the Span- 
ish colonies. In reply Mr. Rush reminded him of 
this fact and of the desire of the United States to 
see the colonies recognized by England. In other re- 
spects, he believed that the views unfolded by Mr. 
Canning in his note were shared by the United States, 
but he added that he had no authority to avow these 
principles publicly in the manner suggested. 

As soon as Rush's first dispatch was received Pres- 
ident Monroe realized fully the magnitude of the issue 
presented by the proposal of an Anglo-American alli- 
ance. Before submitting the matter to his cabinet he 
transmitted copies of the dispatch to ex-Presidents 
Jefferson and Madison and the following interesting 
correspondence took place. In his letter to Jefferson 
of October 17th, the President said: 

I transmit to you two despatches which were receiv'd 
from Mr. Rush, while I was lately in Washington, which 

19 Rush's " Residence at the Court of London," p. 412. 

20 " Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, p. 458. Bagot's 
reports of interviews with Adams. 

67 






UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

involve interests of the highest importance. They contain 
two letters from Mr. Canning, suggesting designs of the 
holy alliance, against the Independence of S°. America, & 
proposing a co-operation, between G. Britain & the U 
States, in support of it, against the members of that alliance. 
The project aims, in the first instance, at a mere expression 
of opinion, somewhat in the abstract, but which, it is ex- 
pected by Mr. Canning, will have a great political effect, 
by defeating the combination. By Mr. Rush's answers, 
which are also enclosed, you will see the light in which he 
views the subject, & the extent to which he may have gone. 
Many important considerations are involved in this proposi- 
tion. I st Shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European 
politicks, & wars, on the side of any power, against others, 
presuming that a concert, by agreement, of the kind pro- 
posed, may lead to that result? 2 d If a case can exist in 
which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is 
not the present instance, precisely that case? 3 d Has not 
the epoch arriv'd when G. Britain must take her stand, 
either on the side of the monarchs of Europe, or of the 
U States, & in consequence, either in favor of Despotism 
or of liberty & may it not be presum'd that, aware of that 
necessity, her government has seiz'd on the present occur- 
rence, as that, which it deems, the most suitable, to announce 
& mark the commenc'ment of that career. 

My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal 
of the British govt. & to make it known, that we would 
view an interference on the part of the European powers, 
and especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an 
attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded with 
them, they would extend it to us. 1 am sensible however 
of the extent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy 
to have yours, & Mr. Madison's opinions on it. 21 

Jefferson's reply dated Monticello, October 24th, 
displays not only a profound insight into the inter- 
national situation, but a wide vision of the possibili- 
ties involved. He said : 



ai Hamilton, "Writings of James Monroe," Vol. VI, pp. 323-325. 

68 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 



The question presented by the letters you have sent me, 
is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my 
contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a 
nation, this sets our compass and points the course which 
we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. 
And never could we embark on it under circumstances 
more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should 
be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe 
Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with 
cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set 
of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly 
her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, 
separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last 
is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our en- 
deavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of 
freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this 
pursuit ; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in 
it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the 
bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free gov- 
ernment, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which 
might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great 
Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of 
any one, or all on earth ; and with her on our side we need 
not fear the whole world. With her then, we should most 
sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would 
tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once 
more, side by side, in the same cause. Not that I would 
purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her 
wars. But the war in which the present proposition might 
engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, 
but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the 
American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign 
powers, of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle 
with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own 
principle, not to depart from it. And if, to facilitate this, 
we can effect a division in the body of the European powers, 
and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely 
we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion, 
that it will prevent instead of provoking war. With Great 
Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of 

6 9 



s 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

our two continents, all Europe combined would not under- 
take such a war. For how would they propose to get at 
either enemy without superior fleets? Nor is the occasion 
to be slighted which this proposition offers, of declaring our 
protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of 
nations, by the interference of any one in the internal affairs 
of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now 
continued by the equally lawless Alliance, calling itself 
Holy. 22 

Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as to the 
wisdom of accepting the British proposal of some 
form of joint action, but he went even further and 
suggested that the declaration should not be limited 
to the American republics, but that it should express 
disapproval of the late invasion of Spain and of any 
interference with the Greeks, who were then struggling 
for independence from Turkey. 23 Monroe, it ap- 
pears, was strongly inclined to act on Madison's sug- 
gestion, but his cabinet took a different view of the 
situation. From the diary of John Quincy Adams, 
Monroe's secretary of state, it appears that almost the 
whole of November was taken up by cabinet discus- 
sions on Canning's proposals and on Russia's aggres- 
sions in the northwest. Adams stoutly opposed any 
alliance or joint declaration with Great Britain. The 
composition of the President's message remained in 
doubt until the 21st, when the more conservative views 
of Adams were, according to his own statement of 
the case, adopted. He advocated an independent 
course of action on the part of the United States, with- 
out direct reference to Canning's proposals, though 
substantially in accord with them. Adams defined his 

48 Ford, " Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. X, pp. 277278. 
a * Hamilton, " Writings of James Madison," Vol. IX, pp. 161-162. 

70 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

position as follows : " The ground that I wish to 
take is that of earnest remonstrance against the in- 
terference of the European powers by force with 
South America, but to disclaim all interference on our 
part with Europe; to make an American cause and 
adhere inflexibly to that." 2i Adams's dissent from 
Monroe's position was, it is claimed, due partly to 
the influence of Clay, who advocated a Pan American 
system, partly to the fact that the proposed coopera- 
tion with Great Britain would bind the United States 
not to acquire some of the coveted parts of the Span- 
ish possessions, and partly to the fear that the United 
States as the ally of Great Britain would be com- 
pelled to play a secondary part. He probably carried 
his point by showing that the same ends could be 
accomplished by an independent declaration, since it 
was evident that the sea power of Great Britain would 
be used to prevent the reconquest of South America 
by the European powers. Monroe, as we have seen, 
thought that the exigencies of the situation justified 
a departure from the sound maxim of political iso- 
lation, and in this opinion he was supported by his 
two predecessors in the presidency. 

The opinions of Monroe, Jefferson, and Madison in 
favor of an alliance with Great Britain and a broad 
declaration against the intervention of the great 
powers in the affairs of weaker states in any part 
of the world, have been severely criticised by some 
historians and ridiculed by others, but time and cir- 
cumstances often bring about a complete change in 
our point of view. Since our entrance into the great 
world conflict several writers have raised the question 

** W. C. Ford, " Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," in Mass. Hist. Soc. 
Proceedings, second series, Vol.. XV, p. 392. 

71 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

as to whether the three elder statesmen were not right 
and Adams and Clay wrong. 25 If the United States 
and England had come out in favor of a general 
declaration against intervention in the concerns of 
small states and established it as a world-wide princi- 
ple, the course of human history during the next cen- 
tury might have been very different, but Adams's 
diary does not tell the whole story. On his own 
statement of the case he might be justly censured by 
posterity for persuading the President to take a nar- 
row American view of a question which was world- 
wide in its bearing. An important element in the 
situation, however, was Canning's change of attitude 
between the time of his conference with Rush in 
August and the formulation of the President's mes- 
sage. Two days after the delivery of his now famous 
message Monroe wrote to Jefferson in explanation of 
the form the declaration had taken: "Mr. Canning's 
zeal has much abated of late." It appears from Rush's 
correspondence that the only thing which stood in the 
way of joint action by the two powers was Canning's 
unwillingness to extend immediate recognition to the 
South American republics. On August 27th, Rush 
stated to Canning that it would greatly facilitate joint 
action if England would acknowledge at once the 
full independence of the South American colonies. 
In communicating the account of this interview to his 
government Mr. Rush concluded : 

Should I be asked by Mr. Canning, whether, in case the 
recognition be made by Great Britain without more delay, I 
am on my part prepared to make a declaration, in the name 
of my government, that it will not remain inactive under 

25 See especially G. L. Beer, "The English-Speaking Peoples," p. 79. 

72 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

an attack upon the independence of those states by the Holy 
Alliance, the present determination of my judgment is that 
I will make such a declaration explicitly, and avow it before 
the world." 

About three weeks later Canning, who was growing 
restless at the delay in hearing from Washington, again 
urged Rush to act without waiting for specific instruc- 
tions from his government. He tried to show that the 
proposed joint declaration would not conflict with the 
American policy of avoiding entangling alliances, for 
the question at issue was American as much as Euro- 
pean, if not more. Rush then indicated his willing- 
ness to act provided England would " immediately 
and unequivocally acknowledge the independence of 
the new states." Canning did not care to extend full 
recognition to the South American states until he 
could do so without giving unnecessary offense to 
Spain and the allies, and he asked if Mr. Rush could 
not give his assent to the proposal on a promise of 
future recognition. Mr. Rush refused to accede to 
anything but immediate acknowledgment of independ- 
ence and so the matter ended. 27 As Canning could 
not come to a formal understanding with the United 
States, he determined to make a frank avowal of the 
views of the British cabinet to France and to this 
end he had an interview with Prince Polignac, the 
French ambassador at London, October 9, 1823, in 
which he declared that Great Britain had no desire 
to hasten recognition, but that any foreign interfer- 
ence, by force, or by menace, would be a motive for 
immediate recognition; that England "could not go 



5 " Rush's " Residence at the Court of London," p. 419. 
27 Ibid., pp. 429, 443. 

73 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish 
America upon an equal footing with other powers, 
whose opinions were less formed upon that question." 
This declaration drew from Polignac the admission 
that he considered the reduction of the colonies by 
Spain as hopeless and that France "abjured in any 
case, any design of acting against the colonies by 
force of arms." 28 This admission was a distinct vic- 
tory for Canning, in that it prepared the way for 
ultimate recognition by England, and an account of 
the interview was communicated without delay to 
the allied courts. The interview was not communi- 
cated to Rush until the latter part of November, and 
therefore had no influence upon the formation of 
Monroe's message of December 2. 29 

Before the close of the year the British government 
appointed consuls to the South American states, and 
about the time of their departure, an invitation was 
sent to the courts of St, Petersburg, Paris, and Vienna 
to a conference to be held at Paris to " aid Spain in 
adjusting the affairs of the revolted colonies." A copy 
of this invitation was also handed to the British am- 
bassador at Madrid, but in such a form as to leave 
him in doubt as to whether his government was invited 
to the conference or not. 30 While the discussion as 
to the proposed conference was going on and before 
Canning had announced what action his government 
would take in the matter, President Monroe's mes- 
sage arrived in Europe. 

Spanish America was not the only part of the west- 
ern continent threatened at this time by European 

* 8 " Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 26. 

*• Rush's " Residence at the Court of London," p. 448. 

,0 " Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 33. 

74 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

aggression. On the 4th of September, 1821, the em- 
peror of Russia had issued an ukase, in which he 
claimed the northwestern coast of North America 
down to the 51st degree. This claim was incompatible 
with the pretensions of both England and the United 
States, and was stoutly opposed by them. This was - 
a part of the territory known as the Oregon country, 
which continued in dispute between England and the 
United States until 1846. In July, 1823, Adams de- 
clared to Baron Tuyll, the Russian minister to the 
United States, " that we should contest the right of 
Russia to any territorial establishment on this con- 
tinent, and that we should assume distinctly the prin- 
ciple that the American continents are no longer sub- 
jects for any new European colonial establishments." 
This language was incorporated substantially in the 
President's message. 

The Monroe Doctrine is comprised in two widely 
separated paragraphs that occur in the message of 
December 2, 1823. The first, relating to Russia's 
encroachments on the northwest coast, and occurring 
near the beginning of the message, was an assertion 
to the effect that the American continents had as- 
sumed an independent condition and were no longer 
open to European colonization. This may be re- 
garded as a statement of fact. No part of the con- 
tinent at that time remained unclaimed. The second 
paragraph relating to Spanish America and occurring 
near the close of the message, was a declaration 
against the extension to the American continents of 
the system of intervention adopted by the Holy Alli- 
ance for the suppression of popular government in j 
Europe. 

75 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

The language used by President Monroe is as fol- 
lows : 

i. At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, 
made through the minister of the emperor residing here, 
a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the 
minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange 
by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests 
of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. 
A similar proposal had been made by His Imperial Majesty 
to the government of Great Britain, which has likewise been 
acceded to. The government of the United States has been 
desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the 
great value which they have invariably attached to the 
friendship of the emperor and their solicitude to cultivate 
the best understanding with his government. In the dis- 
cussions to which this interest has given rise and in the 
arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion 
has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which 
the rights and interests of the United States are involved, 
that the American continents, by the free and independent 
condition which they have assumed and maintain, are hence- 
forth not to be considered as subjects for future coloniza- 
tion by any European powers. 31 

2. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating 
to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it 
comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our 
rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent 
injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the 
movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more 
immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious 
to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political 
system of the allied powers is essentially different in this 
respect from that of America. This difference proceeds 
from that which exists in their respective governments; and 
to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the 
loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the 
wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which 

$1 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents,'' Vol. II, p. 209. 

76 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is 
devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amica- 
ble relations existing between the United States and those 
powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on 
their part to extend their system to any portion of this 
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With 
the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power 
we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with 
the governments who have declared their independence and 
maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great 
consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we 
could not view any interposition for the purpose of op- 
pressing them, or controlling in any other manner their 
destiny, by any European power in any other light than as 
the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the 
United States. In the war between those new governments 
and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their 
recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall con- 
tinue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in 
the judgment of the competent authorities of this govern- 
ment, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the 
United States indispensable to their security. 32 

The President's message reached England while the 
discussion in regard to the proposed congress at Paris 
was still going on. It was received with enthusiasm 
by the liberal members of Parliament. Lord Broug- 
ham said: 

The question with regard to South America is now, I 
believe, disposed of, or nearly so ; for an event has recently 
happened than which none has ever dispersed greater joy, 
exultation, and gratitude over all the free men of Europe; 
that event, which is decisive on the subject, is the language 
held with respect to Spanish America in the message of the 
President of the United States. 



" Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 218. 

77 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 
Sir James Mackintosh said : 

This coincidence of the two great English commonwealths 
(for so I delight to call them; and I heartily pray that they 
may be forever united in the cause of justice and liberty) 
cannot be contemplated without the utmost pleasure by 
every enlightened citizen of the earth." 

They evidently had reference to the second clause 
alone, the one relating to Spanish America. The 
other clause, the one against European colonization 
in America, seems not to have attracted much atten- 
tion. Canning, however, saw the bearing of it and 
objected to the principle it set forth, which was 
directed against England as much as against the 
allies. He was evidently a little taken aback at the 
turn his proposal had taken. The President's mes- 
sage really settled the question before Canning had 
announced what action his government would take. 
Some little chagrin is apparent in the tone of his 
letter to Sir William a Court, British minister at 
Madrid, December 21, 1823. 

While I was yet hesitating [he says], what shape to give 
to the declaration and protest which ultimately was conveyed 
in my conference with P. de Polignac, and while I was more 
doubtful as to the effect of that protest and declaration, I 
sounded Mr. Rush (the American minister here) as to his 
powers and disposition to join in any step which we might 
take to prevent a hostile enterprise on the part of the Euro- 
pean powers against Spanish America. He had no powers ; 
but he would have taken upon himself to join with us if 
we would have begun by recognizing the Spanish-Ameri- 
can states. This we could not do, and so we went on with- 
out. But I have no doubt that his report to his government 
of this sounding, which he probably represented as an over- 



"" Wharton's Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 276. 

78 






SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

ture, had a great share in producing the explicit declaration 
of the President." 

The conference with Prince Polignac here referred 
to was that of October 9th quoted above. It was not 
until after the receipt of President Monroe's message 
in Europe that Canning framed his answer to the 
Spanish communication informing him of the pro- 
posed meeting in Paris for the discussion of the South 
American question. In that reply he stated to the 
Spanish government very fully his views upon the 
question at issue. He said that while England did 
not wish to precede Spain in the matter of recognition, 
yet she reserved to herself the privilege of recogniz- 
ing the colonies when she deemed it best for her in- 
terests and right to them. He said that these views 
had been communicated fully from time to time to the 
powers invited to the congress and he concluded with 
the statement: "It does not appear to the British 
cabinet at all necessary to declare that opinion anew, 
even if it were perfectly clear (from the tenor of M. 
Ofalia's instruction) that Great Britain was in fact 
included in the invitation to the conference at Paris." 35 

While Canning and Monroe acted independentiy of 
each other, the expression that each gave to the views 
of his government was rendered more emphatic and 
of more effect by the knowledge of the other's atti- 
tude in the matter. Another point to be noted is 
that Monroe's message was made public, while Can- 
ning's answer was for some time known only to the 
diplomatic corps. 

The determination of both England and the United 



34 " Wharton's Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 272. 
36 " Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 42. 

79 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

States to oppose the intervention of the allies in South 
America had the desired effect. Conferences in an- 
swer to the invitation of Spain were held in Paris, 
but they were participated in only by the ordinary 
representatives of the powers invited, resident in that 
capital, and their only result was to advise Spain 
not to listen to the counsels of England. 

All further discussion that took place between Eng- 
land and Spain in reference to recognition of the col- 
onies by Great Britain was confined to the status of 
the revolutionary governments, and upon this point 
their views were so divergent that Canning finally 
announced to the Spanish government that, " His 
Majesty would, at his own time, take such steps as 
he might think proper in respect to the several states 
of Spanish America without further reference to the 
court of Madrid; but at the same time without any 
feeling of alienation towards that court, or of hos- 
tility towards the real interests of Spain." 36 

The French troops continuing to occupy Spain after 
the time stipulated by treaty, Canning sought an ex- 
planation from France, but without satisfactory re- 
sults. He therefore determined at a cabinet meeting 
held December 14, 1824, to recognize Mexico and 
Colombia forthwith. On January 1, 1825, after the 
ministers had left England with instructions and full 
powers, the fact of recognition was communicated 
officially to the diplomatic corps and two days later 
it was made public. That this recognition was a re- 
taliatory measure to compensate England for the 
French occupation of Spain was understood at the 
time and was distinctly avowed by Canning two years 



*• " Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 54. 

80 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 

later. 37 In a speech delivered December 12, 1826, 
in defense of his position in not having arrested the 
French invasion of Spain, he said : 

I looked another way — I sought for compensation in an- 
other hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ances- 
tors had knovvn her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, 
it should not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New 
World into existence to redress the balance of the Old. 

In spite of the great indebtedness of South America 
to Canning, this boast falls somewhat flat when we 
remember that the Spanish colonies had won their 
independence by their own valor and had been rec- 
ognized as independent governments by the United 
States two years before Great Britain acted in the 
matter. 

Mr. Stapleton, Canning's private secretary and biog- 
rapher, says that the recognition of Spanish-Ameri- 
can independence was, perhaps, the most important 
measure adopted by the British cabinet while Canning 
was at the head of the foreign office. He sums up 
the reasons and results of the act as follows : 

First, it was a measure essentially advantageous to British 
interests; being especially calculated to benefit our commerce. 
Next, it enabled this country to remain at peace, since it 
compensated us for the continued occupation of Spain by a 
French force, a disparagement to which, otherwise, it would 
not have become us to submit. Lastly, it maintained the 
balance between conflicting principles; since it gave just so 
much of a triumph to popular rights and privileges, as was 
sufficient to soothe the irritation felt by their advocates at the 
victory, which absolute principles had obtained by the over- 

* 7 " Official Corresp. of Canning," Vol. II, p. 242. Letter to Granville. 
On the general question of recognition, see " Life of Lord Liverpool," 
Vol. III. pp. 297-304. 

8l 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

throw of the constitutions of Spain, Portugal, and Naples; 
and it dealt a death-blow to the Holy Alliance, by disabusing 
its members of the strange fancy, with which they were 
prepossessed, that the differences between them and the 
British ministers (where they did differ) were merely feints 
on the part of the latter to avoid a conflict with public 
opinion. 38 

The United States government did not relax its 
efforts in behalf of the South American states with 
the recognition of England, but continued to exert 
itself in order to secure the acknowledgment of their 
independence by the other powers of Europe, par- 
ticularly Spain. 39 Mr. Clay tried to get the other 
members of the alliance, especially the emperor of 
Russia, to use their good offices with Spain for the 
purpose of inducing her to recognize her late colonies, 
but the emperor of Russia, the head of the alliance, 
continued to preach to Spain " not only no recognition 
of their independence, but active war for their sub- 
jugation." To the request of the United States he 
replied that, out of respect for " the indisputable titles 
of sovereignty," he could not prejudge or anticipate 
the determination of the king of Spain. 40 It was some 
ten years before Spain could be persuaded to renounce 
her ancient claims. 



88 " Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. i. 

89 Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, pp. 794-796, and Vol. VI, pp. 
1 006-1014. 

40 Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 850 ff. 



82 



CHAPTER III 

The Diplomacy of the United States in Regard 

to Cuba 

The Cuban question had its origin in the series of 
events that have been narrated in the two preceding 
chapters — the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the 
resulting paralysis of Spanish power in America. The 
declaration of President Monroe, enforced by the well- 
known attitude of England, dealt the death-blow to 
Spanish hopes of recovering the Southern continent. 
Hence the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, which had 
remained loyal to the king, were clung to with all the 
greater tenacity as the sole remains of the imperial pos- 
sessions over which the successors of Ferdinand and 
Isabella had ruled for three centuries. The " Ever- 
faithful Island of Cuba " was rewarded for her loyalty 
by the concession of certain liberties of trade and in- 
vited to send representatives to the Spanish Cortes — a 
privilege which was subsequently withdrawn. Spain 
was now too weak to protect her two West Indian de- 
pendencies — the remains of her former glory, but her 
very weakness secured their possession to her. The 
naval and commercial importance of Cuba, " the pearl 
of the Antilles," made it a prize too valuable to be ac- 
quired by any one of the great maritime powers with- 
out exciting the jealousy and opposition of the others. 
Henceforth, to borrow the figure of a contemporary 
journalist, Cuba was to be the trans- Atlantic Turkey, 

83 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

trembling to its fall, but sustained by the jealousies of 
those who were eager to share the spoils. 

The strategic importance of Cuba, commanding to 
a large extent the commerce of the West Indies and of 
the Central American states, and, what was of vital 
interest to us, the traffic of the Mississippi valley, at- 
tracted at an early period the attention of American 
as well as of European statesmen. In a letter to Presi- 
dent Madison in 1809, Jefferson, in speaking of Na- 
poleon's policy in regard to the Spanish-American 
colonies, said : 

That he would give up the Floridas to withhold inter- 
course with the residue of those colonies cannot be doubted. 
But that is no price; because they are ours in the first mo- 
ment of the first war; and until a war they are of no 
particular necessity to us. But, although with difficulty, he 
will consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union, to prevent 
our aid to Mexico and the other provinces. That would be 
a price, and I would immediately erect a column on the 
southern-most limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a ne plus ultra 
as to us in that direction. 1 

President Madison expressed his views on the 
Cuban question in a letter to William Pinkney, October 
30, 1810: 

The position of Cuba gives the United States so deep an 
interest in the destiny, even, of that island, that although 
they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied 
spectator at its falling under any European government, 
which might make a fulcrum of that position against the 
commerce and security of the United States. 2 



1 H. A. Washington, " Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. V, p. 443. 

2 " Madison's Works," Vol. II. p. 488 



84 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

This was the first statement in the evolution of a 
Cuban policy consistently adhered to by the United 
States until the successes of the Mexican war super- 
induced larger ideas of the mission and destiny of the 
Union. 

As early as 1817 fears as to the fate of Cuba were 
raised in the minds of the American public by news- 
paper reports to the effect that England had proposed 
a relinquishment of her claim against Spain for the 
maintenance of the British army during the Peninsular 
campaign, amounting to £15,000,000, in return for the 
cession of the island. 3 Reports of this nature were 
circulated for several months on both sides of the 
Atlantic, but the question did not assume any very 
great importance until 18 19, when the treaty for the 
cession of the Floridas to the United States was 
being negotiated with Spain. It was then insisted by 
the British press that the acquisition of the Floridas 
would give the United States such a preponderating 
influence in West Indian affairs as to render necessary 
the occupation of Cuba by Great Britain as the natural 
and only off-set. 4 The Florida treaty was ratified 
after some delay, which, however, does not appear to 
have been caused by the British government, as was 
supposed at the time. The British papers, neverthe- 
less, continued to condemn in strong terms the treaty 
as well as the inaction of their government in not mak- 
ing it a pretext for the seizure of Cuba. 

As the preparations of France for the invasion of 
Spain in 1823 progressed the fate of Cuba became a 

8 Niles's " Register," under date November 8, 1817. 

* For a full discussion of the question see the pamphlet by J. Freeman 
Rattenbury, entitled, " The Cession of the Floridas to the United States 
of America and the Necessity of Acquiring the Island of Cuba by Great 
Britain." London, 1819. 

85 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

question of absorbing interest in America. There was 
little hope that the island would continue a dependency 
of Spain. It was rumored that Great Britain had 
engaged to supply the constitutional government of 
Spain with money in her struggle with France and 
would occupy Cuba as a pledge for its repayment. 
Both Spanish and French journals spoke of British 
occupation of Cuba as a matter no longer to be 
doubted, and the presence in the West Indies of a 
large British squadron, sent nominally for the purpose 
of suppressing piracy, seemed to lend color to the 
reports. 5 The British press was clamoring for the 
acquisition of Cuba. The Packet declared : " The 
question then comes to this, shall England occupy 
Cuba, or by permitting its acquisition by the United 
States (which they have long desired) sacrifice her 
whole West India trade? There can be no hesitation 
as to the answer." 

The British government, however, officially, dis- 
claimed all designs upon Cuba, but this disclaimer did 
not fully reassure the American government, and our 
representatives abroad were instructed to exercise a 
close scrutiny upon all negotiations between Spain and 
England. In the spring of 1823 Mr. Forsyth was suc- 
ceeded by Mr. Nelson at the court of Madrid. In his 
instructions to the new minister, which went much be- 
yond the usual length and were occupied almost ex- 
clusively with a discussion of the Cuban question, John 
Quincy Adams used the following remarkable words : 

" In looking forward to the probable course of 
events for the short period of half a century, it seems 
scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the an- 

6 Niles's "Register," March and April, 1823. 

86 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

nexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be in- 
dispensable to the continuance and integrity of the 
Union itself." We were not then prepared for an- 
nexation, he continued, " but there are laws of political 
as well as physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed 
by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but 
fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its 
own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable 
of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North 
American Union, which, by the same law of nature, 
cannot cast her off from its bosom." 6 

President Monroe consulted Jefferson on the subject 
of Spanish-American affairs and the entanglements 
with European powers likely to arise therefrom. Jef- 
ferson replied, June II, 1823: 

Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to 
us. Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great 
calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guarantee- 
ing its independence against all the world, except Spain, it 
would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own. But 
should she take it, I would not immediately go to war for 
it ; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us, 
or the island will give itself to us when able to do so. 7 

During the summer of 1825 a large French squad- 
ron visited the West Indies and hovered for several 
weeks about the coasts of Cuba. This action on the 
part of the French government, without explanation, 
excited the alarm of both England and the United 
States and drew forth strong protests from Mr. Can- 
ning and from Mr. Clay. Canning wrote to Gran- 

• " H. Ex. Doc. No. i2i, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also Brit, 
and For. St. Pap., Vol XLIV, pp. 114-236. 
» H. A. Washington, " Writings of Jefferson," Vol. VII, p. 288. 

87 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

ville, the British minister at Paris, that he could not 
consent to the occupation of Havana by France, even 
as a measure of protection against possible attacks 
from Mexico and Colombia. 8 Again some two months 
later he wrote : 

As to Cuba you cannot too soon nor too amicably, of 
course, represent to Villele the impossibility of our allowing 
France (or France us, I presume) to meddle in the internal 
affairs of that colony. We sincerely wish it to remain with 
the mother-country. Next to that I wish it independent, 
either singly or in connection with Mexico. But what 
cannot or must not be, is that any great maritime power 
should get possession of it. The Americans (Yankees, I 
mean) think of this matter just as I do. 9 

The expressions of the United States, as to the de- 
signs of France, were as emphatic as those of England. 
Mr. Clay declared " that we could not consent to the 
occupation of those islands by any other European 
power than Spain under any contingency whatever." 10 

In this connection Canning wished to bring about 
the signature, by England, France, and the United 
States, of " ministerial notes, one between France and 
the United States, and one between France and Great 
Britain, or one tripartite note signed by all, disclaim- 
ing each for themselves, any intention to occupy Cuba, 
and protesting against such occupation by either of 
the others." ll The government of the United States 
held this proposal under advisement, but on France 
declining, it was dropped. 12 In 1826 when an attack 

• " Official Corresp. of Canning," Vol. I, p. 265. 
8 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 275. 

10 Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 855- Also " Wharton's Digest," 
Sec. 60. 

11 Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning." Vol. Ill, p. 154. 

13 Mr. Clay to Mr. King, October 25, " Wharton's Digest," Sec. 60. 

88 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

upon Portugal was feared Canning advised, in case of 
such an attack, the immediate seizure of Cuba by Great 
Britain as more effective than half a dozen Peninsular 
campaigns. 13 

The Cuban question was involved in the long debate 
on the proposal of the executive of the United States 
to send delegates to the congress of Spanish-American 
republics assembled at Panama in 1826. This debate 
occupied the attention of Congress during the winter 
and spring of 1826, and was engaged in with great 
earnestness. One of the chief objections to the pro- 
posed mission was the fact that the question of Cuba 
and Porto Rico would come up and that the United 
States government had already committed itself to the 
foreign powers on that subject. The report of the 
Senate committee on foreign relations declared that, 

The very situation of Cuba and Porto Rico furnishes the 
strongest inducement to the United States not to take a 
place at the contemplated congress, since, by so doing, they 
must be considered as changing the attitude in which they 
hitherto have stood as impartial spectators of the passing- 
scenes, and identifying themselves with the new republics. 14 

The Southern members were united in their opposi- 
tion to the Panama mission, and in fact to any closer 
alliance with the new republics, for the reason that 
the latter had adopted the principle of emancipation 
and any further extension of their influence would 
jeopardize the institution of slavery in the United 
States. For the same reason they were opposed to 
the transfer of Cuba to any other European power. If 
a change from its connection with Spain were neces- 

18 Canning to Earl of Liverpool, October 6, 1826. 
14 Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 863. 

89 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

sary they favored annexation by the United States, 
and meantime they were strongly opposed to the gov- 
ernment entering into any engagement with foreign 
powers or in any way committing itself on the Cuban 
question. 15 

The declaration of Mr. Clay against the interference 
of England and France in the affairs of Cuba was 
consistently adhered to under the administrations of 
Jackson and Van Buren. 

In 1838-39, the British government dispatched spe- 
cial commissioners to Cuba and Porto Rico to report 
on the condition of the slave trade. The presence of 
these agents in Cuba gave rise to reports that Great 
Britain contemplated revolutionizing the island, or at 
least occupying it for the purpose of suppressing the 
slave trade. The United States gave Spain to under- 
stand that we would not consent to British control in 
whatever way it might be brought about. Mr. For- 
syth wrote to Mr. Vail, our representative at Madrid, 
July 15, 1840: 

You are authorized to assure the Spanish government, that 
in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from 
her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend 
upon the military and naval resources of the United States 
to aid her in preserving or recovering it. 1 ' 

Again, Mr. Webster in January, 1843, wrote to Mr. 
Campbell, United States consul at Havana: 

The Spanish government has long been in possession of 
the policy and wishes of this government in regard to Cuba, 

16 Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VIII, pp. 427, 428, and Vol. IX, 
pp. go 218. 

16 H. Ex. Doc. No. 121, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also "Wharton's 
Digest," Sec. 60. 

90 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

which have never changed, and has repeatedly been told 
that the United States never would permit the occupation 
of that island by British agents or forces upon any pretext 
whatever; and that in the event of any attempt to wrest 
it from her, she might securely rely upon the whole naval 
and military resources of this country to aid her in preserving 
or recovering it. 17 

A copy of this letter was also sent to Washington 
Irving, our representative at Madrid to make such 
use of as circumstances might require. 18 

During the first period of our Cuban diplomacy the 
efforts of this government were directed toward pre- 
venting the acquisition of the island, or the establish- 
ment of a protectorate over it, by Great Britain or 
France. With the Mexican war, however, and the 
growing conviction of " manifest destiny," our foreign 
policy assumed a much bolder and more aggressive 
character, and during the next fifteen years all manner 
of schemes for the southward extension of our terri- 
tory were suggested and many of them actually under- 
taken. Cuba became an object of desire, not only in the 
eyes of the slave-holding population of the South as an 
acquisition to slave territory, but of a large part of 
the nation, because of its strategic importance in rela- 
tion to the inter-oceanic transit routes of Central 
America, which seemed the only feasible line of com- 
munication with our rapidly developing interests in 
California. Consequently various attempts were 
made to annex the island to the United States, both by 
purchase from Spain and forcibly by filibustering ex- 
peditions. 



17 " Wharton's Digest," Sec. 60. 

18 Mr. Upshur, who succeeded Mr. Webster as secretary of state, wrote 
to Mr. Irving to the same effect, October 10, 1843. 

91 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

In June, 1848, under the administration of Presi- 
dent Polk, Mr. Buchanan, secretary of state, wrote 
to our minister at Madrid, directing him to open nego- 
tiations with the Spanish government for the purchase 
of Cuba. After referring to the dangers of British 
occupation and to the advantages of annexation, he 
said : " Desirable, however, as this island may be to the 
United States, we would not acquire it except by the 
free will of Spain. Any acquisition not sanctioned by 
justice and honor would be too dearly purchased." 
He stated that the President would stipulate for the 
payment of $100,000,000, as a maximum price. 19 This 
offer was rejected by the Spanish government. The 
minister of state after several months' delay finally re- 
plied " that it was more than any minister dare to 
entertain any such proposition; that he believed such 
to be the feeling of the country, that sooner than see 
the island transferred to any power, they would prefer 
seeing it sunk in the ocean." 

Under the Whig administration of Taylor and Fill- 
more no effort was made for the purchase of Cuba. 
On August 2, 1849, Mr. Clayton wrote to Mr. Bar- 
ringer that the government did not desire to renew the 
negotiation for the purchase of Cuba made by the 
late administration, since the proposition had been con- 
sidered by the Spanish government as a national in- 
dignity; that should Spain desire to part with Cuba, 
the proposal must come from her. 

About this time active preparations were going on 
for the invasion of Cuba by an armed expedition 
under the Cuban patriot Narciso Lopez. On August 



'• Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Saunders, Tune 17, 1848. H. Ex. Doc. N T o. 121, 
Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. XXVI. 

92 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

ii, 1849, President Taylor issued a proclamation 
warning all citizens of the United States against tak- 
ing part in such expedition and saying, " No such per- 
sons must expect the interference of this government 
in any form on their behalf, no matter to what ex- 
tremities they may be reduced in consequence of their 
conduct." 20 A few days later the entire force of 
Lopez was arrested by the United States marshal just 
as it was on the point of leaving New York. 

Nothing daunted, Lopez traveled through the south- 
ern and southwestern states secretly enlisting men and 
making arrangements for their transportation to Cuba. 
Many men of prominence at the South were in open 
and avowed sympathy with the enterprise. In the 
spring of 1850, Lopez called upon Gen. John A. Quit- 
man, governor of Mississippi, who had served with 
great distinction in the Mexican war, and offered him, 
in the name of his compatriots, the leadership of the 
revolution and the supreme command of the army. 
Quitman's sympathies were thoroughly enlisted in the 
movement, but he declined the honor on account of 
the serious aspect of political affairs, particularly what 
he considered the encroachments of the federal gov- 
ernment upon the rights of the states. He made 
liberal contributions of money, however, and gave 
Lopez sound advice about his undertaking, insisting 
that he must have an advance column of at least 2,000 
men to maintain a footing on the island until reinforce- 
ments could go to their aid. 21 

20 "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. V, p. 7. 

21 J. F. H. Claiborne, " Life and Corresp. of John A. Quitman," Vol. II, 
PP 55-56, and Appendix, p. 385. 

In June the Grand Jury of the United States Circuit Court at New 
Orleans found a bill against John A. Quitman. John Henderson, Governor 
of Louisiana, and others, for setting on foot the invasion of Cuba. Quitman's 

93 



4r 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

Unfortunately for Lopez he did not follow the ad- 
vice of Quitman. A company of volunteers altogether 
inadequate for the successful accomplishment of the 
enterprise was collected at New Orleans. There Lopez 
chartered a steamer, the Creole, and two barks, the 
Georgiana and the Susan Loud. Three-fourths of the 
volunteers had served in the Mexican war. The first 
detachment comprising 250 men left New Orleans in 
the bark Georgiana, April 25, 1850, under the com- 
mand of Col. Theodore O'Hara. They proceeded to 
the island of Contoy off the coast of Yucatan in the 
territory of Mexico. There they were joined three 
weeks later by Lopez and 450 followers in the Creole. 
The entire command, with the exception of the crews 
of the two barks and a few others to guard the stores, 
embarked in the Creole and effected a landing at Car- 
denas, but the natives did not come to the aid of Lopez 
and after holding the town for twelve hours he reluc- 
tantly reembarked and headed for Key West. The 
Creole was pursued by the Pizarro, a Spanish war 
vessel, which steamed into the harbor just as she cast 
anchor. For a few moments the Spaniards seemed to 
be on the point of preparing to open fire on the Creole, 
but when they saw the United States custom-house of- 



view of state sovereignty did not admit the tight of the United 
States Courts to proceed against the chief executive of a sovereign state. 
He sought the advice of friends throughout the South as to what course 
he should pursue. None of them admitted the right of the United States 
Courts to indict him and several of them advised him that it was his duty 
to assert the principle of state sovereignty even to the point of calling 
out the state militia to protect him against arrest. Others advised him to 
submit under protest so as to avoid an open breach. This course was 
finally adopted, and when the United States marshal appeared on the 
3rd of February, 185 1, to take him into custody, he yielded, causing at 
the same time an address to be issued to the people of Mississippi, in 
which he resigned the office of governor After proceedings which lasted 
two months, Henderson was acquitted and the charges against Quitman 
and the others dismissed. 

94 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

ficers take possession of her they changed their minds 
and left the harbor. 

The two barks, which had been left with a small 
guard at the island of Contoy, were captured by Span- 
ish warships, taken to Havana, condemned as prizes 
and the men put on trial for participation in the Lopez 
expedition. As these men had committed no act of 
hostility against Spain, and had, moreover, been seized 
on neutral territory, the United States government at 
once issued its protest and demanded their release. 
The Spanish government replied that these men had 
been described as pirates by the President of the 
United States in his proclamation warning citizens 
against joining the expedition and were, therefore, 
beyond the pale of the protection of the United States. 
After heated negotiations which lasted several months 
and seriously threatened the peace of the two coun- 
tries, the prisoners were released, but it was declared 
to be an act of grace on the part of the Queen and not 
a concession to the demands of the United States. 22 

Lopez was prosecuted by the United States govern- 
ment for violation of the neutrality laws, but escaped 
conviction and at once set about organizing another 
expedition. On August 3, 185 1, the third and last ex- 
pedition of Lopez, consisting of over 400 men, left 
New Orleans. After touching at Key West the 
steamer proceeded to the coast of Cuba and landed the 
expedition at Bahia Honda. The main body under 
Lopez proceeded into the country where they had been 
led to expect a general uprising of the Cubans. Col. 
W. S. Crittenden, who had served with bravery in 
the Mexican war, was left in command of a smaller 

" Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 41, Thirty-first Cong., Second Sess. 

95 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

body to bring up the baggage. This detachment was 
attacked on the 13th and forced to retreat to the place 
where they had landed, where about fifty of them ob- 
tained boats and tried to escape. They were, however, 
intercepted off the coast, taken to Havana, sentenced 
before a military court, and executed on the 16th. 

The main body under Lopez was overcome and dis- 
persed by Spanish troops on the 24th. Lopez was 
taken prisoner, tried, and executed. Many of his fol- 
lowers were killed or died of hunger and fatigue and 
the rest made prisoners. Upon receipt of this news 
Commodore Parker was at once ordered to proceed in 
a frigate to Havana to inquire into the charges against 
the prisoners executed, and the circumstances of their 
capture, trial, and sentence. To these inquiries the cap- 
tain-general replied that he considered those executed 
as pirates, that they had been so denounced by the 
President of the United States in his proclamation, 
that he was not at liberty to furnish a copy of the 
court records, but would send them to Madrid and to 
the Spanish minister at Washington. 23 

When the news of the executions at Havana reached 
New Orleans the excitement was intense. The office 
of the Spanish consul was broken into, portraits of 
the Queen and Captain-General of Cuba defaced, the 
Spanish flag torn in pieces, and the consul burned in 
effigy in LaFayette Square. The consul had to flee 
from the city for safety and the property of certain 
Spaniards residing in New Orleans was destroyed. A 
long correspondence ensued between the two govern- 
ments. The United States agreed to pay an indemnity 

;3 H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess. ; also 2d Annual 
Message of Fillmore, December 2, 1851. " Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents'' Vol. V, p. 113. 

96 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

for injuries to the public property of Spain, but not A & 

for the destruction of property belonging to Spanish 
residents, who were entitled only to the same protec- 
tion afforded our own citizens. 24 

A few weeks after the last Lopez expedition the 
British and French representatives at Washington 
notified our government that orders had been issued 
to their squadrons in the West Indies to repel by force 
any attempts at the invasion of Cuba from any quarter. 
Our government replied that such action on the part 
of England and France could " not but be regarded by 
the United States with grave disapproval, as involving 
on the part of European sovereigns combined action 
of protectorship over American waters." 25 

In order to allay the uneasiness caused by the at- 
tempts of filibusters, supposed to be encouraged or at 
least connived at by the government of the United 
States, the Spanish government requested Great Brit- 
ain and France, in January, 1852, to secure the sig- 
nature by the American government in conjunction 
with them of an abnegatory declaration with respect 
to Cuba. 26 Accordingly in April, 1852, the British and 
French ministers at Washington brought the subject 
to the attention of this government in notes of the 
same date, suggesting a tripartite convention for the 
guarantee of Cuba to Spain. 27 

To this proposal Mr. Webster replied in part as 
follows : 



24 H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess. 

26 Mr. Crittenden to Comte de Sartiges, October 22, 1851. See also 
Pres. Fillmore to Mr. Webster and Mr. Webster's reply. 2 Curtis's " Life 
of Webster," p. 551. 

26 Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. XLIV, Lord Howden to Earl Gran- 
ville, January 9, 1852. 

27 Comte de Sartiges to Mr. Webster, April 23, 1852. Sen. Ex. Doc. 
No. 13, Thirty-second Cong., Second Sess. 

97 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

It has been stated and often repeated to the government 
of Spain by this government, under various administrations, 
not only that the United States have no design upon Cuba 
themselves, but that, if Spain should refrain from a volun- 
tary cession of the island to any other European power, she 
■ might rely on the countenance and friendship of the United 
States to assist her in the defense and preservation of that 
island. At the same time it has always been declared to 
Spain that the government of the United States could not 
be expected to acquiesce in the cession of Cuba to an Euro- 
*• pean power. 

He reminded them, furthermore, that " the policy of 
the United States has uniformly been to avoid, as far 
as possible, alliances or agreements with other states, 
and to keep itself free from national obligations, except 
such as afreet directly the interests of the United States 
themselves." 28 

The matter was again urged upon the United States 
by the British and French governments in notes to 
Mr. Webster, dated July 9, 1852, in which the inde- 
feasibility of the Spanish title to the island and its 
bearings upon the neutrality of the proposed Central 
American canals were dwelt upon. The death of Mr. 
Webster postponed for some time the answer of the 
United States, but the proposal was finally rejected 
in a notable dispatch prepared by Webster's successor, 
Edward Everett. 

With the growth of the slavery conflict, which had 
now become paramount to all other questions, the an- 
nexation of Cuba had become a party issue, and the 
return of the Democratic party to power, in 1853, was 
hailed by the southern extremists as a signal for the 

'* Mr. Webster to Comte de Sartiges, April 29, 1852. To Mr. Cramp- 
ton, same date, to same effect. 

98 






THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

acquisition of the long coveted prize. This expecta- 
tion was further heightened by the declaration of 
President Pierce, in his inaugural address, that the 
policy of his administration would " not be controlled 
by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion," and 
that the acquisition of certain possessions not within 
our jurisdiction was " eminently important for our 
protection, if not in the future essential for the preser- 
vation of the rights of commerce and the peace of 
the world." 

William L. Marcy, of New York, was appointed 
secretary of state and for the mission to Spain the 
President selected Pierre Soule of Louisiana, a 
Frenchman by birth and education, who had been 
exiled for political reasons. His appointment under 
the circumstances created unfavorable comment both 
in this country and in Europe, and his sojourn of 
several days at Paris on the way to his post at Madrid 
caused the French government some annoyance. Louis 
Napoleon advised the court of Madrid not to receive 
him, as his views on the Cuban question were well 
known to be of a radical character. 

In his instructions to Mr. Soule, July 23, 1853. Mr. 
Marcy emphasized the importance of our relations 
with Spain in view of the rumors of contemplated 
changes in the internal affairs of Cuba and of the re- 
cent interposition of England and France. He di- 
rected him to try to negotiate a commercial treaty 
with Spain favorable to our trade with Cuba, and 
pointed out the urgent necessity of allowing a " quali- 
fied diplomatic intercourse between the captain-general 
of that island and our consul at Havana, in order to 
prevent difficulties and preserve a good understanding 

99 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

between the two countries." 29 The difficulty of set- 
tling disputes arising in Cuba had been the subject of 
frequent remonstrances on the part of the United 
States. The captain-general was clothed with almost 
" unlimited powers for aggression, but with none for 
reparation." He exercised no diplomatic functions 
and was in no way subject to the authority of the 
Spanish minister at Washington. 

Upon the arrival of Mr. Soule in Spain, he found 
that Mr. Calderon, the head of the cabinet, was 
strongly opposed to any commercial treaty or agree- 
ment which would promote intercourse between the 
United States and the dependencies of Spain, and 
equally averse to allowing the captain-general any dip- 
lomatic powers. 30 Mr. Soule was by nature hot- 
headed and impetuous and could suffer anything 
sooner than enforced inactivity. Whatever may have 
been the intentions of the executive in sending him, 
he had come to Madrid for the purpose of consum- 
mating the long cherished scheme of acquiring Cuba. 
Accordingly, on February 23, 1854, he wrote to Mr. 
Marcy that the affairs of the Spanish government were 
about to reach a crisis, that a change of ministry was 
imminent, and that contingencies involving the fate of 
Cuba were likely to arise which might be of great in- 
terest to the United States. He, therefore, asked for 
definite instructions. Relying upon these representa- 
tions and upon Mr. Soule's judgment, Mr. Marcy 
transmited in due time the necessary powers, author- 
izing him to negotiate with Spain for the purchase of 
Cuba, or for its independence, if such an arrange- 

39 H. Ex. Doc. No. 93. Thirty-third Cong., Second Sess., p. 3. 
■° Mr. Soule to Mr. Marcy, November 10, and December 23, 1853, and 
January 20, 1854. 

IOO 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

ment would be more agreeable to Spanish pride, in 
which event the United States would be willing to 
contribute substantial aid to the result. 

In the meantime, however, the Black Warrior affair 
had strained the relations of the two countries almost 
to the point of rupture. This case, involving the 
seizure of an American steamer by Spanish officials 
at Havana for an unintentional violation or neglect 
of custom-house regulations, was of an unusually ex- 
asperating character. 

As soon as the department at Washington was fully J 
informed of this outrage, Mr. Marcy forwarded all 
the documents in the case to Mr. Soule and directed 
him to demand of the Spanish government a prompt 
disavowal of the act and the payment of an indemnity 
to the owners of the vessel and of the cargo, the 
extent of the injury being estimated at $300,000. On 
April 8 Mr. Soule presented a formal demand on the 
part of his government. No answer to this note hav- 
ing been received, on the nth he repeated his demands 
much more emphatically, calling for an indemnity of 
$300,000, insisting that all persons, whatever their 
rank or importance, who were concerned in the perpe- 
tration of the wrong, be dismissed from her majesty's 
service, and finally declaring that non-compliance with 
these demands within forty-eight hours would be con- 
sidered by the government of the United States as 
equivalent to a declaration that her majesty's govern- 
ment was determined to uphold the conduct of its 
officers. 

Mr. Calderon replied, on the 12th, that whenever 
her majesty's government should have before it the 
authentic and complete data, which it then lacked, a 

101 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

reply would be given to the demand of the United 
States conformable to justice and right ; that the per- 
emptory tone of Mr. Soule's note suggested to the 
government of her majesty " a suspicion that it was 
not so much the manifestation of a lively interest in 
the defense of pretended injuries, as an incomprehen- 
sible pretext for exciting estrangement, if not a quarrel 
between two friendly powers." To this note Mr. 
Soule replied that the suggestion made as to the mo- 
tives of the United States in seeking redress was " but 
little creditable to the candor of her Catholic majesty's 
government, and comes in very bad grace from one 
who, like your excellency, cannot but be aware that the 
records of this legation, as well as those of her Catho- 
lic majesty's department of state, are loaded with 
reclamations bearing on grievances most flagrant, 
which have never been earnestly attended to and were 
met at their inception with precisely the same dilatory 
excuses through which the present one is sought to 
be evaded." 

Meanwhile the aspects of the case were altogether 
changed by a private agreement between the Havana of- 
ficials and the owners of the Black Warrior, by which 
the ship and her cargo were released. Mr. Soule con- 
tinued, however, according to instructions from Wash- 
ington, to demand compensation for the damages sus- 
tained by the owners and passengers not compensated 
for by the return of the ship and cargo, and also repa- 
ration for the insult to the United States flag. The 
Spanish government, however, refused to recognize 
any ground for reparation after the restitution of the 
ship and cargo, and persisted in contradicting, without 
the support of any evidence whatever, the facts as 

102 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

presented by the United States, although they were all 
certified to in proper legal form. 
v On June 24 Mr. Marcy wrote that the President 
was far from satisfied with the manner in which our 
demands were treated by the Spanish government, but 
that before resorting to extreme measures he was de- 
termined to make a final appeal to Spain for the ad- 
justment of past difficulties and for the guarantee of 
more friendly relations in the future. Although satis- 
fied with the spirited manner in which Mr. Soule had 
performed the duties of his mission, the President was 
considering the expediency of reinforcing the demands 
of the United States by the appointment of an ex- 
traordinary commission of two distinguished citizens 
to act in conjunction with him. He instructed him, 
therefore, not to press the affair of the Black Warrior, 
but to wait until the question of the special commis- 
sion could be laid before Congress. 

/During the summer there was a change of ministry 
in the Spanish government, which, as was not infre- 
quently the case, was attended with more or less seri- 
ous disorders. In August Mr. Marcy wrote that in 
view of the unsettled condition of affairs in Spain and 
for other reasons not stated, the purpose of sending 
a special mission had, for the present at least, been 
abandoned. Without pressing matters Mr. Soule was, 
nevertheless, to avail himself of any opportunity 
which might be presented, of settling the affairs in 
dispute and of negotiating for the purchase of Cuba. 
Under the same date he proposed to Mr. Soule the 
plan of consulting with Mr. Mason and Mr. Buchanan, 
our ministers at Paris and London, for the purpose of 
overcoming any obstacles that England and France 

103 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

might interpose. This suggestion led to the celebrated 
meeting at Ostend and the so-called manifesto. 

In accordance with the instructions of the President, 
Messrs. Soule, Mason, and Buchanan proceeded to 
make arrangements for the proposed conference, 
which was held at Ostend, in Belgium, October 9, 10, 
11, 1854. They then adjourned to Aix-la-Chapelle for 
a week, where the reports of their proceedings were 
prepared. 

The greater part of the report is taken up with an 
enumeration of the advantages that would accrue to 
the United States from the acquisition of Cuba, and 
an elaborate exposition of the ways in which the inter- 
ests of Spain would be promoted by the sale. The only 
specific recommendation of the report was that a pro- 
posal should be made through the proper diplomatic 
channel to the Supreme Constituent Cortes about to 
assemble, to purchase Cuba from Spain, the maximum 
price to be $120,000,000. The report then proceeds 
to discuss the question, what ought to be the course of 
the American government should Spain refuse to sell 
Cuba ? The ministers declared : 

After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far 
beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it 
will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba, in the 
possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace 
and the existence of our cherished Union? 

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, 
by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified _in 
wresting it from Spain if we possess the power; and this 
upon the very same principle that would justify an individual 
in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there 
were no other means of preventing the flames from destroy- 
ing his own home. 

104 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

The report also recommended that all proceedings 
in reference to the negotiations with Spain " ought to 
be open, frank, and public." This recommendation, 
together with the general character of the report, in- 
dicates that its authors were rather bent on making 
political capital of the affair at home than on seriously 
furthering negotiations at Madrid. As a matter of 
fact the Ostend Manifesto made Buchanan an accept- 
able presidential candidate to the southern wing of the 
Democratic party and played no small part in securing 
for him the nomination in i856. 31 
I The objectionable features of the report were 
politely but firmly repudiated by the administration in 
Marcy's reply to Soule and Soule promptly resigned 
his mission. This fact was generally overlooked at 
the time, while the unfortunate publicity given to the 
proceedings at Ostend brought endless censure upon 
President Pierce and Secretary Marcy. 

In spite of the " jingo " policy attributed to the 
Pierce administration, the complications arising out of 
the seizure of the Black Warrior were not made a 
casus belli, as might easily have been done. After 
Mr. Soule's return to the United States the negotia- 
tions were continued by his successor. The conduct 
of the officials concerned in the seizure was disavowed, 
and the indemnity claimed by the American citizens 
concerned was paid. The administration closed on 
terms of comparative friendship with Spain, although 
there were numbers of claims still unadjusted. The 
Cuban question figured conspicuously in the campaign 
of 1856. The platform of the Democratic party was 

81 The correspondence relating to the Black Warrior case and to the 
Ostend conference is contained in H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-third Ccng., 
Second Sess. 

105 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

strongly in favor of acquisition, while the new Repub- 
lican platform stigmatized the Ostend manifesto as the 
highwayman's plea. 

Until the Buchanan administration all negotiations 
for the purchase of Cuba had been undertaken on the 
authority of the executive alone. An effort was now 
made to get the two houses of Congress to concur in 
an appropriation for this purpose. It was thought that 
united action on the part of the legislative and execu- 
tive branches of the government would produce some 
impression on Spain. Accordingly, in his second, 
third and fourth annual messages, President Buchanan 
brought the matter to the attention of Congress, but 
his appeal met with little encouragement. In January, 
1859, Senator Slidell, the chairman of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations, reported a bill carrying 
$30,000,000, to be placed at the disposal of the Presi- 
dent as a preliminary sum for the purchase of Cuba. 32 

This report created violent opposition, and in Feb- 
ruary the bill was withdrawn by Mr. Slidell at the 
urgent request of his friends. 

The annexationist and filibustering schemes of the 
decade immediately preceding the War of Secession 
; were prompted by two motives. The one was the 
extension of slave territory, or at least the thwarting 
of the schemes of emancipation for Cuba which Great 
Britain was urging upon the Spanish government. 
The other was to secure, by the occupation of this 
strong strategic position, undisputed control over the 
proposed interoceanic canal routes of Central America 
and communication by this means with the new states 
on the Pacific coast. These motives for annexation 

"Sen. Report No. 331, Thirty-fifth Cong., Second Sess., Vol. I. 

I06 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

were removed, the one by the abolition of slavery in 
the United States, and the other by the construction 
of the great transcontinental railroads which estab- 
lished direct overland communication with the Pacific 
states. During the period following the civil war, 
therefore, our policy was mainly concerned in urging 
upon the Spanish government the abolition of slavery 
in Cuba, the establishment of a more liberal form of 
government through independence or autonomy, and 
the promotion of more untrammelled commercial in- 
tercourse with the United States. 

The abolition of slavery in the southern states left 
the Spanish Antilles in the enjoyment of a monopoly 
of slave labor, which in the production of sugar, espe- 
cially, gave them advantages which overcame all com- 
petition. This led to the formation of a strong Span- 
ish party, for whom the cause of slavery and that of 
Spanish dominion were identical. These were known 
as Peninsulars on Spanish immigrants. They were the 
official class, the wealthy planters and slave-owners 
and the real rulers of Cuba. On the other hand there 
was a party composed of Creoles, or native Cubans, 
whose cry was "Cuba for the Cubans!" and who 
hoped to effect the complete separation of the island 
from Spain, either through their own efforts or 
through the assistance of the United States. Not in- 
frequently in the same family, the father, born and 
brought up in the Peninsula, was an ardent loyalist, 
while the son, born in Cuba, was an insurgent at heart, 
if not actually enlisted in the ranks. 

The Spanish revolution of September, 1868, was the 
signal for an uprising of the native or Creole party in 
the eastern part of the island. This movement was 

107 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

not at first ostensibly for independence, but for the 
revolution in Spain, the cries being " Hurrah for 
Prim!" "Hurrah for the Revolution!" Its real 
character was, however, apparent from the first and 
its supporters continued for a period of ten years, 
without regard to the numerous vicissitudes through 
which the Spanish government passed — the provis- 
ional government, the regency, the elective monarchy, 
the republic, and the restored Bourbon dynasty — to 
wage a dogged, though desultory warfare against the 
constituted authorities of the island. This struggle 
was almost coterminous with President Grant's ad- 
ministration of eight years. 

At an early stage of the contest the Spanish authori- 
ties conceived it to be necessary to issue certain decrees 
which were contrary to public law and, in so far as 
they affected citizens of the United States, in violation 
of treaty obligations. On March 24, 1869, the cap- 
tain-general issued a decree authorizing the capture on 
the high seas of vessels carrying men, arms, munitions, 
or effects in aid of the insurgents, and declaring that 
" all persons captured in such vessels without regard 
to their number will be immediately executed." 33 By 
another decree the estates of American citizens sus- 
pected of sympathy with the insurgents were confis- 
cated. 34 Secretary Hamilton Fish protested against 
these decrees so far as they affected citizens of the 
United States, as they were in violation of the pro- 
visions of the treaty of 1795. 

On July 7, 1869, the captain-general issued another 
decree closing certain ports, declaring voyages with 



•» Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 7, Forty-first Cong., Second Ses9. 
84 Ibid. 

108 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

arms, ammunition, or crew for the insurgents illegal, 
and directing cruisers on the high seas to bring into 
port all vessels found to be enemies. On July 16 Mr. 
Fish called the attention of the Spanish minister to this 
decree, saying that it assumed powers over the com- 
merce of the United States that could be permitted 
only in time of war; that the United States would not 
yield the right to carry contraband of war in time of 
peace, and would not permit their vessels to be inter- 
fered with on the high seas except in time of war; that 
if Spain was at war she should give notice to the 
United States to that effect, and that a continuance of 
the decree or any attempt to enforce it would be re- 
garded as a recognition by Spain of a state of war in 
Cuba. This declaration produced a prompt modifi- 
cation of the decree so far as it concerned the search 
of vessels on the high seas. 

v/As our commercial interests at large, as well as the 
interests of individual citizens, were deeply affected 
by the condition of the island, President Grant deter- 
mined at the beginning of his administration to offer 
to mediate between Spain and the insurgents. Gen- 
eral Daniel E. Sickles was appointed minister to Spain 
and his instructions, under date of June 29, 1869, di- 
rected him to offer to the cabinet at Madrid the good 
offices of the United States for the purpose of bring- 
ing to a close the civil war then ravaging the island 
and establishing the independence of Cuba. Mr. Fish 
instructed General Sickles to explain to the Spanish 
government that he used the term civil war advisedly, 
not as implying any public recognition of belligerent 
rights, but a condition of affairs that might not justify 
withholding much longer those rights from the insur- 

109 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

gents. 35 In reply Spain agreed to accept the good of- 
fices of the United States, but on conditions that were 
impracticable and unsatisfactory. At the same time 
the Spanish government allowed the purport of Gen- 
eral Sickles's note tendering the good offices of the 
United States to get out, and it was accepted by the 
press as indicating the purpose of the United States 
to recognize the Cubans as belligerents if its offer of 
mediation were refused. No Spanish cabinet could 
possibly endure the odium of having made a concession 
to the Cubans under a threat from an outside power. 
The Spanish government therefore requested the with- 
drawal of the American note. 

After the rejection of the offer of mediation Presi- 
dent Grant decided to recognize the Cuban insurgents 
and in August, 1869, while on his way from New 
York to New England on the Fall River boat he signed 
a proclamation of Cuban belligerency which he for- 
warded to Washington with a note to Secretary Fish, 
requesting him to sign, seal, and issue it. Mr. Fish dis- 
approved of this step, and while he affixed the seal 
and signed the document, he did not issue it, but kept 
it in a safe place to await further developments. 
Grant's attention was diverted by Wall Street specu- 
lations in gold and the crisis that followed on " Black 
Friday." He failed to notice at the time that the 
secretary of state did not carry out his instructions, 
and later he thanked Mr. Fish for having saved him 
from a serious mistake. 36 

For some time the United States had been urging 
upon Spain the importance of abolishing slavery in 

,B House Ex. Doc. No. 160, Forty-first Cong , Second Sess. 
•• C. F. Adams, " The Treaty of Washington," in " Lee at Appomattox 
and Other Papers," p. 119. 

no 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

Cuba as a necessary condition to the complete pacifica- 
tion of the island. During the fall of 1869 Spain gave 
repeated assurances to the United States of her readi- 
ness to effect emancipation in Cuba as soon as hos- 
tilities should cease, but the Spanish government could 
never be brought to enter into any definite engagement 
on the subject. In fact as regarded the slavery ques- 
tion the cabinet of Madrid found itself unable to 
choose between the horns of the dilemma. The United 
States and Great Britain were urging the immediate 
abolition of slavery, while the most influential up- 
holders of Spanish rule in Porto Rico as well as in 
Cuba were the slaveholders themselves. The insur- 
gents on the other hand had abolished slavery by a 
decree of the assembly of February 26, 1869, promis- 
ing indemnity to the owners in due time and providing 
for the enrolment of liberated slaves in the army. 37 
On January 26, 1870, Mr. Fish wrote to General 
Sickles : 

It becomes more apparent every day that this contest can- 
not terminate without the abolition of slavery. This govern- 
ment regards the government at Madrid as committed to that 
result. . . . You will, therefore, if it shall appear that the 
insurrection is regarded as suppressed, frankly state that 
this government, relying upon the assurances so often given, 
will expect steps to be taken for the emancipation of the 
slaves in the Spanish colonies. 

The British representative at Madrid, Mr. Layard, 
was instructed to second the suggestions of the United 
States minister in regard to the abolition of slavery 
in the Spanish colonies. 



87 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 113, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess. 

Ill 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

From the outbreak of the insurrection the Cuban 
patriots had the sympathy of the great mass of the 
American people, and that of the administration, al- 
though the latter was kept within the bounds of public 
law and treaty obligation, so as to avoid giving of- 
fense to Spain. The government did all that treaty 
obligations demanded of it to prevent the violation of 
the neutrality laws. Numbers of filibustering expedi- 
tions did, however, escape from American ports, and 
those that were arrested at the instance of the Spanish 
government through its representatives in this country 
usually escaped conviction in our courts for want of 
evidence. 

v In June, 1870, the question of granting belligerent 
rights to the Cubans was brought before Congress in 
the form of a joint resolution introduced into the 
House. Personally General Grant sympathized with 
the Cubans and was disposed to grant them the rights 
of belligerents, but his judgment was again overruled 
by the counsels of Mr. Fish. On June 13, during the 
heat of the debate on the question of belligerency, the 
President sent to Congress a message embodying 
the views of the executive. At Mr. Fish's instance the 
message took the ground that the facts did not justify 
the recognition of a state of war, although Mr. Fish 
himself had made use of the term civil war in his 
instructions to General Sickles. The Secretary had 
almost to force the President to sign this message, 
though General Grant was afterwards satisfied as to 
the wisdom of the measure. 38 The message said in 
part: 



" Private journal of Mr. Fish, quoted by Prof. J. B. Moore in the 
Forum, May, 1896. 

112 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

The question of belligerency is one of fact not to be 
decided by sympathies with or prejudices against either' 
party. The relations between the parent state and the 
insurgents must amount, in fact, to war in the sense of 
international law. Fighting, though fierce and protracted, 
does not alone constitute war; there must be military forces 
acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war — 
flags of truce, cartels, exchange of prisoners, etc., — and to 
justify belligerency there must be, above all, a de facto 
political organization of the insurgents sufficient in char- 
acter and resources to constitute it, if left to itself, a state 
among nations capable of discharging the duties of a state, 
and of meeting the just responsibilities it may incur as such 
toward other powers in the discharge of its international 
duties. 

This message provoked a long and animated discus- 
sion in the House next day and sharp criticism on the 
part of the Cuban sympathizers of the President's con- 
duct in thus " intruding himself into the House for 
the purpose of controlling their deliberations." The 
debate continued until June 16, when the resolution 
passed the House by a vote of 80 to 68. 39 It was taken 
up by the Senate, discussed and amended, but finally 
lost. 

The conclusion of an agreement on February 12, 
1871, for the submission to a mixed commission of 
claims of American citizens arising in Cuba, 40 took 
away all our pressing grievances against Spain and 
for more than two years our diplomatic relations were 
on a comparatively friendly basis. Good feeling be- 
tween the two countries was further promoted by the 
proclamation of the Spanish republic in 1873 and by 



*• Congressional Globe, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess., p. 4438. 
'""Treaties and Conventions of the United States" (Malloy's Ed.), 
Vol. II, p. 1661. 

113 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

the prompt action of General Sickles in extending to 
it the recognition of the United States. After striving 
in vain for more than two years to reconcile and unite 
the contending factions of Spain, King Amadeus on 
February n, 1873, abdicated the royal authority and 
returned to the nation the powers with which he had 
been intrusted. The Cortes at once proclaimed a 
republic. General Sickles had on January 30 tele- 
graphed to Washington for instructions in case the 
republicans should succeed in their efforts. On the 
day after the abdication, he received directions to rec- 
ognize the republican government when it was fully 
established and in possession of the power of the -na- 
tion. Three days later, in the uniform of a major- 
general of the United States army he was given an 
audience by the president of the assembly and formally 
recognized the republic. 

On March 6, Congress by joint resolution, in behalf 
of the American people, tendered its congratulations to 
the people of Spain. It seemed at last as if our rela- 
tions with Spain were on a good footing. General 
Sickles urged upon the new republican government the 
, abolition of slavery and the concession of self-govern- 
ment to Cuba. 

But such cordial relations did not long continue. 
On October 31, 1873, the steamer Virginius, sailing 
under American colors and carrying a United States 
registry, was captured on the high seas by the Tor- 
nado, a Spanish war vessel, and on the afternoon of 
the first of November taken into the port of Santiago 
de Cuba. The men and supplies she bore were bound 
for the insurgents, but the capture did not occur in 
Cuban waters. General Burriel, the commandant of 

114 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

the city, summoned a court-martial, and in spite of the 
protests of the American consul, condemned to death 
at the first sitting four of the passengers, General W. 
A. C. Ryan, an Irish patriot and three Cubans. They 
were shot on the morning of November 4. On the 
7th twelve other passengers were executed and on the 
8th, Captain Fry and his entire crew, numbering 
thirty—six, making the total number of executions 
fifty-three. As soon as news of the capture reached 
Madrid, General Sickles called upon President Castelar 
and represented to him the difficulties that might arise 
in case the ship had been taken on the high seas bear- 
ing United States colors. Upon General Sickles's sug- 
gestion the President of the Spanish republic at once 
telegraphed to the captain-general to await orders be- 
fore taking any steps in regard to the captured vessel 
and crew. 

In accordance with instructions from Mr. Fish, 
General Sickles on November 14 protested by note 
against these executions as brutal and barbarous and 
stated that ample reparation would be demanded. The 
next day he received from the minister of state an 
ill-tempered reply, rejecting the protest as inadmissible 
when neither the cabinet at Washington nor that of 
Madrid had sufficient data upon which to ground a 
complaint. On the day this reply was received General 
Sickles, following out telegraphic instructions from 
Washington, made a formal demand by note for the 
restoration of the Virginius, the surrender of the sur- 
vivors, a salute to the United States flag, and the pun- 
ishment of the guilty officials. In case of a refusal 
of satisfactory reparation within twelve days, General 
Sickles was instructed by his government, at the expi- 

115 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

ration of that period, to close the legation and leave 
Madrid. 

The formal reply to General Sickles's demand for 
reparation was received November 18. The Spanish 
government declared that it would make no reparation 
until satisfied that an offense had been committed 
against the flag of the United States, and that when so 
convinced through her own sources of information or 
by the showing of the United States, due reparation 
would be made. 

The representations made at Washington by the 
Spanish minister were of a much more satisfactory 
character than those made to General Sickles at 
Madrid. Mr. Fish, therefore, instructed General 
Sickles to remain at his post until the 26th, and if 
no accommodation were reached by that time he could 
demand his passports. By the time this dispatch 
reached Madrid General Sickles had already asked for 
his passports, but had not received the reply of the 
Spanish government. On the 26th he received a note 
from the Spanish minister asking for a. postponement 
to December 25 and promising that if by that time 
Spain could not show that she had the right on her 
side — i.e., that the Virginius was not entitled to sail 
under the United States flag — she would comply with 
the demands of the United States. General Sickles 
replied that he could not accept such a proposal, but 
that he would inform his government of it and take 
the responsibility of deferring his departure. 

Meanwhile the Spanish minister at Washington had 
proposed arbitration, but Mr. Fish declined to submit 
to arbitration the question of an indignity to the 
United States flag. The minister then asked for a 

116 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

delay, but Mr. Fish told him that delay was impossible 
in view of the approaching meeting of Congress. 
Unless settled beforehand the question would have to 
be referred to Congress. This firm stand brought the 
Spanish minister to time and on November 27 a propo- 
sition was submitted and accepted by Mr. Fish, by the 
terms of which Spain stipulated to restore the vessel 
forthwith, to surrender the survivors of her passengers 
and crew, and on the 25th of December to salute the 
flag of the United States. If, however, before that 
date Spain should prove to the satisfaction of the 
United States that the Virginins was not entitled to 
carry the flag of the United States, the salute should 
be dispensed with, but in such case the United States 
would expect a disclaimer of intent of indignity to its 
flag. 

The Spanish envoy submitted to the state depart- 
ment a large number of documents and depositions to 
show that the Virginius had no right to sail under the 
United States flag. These were referred to the at- 
torney-general, and on December 17 he gave his opin- 
ion that the evidence was conclusive that the Virginius, 
although registered in New York on September 26, 
1870, in the name of one Patterson, who made oath 
as required by law that he was the owner, was in fact 
the property of certain Cubans and was controlled by 
them. In conclusion the attorney-general said : 

Spain, no doubt, has a right to capture a vessel, with an 
American register, and carrying the American flag, found in 
her own waters assisting, or endeavoring to assist, the insur- 
rection in Cuba, but she has no right to capture such a vessel 
on the high seas upon an apprehension that, in violation of 
the neutrality or navigation laws of the United States, she 

117 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

was on her way to assist said rebellion. Spain may defend 
her territory and people from the hostile attacks of what is, 
or appears to be, an American vessel ; but she has no juris- 
diction whatever over the question as to whether or not 
such vessel is on the high seas in violation of any law of 
the United States. Spain cannot rightfully raise that ques- 
tion as to the Virginius, but the United States may, and, as I 
understand the protocol, they have agreed to do it, and, 
governed by that agreement and without admitting that Spain 
would otherwise have any interest in the question, I decide 
that the Virginius, at the time of her capture, was without 
right, and improperly carrying the American flag. 41 

This decision was communicated to the Spanish au- 
thorities and, according to the agreement, the salute 
to the United States flag was dispensed with, and on 
January 3, 1874, the Spanish minister, on behalf of 
his government, expressed a disclaimer of an intent of 
indignity to the flag of the United States. Spain later 
paid indemnities to Great Britain and the United 
States for the families of those who had been executed. 

Meanwhile General Sickles offered his resignation 
by cable in consequence of certain reports that his con- 
duct had been disapproved. Mr. Fish replied that such 
reports were unauthorized, that no dissatisfaction had 
been expressed or intimated and that it was deemed 
important that he remain at his post. Ten days later, 
General Sickles requested that the telegram tendering 
his resignation and the reply be published. Mr. Fish 
declined to do so, as the resignation was hypothetical. 
On December 20, General Sickles again tendered his 
resignation and it was accepted. 

After the settlement of the Virginius affair the gov- 



41 The correspondence relating to the case of the Virginius is in Foreign 
Relations for the years 1874, 1875, an d 1876. 

Il8 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

eminent of the United States addressed itself once 
more to the task of forcing a settlement of the Cuban 
question in general. In his instructions to Mr. Cush- 
ing, who succeeded General Sickles, Secretary Fish 
expressed the policy of the administration at consid- 
erable length. After reviewing the main facts of the 
insurrection which had then lasted more than five 
years, with little or no change in the military situation, 
and after referring to the rejection by Spain of the 
offers of mediation made by the United States at an 
early day of the trouble, he said : 

In these circumstances, the question what decision the 
United States shall take is a serious and difficult one, not to 
be determined without careful consideration of its complex 
elements of domestic and foreign policy, but the determina- 
tion of which may at any moment be forced upon us by 
occurrences either in Spain or in Cuba. 

Withal the President cannot but regard independence, and 
emancipation, of course, as the only certain, and even the 
necessary, solution of the question of Cuba. And, in his 
mind, all incidental questions are quite subordinate to those, 
the larger objects of the United States in this respect. 

It requires to be borne in mind that, in so far as we may 
contribute to the solution of these questions, this government 
is not actuated by any selfish or interested motive. The 
President does not meditate or desire the annexation of 
Cuba to the United States, but its elevation into an inde- 
pendent republic of freemen, in harmony with ourselves and 
with the other republics of America.'* 

For some months Mr. Cushing was occupied with 
the settlement of the indemnities in the Virginius case. 
After nearly two years had elapsed since the instruc- 
tions above quoted, the Grant administration deter- 

* J Foreign Relations, 1874-75, P- 859. 

119 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

mined, in view of the unchanged condition of the 
Cuban struggle, to bring matters to an issue and to 
force, if need be, the hand of the Spanish government. 
On November 5, 1875, Mr. Fish addressed a long 
letter of instruction to Mr. Cushing. After reviewing 
the course of the insurrection, the interests of the 
United States affected thereby, the numerous claims 
arising therefrom, many of them still unsettled, the 
persistent refusal of Spain to redress these grievances 
and the general neglect on her part of treaty obliga- 
tions, he concluded : 

In the absence of any prospect of a termination of the 
war, or of any change in the manner in which it has been 
conducted on either side, he (the President) feels that the 
time is at hand when it may be the duty of other governments 
to intervene, solely with a view to bringing to an end a 
disastrous and destructive conflict, and of restoring peace 
in the island of Cuba. No government is more deeply in- 
terested in the order and peaceful administration of this 
island than is that of the United States, and none has suf- 
fered as the United States from the condition which has ob- 
tained there during the past six or seven years. He will, 
therefore, feel it his duty at an early day to submit the 
subject in this light, and accompanied by an expression of the 
views above presented, for the consideration of Congress. 

Mr. Cushing was instructed to read this note to the 
Spanish minister of state. At the same time a copy 
was sent to General Robert C. Schenck, United States 
minister at London, with instructions to read the same 
to Lord Derby, and to suggest to him that it would 
be agreeable to the United States if the British gov- 
ernment would support by its influence the position 
assumed by the Grant administration. In the course 

120 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

of a few days copies of this note were sent to our rep- 
resentatives at Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Lisbon, 
and St. Petersburg, with instructions to communicate 
its purport orally, or by reading the note, to the gov- 
ernments to which they were accredited and to ask 
their intervention with Spain in the interests of ter- 
minating the state of affairs existing in Cuba. 

As the result of Mr. Cushing's friendly representa- 
tions and in view of the President's message discounte- 
nancing recognition of either independence or bellig- 
erency, the Spanish minister, Mr. Calderon, received 
the communication of November 5 threatening inter- 
vention, in good part, and expressed his intention of 
answering it after he should have had time to con- 
sider it carefully. 

The reply of Great Britain was given to General 
Schenck in an interview with Lord Derby on January 
25, 1876. It was in substance that he was convinced 
that Spain would not listen to mediation, and that the 
British government was not prepared to bring pres- 
sure to bear upon her in case she refused; that the 
Spanish government hoped to finish the Carlist war 
in the spring and would then be in a position to put 
forth its whole military strength for the reduction of 
Cuba; in conclusion, therefore, Lord Derby thought 
" that if nothing were contemplated beyond an ami- 
cable interposition, having peace for its object, the 
time was ill-chosen and the move premature." The 
answers of the other powers were unsatisfactory or 
evasive, none of them being willing to bring pressure, 
to bear upon the government of young Alfonso, while 
the Carlist war was on his hands. 

The answer of Spain was finally given in the form 

121 






/ 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

of a note dated February 3, 1876, addressed to the 
representatives of Spain in other countries, including 
the United States, communicated to Mr. Cushing Feb- 
ruary 19. This answer, written by Mr. Calderon was 
in good temper. He stated that the insurrection was 
supported and carried on largely by negroes, mulat- 
toes, Chinese, deserters, and adventurers; that they 
carried on a guerrilla warfare from their mountain re- 
treats, that Spain had sufficient forces in the island to 
defeat them in the field; that the triumph of Spain 
would soon be followed by the total abolition of slav- 
ery and the introduction of administrative reforms. 
The number of vessels of war and troops in Cuba was 
enumerated to show that Spain was putting forth a 
reasonable effort to bring the rebellion to a close, and 
statistics were quoted to show that the trade between 
Cuba and the United States, as well as the general 
trade of the island, had actually increased largely since 
the outbreak of the insurrection. Finally he declared 
that while individual foreigners had suffered, Spain 
had done justice to all claims presented. 

In conversation with Mr. Cushing, Mr. Calderon in- 
timated that Spain, although she would resist to the 
uttermost armed intervention, might be willing under 
certain circumstances to accept the mediation of the 
United States in Cuba, and he invited a frank state- 
ment of what the United States would advise or wish 
Spain to do with regard to Cuba. In reply to this 
suggestion, Mr. Fish, after disclaiming on the part of 
the United States all intention of annexing Cuba, 
stated the following points as the wish of his govern- 
ment: 

(1) The mutual and reciprocal observance of treaty 

122 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

obligations, and a full, friendly, and liberal under- 
standing and interpretation of all doubtful treaty pro- 
visions, wherever doubt or question might exist. 

(2) Peace, order, and good government in Cuba, 
which involved prompt and effective measures to re- 
store peace, and the establishment of a government 
suited to the spirit and necessities of the age. 

(3) Gradual but effectual emancipation of slaves. 

(4) Improvement of commercial facilities and the 
removal of the obstructions then existing in the way 
of trade and commerce. 

In reply to these suggestions Mr. Calderon handed 
Mr. Cushing a note, dated April 16, 1876, in which 
he represented that his majesty's government was in 
full accord with Mr. Fish's suggestions. 

This assurance on the part of the Spanish govern- 
ment completely thwarted Mr. Fish's plans, and, to- 
gether with Lord Derby's reply, put all further at- 
tempts at intervention out of the question. 

The substance of Mr. Fish's note threatening inter- 
vention appeared unofficially in the press of Europe 
and America in December, 1875, and attracted such 
general attention that in January the House asked for 
the correspondence. In reply Mr. Fish submitted to 
the President for transmission the note of November 
5, together with a few carefully chosen extracts from 
the correspondence between himself and Mr. Cush- 
ing, 43 but nothing was given that might indicate that 
the United States had appealed to the powers of 
Europe to countenance intervention. As rumors to 
this effect had, however, appeared in the press, the 
House called the next day for whatever correspon- 

** House Ex. Doc. No. 90, Forty-fourth Cong., First Sess. 

123 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

dence had taken place with foreign powers in regard 
to Cuba. Mr. Fish replied that " no correspondence 
has taken place during the past year with any Euro- 
pean government, other than Spain, in regard to the 
island of Cuba," but that the note of November 5 had 
been orally communicated to several European gov- 
ernments by reading the same. 44 This was putting a 
very strict and a very unusual construction upon the 
term " correspondence," to say the least. The dis- 
patches, notes, and telegrams that pass between a gov- 
ernment and its representatives abroad are the gener- 
ally recognized means of communicating with foreign 
powers, and are always spoken of as the correspon- 
dence with those powers. The whole affair reveals a 
curious lack of candor and of courage on the part of 
Mr. Fish. He was trying to shield either the admin- 
istration or himself, and did not wish the American 
public to know that he had reversed the time-honored 
policy of the state department by appealing to the 
powers of Europe to intervene in what had been uni- 
formly treated, from the days of John Quincy Adams 
and Henry Clay, as a purely American question. 

This correspondence was suppressed for twenty 
years. On March 24, 1896, the Senate called for 
" copies of all dispatches, notes, and telegrams in the 
department of state, from and after the note from 
Secretary Fish to Mr. Cushing of November 5, 1875, 
and including that note, until the pacification of Cuba 
in 1878, which relate to mediation or intervention by 
the United States in the affairs of that island, together 
with all correspondence with foreign governments re- 
lating to the same topic." On April 15 President 

44 House Ex. Doc. No. ioo, Forty-fourth Cong., First Sess. 

124 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

Cleveland transmitted the " correspondence " called 
for, which forms a document of 137 pages. 45 

The Cuban struggle continued for two years longer. 
In October, 1877, several leaders surrendered to the 
Spanish authorities and undertook the task of bring- 
ing over the few remaining ones. Some of these paid 
for their efforts with their lives, being taken and con- 
demned by court-martial by order of the commander 
of the Cuban forces. Finally, in February, 1878, the 
terms of pacification were made known. They em- 
braced representation in the Spanish Cortes, oblivion 
of the past in respect of political offenses committed 
since the year 1868, and the freedom of slaves in the 
insurgent ranks. 46 In practice, however, the Cuban 
deputies were never truly representative, but were men 
of Spanish birth designated usually by the captain- 
general. By gradual emancipation slavery ceased to 
exist in the island in 1885. The powers of the captain- 
general, the most objectionable feature of Spanish 
rule, continued uncurtailed. 

In February, 1895, the final insurrection against 
Spanish rule in Cuba began, and soon developed the 
same features as the " Ten Years' War." The policy 
of Maximo Gomez, the insurrectionary chief, was to 
fight no pitched battles but to keep up incessant skir- 
mishes, to destroy sugar plantations and every other 
source of revenue with the end in view of either ex- 
hausting Spain or forcing the intervention of the 
United States. With the opening of the second year 
of the struggle, General Weyler arrived in Havana as 
governor and captain-general, and immediately in- 



46 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 213, Fifty-fourth Cong., First Sess. 
48 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 79, Forty-fifth Cong., Second Sess. 

125 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

augurated his famous " Reconcentration " policy. The 
inhabitants of the island were directed by proclama- 
tion to assemble within a week in the towns occupied 
by Spanish troops under penalty, if they refused, of 
being treated as rebels. The majority of those who 
obeyed the proclamation were women and children 
who, as a result of being cooped up in crowded vil- 
lages under miserable sanitary conditions and without 
adequate food, died by the thousands. 47 In the prov- 
ince of Havana alone 52,000 perished. 

Public opinion in the United States was thoroughly 
aroused by the execution of policies which not only 
excited sympathy for the unfortunate inhabitants of 
Cuba, but which paralyzed the industries of the island 
and destroyed its commerce. American citizens owned 
at least fifty millions of property in the island, and 
American commerce at the beginning of the insurrec- 
tion amounted to one hundred millions annually. 
Furthermore, numbers of persons claiming American 
citizenship were thrown into prison by Weyler's orders. 
Some of them were native Americans, but the ma- 
jority were Cubans who had sought naturalization in 
the United States in order to return to Cuba and claim 
American protection. 

Other Cubans, including many who were still Span- 
ish subjects, established themselves in American ports 
and furnished the insurgents with arms and supplies. 
On June 12, 1895, President Cleveland issued a proc- 
lamation calling attention to the Cuban insurrection 
and warning all persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States against doing any of the acts prohibited 
by the American neutrality laws. Notwithstanding 

*' Sen. Doc. No. 25, p. 125, Fifty-eighth Cong., Second Sess. 

126 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

all the efforts of the administration, illegal expeditions 
were continually being fitted out in the United States, 
and while the great majority of them were stopped by 
port officials or intercepted by the navy, some of them 
succeeded in reaching the coasts of Cuba. President 
Cleveland's proclamation recognized insurgency as a 
status distinct from belligerency. It merely put into 
effect the neutrality laws of the United States. It did 
not recognize a state of belligerency and therefore did 
not bring into operation any of the rules of neutrality 
under international law. President Cleveland con- 
sistently refused to recognize the Cubans as belliger- 
ents. In February, 1896, Congress passed a joint 
resolution, by a vote of 64 to 6 in the Senate and 
246 to 27 in the House, recognizing a state of war 
in Cuba, and offering Spain the good offices of the 
United States for the establishment of Cuban inde- 
pendence. Notwithstanding the overwhelming ma- 
jority which this resolution had received, the Presi- 
dent ignored it, for it is a well recognized principle 
that Congress has no right to force the hand of the 
President in a matter of this kind. It amounted 
merely to an expression of opinion by Congress. 

In April, 1896, Secretary Olney addressed a note 
to the Spanish minister in which the United States of- 
fered to mediate between Spain and the insurgents for 
the restoration of peace on the basis of autonomy. 
Spain rejected this offer, claiming that Cuba already 
enjoyed " one of the most liberal political systems in 
the world," and suggesting that the United States 
could contribute greatly to the pacification of the island 
by prosecuting " the unlawful expeditions of some of 
its citizens to Cuba with more vigor than in the 

127 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

past." 48 In his last annual message to Congress, 
President Cleveland reviewed the Cuban situation at 
length and, in conclusion, declared : 

When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the 
insurgents has become manifest and it is demonstrated that 
her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its 
rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its 
reestablishment has degenerated into a strife which means 
nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and 
the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the con- 
flict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations 
to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher 
obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and 
discharge. 

The McKinley administration, which began March 
4, 1897, soon directed its attention to the Cuban ques- 
tion. It was unfortunate that with this question 
rapidly approaching a crisis the State Department was 
in feeble hands. John Sherman, the veteran senator 
from Ohio, was appointed secretary of state by 
McKinley in order to make a place in the Senate for 
Mark Hanna, who had so successfully conducted Mc- 
Kinley's campaign. General Woodford was sent to 
Madrid to succeed Hannis Taylor, and he was in- 
structed to tender again the good offices of the United 
States, to remind Spain of the resolution passed by 
the previous Congress, and to warn her that another 
Congress was soon to assemble. 49 Six days after the 
receipt of General Woodford's note the Spanish min- 
istry resigned, and on October 14 the liberal ministry 
of Sagasta assumed office. Its first act was to recall 

48 Spanish Dipl. Corresp. and Docs, (translation, Washington, 1905), 
pp. 7. 8. 

48 Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 568. 

128 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

General Weyler, and to appoint General Blanco to suc- 
ceed him as governor and captain-general of Cuba. 
The new ministry promised to grant autonomy to 
Cuba, and President McKinley in his message of j 
December 6, 1897, declared his intention of allowing 
time for the new policy to be tested. 

It was soon evident that the grant of autonomy had 
come too late. The Cubans would no longer be satis- 
fied with anything short of independence. On Jan- 
uary 13, 1898, there was serious rioting in Havana, 
deliberately planned as a demonstration against the 
autonomy scheme, and Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee 
cabled his government that it was evident that auton- 
omy would prove a failure, that he doubted whether 
Blanco could control the situation, and that it might 
be necessary to send warships for the protection of 
Americans in Havana. The suggestion as to warships 
met with a prompter response than General Lee had 
expected. The United States battleship Maine was 
immediately dispatched to Havana, where she arrived 
January 25 and was assigned an anchorage by the port 
officials. 60 While she was lying quietly at anchor in 
Havana harbor, attention was suddenly diverted from 
Cuba to Washington by the Dupuy de Lome incident. 
On February 9, 1898, the New York Journal published 
in facsimile a letter from the Spanish minister at 
Washington to a friend in Cuba which severely criti- 
cized President McKinley's policy and referred to him 
as " a would-be politician who tries to leave a door 
open behind him while keeping on good terms with the 
jingoes of his party." The letter was genuine, though 
surreptitiously acquired, and was of such a character 

s0 Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 1025. 

129 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

that it could not be overlooked. When called on for 
an explanation, Senor de Lome admitted having writ- 
ten the letter but questioned the accuracy of the trans- 
lation. He claimed that the language which he had 
used was permissible under the seal of private corre- 
spondence. When General Woodford, acting under 
instructions from Washington, informed the Spanish 
minister of foreign affairs that the President expected 
the immediate recall of Senor de Lome, he was in- 
formed that the latter' s resignation had already been 
accepted by cable. 61 

Before the excitement over this incident had sub- 
sided, the battleship Maine was suddenly blown up in 
Havana harbor on the night of February 15, and two 
of her officers and two hundred and fifty-eight of her 
crew were killed. After a careful examination of wit- 
nesses and of the wreck, an American naval court of 
inquiry reported that the destruction of the ship was 
due to a submarine mine. 02 A Spanish board of in- 
quiry, after examining a number of witnesses who 
had seen or heard the explosion, made a brief report 
the following day to the effect that the ship had been 
destroyed by an explosion in the forward magazine. 
It is generally admitted that the American report was 
correct, but the responsibility for the mine has never 
been disclosed. 

As soon as the report of the court of inquiry was 
made public, the American people, who had displayed 
great self-control, threw aside all restraint and the 
country witnessed an outburst of patriotic fervor such 
as had not been seen since 1861. " Remember the 



" Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 1007-1020. 

•* Sen. Doc. No. 207, Fifty-fifth Cong., Second Sesa. 

I30 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

Maine " became a watchword, and the demand for 
war was overwhelming. President McKinley decided, 
however, to make one more effort at a diplomatic set- 
tlement. He proposed an armistice between Spain and 
the insurgents pending negotiations for a permanent 
adjustment through the friendly offices of the Presi- 
dent of the United States. In reply the Spanish gov- 
ernment made counter-propositions to the effect that 
the questions arising out of the destruction of the 
Maine be submitted to arbitration and that the pacifi- 
cation of the island be left to a Cuban parliament. 
Meanwhile, the governor-general would be authorized 
to accept a suspension of hostilities, provided the in- 
surgents should ask for it and agree to disarm. This 
was simply an invitation to the insurgents to submit, 
in which case Spain would consider what degree of 
autonomy was needed or practicable. The President 
considered the Spanish reply as a rejection of his pro- 
posal and determined to submit the entire question to 
Congress. 53 This meant war, for public feeling in 
America was at the highest pitch of excitement, the 
" yellow " press was clamoring for war, and it was 
with the greatest difficulty that the President, who 
really wanted peace, had held Congress in check. The 
message to Congress was held back a few days in 
consequence of a telegram from General Lee, who 
urged that he be given time to get Americans safely 
out of Havana. During this period of delay the repre- 
sentatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, 
Great Britain, Italy, and Russia made a formal appeal 
to the President for peace, and the Pope persuaded the 
Queen of Spain to authorize General Blanco to sus- 

88 Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 731. 

131 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

pend hostilities. This concession did not meet fully 
the American ultimatum and seemed too much like 
another play for time. The Spanish minister was, 
therefore, simply informed that the President would 
notify Congress of this latest communication. Presi- 
dent McKinley was later severely criticized for not 
giving greater consideration to this note and for 
merely alluding to it in his message instead of trans- 
mitting it in full. Had he given it greater considera- 
tion, war might have been delayed a few months, but 
it would not have been averted, for Spain was not 
willing to make concessions that the Cubans at this 
late date would have regarded as satisfactory. 

In his message to Congress of April n, 1898, Presi- 
dent McKinley referred to the Maine only incidentally 
as " a patent and impressive proof of a state of things 
in Cuba that is intolerable." He suggested forcible 
intervention as the only solution of the question and 
declared that it was justified, not only on grounds of 
humanity, but as a measure for the protection of the 
lives and property of American citizens in Cuba, and 
for the purpose of putting a stop to a conflict which 
was a constant menace to our peace. 54 Two days later 
the House passed a resolution by vote of 324 to 19, 
directing the President to intervene at once to stop the 
war in Cuba with the purpose of " establishing by the 
free action of the people thereof a stable and indepen- 
dent government of their own in the island." On the 
same day the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
reported a resolution demanding the immediate with- 
drawal of Spain from the Island of Cuba, but the 
minority report urging in addition the immediate rec- 

54 Richardson, " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. X, p. 147. 

132 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

ognition of the Cuban republic as then organized was 
at first embodied in the Senate resolution by a vote of 
67 to 21. It was feared by members of the Senate 
that if we liberated Cuba without first recognizing the 
so-called republic of Cuba, the island would inevitably 
be annexed by the United States. After two days of 
hot debate, the Senate reconsidered, and the House res- 
olution prevailed. On April 19, the anniversary of the 
battle of Lexington and of the first bloodshed of the 
Civil War in the streets of Baltimore, the fateful reso- 
lutions were adopted in the following terms : 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States in Congress assembled, 

First, That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of 
right ought to be, free and independent. 

Second, That it is the duty of the United States to de- 
mand, and the Government of the United States does hereby 
demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its 
authority and government in the island of Cuba, and with- 
draw its land and naval forces from Cuban waters. 

Third, That the President of the United States be, and he 
hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and 
naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual 
service of the United States the militia of the several States 
to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolu- 
tions into effect. 

Fourth, That the United States hereby disclaims any dis- 
position or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or 
control over said island except for the pacification thereof, 
and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to 
leave the government and control of the island to its 
people. 56 

As soon as these resolutions were approved by the 
President, the Spanish minister asked for his pass- 

" " U. S. Statutes at Large," Vol. XXX, p. 738. 

133 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

ports, thus severing diplomatic relations, and Wood- 
ford was directed to leave Madrid. The North At- 
lantic Squadron, then at Key West under command 
of Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, was immedi- 
ately ordered to blockade the northern coast of Cuba, 
and Commodore George Dewey was ordered from 
Hong Kong to Manila Bay for the purpose of cap- 
turing or destroying the Spanish fleet. During the 
war that followed, foreign public opinion, outside of 
England, was decidedly hostile to the United States, 
but in the face of the victories of Santiago and Manila 
Bay this sentiment underwent a marked change, and 
Spain abandoned whatever hopes she had cherished of 
European intervention. By the end of July, 1898, the 
American as well as the European press was beginning 
to ask why the war should not be brought to a close. 

After the surrender of Santiago General Miles em- 
barked for Porto Rico with a force of 16,000 men, 
and in a two-weeks' campaign overran most of that 
island with the- loss of three killed and forty wounded. 
A large number of troops had also been sent to the 
Philippines. It was evident, therefore, that while the 
war had been undertaken for the liberation of Cuba, 
the United States did not feel under any obligation to 
confine its military operations to that island. Having 
met all the demands of honor, Spain asked the French 
government to authorize the French ambassador at 
Washington to arrange with the President of the 
United States the preliminary terms of peace. The 
negotiations begun on July 26 resulted in the protocol 
of August 12, in which Spain agreed to the following 
demands : first, the immediate evacuation of Cuba and 
the relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty; second, 

134 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

the cession of Porto Rico and one of the Ladrones by 
way of indemnity; and third, the occupation by the 
United States of " the city, bay and harbor of Manila 
pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall 
determine the control, disposition, and government of 
the Philippines." 56 

By the terms of the protocol Paris was selected as 
the place of meeting for the peace commissioners, 
and here negotiations were opened on October i. The 
United States delegation was composed of William 
R. Day, who resigned the office of Secretary of State 
to head the mission; Cushman K. Davis, Chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; William 
P. Frye, President pro tern of the Senate; Senator 
George Gray of Delaware; and Whitelaw Reid, editor 
of the New York Tribune; with John Bassett Moore, 
Assistant Secretary of State, as Secretary. An entire 
month was taken up with the Cuban question, the 
Spanish commissioners striving in vain to saddle the 
Cuban debt either on the United States or on the 
people of Cuba. The Philippine question occupied 
most of the next month. When the commissioners 
were appointed, President McKinley had not fully 
made up his mind on this important question. His 
first intention seems to have been to retain the bay 
and city of Manila as a naval base and a part or pos- 
sibly the whole of Luzon. Public sentiment in the 
United States in favor of acquiring the whole group 
made rapid headway, and after an extended trip 
through the South and West, during which he sounded 
opinion on this question, the President instructed the 



'\ 



84 Spanish Dipl. Corresp. and Docs., p. 206; Foreign Relations, 1898, 
p. 819. 

135 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

commissioners to demand the entire group. The com- 
missioners were later authorized to offer $20,000,000 
for the cession. This offer, which was recognized by 
the Spanish commissioners as an ultimatum, was 
finally accepted under protest. On other points the 
United States secured what had been demanded in 
the protocol, and the treaty was signed December 10, 
1 898." 

The treaty was submitted to the Senate January 4, 
1899, and precipitated a memorable debate which 
lasted until February 6. The principal opposition 
came from Senator Hoar of Massachusetts, who de- 
clared that the proposal to acquire and govern the 
Philippine Islands was in violation of the Declaration 
of Independence, the Constitution, and the whole 
spirit of American institutions. The treaty could not 
be ratified without the aid of Democrats, and the re- 
sult was in doubt when Bryan went to Washington 
and advised his friends in the Senate to vote for rati- 
fication, saying that the status of the Philippines could 
be determined in the next presidential campaign. The 
outbreak of hostilities between the Filipinos and the 
American troops occupying Manila put an end to the 
debate, and on February 6 the treaty was ratified. 

When the United States demanded the withdrawal 
of Spain from Cuba, it was with the declaration that 
" The United States hereby disclaims any disposition 
or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or 
control over said island except for the pacification 
thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is 
accomplished, to leave the government and control of 
the island to its people." Never has a pledge made by 

87 Senate Doc. No. 62, Fifty-Fifth Cong., Third Sess. 

I36 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

a nation under such circumstances been more faith- 
fully carried out. The administration of Cuba during 
the period of American military occupation was a 
model of its kind. General Leonard Wood, the mili- 
tary governor, and his associates found the cities and 
towns crowded with refugees and reconcentrados, and 
governmental affairs in a state of the utmost con- 
fusion. They established order, relieved distress, or- 
ganized hospitals and charitable institutions, undertook 
extensive public works, reorganized the system of pub- 
lic schools, and put Havana, Santiago, and other cities 
in a sanitary condition. In a hospital near Havana 
Major Walter Reed, a surgeon in the United States 
army, demonstrated the fact that yellow fever is trans- 
mitted by the bite of a mosquito. This discovery was 
at once put to the test in Havana, and the city was 
rendered free from yellow fever for the first time in' 
one hundred and forty years. 58 

In the organization of a government for the island, 
the first step was to take a census of the inhabitants, 
determine the proper basis of suffrage, and hold 
municipal elections for the purpose of organizing local 
government. This work having been successfully ac- 
complished, a constitutional convention, summoned by 
General Wood, convened in the city of Havana, 
November 5, 1900. By February 21, 1901, the con- 
vention had agreed upon a constitution modelled in 
general after that of the United States. The new con- 
stitution provided for the recognition of the public 
debts contracted by the insurgent government, but was 
silent on the subject of future relations with the 
United States. This subject had been brought to the 

58 Report of the Military Governor of Cuba, 8 vols., 1901. 

*37 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

attention of the convention early in February by Gen- 
eral Wood, who had submitted for incorporation in 
the constitution certain provisions which had been 
drafted in Washington. The convention objected to 
these proposals on the ground that they impaired the 
independence and sovereignty of the island, and that 
it was their duty to make Cuba " independent of every 
other nation, the great and noble American nation 
included." 

The United States, however, had no intention of 
withdrawing from the island until this matter was sat- 
isfactorily adjusted. A provision, known as the Piatt 
Amendment, was therefore inserted in the army ap- 
propriation bill of March 2, 1901, directing the Presi- 
dent to leave the control of the island to its people so 
soon as a government should be established under a 
constitution which defined the future relations with the 
United States substantially as follows : 

I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into 
any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or 
powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence 
of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign 
power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military 
or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over 
any portion of said island. 

II. That said government shall not assume or con- 
tract any public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and 
to make reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate 
discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, 
after defraying the current expenses of government shall 
be inadequate. 

III. That the government of Cuba consents that the 
United States may exercise the right to intervene for the 
preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a 
government adequate for the protection of life, property, 

138 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations 
with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the 
United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the 
government of Cuba. 

IV. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its 
military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and 
all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained 
and protected. 

V. That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far 
as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other 
plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the 
cities of the island. . . . 

VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the pro- 
posed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto 
being left to future adjustment by treaty. 

VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the 
independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as 
well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will 
sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling 
or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed 
upon with the President of the United States. 

VIII. That by way of further assurance the government 
of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent 
treaty with the United States. 59 

These articles, with the exception of the fifth, which 
was proposed by General Leonard Wood, were care- 
fully drafted by Elihu Root, at that time Secretary of 
War, discussed at length by President McKinley's 
cabinet, and entrusted to Senator Piatt of Connecticut, 
who offered them as an amendment to the army ap- 
propriation bill. In order to allay doubts expressed 
by members of the convention in regard to the third 
article, General Wood was authorized by Secretary 
Root to state officially that the intervention described 
in this article did not mean intermeddling in the af- 

"U. S. Statues at Largs, Vol. XXXI. p. 897. 

139 



If 






UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

fairs of the Cuban government, but formal action on 
the part of the United States, based upon just and 
substantial grounds. With this assurance the conven- 
tion adopted the Piatt amendment June 12, 1901, and 
added it as an appendix to the constitution. 

On May 20, 1902, Tomas Estrada Palma was in- 
augurated as first president of the Republic of Cuba, 
and General Wood handed over to him the government 
of the island. 60 The Americans left a substantial 
balance in the Cuban treasury. The total receipts for 
the entire period were $57,197,140.80, and the expen- 
ditures $55,405,031.28. The customs service, which 
furnished the principal part of the revenues during the 
period of military occupation, was ably administered 
by General Tasker H. Bliss. 61 

While the Piatt amendment determined the political 
relations that were to exist between Cuba and the 
United States, there had been no agreement on the 
subject of commercial relations. The sugar industry, 
which had been almost destroyed by the insurrection, 
was dependent upon the willingness of the United 
States to arrange for a reduction of its tariff in favor 
of the Cuban product. Otherwise Cuban sugar could 
not compete with the bounty-fed beet sugar of Europe 
or with the sugars of Porto Rico and Hawaii, which 
were now admitted to the American market free of 
duty. President Roosevelt had hoped to settle this 
question before the withdrawal of American troops, 
and he had urged upon Congress the expediency of 
providing for a substantial reduction in tariff duties on 



00 Documentary History of the Inauguration of the Cuban Government, 
in Annual Report of the Secretary of War. 1902, Appendix A. 

61 Documentary History of the Inauguration of the Cuban Government, 
in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1902, Appendix B. 

I4O 









THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

Cuban imports into the United States, but a powerful 
opposition, composed of the beet-sugar growers of the 
North and West and of the cane-sugar planters of 
Louisiana, succeeded in thwarting for two years the 
efforts of the administration to do justice to Cuba. 
All attempts to get a bill through Congress failed. 62 
In the meantime a reciprocity convention was agreed 
upon in the ordinary diplomatic way December n, 
1902, under which Cuban products were to be ad- 
mitted to the United States at a reduction of twenty 
per cent. As the Senate failed to act on this treaty 
before the 4th of March, 1903, President Roosevelt 
convened an extra session of the Senate which rati- 
fied the treaty with amendments, and with the very 
unusual provision that it should not go into effect until 
approved by Congress. As the House was not then in 
session, this meant that the treaty had to go over until 
the fall. The Cuban situation grew so bad that the 
President finally convened Congress in extra session 
November 9, 1903. In a special message he urged 
prompt action on the treaty on the ground that the 
Piatt amendment had brought the island of Cuba 
within our system of international policy, and that it 
necessarily followed that it must also to a certain 
degree come within the lines of our economic policy. 
The House passed the bill approving the treaty No- 
vember 19 by the overwhelming vote of 335 to 21, 
but the Senate, although it had already ratified the 
treaty, permitted the extra session to expire without 
passing the measure which was to give the treaty ef- 
fect. When the new session began December 7, the 
Cuban treaty bill was made the special order in the 

62 Senate Docs. Nos. 405 and 679, Fifty-Seventh Cong., First Sess. 

141 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

Senate until December 16, when the final vote was 
taken and it passed. Under the reciprocity treaty com- 
mercial relations with Cuba were established on a firm 
basis and the volume of trade increased rapidly. 

In August, 1906, President Palma was reelected 
for another term, but the Cubans had not learned the 
primary lesson of democracy, submission to the will 
of the majority, and his opponents at once began an 
insurrectionary movement which had for its object 
the overthrow of his government. About the middle 
of September President Roosevelt sent Secretary Taft 
to Havana for the purpose of reconciling the con- 
tending factions, but Mr, Taft's efforts proved un- 
availing and President Palma resigned. When the 
Cuban Congress assembled, it was found impossible to 
command a quorum. Under these circumstances Sec- 
retary Taft assumed control of affairs on September 
29 and proclaimed a provisional government for the 
restoration of order and the protection of life and 
property. A body of United States^troops under com- 
mand of General Franklin Bell was sent to Cuba to 
preserve order and to uphold the provisional govern- 
ment. On October 3, 1906, Secretary Taft was re- 
lieved of the duties of provisional governor in order 
that he might resume his duties in Washington, and 
Charles E. Magoon was appointed to take his place 
at Havana. 63 In his message to Congress December 3, 
1906, President Roosevelt declared that while the 
United States had no desire to annex Cuba, it was 
" absolutely out of the question that the island should 
continue independent" if the " insurrectionary habit" 



"* Secretary Taft's report on the Cuban situation was sent to Congress 
December 17, 1906. 

142 



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 

should become " confirmed." The second period of 
American occupation lasted a little over two years, 
when the control of the government was again re- 
stored to the people of the island and the American 
troops were withdrawn. x 



143 



CHAPTER IV 

The Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal 

The cutting of the isthmus between North and 
South America was the dream of navigators and en- 
gineers from the time when the first discoverers ascer- 
tained that nature had neglected to provide a passage. 
Yet the new continent which so unexpectedly blocked 
the way of Columbus in his search for the Indies 
opposed for centuries an insurmountable barrier to 
the commerce of the East and the West. The piercing 
of the isthmus always seemed a perfectly feasible 
undertaking, but the difficulties in the way proved 
greater than at first sight appeared. There were 
( i ) the physical or engineering problems to be solved, 
and (2) the diplomatic complications regarding the 
control of the canal in peace and its use in war. The 
weakness of the Spanish-American states, whose terri- 
tories embraced the available routes, and their rec- 
ognized inability either to construct or protect a canal 
made what might otherwise have been merely a ques- 
tion of domestic economy one of grave international 
import. In this respect, as in others, the problem 
presented the same features as the Suez canal. To 
meet these difficulties three plans were successively 
developed during the nineteenth century: (1) a canal 
constructed by a private corporation under interna- 
tional control, (2) a canal constructed by a private 
corporation under the exclusive control of the United 
States, and (3) a canal constructed, owned, operated, 

144 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

and controlled by the United States as a government 
enterprise. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty provided for 
the construction of a canal in accordance with the 
first plan; several unsuccessful attempts were made 
to raise the necessary capital under the second plan; 
while the third plan was the one under ^wHTcrTThe 
gigantic task was actually accomplished. 

The comparative merits of the Nicaragua and 
Panama routes long divided the opinion of experts. 
American engineers generally favored that through 
Nicaragua. The length of the Nicaragua route, from 
Greytown on the Atlantic to Brito on the Pacific by 
way of the San Juan river and through Lake Nica- 
ragua, is about 170 miles. The elevation of the lake 
above the sea is about no feet. Its western shore 
is only twelve miles from the Pacific, with an inter- 
vening divide 154 feet above the sea. From the south- 
east corner of the lake flows the San Juan river, 
120 miles to the Atlantic, with an average fall of 
about 10 inches to the mile. The serious objections 
to this route are: (1) the lack of harbors at the 
terminals, Brito being a mere indentation on the coast, 
rendering the construction of immense breakwaters 
necessary, while at Greytown the San Juan broadens 
out into a delta that would require extensive dredging; 
and (2) the enormous rainfall at Greytown, exceed- 
ing that known anywhere else on the western conti- 
nent — nearly 25 feet. 

The Panama route from Colon on the Atlantic to 
Panama on the Pacific is about 50 miles in length, 
with a natural elevation nearly double that of Nica- 
ragua. There are natural harbors at each end which 
are capacious and able to accommodate the heaviest 

145 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

shipping. The Panama Railroad, built along the line 
of the proposed canal, in 1850-55, gave this route an 
additional advantage. There were, however, certain 
disadvantages: (1) the unhealthfulness of the vicinity, 
rendering labor scarce and inefficient; (2) the heavy 
rainfall, 10 to 12 feet at Colon; and (3) the treacher- 
ous character of the geologic structure, due to its 
volcanic origin, through which the cut had to be made. 
The impossibility of making even approximate esti- 
mates of the cost of the work in such a deadly climate 
and through such an uncertain geologic formation 
was one of the greatest difficulties to be overcome. 
The De Lesseps plan provided for an open cut through- 
out at the sea-level, at an estimated cost of $170,000,- 
000. The work was begun in 1884 and prosecuted 
until 1888, when the gigantic scheme collapsed, after 
the company had expended about $300,000,000 and 
accomplished less than one-third of the work. 

Great as the engineering problems of the various 
canal schemes have been shown to be, the importance 
to the world's commerce of the object in view would, 
in all probability, have led to their solution and to 
the construction of a canal long before the United 
States undertook the Panama enterprise, had it not 
been for difficulties of an altogether different char- 
acter, complications arising out of the question as to 
the status of the canal in international law. The 
diplomatic difficulties in the case of an interoceanic 
canal are very great. It cannot be regarded as a 
natural strait, like the Dardanelles, the Danish Belts, 
or the Straits of Magellan, which were for a long 
time held under exclusive jurisdiction, but are now 
free to all nations. Nor, on the other hand, could an 

146 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

isthmian canal be compared to the Kiel canal, which 
is within the territory of Germany, and which, al- 
though open to commerce, was specially designed to 
meet the needs of the German navy. Such canals as 
this are built by the capital of the country through 
which they pass, and are protected and controlled by 
its government. 

No one of the republics to the south of us, through 
whose territory it was proposed to build a canal, could 
raise the capital for its construction or insure its 
protection "when completed. No company chartered 
by one of these governments could have raised the 
necessary capital without some further guarantee. 
Hence it was that all companies organized for this 
purpose had to secure their charters frcm some more 
powerful nation, such as the United States or France, 
and their concessions from one of the Central Ameri- 
can states. This rendered necessary a treaty between 
the state granting the concession or right to construct 
a canal through its territory and the state chartering 
the company. The claims of other states to equality 
of treatment in the use of such a canal constituted 
another element that had to be considered. 

With the establishment of the independence of the 
Spanish-American republics the question of the con- 
struction of a ship canal across the isthmus became 
a matter of general interest, and it was one of the 
proposed subjects of discussion at the Congress of 
American Republics summoned by Bolivar to meet 
at Panama in 1826. In the instructions to the United 
States commissioners to that congress, Mr. Clay 
authorized them to enter into the consideration of that 
subject, suggesting that the best routes would likely 

147 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

be found in the territory of Mexico or of the Central 
Republic. As to the diplomatic status of the canal, 
he said: 

If the work should ever be executed so as to admit of the 
passage of sea vessels from ocean to ocean, the benefits of it 
ought not to be exclusively appropriated to any one nation, 
but should be extended to all parts of the globe upon the 
payment of a just compensation or reasonable tolls. 1 

In 1835, and again in 1839, the United States. Sen- 
ate passed resolutions authorizing the President to 
enter into negotiations with other nations, particularly 
Central America and New Granada, for the purpose 
of protecting by treaty either individuals or companies 
who might undertake to open communication between 
the two oceans, and of insuring " the free and equal 
navigation of the canal by all nations." Presidents 
Jackson and Van Buren both commissioned agents 
with a view to carrying out these resolutions, but with- 
out success. 

While a prisoner at Ham in 1845, Prince Louis 
Napoleon Bonaparte secured from the government of 
Nicaragua a concession granting him power to organize 
a company for the construction of a waterway to be 
known as " Le Canale Napoleon de Nicaragua." After 
his escape from Ham, he published in London a 
pamphlet entitled " The Canal of Nicaragua, or a 
Project for the Junction of the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans by means of a Canal." 2 

Although the United States government was a party 
to endless negotiations in regard to an inter-oceanic 
canal, there were only three treaties of any practical 



1 Report of International American Conference, Vol. IV (Hist. App.), 
P M3- 

' Snow: " Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy," p. 328. 



I48 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

importance prior to the close of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, by which it acquired rights and assumed obli- 
gations on that account. 3 These were ( I ) the treaty 
with New Granada (Colombia) of 1846; (2) the 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty with England of 1850; and 
(3) the treaty with Nicaragua of 1867. We shalll 
proceed to examine these in detail. 

The treaty with New Granada was signed at Bo- 
gota, December 12, 1846, and ratified by both govern- 
ments in 1848. It did not differ materially from the 
general draft of treaties, except in the thirty-fifth 
article, which was of a special character and related 
to the Isthmus of Panama. By this article " the gov- 
ernment of New Granada guarantees to the govern- 
ment of the United States that the right-of-way or 
transit across the Isthmus of Panama, upon any modes 
of communication that now exist or that may be here- 
after constructed, shall be open and free to the gov- 
ernment and citizens of the United States," for the 
transportation of all articles of lawful commerce upon 
the same terms enjoyed by the citizens of New 
Granada. 

And in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and con- 
stant enjoyment of these advantages, and for the favors they 
have acquired by the 4th, 5th, and 6th articles of this treaty, 
the United States guarantee positively and efficaciously to 
New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neu- 
trality of the before-mentioned isthmus, with the view that 
the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be 
interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this 
treaty exists; and, in consequence, the United States also 
guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and 

8 Our treaties with Mexico and Honduras, although covering the case 
of canal constructions, were of no practical importance, as the routes 
through these countries were not feasible. 

149 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

property which New Granada has and possesses over the 
said territory.* 

This treaty was to remain in force for twenty years, 
and then, if neither party gave notice of intended ter- 
mination, it was to continue in force, terminable by 
either party at twelve months' notice. This treaty 
was in full force when the Panama revolution of 1903 
took place. Under the protection of this treaty the 
Panama Railroad Company, composed mainly of citi- 
zens of the United States, secured a charter from New 
Granada, and between 1850 and 1855 constructed a 
railroad across the isthmus along the line of the pro- 
posed Panama canal. In consequence of the riot at 
Panama in 1856, efforts were made by the United 
States to modify this treaty so as to give the United 
States greater control and power to protect the means 
of transit, but without success. 5 Other attempts to 
modify it in 1868 and 1870 likewise failed. 6 

In 1862 the Granadian government, through its rep- 
resentative at Washington, notified the United States 
that a revolutionary chief, who was then trying to 
subvert the Granadian confederation, had sent an 
armed force to occupy the Isthmus of Panama, and 
the government of Granada called upon the United 
States to enforce its guarantee. Simultaneously the 
same information was received from the United States 
consul at Panama, and the President instructed the 
United States naval commander at that port to pro- 
tect at all hazards and at whatever cost the safety of 
the railroad transit across the isthmus. 



« Correspondence in relation to the Proposed Interoceanic Canal, the 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the Monroe Doctrine. Government Printing 
Office, 1885, p. 5. Referred to hereafter as " Collected Correspondence." 

• Ibid., pp. 23-27. 

* Ibid., pp. 27 and 40. 

I50 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

The Granadian government, however, was not satis- 
fied with this action, and urged the United States to 
land a body of troops at Panama, suggesting that it 
consist of 300 cavalry. Under the circumstances, 
President Lincoln hesitated to take such action with- 
out consulting Great Britain and France, and Mr. 
Seward instructed our representatives at London and 
Paris to seek an understanding with those govern- 
ments in regard to the matter. He declared: 

This government has no interest in the matter different 
from that of other maritime powers. It is willing to inter- 
pose its aid in execution of its treaty and for the benefit of all 
nations. But if it should do so it would incur some hazard 
of becoming involved in the revolutionary strife which is 
going on in that country. It would also incur danger of 
misapprehension of its object by other maritime powers if it 
should act without previous consultation with them. 7 

In a conference between Mr. Adams and Lord John 
Russell, the latter declared that he did not consider 
that the contingency had arisen which called for inter- 
vention; that so far as he could learn, no attempt had 
been made to obstruct the free transit across the 
isthmus. The French government took substantially 
the same view. 8 In questions of a similar nature that 
arose later, the attorney-general of the United States 
expressed the opinion that the guarantee by the 
United States of Granadian sovereignty and property 
in the territory of the isthmus was only against for- 
eign governments, and did not authorize the United 
States to take sides with one or the other party in the 
intestine troubles of that nation. 



7 Seward to Adams, July 11, 1862. 

• " Collected Correspondence," pp. 7 and 8 

151 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

In April, 1885, the Colombian government, which 
was embarrassed by civil war, called upon the United 
States for the fulfillment of the treaty of 1846, to 
secure the neutrality and sovereignty of the isthmus. 
President Cleveland at once sent a body of troops to 
the isthmus with instructions to confine their action 
to preventing the transit and its accessories from be- 
ing interrupted or embarrassed. As soon as peace 
was reestablished, the troops of the United States were 
withdrawn. 9 

Four years after the signature of the above treaty 
with Colombia, and two years after its ratification by 
the Senate, the United States and Great Britain exe- 
cuted what is popularly known as the Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty. It is of great importance to understand clearly 
the circumstances under which this treaty was nego- 
tiated. 

For very obvious reasons, the Isthmus of Panama 
was for many years the objective point of all canal 
schemes, but as the engineering difficulties of this 
route began to be fully appreciated, attention was 
directed more and more to that through Nicaragua. 
The occupation by Great Britain, under the assump- 
tion of a protectorate, of the territory about the mouth 
of the San Juan river, which belonged to Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica, and in which the Atlantic terminus 
of the canal would fall, was a source of no little un- 
easiness and perplexity to the United States. In June, 
1849, Mr. Hise, charge d'affaires of the United States 
in Central America, negotiated without the authoriza- 
tion or knowledge of his government, a treaty with 



8 Mr. Scruggs to Mr. Bayard, April 16, 1885, For. Rel., also " Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VIII, p. 326. 

152 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

Nicaragua which gave the United States exclusive 
rights in the construction of a canal through the terri- 
tory of that state. 10 This treaty was not submitted 
to the Senate, but was made use of in the negotia- 
tions that were opened shortly thereafter with Great 
Britain for the purpose of ousting her from her posi- 
tion of control over the mouth of the San Juan. A 
few months later, September 28, 1849, Mr. Squier 
signed with Honduras a treaty which ceded Tiger 
Island, in the Bay of Fonseca, to the United States, 
thus giving us a naval station on the Pacific side of 
the isthmus. This treaty, like that negotiated by Mr. 
Hise, was unauthorized and never submitted to the 
Senate. 11 Both treaties were used, however, in bring- 
ing England to the signature of the Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty. This activity in treaty-making was occasioned 
by the acquisition of California and the rush to the 
gold fields by way of the isthmus. 

During the period that elapsed between Mr. Ban- 
croft's withdrawal from London and Mr. Lawrence's 
arrival as the representative of the United States, Mr. 
Clayton instructed Mr. Rives, who was on his way to 
Paris, to stop in London and hold a conference with 
Lord Palmerston on the Central American question. 
At this date the United States was striving simply 
for equal rights in any waterway that might be opened 
through the isthmus and not for any exclusive rights. 
Mr. Rives declared to Lord Palmerston " that citizens 
of the United States had entered into a contract with 
the state of Nicaragua to open, on certain conditions, 
a communication between the Atlantic and Pacific 



10 "Collected Correspondence," p. 94- 

11 Ibid., p. 14. 

153 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

oceans by the river San Juan and the Nicaragua lake; 
that the government of the United States, after the 
most careful investigation of the subject, had come 
undoubtedly to the conclusion that upon both legal 
and historical grounds the state of Nicaragua was the 
true territorial sovereign of the river San Juan as 
well as of the Nicaragua lake, and that it was, there- 
fore, bound to give its countenance and support, by 
all proper and reasonable means, to rights lawfully 
derived by their citizens under a grant from that 
sovereign." He further said: 

That the United States would not, if they could, obtain any 
exclusive right or privilege in a great highway, which 
naturally belonged to all mankind, for they well knew that 
the possession of any such privilege would expose them to 
inevitable jealousies and probable controversies which would 
make it infinitely more costly than advantageous; that while 
they aimed at no exclusive privilege for themselves, they 
could never consent to see so important a communication 
fall under the exclusive control of any other great commer- 
cial power ; that we were far from imputing to Her Britannic 
Majesty's government any views of that kind, but Mosquito 
possession at the mouth of the San Juan could be considered 
in no other light than British possession, and his lordship 
would readily comprehend that such a state of things, so long 
as it was continued, must necessarily give rise to dissatisfac- 
tion and distrust on the part of other commercial powers. 13 

The negotiations thus opened by Mr. Rives were 
continued by Mr. Lawrence upon his arrival in Eng- 
land, but were shortly thereafter transferred to Wash- 
ington, where Mr. Clayton succeeded in arranging 
with Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer the terms of a con- 
vention which was signed April 19, 1850. The inten- 

> 3 " Collected Correspondence," pp. n and 12. 

154 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

tion of the two governments, as declared in the pre- 
amble, was to set forth " their views and intentions 
with reference to any means of communication by 
ship canal which may be constructed between the 
Atlantic and Pacific oceans by the way of the river 
San Juan de Nicaragua, and either or both of the lakes 
of Nicaragua or Managua, to any port or place on 
the Pacific ocean." 

By the first article Great Britain and the United 
States bound themselves never to obtain or maintain 
any exclusive control over the said ship canal; never 
to erect or maintain any fortifications commanding 
the same or in the vicinity thereof, or to colonize or 
exercise dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the 
Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America; and 
never to make use of any alliance, connection or in- 
fluence with any of these states to obtain any unequal 
advantages in regard to commerce or navigation 
through the said canal. 

The second article provided for the neutralization 
of the canal in the event of war between the contract- 
ing parties. The third guaranteed protection for the 
persons and property of the parties legally undertak- 
ing the construction of the canal. The fourth related! 
to gaining the consent of the states whose territory 
the canal should traverse. The fifth article provided 
for the neutralization and protection of the canal so 
long as it was managed without discrimination against 
either of the contracting parties, and stipulated that 
neither of them would withdraw its protection with- 
out giving the other six months' notice. In the sixth 
article the contracting parties promised to invite every 
state with which they were on terms of friendly in 

155 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

tercourse to accede to this convention. In the seventh 
article the contracting parties agreed to lend their sup- 
port and encouragement to the first company offering 
to construct the canal in accordance with the spirit 
and intention of this convention. The eighth article 
was of special importance. It declared that " the gov- 
ernments of the United States and Great Britain hav- 
ing not only desired, in entering into this convention, 
to accomplish a particular object, but also to establish 
a general principle, they hereby agree to extend their 
protection, by treaty stipulations, to any other prac- 
ticable communication, whether by canal or railway, 
across the isthmus which connects North and South 
America, and especially to the interoceanic communi- 
cations, should the same prove practicable, whether by 
canal or railway, which are now proposed to be es- 
tablished by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama." 13 

Such are the main stipulations of the celebrated 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which remained in force until 
1901, and which during that period probably called 
forth more discussion than any treaty which the 
United States had ever signed. 

In after years a large number of people on this 
side of the Atlantic, forgetting the object and aim of 
the treaty and the circumstances under which it was 
negotiated, thought that the United States conceded 
too much and violated the principle of the Monroe 
Doctrine in giving England a position and interest 
in America which she did not before possess. This 
opinion was held by some prominent statesmen at the 
time the treaty was negotiated, notably by Buchanan, 
who poured forth severe criticism and ridicule upon 



18 " Collected Correspondence," p. 99. 

156 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

it. While it was before the Senate for ratification, 
he wrote to a friend: 

If Sir Henry Bulwer can succeed in having the two first 
provisions of this treaty ratified by the Senate, he will de- 
serve a British peerage. The consideration for our conces- 
sions is the relinquishment of the claim to the protectorate 
of the Mosquito shore — so absurd and unfounded that it has 
been ridiculed even by the London Times. Truly Sir Henry 
has brought this claim to a good market when he found a 
purchaser in Mr. Clayton. The treaty altogether reverses 
the Monroe Doctrine, and establishes it against ourselves 
rather than European governments. 14 

Let us see what the interests of the two signatory 
powers were at that time in Central America. The 
United States had recently acquired California by 
the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the rapid de- 
velopment of the Pacific states made the canal a ques- 
tion of greater importance to the United States than 
ever before. The great transcontinental railroads, 
which some fifteen years later established direct over- 
land communication with the Pacific states, were then 
hardly thought of. 

England's interest in the canal, on the other hand, 
was rather a prospective one, but farsighted as usual, 
she had provided for future contingencies by occupy- 
ing several years before, under the guise of a pro- 
tectorate over the Mosquito Indians, Greytown at the 
mouth of the San Juan river, the Atlantic terminus 
of the canal. In addition to the Mosquito coast, Eng- 
land at this time held the Bay Islands and Belize, or 
British Honduras. The United States, it is true, had 

11 Mr. Buchanan to Hon. John A. McClernand, April 2, 1850, " American 
Hist. Rev.," Oct., 1899. 

157 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

never recognized the claims of Great Britain to domin- 
ion over the Mosquito coast. These claims, which 
dated back to the eighteenth century, when British 
wood-cutters in search of mahogany, and smugglers 
entered the territory occupied by the Mosquito Indians 
and established cordial relations with them, had been 
abandoned by the treaty of 1786 with Spain, but were 
revived in 1841, when a ship of war was sent to San 
Juan del Norte to announce the protection of England 
over the lands of the Mosquito king and to raise the 
Mosquito flag. 16 In 1848 the English and Indians 
drove the Nicaraguans out of the town and changed 
the name to Greytown. 

The United States uniformly denied the rights of 
the Mosquito king to sovereignty over the district, 
and consequently the pretensions of the inhabitants of 
Greytown to political organization or power derived in 
any way from the Mosquitos. In his instructions to 
Mr. Hise soon after the occupation of Greytown, Sec- 
retary Buchanan said : 

The object of Great Britain in this seizure is evident from 
the policy which she has uniformly pursued throughout her 
history, of seizing upon every available commercial point in 
the world whenever circumstances have placed it in her 
power. Her purpose probably is to obtain control of the 
route for a railroad or canal between the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans by way of Lake Nicaragua. . . . The government 
of the United States has not yet determined what course it 
will pursue in regard to the encroachment of the British 
government. . . . The independence as well as the inter- 
ests of the nations on this continent require that they should 
maintain an American system of policy entirely distinct 
from that which prevails in Europe. To suffer any inter- 
ference on the part of the European governments with the 

16 " Wharton's Digest," Sec. 295. 

IS8 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

domestic concerns of the American republics, and to permit 
them to establish new colonies upon this continent, would be 
to jeopard their independence and ruin their interests. These 
truths ought everywhere throughout this continent to be 
impressed upon the public mind ; but what can the United 
States do to resist such European interference whilst the 
Spanish-American republics continue to weaken themselves 
by civil divisions and civil war, and deprive themselves of 
doing anything for their own protection. 

Whatever the rights of the case, Great Britain was 
in actual possession of the Atlantic terminus of the 
proposed canal, and the United States was not pre- 
pared forcibly to oust her, even if such a course had 
been deemed advisable. The United States had no 
rights in the case at this time by treaty with Nica- 
ragua or otherwise, none of the statesmen of that day 
having been broad enough in their views or bold 
enough to consider the territory of Nicaragua as "a 
part of the coast-line of the United States." All that 
could be opposed to England's de facto possession 
was the Monroe Doctrine, and England held that her 
claim antedated the declaration of that principle of 
American diplomacy. Mr. Clayton cannot, therefore, 
be justly charged with a violation of the Monroe Doc- 
trine, for the effect of the treaty was to leave Eng- 
land weaker territorially on this continent than she was 
before. 

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty left open several minor 
questions that required adjustment before the canal 
enterprise could be pushed forward with success. 
Chief among these were the dispute between Nica- 
ragua and Costa Rica in regard to their boundary 
line and the controversy between Great Britain and 
Nicaragua in regard to the territory claimed by the 

159 






UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

Mosquito Indians. In April, 1852, Mr. Webster and 
Sir John Crampton agreed upon a basis for the set- 
tlement of Central American affairs, and drew up and 
signed a proposal to be submitted to Nicaragua and 
Costa Rica. 16 This proposed basis for a treaty was 
rejected by Nicaragua, which left the questions in- 
volved in the same unsettled position. 

A much more serious obstacle to the accomplish- 
ment of the objects of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty than 
the failure of the above proposal arose from the wide 
divergence of opinion between the British and Ameri- 
can governments in regard to its interpretation. The 
discussion involved two principal points :J(jJl Whether 
the abnegatory clauses of the first article were merely 
prospective in character and directed against future 
acquisitions in Central America, or whether they re- 
quired Great Britain to abandon her protectorate over 
the Mosquito coast at once; and (2) whether the Bay 
Islands came within the purview of the treaty. It 
was expressly stipulated that Belize or British Hon- 
duras was not included in Central America and there- 
fore not affected by the treaty one way or the other. 
A declaration to this effect was filed at the state de- 
partment by the British minister, Sir Henry Bulwer. 
In reply, Mr. Clayton, after conference with the chair- 
man of the Senate committee on foreign relations, 
acknowledged that British Honduras did not come 
within the scope of the treaty, but at the same time 
carefully refrained from affirming or denying the 
British title to that settlement or its alleged dependen- 
cies. 17 This left open the question as to whether the 



""Collected Correspondence," p 102. 

17 Ibid., p. 234, also Wharton's Digest, Vol. II, p. 190. 

l6o 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

Bay Islands were dependencies of Belize or of the 
Republic of Honduras. 

Shortly after the failure of the Crampton-Webster 
proposals, Great Britain took advantage of the un- 
certainty that existed in regard to the status of the 
Bay Islands and by a formal proclamation, issued 
July 17, 1852, converted her settlements on those 
islands into " The Colony of the Bay Islands." When 
the United States government expressed its surprise 
at this proceeding, the British government replied that 
the Bay Islands were dependencies of Her Majesty's 
settlement at Belize and therefore, by explicit agree- 
ment, not within the scope of the Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty. 18 

In 1856^ an effort was made to terminate the diffi- 
culties arising out of the different constructions put 
upon the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by the negotiation 
of a supplementary convention. On October 17 of 
that year ajtreaty was signed in London by the Ameri- 
can minister and Lord Clarendon, known as the Dal- 
las-Clarendon treaty. It provided (1) for the with- 
drawal of the British protectorate over the Mosquito 
Indians; (2) it regulated the boundaries of the Belize 
settlements on the basis of a compromise; and (3) it 
provided for a cession of the Bay Islands to Hon- 
duras, upon condition of the ratification of a treaty 
already negotiated between Great Britain and Hon- 
duras, which virtually erected an independent state 
of the islands, exempt in many particulars from the 
sovereignty of Honduras, and under the protectorate 
of Great Britain. 

The first two clauses were acceptable to the United 

18 " Collected Correspondence," p. 248. 

l6l 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

States Senate, but it was deemed proper to amend 
the third by striking out all that part of it which 
contemplated the concurrence of the United States in 
the British treaty with Honduras, and simply to pro- 
vide for a recognition by the two governments of 
the sovereignty of Honduras over the islands in ques- 
tion. 19 Great Britain rejected this amendment and 
the Dallas-Clarendon treaty fell through. Great Bri- 
tain and the United States were thus thrown back 
upon the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with its conflicting 
interpretations. 

In October, 1857, the President was notified in- 
formally that the British government had decided to 
dispatch Sir Wm. Ouseley, a diplomatist of well-rec- 
ognized authority and experience, to Central America 
to make a definite settlement of all matters in dispute 
between the United States and England; that the 
efforts of the new plenipotentiary would be directed 
to those objects which had been dealt with in the 
Dallas-Clarendon treaty of 1856, viz., the cession 
of the Bay Islands to Honduras, the substitution of 
the sovereignty of Nicaragua for the protectorate of 
England over the Mosquitos and the regulation of the 
frontiers of Belize; that it was the intention of Her 
Majesty's government to carry the Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty into execution according to the general tenor 
of the interpretation put upon it by the United States, 
but to do so by separate negotiation with the Central 
American republics, in lieu of a direct engagement 
with the federal government. 20 

President Buchanan replied that he would be satis- 



18 " Collected Correspondence," p. 286. 
ao Ibid., p. 262263. 

l62 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

fied with this course and that upon receiving an offi- 
cial assurance to that effect, he would change the 
character of the message he had already prepared for 
Congress. On the 30th of November, 1857, ^ e Brit- 
ish government submitted to the United States the 
alternative of referring the Clayton-Bulwer treaty to 
the arbitration of any European power which the 
United States might prefer to select or of adjusting 
matters by negotiations with the Central American 
republics, as already outlined in Sir William Ouseley's 
prospective mission. 21 

At this stage of the negotiations matters were fur- 
ther complicated (1) by the negotiation of the Cass- 
Yrissari treaty of November 16, 1857, between the 
United States and Nicaragua for protection of the 
transit route and (2) by the invasion of Nicaraguan 
territory by a band of filibusters under General 
Walker, bent on the subversion of the lawful govern- 
ment of the country. The treaty was not ratified, 
however, and the Walker expedition was arrested by 
the interposition of the United States navy. 

The United States government not having given 
any definite answer to the British proposal to sub- 
mit the treaty to arbitration, the British government 
delayed dispatching Sir William Ouseley on his mis- 
sion. In the negotiations which took place during 
this delay the question of the abrogation of the Clay- 
ton-Bulwer treaty was discussed between the two gov- 
ernments. In his message of December 8, 1857, Pres- 
ident Buchanan had suggested the abrogation of the 
treaty by mutual consent as the wisest course that 
could be pursued in view of the increasing complica- 

^Ibid., p. 276. 

163 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

tions to which the varying constructions of it were 
giving rise. The British government took up this 
suggestion and expressed its willingness to concur in 
such a course, but also expressed the opinion that 
the initiative should be taken by the government which 
was dissatisfied with its provisions. 

The British minister was, however, directed by his 
government to make it perfectly clear to the govern- 
ment of the United States, that to abrogate the treaty 
was to return to the status quo ante its conclusion in 
1850; that Great Britain had no kind of jealousy re- 
specting American colonization in Central America, 
and did not ask or wish for any exclusive privileges 
whatever in that quarter. 22 Finally, Sir William 
Ouseley was dispatched on his mission and during 
the years 1859 and i860 succeeded in negotiating 
treaties with Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 
the provisions of which were in substantial accord 
with the rejected Dallas-Clarendon treaty. 23 

The treaty with Nicaragua signed at Managua, Jan- 
uary 28, i860, though restoring to that republic nom- 
inal sovereignty over the Mosquito territory, reserved 
to the Indians the right of retaining their own cus- 
toms, assigned boundaries to that reservation in all 
probability greatly beyond its true limits, and con- 
firmed grants of land previously made in that terri- 
tory. Notwithstanding these facts, in his annual mes- 
sage of December 3, i860, President Buchanan de- 
clared that the United States government was satis- 
fied with the final settlement. His words were 1 

/ J 

22 " Collected Correspondence," p. 280. 
sa Ibid., pp. 294-302. 

164 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

The discordant constructions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty 
between the two governments, which at different periods of 
the discussion bore a threatening aspect, have resulted in a 
final settlement entirely satisfactory to this government. 24 

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was negotiated with the 
expectation that the construction of a ship canal would 
rapidly follow, but the unfortunate entanglements that 
grew out of the variant constructions put upon that 
treaty by the contracting powers deferred to an in- 
definite period the accomplishment of the object it 
was designed to promote. By the time these differ- 
ences were adjusted the attention of the American 
public was centered upon the first throes of the gigantic 
struggle of the war of secession and the canal ques- 
tion was for several years completely overshadowed. 
The government of the United States emerged from 
that struggle with larger ideas of its position among 
the powers of the world and with broader views of 
national policy. Mr. Seward gave expression to that 
feeling in the purchase of Alaska, in his interposition 
in Mexico and in his efforts to secure a position for 
the United States in the West Indies. In order to 
strengthen the position of the United States he wished 
to purchase Tiger Island, a possession of Honduras 
in Fonseca bay on the Pacific coast. As this island 
lay in Central America, Mr. Seward could not take 
any steps in the matter without the consent of Great 
Britain, on account of the renunciatory clause with 
respect to that territory in the Clayon-Bulwer treaty. 
He, therefore, directed Mr. Adams, April 25, 1866, 
to sound Lord Clarendon as to the disposition of the 
British government toward the United States acquir- 

24 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. V, p. 639. 

165 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

ing a coaling station in Central America. In this 
dispatch we find the first suggestion of a repudiation 
of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty on the ground that it 
was a special and not a general contract, and that the 
work for which it had been negotiated had never been 
undertaken. Mr. Seward uses these words : 

At the time the treaty was concluded there was every 
prospect that that work would not only soon be begun, but 
that it would be carried to a successful conclusion. For 
reasons, however, which it is not necessary to specify, it 
never was even commenced, and at present there does not 
appear to be a likelihood of its being undertaken. It may 
be a question, therefore, supposing that the canal should 
never be begun, whether the renunciatory clauses of the 
treaty are to have perpetual operation. Technically speak- 
ing, this question might be decided in the negative. Still, so 
long as it should remain a question, it would not comport 
with good faith for either party to do anything which might 
be deemed contrary to even the spirit of the treaty.*" 

The subject was brought to the attention of Lord 
Clarendon in a casual way by Mr. Adams, but it was 
not pressed and Mr. Seward refrained from disre- 
garding the renunciatory clause of the treaty. 

In 1867, a treaty between the United States and 
Nicaragua, covering the case of an interoceanic canal, 
was negotiated and ratified by both parties. It granted 
to the United States the right of transit between the 
Atlantic and Pacific oceans on any lines of communi- 
cation, natural or artificial, by land or by water, then 
existing, or that might thereafter be constructed, upon 
equal terms with the citizens of Nicaragua, and the 
United States agreed to extend its protection to all 

11 " Collected Correspondence," p. 303. 

166 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

such routes of communication, and " to guarantee the 
neutrality and innocent use of the same." The United 
States further agreed to employ its influence with 
other nations to induce them to guarantee such neu- 
trality and protection. 26 

This treaty, like the treaty with Colombia of 1846 
and the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, contemplated the neu- 
tralization of the canal. It in no way infringed our en- 
gagements with England under the Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty, but in providing for the joint guarantee of 
other powers, was in accord with the provisions of 
that treaty. 

In 1873, Mr. Hamilton Fish directed General 
Schenck to remonstrate, if upon investigation he found 
it to be necessary, against British encroachments upon 
the territory of Guatemala as an infringement of the 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 27 

In spite of the doubts expressed by Mr. Seward in 
the dispatch to Mr. Adams above quoted, as to the 
perpetual character of the obligations imposed by the 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the obligatory force of that 
instrument after the readjustment of i860 was not 
seriously questioned until interest in the canal ques- 
tion was suddenly aroused anew by the concession 
granted by Colombia to Lieutenant Wyse in 1878, and 
the subsequent organization of a French construction 
company under the presidency of Ferdinand de Les- 
seps, the promoter of the Suez canal. 

The prospect of the speedy construction of a canal 
under French control, for which De Lesseps' name 
seemed a sufficient guarantee, produced a sudden and 



2 * " Collected Correspondence," p. 132. 
2T Ibid., pp. 310-12. 



167 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

radical change of policy on the part of the United 
States. In a special message to Congress, March 8, 
1880, President Hayes made the following statement 
of what he conceived to be the true policy of this 
country in regard to a Central American canal : 

The policy of this country is a canal under American 
control. The United States cannot consent to the sur- 
render of this control to any European power, or to any 
combination of European powers. If existing treaties be- 
tween the United States and other nations, or if the rights 
of sovereignty or property of other nations stand in the way 
of this policy — a contingency which is not apprehended — 
suitable steps should be taken by just and liberal negotiations 
to promote and establish the American policy on this sub- 

/ject, consistently with the rights of the nations to be affected 
by it. 

The capital invested by corporations or citizens of other 
countries in such an enterprise must, in a great degree, look 
for protection to one or more of the great powers of the 
world. No European power can intervene for such pro- 
tection without adopting measures on this continent which 
the United States would deem wholly inadmissible. If the 
protection of the United States is relied upon, the United 
States must exercise such control as will enable this country 
to protect its national interests and maintain the rights of 
those whose private capital is embarked in the work. 

An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus will 
essentially change the geographical relations between the 
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, and between 
the United States and the rest of the world. It will be the 
great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our 
Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coast-line of the 
United States. Our merely commercial interest in it is 
greater than that of all other countries, while its relation 
to our power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of 
defense, our unity, peace, and safety, are matters of para- 
mount concern to the people of the United States. No other 
great power would, under similar circumstances, fail to 

168 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

assert a rightful control over a work so closely and vitally 
affecting its interests and welfare. 

Without urging further the grounds of my opinion, I 
repeat, in conclusion, that it is the right and the duty of 
the United States to assert and maintain such supervision 
and authority over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus 
that connects North and South America as will protect our 
national interests. This I am quite sure will be found not 
only compatible with, but promotive of, the widest and most 
permanent advantage to commerce and civilization. 28 



The message itself was accompanied by a report 
from the secretary of state, Mr. Evarts, in which he 
called attention to the mutual engagements entered 
into between the United States and Colombia by the 
treaty of 1846 in reference to a transit route across 
the isthmus and declared that the guarantee of the 
neutrality of the isthmus and of the sovereignty of 
Colombia over the same would be a very different 
thing when the isthmus should be opened to the in- 
terests and ambitions of the great commercial na- 
tions. 29 

President Garfield, in his inaugural address, ap- 
proved the position taken by his predecessor on the 
canal question, 30 and very soon after assuming the 
portfolio of state, Mr. Blaine outlined the new policy 
to our representatives in Europe, cautioning them, 
however, against representing it as the development 
of a new policy and affirming that it was " nothing 
more than the pronounced adherence of the United 
States to principles long since enunciated by the high- 
est authority of the government." 



28 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VII, p. 585. 

29 " Collected Correspondence," p. 313. 

80 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VIII, p. n. 



I69 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

This dispatch of Mr. Blaine is remarkable for sev- 
eral reasons, but chiefly for the fact that it com- 
pletely ignores the existence of the Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty, there being no allusion to that celebrated con- 
vention either open or implied. Aside from this there 
are three points to be noted. In the first place Mr. 
Blaine calls attention to the rights and duties devolv- 
ing upon the United States from the treaty with 
Colombia of 1846, and states that in the judgment of 
the President the guarantee there given by the United 
States requires no reenforcement, or accession, or 
assent from any other power; that the United States 
in more than one instance had been called upon to 
vindicate the neutrality thus guaranteed; and that 
there was no contingency, then foreseen or appre- 
hended, in which such vindication would not be within 
the power of the nation. 

In the second place, Mr. Blaine declared with em- 
phasis that during any war to which the United States 
of America or the United States of Colombia might 
be a party, the passage of armed vessels of a hostile 
nation through the canal of Panama would be no 
more admissible than would the passage of the armed 
forces of a hostile nation over the railway lines join- 
ing the Atlantic and Pacific shores of the United 
States, or of Colombia. This declaration was in direct 
opposition to the second article of the Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty. Mr. Blaine then proceeded to expatiate upon 
the remarkable development of our Pacific slope and 
the importance of the canal in facilitating communica- 
tion between our Atlantic and Pacific states, alluding 
to the canal in this connection, in the very apt phrase 
of President Hayes, as forming a part of the coast- 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

line of the United States. It does not appear to have 
occurred to Mr. Blaine that the same arguments ap- 
plied with equal force to Great Britain's American 
possessions to the north of us, which likewise ex- 
tended from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and were like- 
wise entering upon a period of unusual development. 

The third point to be noted in the dispatch is the 
statement that the United States would object to any 
concerted action of the European powers for the pur- 
pose of guaranteeing the canal or determining its 
status. 31 This declaration was supposed to be nothing 
more than a reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine. 

A copy of this document was left by Mr. Lowell at 
the British foreign office on the 12th of July, 1881. 
No formal notice of the dispatch was taken by the 
British government until November, when Lord Gran- 
ville replied that, as Mr. Blaine had made the state- 
ment that the government of the United States had 
no intention of initiating any discussion upon this 
subject, he did not propose to enter into a detailed 
argument in reply to Mr. Blaine's observations. He 
wished, however, merely to point out that the position 
of Great Britain and the United States with reference 
to the canal, irrespective of the magnitude of the 
commercial relations of the former power, was de- 
termined by a convention signed between them at 
Washington on the 19th of April, 1850, commonly 
known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and her majes- 
ty's government relied with confidence upon the ob- 
servance of all the engagements of that treaty. 32 

Before this reply reached Washington, Mr. Blaine 



81 " Collected Correspondence," pp. 322-326. 
* 3 Ibid., p. 326. 

171 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

had again taken up the question of the canal in a 
special dispatch of November 19, 1881. In this dis- 
patch he addressed himself specifically to a considera- 
tion of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and urged upon the 
consideration of the British government modifications 
of such a radical character as to amount to a complete 
abrogation of the treaty. The grounds of objection 
to the treaty were stated in full. In the first place 
it was declared that the treaty had been made more 
than thirty years before under exceptional and ex- 
traordinary conditions, which were at least temporary 
in their nature and had long since ceased to exist. 
The remarkable development of the United States on 
the Pacific coast since that time had created new 
duties and responsibilities for the American govern- 
ment which required, in the judgment of the Presi- 
dent, some essential modifications in the treaty. The 
objections to the perpetuity of the treaty were then 
stated in full. First and foremost was the objection 
that the treaty by forbidding the military fortification 
of the proposed canal practically conceded its control 
to Great Britain by reason of her naval superiority. 
The military power of the United States in any con- 
flict on the American continent was irresistible, yet 
the United States was restrained from using this 
power for the protection of the canal, while no re- 
strictions could be placed upon the natural advantages 
that England enjoyed in this regard as a great naval 
power. A more serious objection to the treaty, how- 
ever, was urged in the statement that it embodied a 
misconception of the relative positions of Great Britain 
and the United States with respect to interests on this 
continent. The United States would not consent to 

172 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

perpetuate any treaty that impeached " our right and 
long-established claim to priority on the American 
continent." 

In the third place, at the time the convention was 
agreed upon, Great Britain and the United States were 
the only nations prominent in the commerce of Cen- I 
tral and South America. Since that time other nations 
not bound by the prohibitions of that treaty had be- 
come interested in Central America, and the republic 
of France had become sponsor for a new canal scheme. 
Yet by the treaty with England the United States was 
prevented from asserting its rights and the privileges 
acquired through treaty with Colombia anterior to the 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 

In the fourth place, the treaty had been made with 
the implied understanding that British capital would 
be available for the construction of a canal. That 
expectation had never been realized, and the United 
States was now able to construct a canal without aid 
from outside resources. 

In conclusion, Mr. Blaine proposed several modifi- 
cations of the treaty which would leave the United 
States free to fortify the canal and to hold political 
control of it in conjunction with the country in which 
it might be located. 33 

A few days after the dispatch was written, Lord 
Granville's answer to Mr. Blaine's first dispatch 
reached Washington, and on the 29th of November, 
Mr. Blaine wrote a second dispatch equally volumin- 
ous with the one of November 19. In this he re- 
viewed the discussions which had taken place between 
1850 and i860 in regard to the treaty with a view to 

3 * " Collected Correspondence," pp. 327-332. 

173 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

showing that it had never been satisfactory to the 
United States and had been the cause of serious mis- 
understanding. He failed, however, to make mention 
of the settlement of i860 and the declaration of Presi- 
dent Buchanan that the United States was satisfied 
with that adjustment. 

The full reply of the British government to Mr. 
Blaine's arguments was given in two dispatches dated 
respectively January 7 and 14, 1882. Lord Granville 
took exception to certain conclusions which Mr. Blaine 
had sought to establish by analogy with the conduct 
of Great Britain in regard to the Suez canal. His 
lordship fully concurred in what Mr. Blaine had said 
as to the unexampled development of the United States 
on the Pacific coast, but reminded him that the de- 
velopment of her majesty's possessions to the north 
of the United States, while less rapid, had been, never- 
theless, on a scale that bore some relation even to 
that of the Pacific states. In the view of her majes- 
ty's government, the changes desired by the United 
States would not improve the situation as regarded 
the canal, while the declaration that the United States 
would always treat the waterway connecting the two 
oceans " as part of her coast-line " threatened the in- 
dependence of the territory lying between that water- 
way and the United States. 

Her majesty's government believed that the only 
way to relieve the situation was to extend the invita- 
tion to all maritime states to participate in an agree- 
ment based on the stipulations of the convention of 
1850. 34 

The task of replying to Lord Granville's two dis- 

** " Collected Correspondence," pp. 340-352. 

174 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

patches fell upon Mr. Blaine's successor in the State 
Department, Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Frelinghuy- 
sen's voluminous dispatch of May 8, 1882, reiterated 
in the main the arguments advanced by Mr. Blaine. 
He adduced evidence at great length to try to show- 
that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was a special contract 
for the accomplishment of a specific object, which had 
never been achieved, and was no longer binding; that 
Great Britain had violated the treaty by converting 
her settlement of British Honduras into a possession 
without ever receiving the assent of the United States, 
and that such act would entitle the United States to 
renounce the treaty. The dispatch was further char-, 
acterized by a direct appeal to the Monroe Doctrine 
in these words: 

The President believes that the formation of a protectorate 
by European nations over the isthmus transit would be in 
conflict with a doctrine which has been for many years 
asserted by the United States. This sentiment is properly 
termed a doctrine, as it has no prescribed sanction and its 
assertion is left to the exigency which may invoke it. It has 
been repeatedly announced by the executive department of 
this government, and through the utterances of distinguished 
citizens ; it is cherished by the American people, and has 
been approved by the government of Great Britain. 

After quoting a part of President Monroe's message 
of December 2, 1823, and reviewing the circumstances 
under which it was delivered, Mr. Frelinghuysen said : 

Thus the doctrine of non-intervention by European powers 
in American affairs arose from complications in South 
America, and was announced by Mr. Monroe on the sugges- 
tion of the official representative of Great Britain. 85 

*' " Collected Correspondence," pp. 160-161. 

175 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

In his reply of December 30, 1882, Lord Granville 
proved conclusively that Article VIII. of the treaty 
was understood by the American government during 
the discussions of 1850-1860 as establishing a general 
principle applicable to all waterways connecting the 
two oceans. In answer to the second point, Lord 
Granville adduced the notes exchanged between Mr. 
Clayton and Sir Henry Bulwer in July, 1850, which 
made it perfectly clear that, in the understanding of 
both governments at that time, the claims of Great 
Britain to Belize or British Honduras were not affected 
one way or the other by the treaty. 36 

— *. In a later dispatch, August 17, 1883, Lord Gran- 
ville briefly touched upon Mr. Frelinghuysen's ap- 
peal to the Monroe Doctrine, reminding him very 
pertinently that neither the American administration 
which negotiated the treaty nor the Senate which 
ratified it considered that they were precluded by the 
utterances of President Monroe from entering into 
such a treaty with one or more of the European 
powers. 37 

The correspondence on the treaty closed with Mr. 
Frelinghuysen's dispatch of November 22, 1883, in 
which he reiterated with no small degree of bluntness 
and pertinacity the arguments of his earlier dispatches. 

v— The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was designed at the time 
of its execution to establish a permanent principle of 
control over interoceanic communication in Central 
America. No provision was made, as in most treaties, 
for its abrogation, and the American government could 
not terminate it without the consent of Great Britain 



•• " Collected Correspondence," pp. 353-359- 
» 7 Ibid., p. 364. 

I76 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

for fear that she would return to her position of 
vantage at the time the treaty was made. For this 
reason, while Mr. Frelinghuysen claimed that the 
treaty was voidable, he did not actually declare it void. 

Mr. Blaine's efforts to secure a modification were 
the result of the development of a new policy by the 
United States and the arguments presented by Mr. 
Blaine and Mr. Frelinghuysen in support of this policy 
were disingenuous and flimsy. It may be safely said 
that no state papers have ever emanated from our 
government on so serious a question equally lacking 
in logical consistency and moral force. 

The result was that Great Britain refused to consent 
to a modification of the treaty and the United States 
saw before her the alternative of abiding by the terms 
of the treaty or ultimately resorting to war with 
England. 

In December, 1884, Mr. Frelinghuysen negotiated 
a treaty with Nicaragua providing for the construc- 
tion of a canal by the United States to be under the 
joint ownership and protection of the United States 
and Nicaragua. The United States also guaranteed 
the integrity of the territory of Nicaragua. When Mr. 
Cleveland became president this treaty was still be- 
fore the Senate for consideration. Mr. Cleveland 
withdrew the treaty, and in his first annual message, 
December 8, 1885, reverted to our traditional policy. 
He declared himself opposed to entangling alliances 
with foreign states and declared: 

Whatever highway may be constructed across the barrier 
dividing the two greatest maritime areas of the world, must 
be for the world's benefit, a trust for mankind, to be removed 
from the chance of domination by any single power, nor 

177 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

become a point of invitation for hostilities or a prize for 
warlike ambition. 88 

No discussion as to the validity of the Clayton- 
Bulwer treaty took place between the two govern- 
ments after the close of President Arthur's adminis- 
tration. Mr. Cleveland's message above quoted was 
accepted as a reaffirmation of the treaty on the part 
of the American government. 

Upon two occasions subsequently questions arose 
between the two governments involving the stipula- 
tions of the treaty. In 1888, and again in 1894, 
the United States felt called upon to protest against 
British interference in the affairs of the Mosquito 
coast. 39 The ground of interposition on the part of 
Great Britain was alleged to be found in the treaty of 
Managua, signed between Great Britain and Nica- 
ragua on the 28th of January, i860. This convention, 
it will be remembered, was one of the three treaties 
entered into by Great Britain with Central American 
republics with a view to removing the causes of dis- 
pute in the construction of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 
The treaty of Managua assigned a district to the 
Mosquito Indians within the limits of the republic 
of Nicaragua. The sovereignty of Nicaragua over the 
district was recognized, but the Indians were secured 
in the possession and enjoyment of their own domestic 
customs and regulations. It was agreed, however, 
that nothing in the treaty should prevent the Mos- 
quitos at any subsequent date from voluntarily agree- 
ing to absolute incorporation with the republic of 



•""Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VIII, p. 327. 
*• See Mr. Bayard to Mr. Phelps, Nov. 23, 1888. For. Rel., 1888, Pt. I. 
pp. 759768. 



178 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

Nicaragua. By the terms of the treaty the protec- 
torate of Great Britain over the Mosquito coast was 
to cease three months after the exchange of ratifica- 
tions. 

In reply to the protest of 1888, Lord Salisbury said 
that her majesty's government had no intention to 
assert a protectorate in substance or in form over the 
Mosquito nation, but that according to the convention 
with Nicaragua of i860, Great Britain undertook "to 
secure certain rights and privileges to the Mosquito 
Indians, and in the event, which has arisen, of the 
Mosquito Indians complaining that their rights are 
infringed by Nicaragua, by whom is remonstrance 
to be made to Nicaragua unless by Great Britain, with 
whom she has concluded the convention in ques- 
tion?" 40 

In the spring of 1894, yet more serious trouble 
arose. The Mosquito territory was invaded by the 
troops of Nicaragua and Bluefields was surrounded. 
The British consul at that point protested against this 
act as contrary to the treaty of Managua. The pro- 
test being unheeded, a force of troops was landed 
from the British ship Cleopatra and on March 9, the 
Nicaraguans were forced to retire. Mr. Bayard was 
instructed by telegraph " to ascertain and report fully 
by cable the occasion for this action." The British 
government disavowed all intention of violating the 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which it recognized " as ex- 
tant *and in full force." 

In July, 1894, United States marines were landed 
at Bluefields to protect American interests and to 
restore order. Later the British government assured 



♦° For. Rel., 1889, p. 468. 

179 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

Mr. Bayard that its action had been wholly uncon- 
nected with any political or conventional question 
touching the Mosquito reservation, but simply to pro- 
tect British interests. 

By a convention signed November 20, 1894, the 
Mosquito Indians surrendered their rights under the 
treaty of i860 and were incorporated with Nicaragua. 
This voluntary incorporation took away all further 
occasion for interposition on the part of Great Britain, 
and Mr. Bayard reported that it was received with 
11 the most open expression of satisfaction at the for- 
eign office." 41 

The attempts of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to bring 
about a modification of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty 
were, as we have seen, unsuccessful. In fact, their 
only effect was to strengthen the British government 
for the time being in the determination to hold us 
more strictly to the terms of that convention. In 1896 
Secretary Olney in a review of the situation declared: 

Upon every principle which governs the relations to each 
other, either of nations or of individuals, the United States is 
completely estopped from denying that the treaty is in full 
force and vigor. If changed conditions now make stipula- 
tions, which were once deemed advantageous, either inappli- 
cable or injurious, the true remedy is not in ingenious at- 
tempts to deny the existence of the treaty or to explain away 
its provisions, but in a direct and straightforward application 
to Great Britain for a reconsideration of the whole matter." 

It was precisely in this spirit that Secretary Hay 
undertook in 1899 to negotiate a new treaty with Eng- 
land. The original draft of the Hay-Pauncefote 

41 See Foreign Relations, 1894, App. 1. "Affairs at Bluefields," pp. 
234-363- 

42 Senate Doc. No. 160, Fifty-sixth Cong., First Sess. 

180 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

in the Maritime Canal Company, which held a charter 
from Congress and had secured a concession from 
Nicaragua. This company had started work at Grey- 
town in 1890, but having been forced from lack of 
funds to stop work in 1893, was now urging Con- 
gress to make its enterprise a national one. It found 
a ready champion in Senator Morgan of Alabama, 
who had for years taken a lively interest in the canal 
question and who had strong convictions as to the 
superiority of the Nicaragua route. In 1900 Nica- 
ragua declared the concession of the Maritime Canal 
Company null and void, and granted a new con- 
cession to a group of New York capitalists known 
as the Grace-Eyre-Cragin Syndicate. The Maritime 
Canal Company, however, refused to abandon its 
claims, and a contest between the two concerns was 
carried to the lobbies of Congress. The opposition of 
the transcontinental railroads to a canal at either point 
brought into play another set of powerful interests, 
usually arrayed against the plan which appeared for 
the time being most likely to succeed. 45 

On November 16, 1901, the Walker commission 
after a thorough investigation of the Nicaragua and 
Panama routes made its report. It estimated the cost 
of construction of the Nicaragua canal at $189,864,062, 
and the cost of completing the Panama canal at $144.- 
2 33.35& To this latter sum had to be added the cost 
of acquiring the rights and property of the French 
company, which had stated to the commission that it 
estimated its interests at $109,141,500, making the 
total cost of J_he_Panama_ canal $253,374,858. The 
commission expressed the opinion that the" interests of 

46 Johnson, " Four Centuries of the Panama Canal," Chap. VIII. 

183 



\ 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

the French company were not worth over $40,000,000. 
In conclusion the report stated : 

After considering all the facts developed by the investiga- 
tions made by the commission and the actual situation as it 
now stands, and having in view the terms offered by the New 
Panama Company, this commission is of the opinion that the 
most practicable and feasible route for an isthmian canal, to 
be under the control, management, and ownership of the 
United States, is that known as the Nicaragua route.* 8 

A bill was promptly introduced into the House of 
Representatives by Mr. Hepburn providing for the 
construction of the canal through Nicaragua, and on 
January 9, 1902, this bill passed the House by the 
almost unanimous vote of 308 to 2. The report of 
the commission had meanwhile created great conster- 
nation among the stockholders of the New Panama 
Canal Company, and on January 4, 1902, a definite 
offer to sell out to the United States at $40,000,000 
was made to the commission by cable. On January 18, 
the commission filed a supplementary report which 
recommended the adoption of the Panama route in- 
stead of that through Nicaragua. 

When the Hepburn bill came up for discussion in 
the Senate, the situation had thus been radically 
changed, and a long debate ensued as to the relative 
merits of the two routes. Senator Morgan continued 
to fight for Nicaragua as the traditional American 
route, declaring that the Panama Company could not 
give a valid transfer of its property and interests. 
But this objection was cleverly met by Senator 
Spooner, who offered an amendment, which was vir- 

4e Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission (Sen. Doc. No. 54, Fifty- 
seventh Cong., First Sess.). 

I84 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

tually a substitute, authorizing the President to ac- 
quire the rights and property of the French company 
at a cost not exceeding $40,000,000; to acquire from 
the Republic of Colombia, upon such terms as he 
might deem reasonable, perpetual control of a strip 
of land, not less than six miles in width, extending 
from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean, with 
jurisdiction over said strip; and to proceed as soon 
as these rights were acquired, to construct a canal. 
But should the President be unable to obtain a satis- 
factory title to the property of the French company 
and the control of the necessary strip of land from 
the Republic of Colombia " within a reasonable time 
and upon reasonable terms," then he was instructed 
to secure control of the necessary strip through Nica- 
ragua and to proceed to construct a canal there. The 
bill as amended passed the Senate June 19, 1902, by 
a vote of 67 to 6. The House at first refused to con- 
cur in the Spooner amendment, but after a conference 
it finally gave way and the measure was adopted by 
a vote of 260 to 8. The act was signed by President 
Roosevelt June 28." 

Attorney-General Knox was sent to Paris to make 
a thorough investigation of the affairs of the Panama 
Company. He reported that it could give a clear title. 
The next step was to secure a right of way through 
Colombia. After considerable delay Secretary Hay 
and Mr. Herran, the Colombian charge d'affaires, 
signed, January 22, 1903, a canal convention, by the 
terms of which the United States agreed to pay Colom- 
bia $10,000,000 in cash and an annuity of $250,000 
for the lease of a strip of land six miles wide across 

*■> U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. XXXII, Pt. I, p. 481. 

185 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

the isthmus. Objection was raised to this treaty 
because it failed to secure for the United States full 
governmental control over the canal zone, but it was 
considered the best that could be gotten and it was 
ratified by the United States Senate March 17, 1903. 

The Colombian Senate, however, did not regard the 
treaty with favor. They felt that Panama was their 
greatest national asset, and they knew perfectly well 
that in spite of threats to the contrary President Roose- 
velt was determined not to adopt the alternative of 
the Spooner amendment and go to Nicaragua. After 
discussing the treaty for nearly two months, they 
finally rejected it August 12 by the unanimous vote 
of all the senators present. 48 They probably thought 
that they could get better terms from the United States 
and particularly that they might reserve a fuller 
measure of sovereignty over the isthmus. President 
Roosevelt declared that the action of the Colombian 
Senate was due to an " anti-social spirit " and to the 
cupidity of the government leaders, who merely 
wished to wait until they could confiscate the $40,000,- 
000 worth of property belonging to the French com- 
pany and then sell out to the United States. This view 
is not borne out by the dispatches of Mr. Beaupre, 
the American minister, who repeatedly warned Sec- 
retary Hay that there was a " tremendous tide of 
public opinion against the canal treaty," which even 
the Colombian government could not ignore. The 
charge of bad faith against Colombia does not come 
in good grace from a country whose constitution also 
requires the ratification of treaties by the Senate. 

As soon as the Hay-Herran convention was rejected 

** Senate Doc. No. 51, Fifty-eighth Cong., Second Sess., p. 56. 

186 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

by the Colombian Senate, the advocates of the Nica- 
ragua route began to take courage and to demand 
that as the " reasonable time " allowed in the Spooner 
act for the President to acquire the right of way- 
through Panama had expired, it was now his duty to 
adopt the Nicaragua route. The directors of the 
French company were again in a state of consterna- 
tion. If they could not sell to the United States 
they would have to sacrifice their property entirely, 
or sell to some other purchaser at a lower figure. It 
was rumored that Germany was willing to buy their 
interests. The directors of the company were so 
completely demoralized that William Nelson Cromwell, 
their American attorney, hastened to Paris to dissuade 
them from taking any rash step. The rejection of 
the Hay-Herran treaty was a great disappointment 
to the inhabitants of the isthmus, who considered this 
action a sacrifice of their interests, and some of the 
foremost citizens conferred with the American agent 
of the Panama Railroad Company as to the advisa- 
bility of organizing a revolution. Before taking any 
step in this direction, it was considered advisable to 
send one of their number to the United States, and 
Dr. Amador was selected for this mission. He had 
conferences with William Nelson Cromwell and with 
Secretary Hay. The latter merely outlined what he 
considered the rights and duties of the United States 
under the treaty of 1846, but refused of course t® 
commit the government to a definite support of the 
revolutionary project. Amador was somewhat dis- 
couraged at the result of his conference with Hay, 
but his hopes were revived by the sudden arrival 
of Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the former chief engineer 

187 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

of the French company, who entered with enthusiasm 
into the revolutionary scheme. 49 

The Colombian Congress adjourned October 30 
without any reconsideration of the treaty, and Presi- 
dent Roosevelt at once ordered the Boston, Dixie, At- 
lanta, and Nashville to proceed within easy reach of 
the isthmus. Their commanders received orders to 
keep the transit open and to " prevent the landing of 
any armed force with hostile intent, either govern- 
ment or insurgent, at any point within fifty miles of 
Panama." The Nashville arrived off Colon Novem- 
ber 2. It can hardly be denied that these measures 
created a situation very favorable to revolution. 50 

The revolutionists had been greatly disappointed 
at Dr. Amador's failure to get a definite promise of 
support from the American government, but their 
spirits revived when they learned of the presence 
of American war vessels. Still they were slow in 
taking advantage of their opportunities and the gov- 
ernment at Washington was growing impatient. At 
3.40 p. m. November 3 the following dispatch was 
sent to the American consuls at Panama and Colon : 
" Uprising on isthmus reported. Keep Department 
promptly and fully informed. Loomis, Acting." At 
8.15 a reply was received from the consul at Panama : 
" No uprising yet. Reported will be in the night. 
Situation is critical." At 9 p.m. a second dispatch 
was received from the same source : " Uprising oc- 
curred to-night, 6; no bloodshed. Army and navy 
officials taken prisoners. Government will be organ- 
ized to-night." 51 

*• Johnson, " Four Centuries of the Panama Canal," pp. 162-171. 

80 Senate Doc. No. 53, Fifty-eighth Cong., Second Sess. 

81 House Doc. No. 8, Fifty-eighth Cong., First Sess. 

188 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

' Before the Nashville received the order to prevent 
the landing of armed forces, 450 Colombian troops 
arrived at Colon. The principal officers were pro- 
vided with a special train to take them across the 
isthmus to Panama. When they arrived they were 
seized by the revolutionary leaders and locked up for 
safe-keeping, while the railroad officials saw to it 
that there were no trains for their troops to use. 
The next day Commander Hubbard landed fifty ma- 
rines from the Nashville at Colon, and a day later 
the officer in charge of the Colombian forces was 
persuaded by a generous bribe to reembark his troops 
and leave. Events continued to follow one another 
with startling rapidity. On the 6th the de facto 
government was recognized and a week later Bunau- 
Varilla was received by President Roosevelt as envoy 
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the Re- 
public of Panama. Such hasty recognition of a new 
government was of course without precedent in the 
annals of American diplomacy, and it naturally con- 
firmed the rumor that the whole affair had been 
prearranged. On October 10 President Roosevelt 
had written a personal letter to Dr. Albert Shaw, edi- 
tor of the Review of Reviews, who was a strong ad- 
vocate of the Panama route, in which he said: 

Privately, I freely say to you that I should be delighted if 
Panama were an independent state, or if it made itself so at 
this moment; but for me to say so publicly would amount to 
an instigation of a revolt, and therefore I cannot say it." 

This letter throws an interesting light on an article 
in the Review of Reviews for November of the same 

62 Literary Digest, October 29, 1904. 

189 



I/* 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

year in which Dr. Shaw discussed the question, 
" What if Panama should Revolt? " and outlined with 
remarkable prophetic insight the future course of 
events. 

In his annual message of December 7, 1903, the 
President discussed the Panama revolution and under- 
took to justify his course under the treaty of 1846. / M 
This message failed to allay public criticism, and on \ W/ 
January 4, 1904, he sent a special message to Con- I 7 
gress in defense of his action. He held that Colombia 
was-not entitled. " to.. .bar -the transit of the world's fonJ 
traffic across the isthmus," and that the intervention 
of the United States was justified, (1) by our treaty 
rights, (2) by our international interests, and (3) by 
the interests of " collective civilization." The " legal " 
argument in this message, if we may dignify it by 
that name, is reported to have been prepared by Root 
and Knox, both at that time members of the Cabinet. 
Several years later, after Mr. Roosevelt had retired 
from the presidency, he expressed the real truth in a 
public speech when he said : 

If I had followed traditional conservative methods I should 
have submitted a dignified state paper of probably two 
hundred pages to the Congress and the debate would be 
going on yet, but I took the Canal zone and let Congress de- 
bate, and while the debate goes on the canal does also. 

The reason why the President did not wish the 
matter to go before Congress again was that he 
had decided upon the Panama route, and he knew 
that when Congress convened in December, the situ- 
ation remaining unchanged, action would be taken 
to compel him to adopt the alternative of the Spooner 

190 



HISTORY OF PANAMA CANAL 

amendment and go to the Nicaragua route. His ob- 
ject in the hasty recognition of the Panama revolu- 
tion was therefore to make the Panama route an ac- 
complished fact before Congress should meet. This 
was the attitude definitely assumed in the message 
of January 4, 1904, in the course of which he said: 

The only question now before us is that of the ratification 
of the treaty. For it is to be remembered that a failure to 
ratify the treaty will not undo what has been done, will not 
restore Panama to Colombia, and will not alter our obliga- 
tion to keep the transit open across the Isthmus, and to pre- 
vent any outside power from menacing this transit. 

The treaty referred to was the convention with 
Panama which had been signed November 18, 1903, 
and which was ratified by the Senate February 23, 
1904, by a vote of 66 to 14. By the terms of this 
agreement the United States guaranteed the independ- 
ence of the Panama Republic, and agreed to pay the 
Panama Republic a sum of $10,000,000 upon the ex- 
change of ratifications and an annual rental of $250,- 
000 a year beginning nine years thereafter. Panama 
on her part granted to the United States in perpetuity 
a zone of land ten miles wide for the construction 
of a canal, the United States receiving as full power 
and authority over this strip and the waters adjacent 
as if it were the sovereign of the said territory. 53 The 
construction of the canal was at once undertaken and 
the work was carried through successfully by General 
Goethals and a corps of army engineers. It was 
opened to commerce August 15, 19 14, though it was 
not completed at that time and traffic was subsequently 
interrupted by landslides. 

68 Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 543- 

191 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

''' Colombia naturally felt aggrieved at the course 
pursued by President Roosevelt and refused to rec- 
ognize the Republic of Panama. She objected to his 
interpretation of the convention of 1846. In this 
convention the United States pledged itself to keep 
the isthmian transit open and guaranteed Colombia's 
sovereignty over the same. This treaty established 
an obligation to Colombia alone, and it is difficult to 
accept the President's view that it established an 
obligation to the world at large against Colombia. 
Colombia demanded that the whole question be sub- 
mitted to arbitration. As the United States had al- 
ways held the ground that disputes arising out of the 
interpretation of treaties should be settled by arbitra- 
tion, it was inconsistent for the United States to re- 
fuse to arbitrate. But President Roosevelt did refuse. 
The Panama episode created strained relations with 
Colombia and made a very bad impression throughout 
Latin America. The United States has since been 
eyed with suspicion by its weaker Southern neighbors. 
The Taft and Wilson administrations both tried to 
appease Colombia by a money payment, but this sub- 
ject will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. 



192 



CHAPTER V 

French Intervention in Mexico 

The attempt of Louis Napoleon to establish a Euro- 
pean monarchy in Mexico under the tutelage of France 
was the most serious menace that republican institu- 
tions in the new world have had to face since the 
schemes of the Holy Alliance were checked by Monroe 
and Canning. The thwarting of that attempt may be 
accounted one of the greatest triumphs of American 
diplomacy. The internal disorders common to South 
and Central American republics have always been a 
fruitful source of embarrassment to the United States, 
on account of the liability to European intervention to 
which these governments continually subject themselves 
in such periods by their open and flagrant disregard 
of international obligations. Of no country is this 
statement truer than of Mexico, where the well-nigh 
interminable strife of parties gave rise between the 
years 1821 and 1857 to thirty-six different govern- 
ments. In 1857 a favorable change occurred in the 
affairs of the republic. A constituent congress, elected 
by the people of the different states, framed and 
adopted a republican constitution which promised 
better things for the future. Under the provisions of 
this constitution an election was held in July (1857) 
and General Comonfort chosen president almost with- 
out opposition. His term of office was to begin De- 
cember 1, 1857, and to continue four years. Within 

193 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

one brief month, however, President Comonfort was 
driven from the capital, and ultimately from the coun- 
try, by an uprising headed by General Zuloaga. As 
soon as Comonfort abandoned the presidency, General 
Benito Juarez, the president of the Supreme Court of 
Justice, became according to the constitution, the presi- 
dent de jure of the republic for the remainder of the 
unexpired term, that is, until December i, 1861. Gen- 
eral Zuloaga had, however, assumed the name of presi- 
dent, with indefinite powers, and the entire diplomatic 
corps, including the minister of the United States, had 
recognized his government. But Zuloaga was speedily 
expelled, and the supreme power seized by General 
Miramon, the head of the church party, whom the dip- 
lomatic corps likewise recognized. Meanwhile Juarez, 
the constitutional president, had proceeded to Vera 
Cruz, where he put his administration into successful 
operation. 

For several months, Mr. John Forsyth, the Ameri- 
can minister, continued at the city of Mexico in the 
discharge of his duties. In June, 1858, however, he 
suspended his diplomatic connection with the Mira- 
mon government. Our relations, which had been bad 
under former governments, were now rendered almost 
intolerable under that of Miramon by outrages towards 
American citizens and personal indignities to Mr. For- 
syth himself. His action was approved by President 
Buchanan, and he was directed to return to the United 
States. All diplomatic intercourse was thus termi- 
nated with the government of Miramon, but as yet 
none was established with the Juarez government. The 
ultimate success of the latter became, however, so 
probable that the following year the President sent 

194 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

a confidential agent to Mexico to inquire into and re- 
port upon the actual condition of the belligerents, and 
in consequence of his report, Mr. Robert M. McLane 
was dispatched to Mexico, March 8, 1859, " with dis- 
cretionary authority to recognize the government of 
President Juarez, if on his arrival in Mexico he should 
find it entitled to such recognition according to the 
established practice of the United States." On the 
7th of April, Mr. McLane presented his credentials 
to President Juarez, having no hesitation, he said, " in 
pronouncing the government of Juarez to be the only 
existing government of the republic." He was cor- 
dially received by the authorities at Vera Cruz, and 
during all the vicissitudes of the next eight years the 
United States government continued to extend its sym- 
pathy and moral support to the government of Juarez 
as the only one entitled to the allegiance of the people 
of Mexico. 

Juarez thus came forward, in the role of reformer, 
as the champion of constitutionalism and the suprem- 
acy of the state against the overreaching power, in- 
fluence, and wealth of the church party. He was a 
full-blooded Indian, without the slightest admixture 
of Spanish blood. In December, i860, he finally suc- 
ceeded in overthrowing the party of Miramon and 
driving the latter into exile. Immediately, on reoccu- 
pying the city of Mexico, the Constitutionalists pro- 
ceeded to execute with severity the decree issued at 
Vera Cruz nationalizing or sequestrating the property 
of the church. 

The most difficult question which the new govern- 
ment had to face was that of international obligations 
recklessly contracted by the various revolutionary 

195 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

leaders who had successively been recognized as con- 
stituting the government of Mexico. In consequence 
of debts contracted and outrages and enormities per- 
petrated, for the most part during the regime of Mira- 
mon and the church party, the governments of Eng- 
land, France, and Spain determined to intervene in 
Mexico. 

The grievances of the British government were 
based on the following facts : non-settlement of claims 
of British bondholders; the murder of the British 
Vice-consul at Tasco; the breaking into the British 
legation and the carrying off £152,000 in bonds be- 
longing to British subjects, besides numerous other 
outrages committed on the persons and property of 
individuals. 1 

The claims of the British bondholders referred to 
had been recognized by the Pakenham convention of 
October 15, 1842, and formed into a consolidated fund 
of $250,000, which was to be paid off, principal and 
interest, by a percentage on import duties at the 
custom-houses of Vera Cruz and Tampico. This con- 
vention was not carried out by the Mexican govern- 
ment, and on December 4, 185 1, Mr. Doyle signed on 
behalf of Great Britain a new convention, in which not 
only the claims under the Pakenham convention, but 
others, recognized by both governments, were likewise 
formed into a consolidated fund, on which the Mexi- 
can government bound itself to pay five per cent, as a 
sinking fund and three per cent, as interest until the 
debt should be paid off. This five and three per cent, 
were to be met by a percentage of customs receipts. 



1 Brit, and For. St. Pap., 1861-62. Vol. LII. Also House Exec. Doc. 
No. 100, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess. 



I96 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

In 1857 tne sinking fund was to be raised to six per 
cent, and the interest to four per cent. 

Two days after the signing of this Doyle convention 
the Spanish minister in Mexico also signed a conven- 
tion on behalf of some Philippine missionaries, known 
as the " Padre Moran " convention, on almost the 
same basis as the British. The consolidated fund in 
this case was $983,000, the sinking fund five per cent., 
and the interest three per cent. 

The interest was paid on both funds in almost the 
whole amount, but the sinking fund was not kept up. 
Succeeding agreements were made in 1858, in 1859, 
and in i860, by which the custom-house assignments 
to satisfy both conventions (British and Spanish) 
were raised from twelve per cent, in 1851, to twenty- 
nine per cent, in i860. 2 

It will thus be seen that the British and Spanish 
claims were perfectly legitimate. The French claims, 
however, were of a somewhat different character. 
During Miramon's administration arrangements were 
made through the agency of Jecker, a Swiss banker, 
by which $750,000 were to be raised through an issue 
of $15,000,000 of bonds. These bonds fell into the 
hands of Jecker's French creditors and were pressed 
by the French government, which thus demanded the 
repayment of twenty times the original sum advanced. 
A claim was made also for $12,000,000 for torts on 
French subjects. 3 

When the Liberal party came into power again in 
i860, they were unable to meet the situation and 
showed a disposition to question the obligatory force , 



2 Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 359- 

3 Wharton's Digest, Sec. 58, Vol. I, p. 312. 

197 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

of engagements entered into by their various revolu- 
tionary predecessors. The British government had 
undertaken to provide against this contingency upon 
the occasion of extending recognition to the Juarez 
administration. Under date of March 30, 1861, Lord 
John Russell wrote to Sir Charles Wyke, recently ap- 
pointed minister to Mexico, as follows : 

The instructions addressed to Mr. Mathew, both before 
and since the final triumph of the Liberal party, made the 
recognition by Great Britain of the constitutional govern- 
ment contingent upon the acknowledgment by that govern- 
ment of the liability of Mexico for the claims of British 
subjects who, either in their persons or in their property, 
for a long series of years, can be proved to have suffered 
wrong at the hands of successive governments in Mexico. 4 

And further on in the same communication the 
attitude of the British government is expressed yet 
more strongly : 

Her majesty's government will not admit as art excuse for 
hesitation in this respect the plea that the robbery was 
committed by the late government. For, as regards this, as 
indeed all other claims, her majesty's government cannot 
admit that the party who committed the wrong is alone 
responsible. Great Britain does not recognize any party as 
constituting the republic in its dealing with foreign nations, 
but holds the entire republic, by whatever party the govern- 
ment of it may from time to time be administered, to be 
responsible for wrongs done to British subjects by any party 
or persons at any time administering the powers of govern- 
ment. 

Mexico, however, was slow to admit this principle 
of international law. In a letter to Lord John Rus- 



Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 237. 

198 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

sell, June 25, 1861, and in other communications, Sir 
Charles Wyke urged the necessity of a naval demon- 
stration against Mexico. His plan was to take pos- 
session of the custom-houses of Vera Cruz, Tampico, 
and Matamoros on the Atlantic, and of one or two 
on the Pacific, lower the duties so as to attract the 
great bulk of trade from other ports, and pay them- 
selves by the percentage to which they were entitled 
by treaty stipulation. 

On the 17th of July, 1861, President Juarez brought' 
matters to a crisis by the publication of a decree, the 
first article of which declared that " all payments are 
suspended for two years, including the assignments 
for the loan made in London and for the foreign con- 
ventions." 5 

On the 23rd, Sir Charles Wyke, the British min- 
ister, demanded the repeal of this law within forty- 
eight hours. On the 24th, the French minister de- 
manded its repeal within twenty-four hours. These 
demands were not complied with and diplomatic rela- 
tions were immediately broken off by the British and 
French representatives. 

The Spanish government had acted somewhat in ad- 
vance of the other governments and was already pre- 
paring to back its claims by an armed expedition ' 
against Mexico. The rupture with the British and 
French governments very naturally pointed to joint 
action with Spain as the best means of securing their 
interests. The United States government, which had 
just entered upon one of the greatest struggles of j 
modern times and had its hands practically tied as 
far as Mexico was concerned, regarded the contem- 1 

« Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 294. 

199 



] i 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

plated intervention of European powers in Mexico 
with grave apprehension, not to say suspicion. So 
great was the uneasiness occasioned in the United 
States by the measures in contemplation and so 
strong was the desire to ward off the threatened 
danger to republican institutions on this continent, 
that Mr. Seward authorized (September 2, 1861) the 
negotiation of a treaty with Mexico for the assump- 
tion by the United States of the payment of the in- 
terest, at three per cent., upon the funded debt of 
Mexico (the principal of which was about $62,000,- 
000) for the term of five years from the date of the 
decree of the Mexican government suspending such 
payment, " provided that the government of Mexico 
will pledge to the United States its faith for the reim- 
bursement of the money so to be paid, with six per 
cent, interest thereon, to be secured by a specific lien 
upon all the public lands and mineral rights in the sev- 
eral Mexican states of Lower California, Chihuahua, 
Sonora, and Sinaloa, the property so pledged to become 
absolute in the United States at the expiration of the 
term of six years from the time when the treaty shall 
go into effect, if such reimbursement shall not have 
been made before that time." 6 All this, of course, 
was subject to the confirmation of the Senate. 

This step was communicated informally to the Brit- 
ish and French governments, and the validity of the 
convention was to be conditioned upon those govern- 
ments engaging not to take any measures against 
Mexico to enforce the payment of the interest of the 
loan until time should have been given to submit the 



• Mr. Seward to Mr. Corwin, Sept. 2, 1861. House Exec. Doc. No. 100, 
p. 22, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess. 

200 






FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

convention to the ratification of the United States 
Senate at its approaching session. It was also to be 
a condition that, if the convention should be ratified, 
Great Britain and France should engage, on their part, 
not to make any demand upon Mexico for the interest, 
except upon its failing to be punctually paid by the 
United States. 7 

Grave objections to Mr. Seward's plan of paying the 
interest on the Mexican debt were entertained both 
in Paris and in London. The French minister of i 
state, M. Thouvenel, said to the British minister at 
Paris : 

It might not be possible to prevent the United States offer- 
ing money to Mexico, or to prevent Mexico receiving money 1 
from the United States, but neither England nor France; 
ought in any way to recognize the transaction. 8 

Lord Lyons declared to Mr. Seward: 

That her majesty's government were as apprehensive as 
Mr. Seward himself could be, of an attempt to build upon a 
foundation of debts due, and injuries inflicted, by Mexico, a 
pretension to establish a new government in that country. 
Her majesty's government thought, however, that the most 
effectual mode of guarding against this danger would be 
for Great Britain, the United States, and France to join 
Spain in a course of action, the objects and limits of which 
should be distinctly defined beforehand. This certainly ap- 
peared more prudent than to allow Spain to act alone now, 
and afterwards to oppose the results of her operations, if she 
should go too far. 9 



7 Brit, and For. St. Pap.. Vol. LII, p. 325. 

8 Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, Sept. 24, 1861. Brit, and For. St. Pap., 
Vol. LII, p. 329. 

9 Earl Lyons to Earl Russell, Oct. 14, 1861. Brit, and For. St. Pap., 
Vol LII, p. 375- 

20I 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

The British government avoided beforehand the 
necessity of a point-blank refusal of the plan of Mr. 
Seward, in case the treaty should go through, by 
declaring that the interest on the funded debt was not 
the only cause of complaint, but that there remained 
over and above that the outrages perpetrated upon 
British subjects still unredressed. 

Mr. Charles Francis Adams, the United States min- 
ister to England, did not approve the plan of guar- 
anteeing the Mexican interest, and in his dispatch to 
Mr. Seward of November i, 1861, he expressed his 
opinion rather more frankly than is usual for a min- 
ister to do in discussing an instruction from the state 
department. 

You will permit me here, however, to make a single remark 
in this connection upon the importance of appearing to divest 
the United States of any personal and selfish interest in the 
action it may think proper to adopt. The view customarily 
taken in Europe is that their government is disposed to resist 
all foreign intervention in Mexico, not upon any principle, 
but simply because it is itself expecting, in due course of 
time, to absorb the whole country for its own benefit. Hence 
any proposal like that which I had the honor to receive, 
based upon the mortgage of portions of Mexican territory as 
security for engagements entered into by the United States, 
naturally becomes the ground of an outcry that this is but the 
preliminary to an entry for inevitable foreclosure. And 
then follows the argument that if this process be legitimate 
in one case, why not equally in all. As against Great Britain 
and France, it would be difficult to oppose to this the abstract 
principle contained in what has been denominated the Monroe 
Doctrine, however just in substance." 

While Mr. Corwin was still in negotiation with the 



10 Thirty-Seventh Cong., Second Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. roo, p. 201. 

202 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

Mexican government in reference to some method of 
releasing Mexico from her complications with the al- 
lied governments of Europe, the United States Senate, 
in reply to two successive messages of the President, 
passed a resolution, February 25, 1862, declaring the 
opinion " that it is not advisable to negotiate a treaty 
that will require the United States to assume any por-< 
tion of the principle or interest of the debt of Mexico; 
or that will require the concurrence of European 
powers." This effectually put an end to Mr. Seward's 
plan. 

Meanwhile Sir Charles Wyke had reopened nego- 
tiations with the Mexican government and negotiated 
a treaty which might have satisfied British claims, but 
the treaty was thrown out by the Mexican congress by 
a large majority, and also disapproved by the British 
government in view of an agreement entered into with 
France and Spain unknown to Sir Charles Wyke. 11 

The agreement referred to was the convention 
signed at London, October 31, 1861, between Spain, 
France, and Great Britain, in reference to the situation 
of affairs in Mexico and looking to armed interven- 
tion for the purpose of securing their rights. The 
preamble of the convention recites that the three con- 
tracting parties " being placed by the arbitrary and 
vexatious conduct of the authorities of the republic 
of Mexico under the necessity of exacting from those 
authorities a more efficient protection for the persons 
and property of their subjects, as well as the perform- 
ance of the obligations contracted toward them by the 
republic of Mexico, have arranged to conclude a con- 



11 Sir C. Wyke to Earl Russell, Nov. 25, 1861. Brit, and For. St. 
Pap., Vol. LII, p. 398. 

203 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

vention between each other for the purpose of com- 
bining their common action." The most important 
article of the convention in view of its subsequent vio- 
lation by the Emperor Napoleon, was the second, 
which declared that : 

The high contracting parties bind themselves not to seek 
for themselves, in the employment of coercive measures 
foreseen by the present convention, any acquisition of terri- 
tory, or any peculiar advantage, and not to exercise in the 
subsequent affairs of Mexico any influence of a character 
to impair the right of the Mexican nation to choose and 
freely to constitute the form of its own government. 

The fourth article, recognizing that the United 
States also had claims against Mexico, provided : 

that immediately after the signing of the present convention, 
a copy of it shall be communicated to the government of the 
United States, that that government shall be invited to 
accede to it. ... But, as the high contracting parties 
would expose themselves, in making any delay in carrying 
into effect articles one and two of the present convention, to 
fail in the end which they wish to attain, they have agreed 
not to defer, with a view of obtaining the accession of the 
government of the United States, the commencement of the 
above-mentioned operations beyond the period at which their 
combined forces may be united in the vicinity of Vera Cruz." 

The advisability of inviting the cooperation of the 
United States had been the subject of considerable 
discussion and difference of opinion among the three 

S European governments. England and France had 
urged the cooperation of the United States, while 
Spain had opposed it. 

1J Thirty-Seventh Cong., Second Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. ioo, 
pp. 186-7. 

204 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

In compliance with the fourth article the conven- 
tion was submitted to the government of the United 
States by a note dated November 30, 1861, signed 
jointly by the representatives of Spain, France, and 
Great Britain at Washington. 

Mr. Seward's reply conveying the declination of the 
United States to the invitation to cooperate with the 
three allied European powers in the demonstration 
against Mexico was dated December 4, 1861. After 
reviewing the substance of the convention, he said : 

First. As the undersigned has heretofore had the honor 
to inform each of the plenipotentiaries now addressed, the 
President does not feel himself at liberty to question, and 
he does not question, that the sovereigns represented have 
undoubted right to decide for themselves the fact whether 
they have sustained grievances, and to resort to war against 
Mexico for the redress thereof, and have a right also to levy 
the war severally or jointly. 

In the second place, Mr. Seward expressed the sat- 
isfaction of his government that the allied powers had 
clearly repudiated in the convention all idea of carry- 
ing on the war for their own ambitious ends and all 
intention of exercising in the subsequent affairs of 
Mexico any influence of a character to impair the right 
of the Mexican people to choose and freely to consti- 
tute the form of their own government. 

It is true, as the high contracting parties assume, that the 
United States have, on their part, claims to urge against 
Mexico. Upon due consideration, however, the President 
is of opinion that it would be inexpedient to seek satisfac- 
tion of their claims at this time through an act of accession 
to the convention. Among the reasons for this decision 
which the undersigned is authorized to assign, are, first, 

205 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

that the United States, so far as it is practicable, prefer to 
adhere to a traditional policy recommended to them by the 
father of their country and confirmed by a happy experience, 
which forbids them from making alliances with foreign na- 
tions; second, Mexico being a neighbor of the United States 
on this continent, and possessing a system of government 
similar to our own in many of its important features, the 
United States habitually cherish a decided good-will toward 
that republic, and a lively interest in its security, prosperity, 
and welfare. Animated by these sentiments, the United 
States do not feel inclined to resort to forcible remedies for 
their claims at the present moment, when the government 
of Mexico is deeply disturbed by factions within, and ex- 
posed to war with foreign nations. And of course, the same 
sentiments render them still more disinclined to allied war 
against Mexico, than to war to be waged against her by 
themselves alone. 

In conclusion, Mr. Seward referred to the fact that 
the United States government had authorized their 
representative in Mexico to enter into a treaty con- 
ceding to the Mexican government material aid, which 
might, he hoped, enable that government to satisfy 
the just claims and demands of the allied sovereigns 
and so to avert the war which they have agreed 
among each other to levy against Mexico. 13 

As already related, the efforts of the executive in 
this direction were not approved by the Senate and 
the negotiations in regard to guaranteeing the interest 
on the Mexican loan were broken off. The treaty 
negotiated by Mr. Corwin was in fact never sub- 
mitted to the Senate, for by the time it was ready 
the French forces occupied a part of Mexican terri- 
tory, and it was feared that a loan to Mexico under 

13 House Exec. Doc. No. ioo, pp. 187-190, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second 
Sess. Brit and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII. p. 394. 

206 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

such conditions would be considered a breach of 
neutrality. 

In pursuance of the London convention, Vera Cruz 
was occupied in the early part of 1862 by a Spanish 
force of 6,000 men under command of Marshal Prim; 
a French force of 2,500, which was largely reinforced 
soon afterward; and a force of 700 British marines. 

The first intimation of the real purposes of the Em- 
peror Louis Napoleon was given in the letter of in- 
structions of M. Thouvenel to the admiral command- 
ing the French expedition to Mexico, dated November 
11, 1861. He said that in case of the withdrawal of 
the Mexican forces from the coast into the interior of 
the country, an advance upon the capital might become 
necessary. He reminded the admiral of the self-ab- 
negatory character of the second article of the conven- 
tion, but continued: 

There are, however, certain hypotheses which present 
themselves to our foresight and which it was our duty to 
examine. It might happen that the pressure of the allied 
forces upon the soil of Mexico might induce the sane por- 
tion of the people, tired of anarchy, anxious for order and 
repose, to attempt an effort to constitute in the country a 
government presenting the guarantees of strength and 
stability which have been wanting to all those which have 
succeeded each other since the emancipation. 

To such efforts the admiral was expressly told that 
he was not to refuse his encouragement. 14 

In view of this order, the British government at 
once instructed its agent, Sir Charles Wyke, that, 
while there was nothing to be said against the reason- 
ing of the French government in reference to the prob- 

11 House Exec. Doc. No. ioo, p. 174, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess. 

207 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

able necessity of marching against the city of Mexico, 
he was to decline to take part in the advance into the 
interior, and that the fact, that the whole available 
British force was only 700 marines, would be suf- 
ficient reason for declining. 15 

The seriousness of the situation was fully appre- 
ciated by the United States government. Shortly after 
the occupation of Vera Cruz by the Spanish forces and 
the announcement of the outfit of a French force to 
follow up the advantage, Mr. Charles Francis Adams 
wrote to his government from London: 

It is no longer concealed that the intention is to advance 
to the capital, and to establish a firm government, with the 
consent of the people, at that place. But who are meant by 
that term does not appear. This issue is by no means palat- 
able to the government here, though it is difficult to imagine 
that they could have been blind to it. Feeble murmurs of 
discontent are heard, but they will scarcely be likely to count 
for much in the face of the obligation under which the action 
of the emperor in the Trent case has placed them. The 
military occupation will go on, and will not cease with the 
limits now assigned to it. It is not difficult to understand the 
nature of the fulcrum thus obtained for operations in a new 
and a different quarter, should the occasion be made to use 
it. The expedition to the city of Mexico may not stop until 
it shows itself in the heart of the Louisiana purchase. 18 

About this time reports began to be circulated that 
the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria would 
be invited by a large body of Mexicans to place him- 
self on the throne of Mexico, and that the Mexican 
people would gladly hail such a change. To what- 

18 Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 381. 

*• Adams to Seward, January 24, 1862. House Ex. Doc. No. 100 p. 206, 
Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess. 

208 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

ever extent such reports might be credited, the United 
States could not call into question the good faith of 
the parties to the London convention. The British 
government, as the issue showed, acted with perfect 
sincerity in the matter; and the Spanish government, 
whatever may have been its original intentions, fol- 
lowed the lead of Great Britain. When the reports 
in regard to Maximilian were first circulated, the Brit- 
ish government declared to its agent, Sir Charles 
Wyke, that: 

If the Mexican people, by a spontaneous movement, place 
the Austrian Archduke on the throne of Mexico, there is 
nothing in the convention to prevent it. On the other hand, 
we could be no parties to a forcible intervention for this 
purpose. The Mexicans must consult their own interests." 

At the time, however, the attitude of the British 
government was not at all understood. Mr. Adams 
wrote : 

Great Britain occupies the post of holding the door, whilst 
her two associates, with her knowledge, go in, fully pre- 
pared, if they can, to perpetrate the act which she, at the 
outset, made them denounce, at the same time that she dis- 
avowed every idea of being made to participate in it. 18 

In the face of armed invasion, the Mexican govern- 
ment assumed a more reasonable attitude, and on the 
19th day of February, 1862, the plenipotentiaries of 
Spain, Great Britain, and France signed, at Soledad, 
with the secretary of state of the Mexican govern- 
ment a preliminary agreement or convention, in which 



17 Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 418. 

18 H. Ex. Doc. No. 100, p. 209, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess. 

209 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

they recognized the constitutional government as then 
organized. Declaring that they had " no designs 
against the independence, sovereignty and integrity of 
the Mexican republic," they agreed to open negotia- 
tions for the settlement of all the demands which they 
had to make at Orizaba. During the negotiations the 
forces of the allies were to be allowed to leave the 
unhealthy locality of Vera Cruz and occupy the three 
towns of Cordova, Orizaba, and Tehuacan, with their 
natural approaches. In the event of negotiations be- 
ing broken off, the allies agreed to abandon the towns 
above named before reopening hostilities. 19 

The convention of Soledad proved, however, of 
short duration. On the 9th of April, 1862, the rep- 
resentatives of the allies announced in a formal note 
to the Mexican government, " that not having been 
able to agree about the interpretation which ought to 
be given in the present circumstances to the conven- 
tion of the 31st of October, 1861 (the convention of 
London), they have resolved to adopt for the future 
an entirely separate and independent line of action. 
In consequence, the commander of the Spanish forces 
will immediately take the necessary measures to re- 
imbark his troops. The French army will concentrate 
in Paso Aucho as soon as the Spanish troops have 
passed from this position, that is to say, probably about 
the 20th of April, thereupon beginning their opera- 
tions." 20 According to instructions already alluded 
to, the British force, which was limited to 700 marines, 
had declined to advance into the interior, and hence 
was not present when the breach occurred. 



19 H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, p. 46, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sesa. 

20 Ibid., p. 48. 

2IO 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

In spite of all appearances to the contrary, the 
French government still persisted in disavowing to the 
United States government, in the most emphatic terms, 
all designs upon the independence of the Mexican re- 
public. Even after the rupture at Orizaba, M. Thou- 
venel assured Mr. Dayton, the United States minister 
at Paris, that all that France wanted was that there 
should be a stable government in Mexico, not an 
anarchy with which other nations could have no relar 
tions. 

That if the people of that country chose to establish a 
republic it was all well; France would make no objection. 
If they chose to establish a monarchy, as that was the form 
of government here, it would be charming (charmant), but 
they did not mean to do anything to induce such a course of y 
action. That all the rumors that France intended to establish 
the Archduke Maximilian on the throne of Mexico were 
utterly without foundation." -* 

;..'■/ 

M. Thouvenel's disclaimer to the British government 
was equally emphatic. 22 

To return to the situation of affairs at Orizaba, the 
disagreement between the allies requires some explana- 
tion. The immediate cause of the rupture and of the 
withdrawal from the convention of London was the 
protection extended by the French agents to General 
Almonte, Padre Miranda, and other leading men of 
the reactionary or church party who had been banished 
from the country and who now from the French camp 
maintained an active correspondence with Marquez, 
Cobos, and other notorious chiefs of the armed bands 



21 Dayton to Seward, April 22, 1862. 

22 Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, May 15, 1862, H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, 
p. 746, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess. 

211 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

then in open rebellion against the constituted govern- 
ment of the country. Almonte and his associates 
openly favored the scheme of placing Maximilian on 
the throne. 

The Mexican government demanded the removal of 
General Almonte and his associates from the camp of 
the allies, and in this demand the British and Spanish 
representatives concurred. A somewhat stormy con- 
ference was held between the commissioners of the 
allied powers at Orizaba, April 2, 1862, at which the 
French agents virtually said that they did not regard 
the convention of London or the preliminaries of Sole- 
dad as binding upon them. Specifically then the two 
causes of the rupture were (1) the persistency of the 
French commissioners in opposing the removal of the 
Mexican exiles, and (2) their refusal to take part in 
the conferences which had been arranged by the con- 
vention of Soledad to be held with the Juarez govern- 
ment at Orizaba, April 15, 1862. The British govern- 
ment heartily approved of the action of its agent, Sir 
Charles Wyke, in breaking up the conference and put- 
ting an end to the joint action of the three powers. 23 
The policy of Spain was completely in accord with that 
of England. 

The French government was not satisfied with the 
convention of Soledad, but did not dispute its validity, 
and declared that if the negotiations should be broken 
off, its provisions in regard to the withdrawal of the 
troops from their vantage ground must be observed. 
The French government further assumed that, when 
negotiations with the Mexican government should be 
broken off, the allied forces would proceed to act 

34 Earl Russell to Sir C. Wyke, May zz, 1862. 

212 






FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

jointly under the convention of London. 24 The Brit- 
ish and Spanish governments, however, having become 
convinced of the duplicity of the French government 
in the matter, terminated the London convention with- 
out further discussion and ordered the immediate 
withdrawal of their forces and agents from Mexican 
territory. 

The government of Louis Napoleon, thus left to its 
own devices by the withdrawal of Great Britain and 
Spain, and by the helpless condition, for the time be- 
ing, to which the war of secession had reduced the 
government of the United States, greatly reinforced 
its Mexican expedition and placed General Forey in 
command. Soon after the withdrawal of the British 
and Spanish contingents, General Almonte instituted a 
government in the territory occupied by the French 
and assumed the title of " Supreme Chief of the Na- 
tion," but it soon became evident, as Mr. Dayton ex- 
pressed it, that instead of the emperor having availed 
himself of the services of General Almonte, Almonte 
had availed himself of the services of the emperor. 
Accordingly, shortly after General Forey assumed 
command, he issued an order dissolving the ministry 
of Almonte, depriving him of his title and limiting him 
thereafter " in the most exact manner to the instruc- 
tions of the emperor, which are to proceed as far as 
possible, with other Mexican generals placed under 
the protection of our flag, to the organization of the 
Mexican army." 

The misfortunes which had overtaken Mexico and 
the dangers that threatened the permanence of her re- 



I 






24 Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, April 25, 1862, H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, 
p. 694, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess. 

213 



7 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

publican institutions, had now thoroughly alarmed her 
sister republics of Central and South America, and a 
correspondence began between them relative to organ- 
izing an international American conference to oppose 
European aggression. 

During the remarkable series of events that took 
place in Mexico in the spring of 1862, Mr. Seward 
consistently held to the opinion well expressed in a 
dispatch to Mr. Dayton, June 21, 1862 : 

France has a right to make war against Mexico, and to 
determine for herself the cause. We have a right and 
interest to insist that France shall not improve the war she 
makes to raise up in Mexico an anti-republican and anti- 
American government, or to maintain such a government 
there. France has disclaimed such designs, and we, besides 
reposing faith in the assurances given in a frank, honorable 
manner, would, in any case, be bound to wait for, and not 
anticipate a violation of them. 25 

For some months the French troops gradually ex- 
tended their military operations and occupied a greater 
extent of territory without, however, any material 
change in the situation. The Juarez government still 
held the capital. In the spring of 1863, however, mili- 
tary operations were pushed forward with greater ac- 
tivity, and in June, General Forey organized a junta of 
government composed of thirty-five Mexican citizens 
designated by decree of the French emperor's minister. 
The members of this supreme junta were to associate 
with them two hundred and fifteen citizens of Mexico 
to form an assembly of two hundred and fifty 
notables. This assembly was to occupy itself with 

ae H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, p. 530, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess. 

214 






FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

the form of the permanent government of Mexico. 
The junta appointed an executive body of three, of 
whom General Almonte was the head. 

On the ioth of July, 1863, the capital of Mexico 
was occupied by the French army, and on the follow- 
ing day the Assembly of Notables declared : 

1. The Mexican nation adopts as its form of government 
a limited hereditary monarchy, with a Catholic prince. 

2. The sovereign shall take the title of Emperor of 
Mexico. 

3. The imperial crown of Mexico is offered to his im- 
perial and royal highness the Prince Ferdinand Maximilian, 
Archduke of Austria, for himself and his descendants. 

4. If, under circumstances which cannot be foreseen, the 
Archduke of Austria, Ferdinand Maximilian, should not take 
possession of the throne which is offered to him, the Mexican 
nation relies on the good will of his majesty, Napoleon III, 
Emperor of the French, to indicate for it another Catholic 
prince. 1 ' 

The crown of Mexico was formally offered to Maxi- \J 
milian by a deputation of Mexicans headed by Senor 
Estrada, October 3, 1863; but Maximilian replied that 
he could not accept the proffered throne until the 
whole nation should " confirm by a free manifestation 
of its will the wishes of the capital." This was a wise 
decision, had it been given in good faith and had it 
been wisely adhered to, but the sequel shows that the 
archduke was either not sincere in his protestations or \ 
else was woefully deceived by representations subse- \ 
quently made to him. Six months later he accepted 
the crown without the question having been submitted 

21 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. n, pp. 254-268, Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess. 

215 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

to the wishes of any but a very small portion of the 
Mexican people. 

In spite of the declaration of the Mexican Assembly, 
which showed so unmistakably the hand of Napoleon, 
the French government continued to repudiate the 
designs imputed to it against the independence of 
Mexico, and Mr. Seward continued to express, offi- 
cially at least, the satisfaction of the American gov- 
ernment at the explanations vouchsafed by France. 
September n, 1863, he stated the case as follows: 

When France made war against Mexico, we asked of 
France explanations of her objects and purposes. She 
answered, that it was a war for the redress of grievances; 
that she did not intend to permanently occupy or dominate 
in Mexico, and that she should leave to the people of 
Mexico a free choice of institutions of government. Under 
these circumstances the United States adopted, and they have 
since maintained entire neutrality between the belligerents, 
in harmony with the traditional policy in regard to foreign 
wars. The war has continued longer than was anticipated. 
At different stages of it France has, in her intercourse with 
us, renewed the explanations before mentioned. The French 
army has now captured Pueblo and the capital, while the 
Mexican government, with its principal forces, is under- 
stood to have retired to San Luis Potosi, and a provisional 
government has been instituted under French auspices in the 
city of Mexico, which being supported by arms, divides the 
actual dominion of the country with the Mexican govern- 
ment, also maintained by armed power. That provisional 
government has neither made nor sought to make any com- 
munication to the government of the United States, nor has 
it been in any way recognized by this government. France 
has made no communication to the United States concerning 
the provisional government which has been established in 
Mexico, nor has she announced any actual or intended de- 
parture from the policy in regard to that country which her 

2l6 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

before-mentioned explanations have authorized us to expect 
her to pursue." 

The probable acceptance of the crown by Maxi- 
milian was, however, the subject of frequent communi- 
cations between the governments of France and the 
United States. In the course of a somewhat familiar 
conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French 
minister of state, in August, 1863, Mr. Dayton ex- 
pressed the fear that in quitting Mexico France might 
leave a puppet behind her. De Lhuys replied : " No ; 
the strings would be too long to work." 

The chances of Maximilian's success in Mexico had 
been from the first deliberately calculated on the basis 
of the probable success of the Southern Confederacy; 
and, therefore, the cause of the Juarez government and 
the cause of the Union were considered the same. The 
active sympathy of the Unionists with the Mexican 
republic made it difficult for the administration to 
maintain neutrality. This difficulty was further en- 
hanced by the doubt entertained in the United States 
as to the intentions of France. In this connection Mr. 
Seward wrote to Mr. Dayton, September 21, 1863, as 
follows : 

The President thinks it desirable that you should seek an 
opportunity to mention these facts to Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, 
and to suggest to him that the interests of the United States, 
and, as it seems to us, the interests of France herself, re- 
quire that a solution of the present complications in Mexico 
be made, as early as may be convenient, upon the basis of 
the unity and independence of Mexico. 28 



27 Seward to Motley, Sept. n, 1863, Dipl. Corr., 1863; Sen. Ex. Doc. 
No. 11, p. 479, Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess. 

28 Sen. Ex. Doc. No> n, p. 464, Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess. 

217, 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

In reply, the French minister declared that the ques- 
tion of the establishment of Maximilian on the Mexi- 
can throne was to be decided by a majority vote of the 
entire nation; that the dangers of the government of 
the archduke would come principally from the United 
States, and the sooner the United States showed itself 
satisfied, and manifested a willingness to enter into 
peaceful relations with that government, the sooner 
would France be ready to leave Mexico and the new 
government to take care of itself, which France would, 
in any event, do as soon as she with propriety could; 
but that she would not lead or tempt the archduke 
into difficulty, and then desert him before his govern- 
ment was settled. He said that the early acknowl- 
edgment of that government by the United States 
would tend to shorten, or perhaps to end, all the 
troublesome complications of France in that country; 
that they would thereupon quit Mexico. 29 

To this communication, Mr. Seward replied that the 
French government had not been left uninformed of 
the opinion of the United States that the permanent 
establishment of a foreign and monarchical govern- 
ment in Mexico would be found neither easy nor de- 
sirable; that the United States could not anticipate the 
action of the Mexican people; and that the United 
States still regarded Mexico as the scene of a. war 
which had not yet ended in the subversion of the 
government long existing there, with which the United 
States remained in the relation of peace and friend- 
ship. 30 



29 Dayton to Seward, Oct. g, 1863, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. if, p. 471, Thirty- 
eighth Cong., First Sess. 

*° Seward to Dayton, Oct. 23, 1863. Ibid. 

2l8 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

Before formally accepting the crown, the archduke 
visited England with a view to securing a promise of 
recognition for his new position. He was, of course, 
to pass through Paris, and in view of his approaching 
visit, Mr. Dayton asked for instructions as to his con- 
duct on the occasion. Mr. Seward replied, February 
27, 1864: 

I have taken the President's direction upon the question. 
If the Archduke Maximilian appears in Paris only in his 
character as an imperial prince of the house of Hapsburg, 
you will be expected to be neither demonstrative nor reserved 
in your deportment toward him. If he appears there with 
any assumption of political authority or title in Mexico, you 
will entirely refrain from intercourse with him. Should 
your proceeding be a subject of inquiry or remark, you will 
be at liberty, in the exercise of your own discretion, to say 
that this government, in view of its rights and duties in the 
present conjuncture of its affairs, has prescribed fixed rules 
to be observed, not only by this department, but by its repre- 
sentatives in foreign countries. We acknowledge revolutions 
only by direction of the President, upon full and mature con- 
sideration." 

The archduke visited London in company with his 
father-in-law, Leopold of Belgium. The British gov- 
ernment declined to act on the subject at that juncture, 
" but gave them reason to hope that, so soon as the 
action in Mexico would appear to justify it, they would 
acknowledge him." 32 Spain and Belgium were ready 
to follow in the wake of France. 

About the time of this visit of Maximilian to Eng- 
land, Mr. McDougall, of California, introduced in 
the Senate a resolution declaring " that the movements 

11 Dip. Corr., 1864. 

* 3 Adams to Seward, March 24, 1864. 

219 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

of the government of France, and the threatened 
movement of an emperor, improvised by the Emperor 
of France, demand by this republic, if insisted upon, 
war." This resolution was not carried, but some days 
later, on the 4th of April, 1864, the House of Repre- 
sentatives passed by a unanimous vote a resolution 
declaring its opposition to the recognition of a mon- 
archy in Mexico. Mr. Seward, fearing a rupture with 
France on this account, took pains to inform the gov- 
ernment of that country, through Mr. Dayton, that 
this action of the House was in no way binding on the 
executive, even if concurred in by the Senate. 

The formal acceptance of the crown of Mexico by 
Maximilian took place April 10, 1864, at Miramar, the 
palace he had built near Trieste, in the presence of the 
Mexican deputation. The next day the Emperor and 
Empress of Mexico, as they styled themselves, set out 
for their new dominions by way of Rome, where they 
received the blessing of the Pope. Before leaving 
Europe Maximilian signed with the Emperor of the 
French a convention in the following terms : 

The French troops in Mexico were to be reduced 
as soon as possible to 25,000 men. 

The French troops were to evacuate Mexico in pro- 
portion as the Emperor of Mexico could organize 
troops to replace them. 

The " foreign legion," composed of 8,000 men, was 
to remain in Mexico six years after all the other 
French troops should have been recalled. 

The expenses of the French expedition to Mexico, 
to be paid by the Mexican government, were fixed at 
the sum of two hundred and seventy million francs 
for the whole duration of the expedition down to 

220 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

July i, 1864. From July 1st all expenses of the Mexi- 
can army were to be met by Mexico. 33 

The resolution of the House referred to above came 
very near producing the rupture that Mr. Seward was 
striving to avert, or at least to postpone, during the 
continuance of the war of secession. When Mr. Day- 
ton visited M. Drouyn de Lhuys just after the resolu- 
tion reached Europe, the remark which greeted Mr. 
Dayton when he entered the room was : " Do you 
bring us peace, or bring us war?" Mr. Dayton re- 
plied that he did not think France had a right to 
think that the United States was about to make war 
against her on account of anything contained in that 
resolution; that it embodied nothing more than the 
principles which the United States had constantly held 
out to France from the beginning. 

The Confederate agents were taking advantage of 
the resolution to stir up trouble between the United 
States and France. In fact they had long caused 
reports to be spread in Europe, and had succeeded 
in gaining credence for them, to the effect that the 
United States government was only awaiting the ter- 
mination of domestic troubles to drive the French 
from Mexico. The French naturally concluded that 
if they were to have trouble with the United States, 
it was safest for them to choose their own time. 34 
Napoleon was all the while coquetting with the Con- 
federate government, and holding above Mr. Seward's 
head a veiled threat of recognition of Confederate in- 
dependence. The Confederate government quickly 
caught at the suggestion of an alliance between Maxi- 

* 8 Dipl. Corn, 1865, Part III, pp. 356-849. 

84 Dipl. Corr., 1864; also Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, Thirty-eighth Cong., 
First Sess. 

221 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

milian and the South with the power of France to 
back them. A Confederate agent was actually ac- 
credited to the government of Maximilian, but did not 
reach his destination. Although Napoleon's calcula- 
tions were based on the overthrow of the Union, and 
although he had assumed at the outset, with England 
and Spain, an attitude decidedly unfriendly to the Fed- 
eral government, nevertheless he was not willing to 
go the full length of recognizing the Confederacy as 
an independent power while the issue of the conflict 
was still in doubt. 

In speaking of Slidell's movements in Europe and 
the encouragement given him in France, Mr. Bigelow 
wrote to Mr. Seward, February 14, 1865 : 

I am strongly impressed with the conviction that, but for 
the Mexican entanglement, the insurgents would receive very 
little further countenance from the imperial government, and 
that a reconciliation of the national policies of the two 
countries on that question would speedily dispose of all other 
sources of dissatisfaction. 

As the war of secession seemed nearing its end, the 
French papers became uneasy in view of possible inter- 
vention in Mexico by the United States on the ground 
of the Monroe Doctrine. This principle of American 
diplomacy, which was likened to the sword of Damo- 
cles suspended over the head of Maximilian, was 
discussed in all its bearings on the present case by the 
journals of Europe. 35 

Throughout all this period of turmoil, the United 
States recognized no authority in Mexico but that of 
the Juarez government. In April, 1864, the French 

»» Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III, pp. 380-385. 

222 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

minister at Washington complained that serious com- 
plications with France were likely to arise out of 
grants of land made by " ex-President Juarez " in 
Sonora to emigrants from California. The French 
government regarded these grants as illegal and pro- 
posed to send forces there to prevent the parties from 
taking " illicit possession." 

In May, 1864, the French government sought ex- 
planations in regard to a club formed in New Orleans, 
called the " D. M. D.," Defenders of the Monroe Doc- 
trine. Mr. Seward replied that the object of the club, 
so far as the government had been able to ascertain, 
was to bring moral influences to bear upon the gov- 
ernment of the United States in favor of a mainte- 
nance of the Monroe Doctrine, but not to act in vio- 
lation of the law, or of the well-understood govern- 
mental policy of neutrality in the war which existed 
between France and Mexico. Members of the associa- 
tion did, however, actually start on an expedition to 
Brownsville, but the steamer was taken possession of 
by United States officials. During the year 1864 con- 
stant complaint was made by the French government 
of shipments of arms to the Juarez government from 
California and from various points along the Rio 
Grande, particularly Brownsville, in violation of 
American neutrality. 

Shortly after the surrender of General Lee, several 
Confederate officers of high position and influence went 
to Mexico and identified themselves with the govern- 
ment of Maximilian. Dr. Wm. M. Gwin, a former 
United States Senator from California, organized a 
plan for colonizing the states of northern Mexico with 
ex-Confederates. This scheme was the subject of sev- 

223 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

eral representations to the French government on the 
part of Mr. Seward. He reminded them that the sym- 
pathies of the American people were already consider- 
ably excited in favor of the republic of Mexico; that 
they were disposed to regard with impatience the con- 
tinued intervention of France in that country; and 
that any favor shown to the proceedings of Dr. Gwin 
by the titular Emperor of Mexico or by the imperial 
government of France would tend greatly to increase 
the popular impatience. He further requested an as- 
surance that the pretenses of Dr. Gwin and his asso- 
ciates were destitute of any sanction from the Emperor 
of France. 

Among the most prominent Confederates connected 
with this scheme were Matthew F. Maury, the dis- 
tinguished geographer and naval officer, who became 
a naturalized Mexican citizen and was appointed Im- 
perial Commissioner of Immigration and an honorary 
councillor of state; and General John B. Magruder, 
who was charged with the supervision of the survey of 
lands for colonization. It was hoped that the promi- 
nence of these men and the high rank they had held 
under the Confederate government would, in the gen- 
eral uncertainty that prevailed as to the treatment of 
the South by the victorious Union party, induce many 
persons to emigrate to Mexico. Maximilian issued a 
special decree, September 5, 1865, regarding coloniza- 
tion with a view to inducing Southern planters to emi- 
grate to Mexico with their slaves — the latter to be 
reduced to a state of peonage, regular slavery being 
prohibited by the laws of the empire. This scheme 
was altogether impracticable. 

In July, 1865, Maximilian finally made an effort to 

224 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

secure recognition of his government by the United 
States. On the 17th of July, the Marquis de Mon- 
tholon, the French minister at Washington, called at 
the department of state and informed Mr. Seward 
that a special agent had arrived at Washington, bear- 
ing a letter signed by Maximilian and addressed to 
the President of the United States, a copy of which 
the marquis presented to the secretary of state. On 
the 18th, Mr. Seward delivered back the copy of the 
letter to the Marquis de Montholon, and said that, as 
the United States were on friendly relations with the 
republican government of Mexico, the President de- 
clined to receive the letter or to hold any intercourse 
with the agent who brought it. The French govern- 
ment expressed to its representative at Washington 
its annoyance and embarrassment at this step, and 
said that Maximilian should have taken measures to 
learn the disposition of the United States before send- 
ing the agent. 36 

Mr. Tucker, in his book on the Monroe Doctrine, 
makes the statement that Mr. Bigelow, who succeeded 
Mr. Dayton as minister to France, announced to the 
French government that the United States would rec- 
ognize the empire of Maximilian upon the immediate 
withdrawal of the French troops from the territory of 
Mexico, but that this statement, made upon the envoy's 
own authority, was disavowed by the President. This 
is hardly a correct version of the case. It seems that 
Mr. Bigelow, in the course of a conversation with M. 
Drouyn de Lhuys, asked him, " in his own name, and 
without prejudicing the opinion of his government, if 
he did not think that the recognition of Maximilian by 

36 Dipl. Corr. 1865, Part III. 

225 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

the United States would facilitate and hasten the re- 
call of the French troops." 3T 

On the 3rd of October, 1865, Maximilian issued a 
decree at the city of Mexico, the first article of which 
declared : 

All persons belonging to armed bands or corps, not legally 
authorized, whether they proclaim or not any political princi- 
ples, and whatever be the number of those who compose the 
said bands, their organization, character and denomination 
shall be tried militarily by the courts-martial; and if found 
guilty even of the only fact of belonging to the band, they 
shall be condemned to capital punishment, within the twenty- 
four hours following the sentence." 

The United States, through Mr. Bigelow, protested 
to France against this decree, as repugnant to the 
sentiments of modern civilization and the instincts of 
humanity. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied with a touch 
of sarcasm: 

Why do you not go to President Juarez? We are not the 
government of Mexico and you do us too much honor to 
treat us as such. We had to go to Mexico with an army to 
secure certain important interests, but we are not responsible 
for Maximilian or his government. He is accountable to you, 
as to any other government, if he violated its rights, and you 
have the same remedies there that we had." 

The American government was now relieved from 
the burden of civil war, and for several months the 
correspondence of Mr. Seward had been assuming a 
more decided tone. On September 6, 1865, he re- 
minded the French government that the attention of 

• T Tucker, p. 104; Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III. 
•• Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 5, p. 3, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess. 
•• Mr. Bigelow to Mr. Seward, Nov. 30, 1865, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 5, 
Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess. 

226 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

the country was now no longer occupied by the civil 
war, and that henceforth both the Congress and the 
people of the United States might be expected to give 
a very large share of their attention to questions of 
foreign policy, chief among which was likely to be 
that of their relations with France in regard to Mexico. 
About this time Major General Schofield was sent to 
Paris on a mission, the precise object of which was 
long a matter of mystery. It appears from John Bige- 
low's memoirs that Grant, Schofield, and a number of 
other army officers were bringing great pressure to 
bear upon the government to intervene by force and 
drive Maximilian from Mexico. Seward, with his 
usual political sagacity, concluded that the best method 
of holding Grant and his followers in check was to 
send Schofield to Paris on an informal mission. Ac- 
cording to the latter, Seward said to him : " I want 
you to get your legs under Napoleon's mahogany and 
tell him he must get out of Mexico." Seward knew 
perfectly well that Schofield would not be as belliger- 
ent in the presence of the Emperor as he was in Wash- 
ington, and above all he had confidence in Bigelow's 
tact and ability to handle Schofield when he arrived in 
Paris. The plan worked beautifully. Neither Bige- 
low nor Schofield reported just what took place at the 
interview with the Emperor, but we may be sure that 
Schofield did not say in Paris what he had intended 
to say when he left Washington. After Bigelow re- 
turned from Paris in 1867, he had a conversation with 
Seward in which the latter said: 

I sent General Schofield to Paris to parry a letter brought 
to us from Grant insisting that the French be driven head 

227 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

over heels and at once out of Mexico. It answered my pur- 
pose. It gave Schofield something to do, and converted him 
to the policy of the Department by convincing him that the 
French were going as fast as they could. That pacified 
Grant and made everything easy. 40 

On November 6 Seward wrote : 

The presence and operations of a French army in Mexico, 
and its maintenance of an authority there, resting upon force 
and not the free will of the people of Mexico, is a cause 
of serious concern to the people of the United States. . . . 
They still regard the effort to establish permanently a foreign 
and imperial government in Mexico as disallowable and im- 
practicable. For these reasons they could not now agree to 
compromise the position they have hitherto assumed. They 
are not prepared to recognize any political institutions in 
Mexico which are in opposition to the republican govern- 
ment with which we have so long and so constantly main- 
tained relations of amity and friendship. 

Finally, on December 16, 1865, Seward addressed 
what was practically an ultimatum to France. He 
pointed out the likelihood that Congress, then in ses- 
sion, would direct by law the action of the executive 
on this important subject, and stated that: 

It has been the President's purpose that France should be 
respectfully informed upon two points, namely: First, that 
the United States earnestly desire to continue and to cultivate 
sincere friendship with France. Second, that this policy 
would be brought into imminent jeopardy, unless France 
could deem it consistent with her interest and honor to desist 
from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico, to 
overthrow the domestic republican government existing there, 
and to establish upon its ruins the foreign monarchy which 

40 Bigelow, " Retrospections of an Active Life," Vol. IV, p. 42; Ban- 
croft, " Life of Seward," Vol. II, p. 435, 

228 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

has been attempted to be inaugurated in the capital of that 
country. 

In conclusion he added : 

It remains now only to make known to M. Drouyn de 
Lhuys my profound regret that he has thought it his duty 
to leave the subject, in his conversation with you, in a 
condition that does not authorize an expectation on our part 
that a satisfactory adjustment of the case can be effected on 
any basis that thus far has been discussed. 

As late as November 29, 1865, the French govern- 
ment, through the Marquis de Montholon, still in- 
sisted on recognition of Maximilian by the United 
States as the only basis for an arrangement for the 
recall of the French troops. 41 

The formal reply to Mr. Seward's note of December 
16 was received through the Marquis de Montholon, 
January 29, 1866. M. Drouyn de Lhuys still insisted 
that the French expedition had in it nothing hostile to 
the institutions of the new world, and assuredly still 
less to those of the United States. He called attention 
to the fact that the United States had acknowledged 
the right of France to make war on Mexico, and con- 
tinued : " On the other part, we admit, as they do, the 
principle of non-intervention; this double postulate in- 
cludes, as it seems to me, the elements of an agree- 
ment." He also contended that the right to make 
war implied the right to secure the results of war; 
that they had to demand guarantees, and these guar- 
antees they could not look for from a government 
whose bad faith they had proven on so many occa- 



41 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 6, p. 98, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess. 

229 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

sions; that they found themselves engaged in the 
establishment of a regular government, which showed 
itself disposed to keep its engagements; that the Mexi- 
can people had spoken, and that the Emperor Maxi- 
milian had been called to the throne by the will of the 
people oi the country. 42 

Mr. Seward's counter-reply was dated February 12, 
1866. He declared that the proceedings in Mexico 
were regarded in the United States as having been 
taken without the authority, and prosecuted against 
the will and opinions of the Mexican people; that the 
United States had not seen any satisfactory evidence 
that the people of Mexico had spoken and called into 
being or accepted the so-called empire, and that the 
withdrawal of the French troops was deemed neces- 
sary to allow such a proceeding to be taken. He 
added, however, that : 

France need not for a moment delay her proposed with- 
drawal of military forces from Mexico, and her putting the 
principle of non-intervention into full and complete practice 
in regard to Mexico through any apprehension that the 
United States will prove unfaithful to the principles and 
policy in that respect which, on their behalf, it has been my 
duty to maintain in this now very lengthened corre- 
spondence." 

He concluded with a virtual ultimatum : 

We shall be gratified when the Emperor shall give to us 
. . . definite information of the time when French military 
operations may be expected to cease in Mexico. 

•■ House Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess. 
*• Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III; also H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-ninth- 
Cong., First Sess. 

23O 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

Napoleon finally decided that, in view of the Euro- 
pean situation, he could not risk a war with the United 
States, and in the issue of April 5, 1866, the Moniteur 
announced that the Emperor had decided that the 
French troops should evacuate Mexico in three de- 
tachments: the first to leave in November, 1866; the 
second in March, 1867; and the third in November, 
1867. In the course of a conversation with Mr. Bige- 
low the day following M. Drouyn de Lhuys acknowl- 
edged that this statement was official. 44 The decision 
of the emperor was officially made known to the 
United States in a note of April 21, 1866. Seward 
had very fortunately left a loophole in his dispatch of 
February 12, in the statement that the United States 
would continue to pursue its policy of neutrality after 
the French evacuation. De Lhuys said : 

We receive this assurance with entire confidence and we 
find therein a sufficient guarantee not any longer to delay 
the adoption of measures intended to prepare for the return 
of our army.* 8 

American historians have usually attributed Na- 
poleon's backdown to Seward's diplomacy supported 
by the military power of the United States, which was, 
of course, greater then than at any other time in our 
history. All this undoubtedly had its effect on Na- 
poleon's mind, but it appears that conditions in Europe 
just at that particular moment had an even greater 
influence in causing him to abandon his Mexican 
scheme. Within a few days of the receipt of Seward's 
ultimatum Napoleon was informed of Bismarck's de- 

44 H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, p. 42, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess. 
" Ibid. 

231 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

termination to force a war with Austria over the 
Schleswig-Holstein controversy. Napoleon realized 
that the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia, without 
any corresponding gains by France, would be a serious 
blow to his prestige and in fact endanger his throne. 
He at once entered upon a long and hazardous diplo- 
matic game in which Bismarck outplayed him and 
eventually forced him into war. In order to have a 
free hand to meet the European situation he decided 
to yield to the American demands. 

About the time that the French government an- 
nounced its intention of withdrawing its forces from 
Mexico, it was found that troops were being enlisted 
in Austria for the Mexican " foreign legion." The 
United States government at once took measures to 
prevent the French troops from being replaced by 
Austrians by declaring to the Austrian government 
through Mr. Motley, " that in the event of hostilities 
being carried on hereafter in Mexico by Austrian sub- 
jects, under the command or with the sanction of the 
government of Vienna, the United States will feel 
themselves at liberty to regard those hostilities as con- 
stituting a state of war by Austria against the republic 
of Mexico; and in regard to such war, waged at this 
time and under existing circumstances, the United 
States could not engage to remain as silent and neu- 
tral spectators." 48 

Mr. Motley seems to have been somewhat surprised 
and puzzled at the sudden and emphatic change of 
tone in the instructions of his government, and failed 
to carry them out in the spirit intended by Mr. Sew- 
ard. This brought forth a sharp reprimand. Mr. 

•« Wharton's Digest, Sec. 58, Vol. I, p. 328. 

232 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

Seward expressed his strong disapproval of the posi- 
tion taken by Mr. Motley in his communication of 
the instructions of the department to the Austrian gov- 
ernment, and directed him to carry out his instructions 
according to the strict letter, adding: 

I refrain from discussing the question you have raised, 
" Whether the recent instructions of this department harmo- 
nize entirely with the policy which it pursued at an earlier 
period of the European intervention in Mexico." 

Mr. Motley was instructed to withdraw from 
Vienna in case troops were sent from Austria to 
Mexico. The embarkation of troops for this purpose 
was stopped. Austria was in a great state of excite- 
ment over the approaching war with Prussia, and, 
besides needing all her available troops at home, did 
not care to antagonize the United States. 

It was now a question of great interest in this coun- 
try and in Europe, whether Maximilian would with- 
draw from Mexico with the French troops or attempt 
to maintain himself there without foreign support. 
Napoleon sent one of his aides to Mexico to make 
known his intentions to Maximilian. This fact was 
communicated to the United States government, 
October 16, 1866: 

Mr. de Castelnau has for his mission to make it well 
understood that the limit of our sacrifices is reached and 
that if the Emperor Maximilian, thinking to find in the 
country itself a point of sufficient support, may wish to en- 
deavor to maintain himself there, he cannot for the future 
count on any succor on the part of France. But it may 
happen that, deeming it impossible to triumph through his 
own resources over the difficulties which surround him ? this 

?33 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

sovereign may determine to abdicate. We will do nothing 
to dissuade him from this, and we think that on this hypothe- 
sis there would be ground to proceed, by way of election, in 
the establishment of a new government. 47 

When the time came for the withdrawal of the first 
contingent of French troops, no action to that end 
was taken by the French government, and the United 
States had once more to seek an explanation. The 
Emperor assured the American government, however, 
that he had decided from military considerations to 
withdraw all his troops in the spring in a body, as the 
recent successes of the insurgents would render any 
large reduction of his forces perilous to those who 
remained. He further stated that he had counselled 
Maximilian to abdicate. 48 To the surprise of every- 
one, however, Maximilian seemed to think that honor 
demanded that he should remain in Mexico and share 
the fate of his supporters. 

After the withdrawal of Mr. Corwin, owing to the 
unsettled state of affairs in Mexico, the United States 
had no one accredited to that government until May, 
1866, when Mr. Lewis D. Campbell, of Ohio, was ap- 
pointed. He left New York for his post in November, 
1866, accompanied by Lieutenant General William T. 
Sherman of the army. They proceeded in the U. S. S. 
Susquehanna by way of Havana, but as they found the 
principal Mexican ports on the Atlantic still occupied 
by the French, they proceeded to New Orleans, from 
which point Mr. Campbell tried to establish regular 
communication with President Juarez. The President 
had first decided to dispatch General Grant with Mr, 

47 Dipl. Corr., 1866. Part I. p. 387. 

•* H. Ex. Doc. No. 30, Fortieth Cong., First Sess. 

234 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

Campbell, in the hope " that some disposition might 
be made of the land and naval forces of the United; 
States without interfering within the jurisdiction of 
Mexico, or violating the laws of neutrality, which 
would be useful in favoring the restoration of law, 
order and republican government in that country." 
This demonstration was intended to insure the with- 
drawal of the French army according to the promises 
of the Emperor. A hitch occurred through some ques- 
tion raised by General Grant and General Sherman 
was substituted. 49 

The French army was withdrawn in the spring of 
1867, and it very soon became evident that Maxi- 
milian's cause would speedily collapse. In view of the 
almost inevitable capture of Maximilian, Mr. Seward 
telegraphed to Mr. Campbell at New Orleans, April 
6, 1867: 

You will communicate to President Juarez, promptly and 
by effectual means, the desire of this government, that in case 
of capture, the prince and his supporters may receive the 
humane treatment accorded by civilized nations to prisoners 
of war. 

Some of the prisoners already taken had been sum- 
marily executed. 

Mr. Campbell at once dispatched a special mes- 
senger, who succeeded in getting through to the head- 
quarters of Juarez, and who returned with an answer 
from the Mexican government, dated April 22, 1867. 
This answer not only undertook to defend the execu- 
tion of prisoners above referred to, but also intimated 
that similar severity would be practiced on Maximilian 

48 Dipl. Corr., 1866, Part III. 

235 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

and his leading associates, if captured, on the ground 
that, by his harsh decrees, he had placed himself be- 
yond the pale of the law of nations. 50 

Maximilian and his chief supporters were taken 
prisoners, May 15, 1867. This information was re- 
ceived in the United States toward the last of the 
month, and along with it a report, not well authen- 
ticated and which afterward proved to be false, that 
they had been executed on the 16th. As soon as these 
rumors reached Washington, Mr. Seward telegraphed 
to Mr. Campbell, then at New Orleans, June i, 1867, 
directing him to proceed at once to the residence of 
the President of Mexico and enter on his mission, and 
if necessary to urge clemency to Maximilian and the 
other prisoners of war. Mr. Campbell failed to act 
under these instructions. He requested first that a 
public vessel of the United States should be detailed 
to carry him to Mexico. When it was found that no 
ship was available for this purpose, he was ordered 
to proceed to Havana and thence by the British or 
French line of steamers to Vera Cruz. He replied 
that under the circumstances he did not think it be- 
coming the dignity of the representative of the United 
States to return to Mexico under the flag of a nation 
which had shown such hostility to that country. He 
thus remained at New Orleans from the first to the 
fifteenth of June. He was then ordered peremptorily 
to proceed at once according to instructions. He re- 
plied that he was ill and was afraid to go by way of 
Havana, where yellow fever was raging; that he would 
resign, if desired. The same day Mr. Seward tele- 
graphed him that his resignation would be accepted. 

»• Dipl. Corr., 1866, Part III. 

236 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

Mr. Seward then informed Mr. Romero, the Mexi- 
can minister at Washington, that Austria, France, and 
Great Britain had appealed to the United States to use 
its good offices to avert the execution of Prince Maxi- 
milian. He strongly recommended clemency to Presi- 
dent Juarez, as good policy, and requested Mr. Romero 
to make the same known to his government at once. 
This was June 15, the same day that Mr. Campbell's 
resignation was accepted. On the 21st, Mr. Seward 
requested Mr. Romero to inform President Juarez that 
the Emperor of Austria would restore Maximilian to 
all his rights of succession upon his release and re- 
nouncing forever all projects in Mexico. 61 

Meanwhile Maximilian of Hapsburg, Miguel Mira- 
mon, and Tomas Mejia had been tried by court-martial 
and sentenced to death, June 14. The sentence was 
confirmed by the government on the 15th, and the 
execution fixed for the 16th, but at the request of 
Maximilian's counsel, it was suspended by order of 
President Juarez until the 19th, in order to allow the 
prince to arrange certain business affairs of a private 
character. At seven o'clock on the morning of June 
19 the prisoners were shot. 

" l Sen. Ex. Doc. N<x 20, Fortieth Cong., First Sess. 



237 



CHAPTER VI 
The Two Venezuelan Episodes 

As a result of Blaine's unsuccessful attempt to 
force Great Britain to relinquish her rights under the 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty the Monroe Doctrine had fallen 
somewhat into disrepute when in 1895 & was suddenly 
revived in a striking and sensational way by President 
Cleveland's intervention in the Venezuelan boundary 
controversy. The dispute between Great Britain and 
Venezuela in regard to the boundary line between the 
latter and British Guiana was of long standing. In 
1 8 14, by treaty with the Netherlands, Great Britain 
acquired " the establishments of Demerara, Essequibo, 
and Berbice," now known as British Guiana. From 
that time on the boundary line between British Guiana 
and Venezuela was a matter of dispute. Venezuela 
always claimed the line of the Essequibo river. 

In 1840, Sir Robert Schomburgk, acting under the 
instructions of the British government, established a 
line some distance to the west of the Essequibo river 
and marked it by monuments on the face of the coun- 
try. Venezuela at once protested. The British gov- 
ernment explained that the line was only tentative 
and the monuments set up by Schomburgk were re- 
moved. 

Various other lines were from time to time claimed 
by Great Britain, each one extending the frontier of 
British Guiana farther and farther to the west. The 

238 



THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES 

British Colonial Office List, a government publication, 
in the issue for 1885, put the area of British Guiana 
at about 76,000 square miles. In the issue of the 
same list for 1886 the same statement occurs in ref- 
erence to British Guiana with the change of area to 
" about 109,000 square miles." Here was a gain of 
33,000 square miles without any statement whatever 
in explanation of how this additional territory had 
been acquired. 

After the failure of repeated efforts on the part of 
Venezuela to secure an adjustment with England, she 
finally came to the conclusion in 1882 that the only 
course open to her was arbitration of the controversy. 
She persistently urged arbitration, but Great Britain 
refused to submit to arbitration any but a compara- 
tively small part of the territory in dispute. In 1887 
Venezuela suspended diplomatic relations with Great 
Britain, protesting " before her British majesty's gov- 
ernment, before all civilized nations, and before the 
world in general, against the acts of spoliation com- 
mitted to her detriment by the government of Great 
Britain, which she at no time and on no account 
will recognize as capable of altering in the least the 
rights which she has inherited from Spain and re- 
specting which she will ever be willing to submit to 
the decision of a third power." 

After repeated efforts to promote the reestablish- 
ment of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and 
Great Britain and after repeated offers of its good 
offices for the purpose of bringing about an adjust- 
ment of the controversy, President Cleveland finally 
determined to intervene in a more positive manner 
with a view to forcing, if need be, a settlement of 

239 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

the controversy. This resolution on the part of the 
American executive, with a full statement of its views 
on the general principles involved in the dispute, was 
forwarded to Mr. Bayard for transmission to the 
British government in Mr. Olney's dispatch of July 20, 
1895. 1 After reviewing the history of the controversy 
Mr. Olney stated in the following concise form what 
he considered the important features of the situation 
as it then existed: 

1. The title to territory of indefinite but confessedly very 
large extent is in dispute between Great Britain on the one 
hand and the South American republic of Venezuela on the 
other. 

2. The disparity in the strength of the claimants is such 
that Venezuela can hope to establish her claim only through 
peaceful methods — through an agreement with her adversary 
either upon the subject itself or upon an arbitration. 

3. The controversy, with varying claims on the part of 
Great Britain, has existed for more than half a century, 
during which period many earnest and persistent efforts of 
Venezuela to establish a boundary by agreement have proved 
unsuccessful. 

4. The futility of the endeavor to obtain a conventional 
line being recognized, Venezuela for a quarter of a century 
has asked and striven for arbitration. 

5. Great Britain, however, has always and continuously 
refused to arbitrate, except upon the condition of a renun- 
ciation of a large part of the Venezuelan claim and of a 
concession to herself of a large share of the territory in 
controversy. 

6. By the frequent interposition of its good offices at the 
instance of Venezuela, by constantly urging and promoting 
the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, by pressing for arbitration of the disputed 
boundary, by offering to act as arbitrator, by expressing its 



1 For. Rel., 189596, Part I, p. 552. 

240 



THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES 

grave concern whenever new alleged instances of British 
aggression upon Venezuelan territory have been brought to 
its notice, the government of the United States has made it 
clear to Great Britain and to the world that the controversy 
is one in which both its honor and its interests are involved 
and the continuance of which it cannot regard with indif- 
ference. 

The greater part of the dispatch was taken up with 
a discussion of the bearing of the Monroe Doctrine 
upon the case and the most striking feature of it was 
that the Monroe Doctrine was appealed to by name. 
Mr. Olney's statement of the Monroe Doctrine is 
worthy of the most careful consideration as it was the 
fullest and most definite official construction of its 
meaning and scope that had been given to the world. 
He said: 

That America is in no part open to colonization, though 
the proposition was not universally admitted at the time of 
its first enunciation, has long been universally conceded. We 
are now concerned, therefore, only with that other practical 
application of the Monroe Doctrine the disregard of which 
by an European power is to be deemed an act of unfriendli- 
ness towards the United States. The precise scope and 
limitations of this rule cannot be too clearly apprehended. 
It does not establish any general protectorate by the United 
States over other American states. It does not relieve any 
American state from its obligations as fixed by international 
law, nor prevent any European power directly interested 
from enforcing such obligations or from inflicting merited 
punishment for the breach of them. It does not contemplate 
any interference in the internal affairs of any American state 
or in the relations between it and other American states. It 
does not justify any attempt on our part to change the estab- 
lished form of government of any American state or to pre- 
vent the people of such state from altering that form accord- 

241 



\ 

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

ing to their own will and pleasure. The rule in question has 
but a single purpose and object. It is that no European 
power or combination of European powers shall forcibly 
deprive an American state of the right and power of self- 
government and of shaping for itself its own political for- 
tunes and destinies. 

Lord Salisbury's reply to Mr. Olney was given in 
two dispatches of the same date, November 26, 1895, 
the one devoted to a discussion of the Monroe Doc- 
trine, the other to a discussion of the rights of the 
controversy as between Great Britain and Venezuela. 
In the first dispatch Lord Salisbury argued that Mr. 
Olney's views went far beyond the scope of the Mon- 
roe Doctrine, that no attempt at colonization was be- 
ing made, and that no political system was being im- 
posed upon any state of South America. He also 
denied that the Monroe Doctrine was a part of inter- 
national law, since it had not received the consent of 
other nations, and he utterly repudiated Mr. Olney's 
principle that " American questions are for American 
discussion." 

In the second dispatch of the same date Lord Salis- 
bury enters fully into the rights of the controversy 
between Great Britain and Venezuela, controverting 
the arguments of the earlier part of Mr. Olney's dis- 
patch, which he characterizes as ex parte. 

In view of the very positive character of Mr. Olney's 
dispatch and of the assertion that the honor and inter- 
ests of the United States were concerned, the refusal 
of Great Britain to arbitrate placed the relations of 
the two countries in a very critical position. The 
American executive, however, had intervened for the 
purpose of settling the controversy, peaceably if pos- 

242 



THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES 

sible, forcibly if need be, and President Cleveland did 
not now shrink from the logic of events. In a mes- 
sage to Congress, December 17, 1895, 2 he laid before 
that body Mr. Olney's dispatch of July 20, together 
with Lord Salisbury's reply. He not only reaffirmed 
the soundness of the Monroe Doctrine and its appli- 
cation to the case in question, but claimed for that 
principle of American diplomacy a place in the code 
of international law. 

In regard to the applicability of the Monroe Doc- 
trine to the Venezuelan boundary dispute Mr. Cleve- 
land declared : 

If a European power by an extension of its boundaries 
takes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring 
republics against its will and in derogation of its rights, it 
is difficult to see why to that extent such European power 
does not thereby attempt to extend its system of government 
to that portion of this continent which is thus taken. This 
is the precise action which President Monroe declared to be 
" dangerous to our peace and safety," and it can make no 
difference whether the European system is extended by an 
advance of frontier or otherwise. 

In regard to the right of the United States to de- 
mand the observance of this principle by other nations, 
Mr. Cleveland said: 

Practically the principle for which we contend has pe- 
culiar, if not exclusive, relation to the United States. It may 
not have been admitted in so many words to the code of 
international law, but since in international councils every 
nation is entitled to the rights belonging to it, if the enforce- 
ment of the Monroe Doctrine is something we may justly 
claim, it has its place in the code of international law as 

2 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. IX, p. 655. 

243 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

certainly and as securely as if it were specifically mentioned ; 
and when the United States is a suitor before the high tri- 
bunal that administers international law the question to be 
determined is whether or not we present claims which the 
justice of that code of law can find to be right and valid. The 
Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of 
international law which are based upon the theory that 
every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims 
enforced. 

Mr. Cleveland concluded that the dispute had 
reached such a stage as to make it incumbent upon the 
United States to take measures to determine with suf- 
ficient certainty for its justification what was the true 
divisional line between the republic of Venezuela and 
British Guiana. He therefore recommended that Con- 
gress make an appropriation for the expenses of a 
commission, to be appointed by the executive, which 
should make the necessary investigations and report 
upon the matter with the least possible delay. " When 
such report is made and accepted," he continued, " it 
will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States 
to resist by every means in its power, as a willful 
aggression upon its rights and interests, the appro- 
priation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise 
of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which 
after investigation we have determined of right be- 
longs to Venezuela." " In making these recommenda- 
tions," he added, " I am fully alive to the responsibility 
incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that 
may follow." 

The publication of this message and the accompa- 
nying dispatches created the greatest excitement both 
in the United States and in England, and called forth 
the severest criticism of the President's course. 

244 



THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES 

The main grounds of this criticism were the con- 
tentions : 

( i ) That the Monroe Doctrine was not a part of in- 
ternational law and therefore its observance as such 
could not be urged upon other nations. 
S(2) That it was not even an established principle of 
American diplomacy, since the original declaration was 
merely a protest against apprehended aggression on 
the part of a combination of European powers which 
had long since ceased to threaten this continent. 

(3) That even granting that the Monroe Doctrine 
was a declaration of American policy, it was merely 
a policy and imposed no obligation on the government 
to enforce it except where our interests were directly 
concerned. 

(4) That the occupation of a few thousand acres of 
uninhabited territory by Great Britain, even if it did 
rightfully belong to Venezuela, was not a matter that 
affected the interests of the United States one way or 
the other or that threatened the permanence or stability 
of American institutions. 

(5) That granting the wisdom and correctness of 
the President's position, the language of his message 
and of Mr. Olney's dispatch was indiscreet at best and 
unnecessarily offensive to British pride. 

It may be well to consider these objections in de- 
tail. In regard to the first point it may be said that 
neither President Cleveland nor Mr. Olney asserted 
or maintained that the Monroe Doctrine was a part 
of international law by virtue of its assertion by Presi- 
dent Monroe and succeeding presidents. The position 
they took was that the Monroe Doctrine was an Ameri- 
can statement of a well recognized principle of inter- 

245 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

national law, viz., the right of a state to intervene in a 
controversy between other states, when it deems its 
own interests threatened. Mr. Cleveland declared: 
" The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those 
principles of international law which are based upon 
the theory that every nation shall have its rights pro- 
tected and its just claims enforced." Mr. Olney's 
analysis of the doctrine was clearer and more specific. 
He said : " That there are circumstances under which 
a nation may justly intervene in a controversy to 
which two or more other nations are the direct and 
immediate parties is an admitted canon of international 
law." After discussing the general principle of in- 
tervention, he adds : " We are concerned at this time, 
however, not so much with the general rule as with 
a form of it which is peculiarly and distinctively Amer- 
ican. 

In answer to the second objection it is only neces- 
sary to refer to accepted works on public law and to 
the official correspondence of the state department to 
show that the Monroe Doctrine had for three-quarters 
of a century been the cardinal principle of American 
diplomacy.* 

The third point, namely as to the expediency of en- 
forcing the Monroe Doctrine in all cases of European 
aggression on this continent, raises an important ques- 
tion. If, however, the Monroe Doctrine is a wise 
principle and one which it is our interest to maintain, 
it is right that it should be asserted on every occasion 
of its violation. The force of precedent is so great 



* Olney to Bayard, July 20. 1895. 

* Moore's " Digest of Int. Law," Vol. VI, pp. 368-604, especially 
Mr. Fish's Report on Relations with the Spanish-American Republics of 
July 14, 1870, pp. 429-431. 

246 



THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES 

that in the present state of international law, it would 
be dangerous to do otherwise. 

In the fourth place while it was perfectly true that 
the occupation of the disputed territory by Great Bri- 
tain could not in itself conceivably endanger the peace 
and integrity of the United States, yet as the open 
violation of a principle upon which we had laid so 
much stress we could not in honor and dignity have 
overlooked it. 

As to the tone of Mr. Olney's dispatch and of Mr. 
Cleveland's message, it must be acknowledged that 
while the positions assumed were in the main correct, 
the language was in some cases unfortunate, either 
from vagueness or generalization. Thus Mr. Olney's 
statement, that " 3,000 miles of intervening ocean 
make any permanent political union between a Euro- 
pean and an American state unnatural and inexpedi- 
ent," — whatever he may have meant by it — appears 
in view of Great Britain's connection with Canada, to 
have been both untrue and calculated to give offense. 
Likewise Mr. Cleveland's reference to " the high tri- 
bunal that administers international law " was too 
rhetorical a figure for a state paper. 

It has, indeed, been suggested that President Cleve- 
land and Mr. Olney deliberately undertook to play a 
bluff game in order to browbeat the British govern- 
ment. In any case, it should be remembered that the 
test of a diplomatic move is its success, and judged 
from this standpoint Mr. Cleveland's Venezuelan pol- 
icy was vindicated by the results. The British gov- 
ernment at once adopted the most friendly attitude 
and placed valuable information in its archives at the 
disposal of the commissioners appointed by President 

247 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

Cleveland to determine the true boundary line. On 
November 12, 1896, before the final report of this 
commission was made, a complete accord was reached 
between Great Britain and the United States by which 
the terms of a treaty to be ratified by Great Britain 
and Venezuela were agreed on, the provisions of which 
embraced a full arbitration of the whole controversy. 
Lord Salisbury's sudden change of front has been the 
subject of much interesting speculation. How far he 
was influenced by the South African situation has 
never been revealed, but it undoubtedly had its effect. 
President Cleveland's message was sent to Congress 
December 17. Before the end of the month came 
Dr. Jameson's raid into the Transvaal, and on the 
3rd of January the German Kaiser sent his famous 
telegram to Paul Kruger. The attention of England 
was thus diverted from America to Germany, and Lord 
Salisbury doubtless thought it prudent to avoid a 
rupture with the United States in order to be free 
to deal with the situation in South Africa. 

The Anglo-Venezuelan treaty provided that an arbi- 
tral tribunal should be immediately appointed to de- 
termine the true boundary line between Venezuela 
and British Guiana. This tribunal was to consist of 
two members nominated by the judges of the Supreme 
Court of the United States and two members nomi- 
nated by the British Supreme Court of Justice and 
of a fifth selected by the four persons so nominated, 
or in the event of their failure to agree within three 
months of their appointment, selected by the king of 
Sweden and Norway. The person so selected was to 
be president of the tribunal, and it was expressly stip- 
ulated that the persons nominated by the Supreme 

248 



THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES 

Court of the United States and England respectively 
might be members of said courts. Certain general 
rules were also laid down for the guidance of the 
tribunal. 5 

A treaty embodying substantially these proposals 
was signed by the British and Venezuelan representa- 
tives at Washington, February 2, 1897. The decision 
of the tribunal which met in Paris gave a large part 
of the disputed area to Great Britain and this occa- 
sioned further criticism of President Cleveland's ac- 
tion in bringing the United States and England to the 
verge of war on what was termed an academic issue. 
The award was a matter of secondary importance. 
The principle for which the United States contended 
was vindicated when Great Britain agreed to arbi- 
trate. It was a great triumph of American diplomacy 
to force Great Britain just at this time to recognize 
in fact, if not in words, the Monroe Doctrine, for 
it was not long before Germany showed a disposition 
to question that principle of American policy, and the 
fact that we had upheld it against England made it 
easier to deal with Germany. 

The attention of Europe and America was drawn 
to Venezuela a second time in 1902 when Germany 
made a carefully planned and determined effort to test 
out the Monroe Doctrine and see whether we would 
fight for it. In that year Germany, England, and Italy 
made a naval demonstration against Venezuela for 
the purpose of forcing her to recognize the validity 
of certain claims of their subjects which she had per- **< 
sistently refused to settle. How England was led 
into the trap is still a mystery, but the Kaiser thought 

B Foreign Relations, 1896, p. 254. 

249 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

that he had her thoroughly committed and that if 
she once started in with him she could not turn against 
him. But he had evidently not profited by the ex- 
perience of Napoleon III in Mexico forty years earlier 
under very similar circumstances. 

In the case of Germany, though the facts were 
somewhat obscured, the real purpose of the interven- 
tion was to collect claims which originated in contract 
between German subjects and the government of Ven- 
ezuela. One claim was for the recovery of interest 
seven years in arrears on five per cent, bonds, for 
which Venezuelan customs were pledged as security. 
Another was for seven per cent, dividends guaranteed 
by the Venezuelan government on the capital stock of 
a railroad built by German subjects at a cost of nearly 
$20,000,000. There were still other claims amount- 
ing to about $400,000 for forced loans and military 
requisitions. 6 ) 

These claims were brought to the attention of the 
United States government by the German ambassador 
on December 11, 1901. Their dubious character, re- 
garded from the standpoint of international law, led 
Germany to make what purported to be a frank avowal 
of her intentions to the United States, and to secure 
for her action the acquiescence of that government. 
Her ambassador declared that the German govern- 
ment had " no purpose or intention to make even the 
smallest acquisition of territory on the South Ameri- 
can continent or the islands adjacent." This precau- 
tion was taken in order to prevent a subsequent asser- 
tion of the Monroe Doctrine. In conclusion the Ger- 
man ambassador stated that his government had de- 

8 Foreign Relations, 1901, p. 193; 1903, p. 429. 

250 



THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES 

cided to " ask the Venezuelan government to make a 
declaration immediately, that it recognizes in principle 
the correctness of these demands, and is willing to 
accept the decision of a mixed commission, with the 
object of having them determined and assured in all 
their details." At the same time the British govern- 
ment demanded a settlement of claims for the destruc- 
tion of property and for the ill-treatment and im- 
prisonment of British subjects in the recent civil wars, 
as well as a settlement of the foreign debt. 

On December 16, 1901, Mr. Hay replied to the 
German note, thanking the German government for 
its voluntary and frank declaration, and stating that 
he did not consider it necessary to discuss the claims 
in question; but he called attention to the following 
reference to the Monroe Doctrine in President Roose- 
velt's message of December 3, 1901 : 

This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial rela- 
tions of any American power, save that it in truth allows 
each of them to form such as it desires. In other words, 
it is really a guarantee of the commercial independence of 
the Americas. We do not ask under this doctrine for any 
exclusive commercial dealings with any other American 
state. We do not guarantee any state against punishment 
if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not 
take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non- 
American power. 

A year later, after fruitless negotiations, the Ger- 
man government announced to the United States that 
it proposed, in conjunction with Great Britain and 
Italy, to establish a pacific blockade of Venezuelan har- 
bors. The United States replied that it did not recog- 
nize a pacific blockade which adversely affected the 

251 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

rights of third parties as a valid proceeding. The pow- 
ers then proposed to establish a " warlike blockade," 
but " without any declaration of war." This device 
was resorted to at the suggestion of the German gov- 
ernment, in order to avoid a formal declaration of 
war, which could not be made without the consent of 
the Bundesrath. Meanwhile, Venezuela's gunboats 
had been seized and her ports blockaded, acts which 
Mr. Balfour admitted on the floor of the House of 
Commons constituted a state of war ; and on December 
20 a formal blockade was announced in accordance 
with the law of nations, which created a status of bel- 
ligerency. 7 

The hostilities thus commenced were brought to 
a close by the diplomatic intervention of the United 
States. Acting under instructions from Washington, 
the American minister Herbert W. Bowen succeeded 
in persuading Venezuela to recognize in principle the 
claims of the foreign powers and to refer them to 
mixed commissions for the purpose of determining 
the amounts. 8 Great Britain and Italy agreed to this 
arrangement, but the German Kaiser remained for a 
time obdurate. /What followed Germany's refusal to 
arbitrate is described in Thayer's " Life and Letters 
of John Hay " in the following words : 

One day, when the crisis was at its height, [President 
Roosevelt] summoned to the White House Dr. Holleben, 
the German Ambassador, and told him that unless Germany 
consented to arbitrate, the American squadron under Ad- 
miral Dewey would be given orders, by noon ten days later, 
to proceed to the Venezuelan coast and prevent any taking 

7 Foreign Relations, 1903, pp. 419, 454; Moore, "Digest of Int. Law," 
Vol. VII, p. 140. 

8 Moore, " Digest of Int. Law," Vol. VI, p 590. 

252 



THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES 

possession of Venezuelan territory. Dr. Holleben began to 
protest that his Imperial master, having once refused to 
arbitrate, could not change his mind. The President said 
that he was not arguing the question, because arguments 
had already been gone over until no useful purpose would 
be served by repeating them; he was simply giving informa- 
tion which the Ambassador might think it important to 
transmit to Berlin. A week passed in silence. Then Dr. 
Holleben again called on the President, but said nothing of 
the Venezuelan matter. When he rose to go, the President 
asked him about it, and when he stated that he had re- 
ceived nothing from his government, the President informed 
him in substance that, in view of this fact, Admiral Dewey 
would be instructed to sail a day earlier than the day he, 
the President, had originally mentioned. Much perturbed, 
the Ambassador protested; the President informed him that 
not a stroke of a pen had been put on paper ; that if the 
Emperor would agree to arbitrate, he, the President, would 
heartily praise him for such action, and would treat it as 
taken on German initiative; but that within forty-eight 
hours there must be an offer to arbitrate or Dewey would 
sail with the orders indicated. Within thirty-six hours Dr. 
Holleben returned to the White House and announced to 
President Roosevelt that a dispatch had just come from 
Berlin, saying that the Kaiser would arbitrate. Neither 
Admiral Dewey (who with an American fleet was then 
manceuvering in the West Indies) nor any one else knew of 
the step that was to be taken; the naval authorities were 
merely required to be in readiness, but were not told what 
for. 

On the announcement that Germany had consented to 
arbitrate, the President publicly complimented the Kaiser on 
being so stanch an advocate of arbitration. The humor of 
this was probably relished more in the White House than 
in the Palace at Berlin. 9 1 

The Holleben incident, as narrated for the first 
time by Thayer, was immediately called in question. 

9 Thayer, " Life and Letters of John Hay," Vol. II, pp. 286-288. 

253 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

It will be noted that Thayer does not in any way 
quote Hay in the matter, and in the three volumes 
of " Diaries and Letters " of John Hay, privately 
printed by Mrs. Hay in 1908, there is no reference 
of any kind to the incident. It is evident that Thayer 
got his report of the interview directly from Roose- 
velt himself. It is said on good authority that while 
Colonel Roosevelt had no documentary evidence to 
support his statements at the time that he gave them 
to Thayer, such evidence came to hand in an inter- 
esting way shortly after the appearance of the book. 
Two German-Americans who had been intimate friends 
of Holleben promptly wrote to Colonel Roosevelt pro- 
testing, not against the facts as stated, but against 
the use that was made of them. Both correspondents 
stated that they had been told of the interview at 
the time by Holleben. /Admiral Dewey confirmed the 
statement as to the preparedness of the fleet in a letter 
dated May 23, 1916, which was published four days 
later in the New York Times. In it he said : 

I was at Culebra, Porto Rico, at the time in command 
of a fleet consisting of over fifty ships, including every 
battleship and every torpedo-boat we had, with orders from 
Washington to hold the fleet in hand and be ready to move 
at a moment's notice. Fortunately, however, the whole 
matter was amicably adjusted and there was no need for 
action. 

In a speech delivered to several thousand Repub- 
lican " Pilgrims " at Oyster Bay, May 27, Colonel 
Roosevelt made the following interesting comments 
on Dewey's letter: 

Just today I was very glad to see published in the papers 
the letter of Admiral Dewey describing an incident that 

254 



THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES 

took place while I was President. When we were menaced 
with trouble I acted up to my theory that the proper way 
of handling international relations was by speaking softly 
and carrying a big stick. And in that particular case Dewey 
and the American fleet represented the big stick. I asked, 
on behalf of the nation, the things to which we were en- 
titled. I was as courteous as possible. I not only acted 
with justice, but with courtesy toward them. I put every 
battleship and every torpedo-boat on the sea under the 
American flag and Dewey, with instructions to hold himself 
ready in entire preparedness to sail at a moment's notice. 
That didn't mean that we were to have war. Dewey was 
the greatest possible provocative of peace. 10 

After the agreement to arbitrate had been made, 
the situation was further complicated by the demands 
of the blockading powers that the sums ascertained 
by the mixed commissions to be due them should be 
paid in full before anything was paid upon the claims 
of the peace powers. Venezuela insisted that all her 
creditors should be treated alike. The Kaiser, from 
what motives it is not quite clear, suggested that this 
question should be referred to President Roosevelt, 
but as the United States was an interested party, Sec- 
retary Hay did not think it would be proper for the 
President to act, and it was finally agreed that the 
demands for preferential treatment should be sub- 
mitted to the Hague Court. 

During the summer of 1903 ten mixed commissions 
sat at Caracas to adjudicate upon the claims of as 
many nations against Venezuela. These commissions 
simply determined the amount of the claims in each 
case. The awards of these commissions are very in- 
structive, as they show the injustice of resorting to 

10 Washington Post, May 28, 1916. 

255 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

measures of coercion for the collection of pecuniary 
claims which have not been submitted to arbitration. 
Belgian claimants demanded 14,921,805 bolivars and 
were awarded 10,898,643; British claimants demanded 
14,743,572 and were awarded 9,401,267; German 
claimants demanded 7,376,685 and were awarded 2,- 
091,908; Italian claimants demanded 39,844,258 and 
were awarded 2,975,906; Spanish claimants demanded 
5,307,626 and were awarded 1,974,818; United States 
claimants demanded 81,410,952 and were awarded 
2,3i3,7ii. 11 

The decision of the Hague Court, which was ren- 
dered February 22 , 1904, held that the three allied 
powers were entitled to preferential treatment; that 
Venezuela had recognized in principle the justice of 
their claims while she had not recognized in principle 
the justice of the claims of the pacific powers; that 
the neutral powers had profited to some extent by 
the operations of the allies, and that their rights re- 
mained for the future absolutely intact. 12 This de- 
cision, emanating from a peace court, and indorsing 
the principle of armed coercion, was received with no 
small degree of criticism. 

During the discussions on the Venezuelan situation 
that took place in Parliament in December, 1902, the 
members of the government repeatedly repudiated the 
charge of the opposition that they were engaged in 
a debt-collecting expedition, and tried to make it ap- 
pear that they were protecting the lives and liberties 
of British subjects./ \ Lord Cranborne declared: 

11 Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903 (Sen. Doc. No. 316, Fifty-eighth Cong., 
Second Sess.); Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 871. 

' = Foreign Relations. 1904. p. 506 For a full report of the case see 
Sen. Doc. No. 119, Fifty-eighth Cong, Third Sess. 

256 



THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES 

I can frankly tell the House that it is not the claims of the 
bondholders that bulk largest in the estimation of the govern- 
ment. I do not believe the government would ever have taken 
the strong measures to which they have been driven if it had 
not been for the attacks by Venezuela upon the lives, the 
liberty, and the property of British subjects. 

During the same discussion, Mr. Norman said : 

This idea of the British fleet being employed to collect the 
debts of foreign bondholders is assuredly a mistaken one. It 
was said by Wellington once that the British army did not 
exist for the purpose of collecting certain debts. It is still 
more true of the British fleet that it does not exist for the 
purpose of collecting debts of bondholders. People who lend 
money to South American republics know what the security 
is and what they are likely to get in return, and they ought 
not to have the British fleet at their backs. 

To this Mr. Balfour, the prime minister, replied : 

I do not deny — in fact, I freely admit — that bondholders 
may occupy an international position which may require 
international action ; but I look upon such international action 
with the gravest doubt and suspicion, and I doubt whether 
we have in the past ever gone to war for the bondholders, 
for those of our countrymen who have lent money to a 
foreign government; and I confess that I should be very 
sorry to see that made a practice in this country. 

Against President Roosevelt's contention that the 
coercion of an American state was not contrary to the 
Monroe Doctrine, provided that it did " not take the 
form of acquisition of territory by any non-American 
power," Signor Drago, Minister of Foreign Relations 
of the Argentine Republic, vigorously protested in a 
note dated December 29, 1902. 13 This note contained 

II Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 1. 

257 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

a restatement of the " Calvo doctrine," which takes 
its name from a celebrated Argentine publicist. In 
his well-known book on international law, Calyocon- 
tends that a state has no right to resort Toarmed 
intervention for the purpose of collecting the private 
claims of its citizens against another state. This doc- 
trine, which has received the indorsement of most 
of the Latin-American states, was applied to public 
bonds in the note above referred to and is now usually- 
known as the " Drago doctrine." Signor Drago held, 
first, " that the capitalist who lends his money to a 
foreign state always takes into account the resources 
of the country and the probability, greater or less, 
that the obligations contracted will be fulfilled without 
delay. All governments thus enjoy different credit 
according to their degree of civilization and culture, 
and their conduct in business transactions," and these 
conditions are measured before making loans. Sec- 
ond, a fundamental principle of international law is 
the entity and equality of all states. Both the acknowl- 
edgment of the debt and the payment must be left 
to the nation concerned " without diminution of its 
inherent rights as a sovereign entity." 
He said further: 

As these are the sentiments of justice, loyalty, and honor 
which animate the Argentine people and have always inspired 
its policy, your excellency will understand that it has felt 
alarm at the knowledge that the failure of Venezuela to 
meet the payment of its public debt is given as one of the 
determining causes of the capture of its fleet, the bombard- 
ment of one of its ports and the establishment of a rigorous 
blockade along its shores. If such proceedings were to be 
definitely adopted they would establish a precedent dangerous 
to the security and the peace of the nations of this part of 

258 



THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES 

America. The collection of loans by military means implies 
territorial occupation to make them effective, and territorial 
occupation signifies a suppression or subordination of the 
governments of the countries on which it is imposed. 



The doctrine so ably expounded by Dr. Drago 
attracted much attention during the next few years 
and was given a place on the program of the Third 
Pan American Conference held at Rio de Janeiro in 
July, 1906. Dr. Drago had made his proposal as 
" a statement of policy " for the states of the American 
continents to adopt. After full discussion the Rio 
Conference decided to recommend to the governments 
represented " that they consider the point of inviting 
the Second Peace Conference at The Hague to con- 
sider the question of the compulsory collection of pub- 
lic debts; and, in general, means tending to diminish 
between nations conflicts having an exclusively pecu- 
niary origin" 14 

As a result of this action the United States modified 
the regular program prepared by Russia for the Sec- 
ond Hague Conference by reserving the right to in- 
troduce the question of an " agreement to observe 
certain limitations in the use of force in collecting 
public debts accruing from contracts." General Hor- 
ace Porter presented to The Hague Conference a res- 
olution providing that the use of force for the col- 
lection of contract debts should not be permitted until 
the justice of the claim and the amount of the debt 
should have been determined by arbitration. A large 
number of reservations were introduced, but the fol- 
lowing resolutions were finally adopted by the votes 

14 Am. Journal of Int. Law, Vol. II, p. 78. 

259 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

of thirty-nine states, with five states abstaining from 
voting : 

The contracting powers agree not to have recourse to 
armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from 
the government of one country by the government of another 
country as being due to its nationals. 

This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the 
debtor state refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbi- 
tration, or, after accepting the offer, prevents any " com- 
promis " from being agreed on, or, after the arbitration, 
fails to submit to the award. 15 



16 Am. Journal of Int. Law, Vol. II, Supplement, p. 82. 



260 



CHAPTER VII 

The Advance of the United States in the 
Caribbean 

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Spain 
was still in possession of all the shores of the Carib- 
bean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, but the downfall 
of her vast colonial empire was rapidly approaching. 
By the secret treaty of San Ildefonso she agreed to 
cede Louisiana back to France, and in 1803 Napoleon 
sold the entire province to the United States. This 
was our first acquisition of territory on the Gulf of 
Mexico, and it insured a free outlet for the vast region 
of the Mississippi valley. The boundaries of the 
province were indefinite, and there ensued a long con- 
troversy with Spain as to whether Louisiana included 
West Florida on the one hand and Texas on the 
other. These questions were finally adjusted by the 
Florida treaty of 1819, which ceded both East and 
West Florida to the United States and fixed the west- 
ern boundary of Louisiana on the Gulf at the Sabine 
river. By this treaty the United States gained un- 
disputed possession of the region extending from 
Mobile bay to the Mississippi, but abandoned the claim 
to Texas. 

It was not many years before American settlers 
began pouring into Texas and came into conflict with 
the government of Mexico, which had by this time 
become independent of Spain. There followed the 

261 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

war of independence and the establishment of the 
Republic of Texas in 1836. Texas promptly applied 
for admission to the United States, but mainly through 
the opposition of the Abolitionists she was kept wait- 
ing for nine years. The new republic was recognized 
by the United States and by the principal powers of 
Europe, but Mexico refused to concede independence. 
Texas was thus in constant danger of attack from 
Mexico and unable to secure admission to the Ameri- 
can Union. In April, 1844, a treaty providing for 
the annexation of Texas was submitted to the Senate 
by President Tyler, but it was rejected by that body. 
Under these circumstances the public men of Texas 
lent a ready ear to British and French intrigues. Great 
Britain wished to encourage the development of Texas 
as a cotton-growing country from which she could 
draw a large enough supply to make her independent 
of the United States. If Texas should thus devote 
herself to the production of cotton as her chief ex- 
port crop, she would naturally adopt a free trade 
policy and thus create a considerable market for 
British goods. Great Britain, therefore, consistently 
opposed the annexation of Texas by the United States 
and entered into negotiations with France, Mexico, 
and the Republic of Texas for the express purpose 
of preventing it. Lord Aberdeen proposed that the 
four powers just mentioned should sign a diplomatic 
act, or perpetual treaty, securing to Texas recognition 
from Mexico and peace, but preventing her from ever 
acquiring territory beyond the Rio Grande or joining 
the American Union. While the United States would 
be invited to unite in this act, it was not expected 
that the government of that country would agree to 

262 







THE C 




tiAN 



UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

it. Despairing of being received into the American 
Union, Texas was apparently ready to accept the 
British proposal, but Lord Aberdeen's plan was de- 
feated by the refusal of Mexico to recognize under 
any conditions the independence of Texas. Aberdeen 
was willing to coerce Mexico and, if need be, to fight 
the United States, but Louis Philippe was not willing 
to go that far. Meanwhile the Texas question had 
become the leading political issue in the United States. 
The Democratic platform of 1844 demanded "the re- 
annexation of Texas at the earliest practicable period," 
and on this platform Polk was elected President. 
Tyler, however, did not wait for his successor to 
carry out this mandate of the American people, but 
in the last days of his administration pashed through 
Congress a joint resolution providing for the admis- 
sion of Texas. 1 

Mexico promptly severed diplomatic relations with 
the United States. As Mexico had never recognized 
the independence of Texas, she had of course never 
agreed upon any boundary with the new republic. 
This was a matter which had to be adjusted and there 
were also a number of private claims of American 
citizens against the government of Mexico which that 
government refused to settle. President Polk took 
up both questions with characteristic vigor, and on 
the refusal of Mexico to receive a special minister 
sent by him for the purpose of discussing these ques- 
tions, he ordered General Taylor to occupy the dis- 
puted area between the Nueces river and the Rio 

1 E. D. Adams, " British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1845 " 
(1910); Justin H. Smith, "The Annexation of Texas" (1911) and "The 
War with Mexico," 2 vols. (1919); Diplomatic Correspondence of the R©» 
public of Texas, edited by G. P. Garrison (Annual Reports, Am. Hist. Ass'a* 
1907, 1908). 

263 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

Grande. Thus began the Mexican War, which es- 
tablished the boundary of the United States on the 
Rio Grande and added the vast region of New Mex- 
ico and California to the Union. Here the tide of 
American expansion to the South was stayed for a 
full half century. 

With the decline of the Spanish power Great Britain 
had succeeded to naval supremacy in the Caribbean. 
As has been related in previous chapters, the United 
States and Great Britain long regarded Cuba with 
jealous eyes and had a controversy lasting for half 
a century over the control of the proposed Isthmian 
canal. Secretary Seward at the close of the civil 
war sought to strengthen the position of the United 
States in the Caribbean by the acquisition of Santo 
Domingo and the Danish West Indies. In 1867 a 
treaty was concluded with Denmark providing for 
the cession of the islands of St. Thomas and St. John 
for $7,500,000, on condition that the inhabitants 
should by popular vote give their consent. In under- 
taking these negotiations the United States was in- 
fluenced on the one hand by the desire to acquire a 
naval base, and on the other by the fear that these 
islands might fall into the hands of one of the greater 
European powers. The plebiscite in St. John and St. 
Thomas was overwhelmingly in favor of the cession, 
and the treaty was promptly ratified by the Danish 
Rigsdag, but the Senate of the United States took 
no action until March, 1870, when Senator Sumner 
presented an adverse report from the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the treaty was rejected. 

In 1867 Admiral Porter and Mr. F. W. Seward, 
the assistant secretary of state, were sent to Santo 

264 



UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

Domingo for the purpose of securing the lease of 
Samana bay as a naval station. Their mission was 
not successful, but the following year the president 
of the Dominican Republic sent an agent to Wash- 
ington proposing annexation and requesting the United 
States to occupy Samana bay at once. In his annual 
message of December 8, 1868, President Johnson ad- 
vocated the annexation of Santo Domingo and a joint 
resolution to that effect was introduced into the House, 
but it was tabled without debate by an overwhelming 
vote. President Grant became much interested in this 
scheme, and soon after entering the White House he 
sent one of his private secretaries, Colonel Babcock, 
to the island to report on the condition of affairs. 
Babcock negotiated a treaty for the annexation of 
the Dominican Republic, and another for the lease 
of Samana bay. As Colonel Babcock was without 
diplomatic authority of any kind, the Cabinet re- 
ceived the treaties in silent amazement, and Hamilton 
Fish, who was secretary of state, spoke of resigning, 
but Grant persuaded him to remain in office. The 
annexation treaty was submitted to the Senate in Jan- 
uary, 1870, but encountered violent opposition, espe- 
cially from Sumner, Chairman of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations. It was finally rejected June 30 
by vote of 28 to 28. 

The advance of the United States into the Caribbean 
was thus delayed until the Spanish War. As a result 
of that conflict the United States acquired Porto Rico 
and a protectorate over Cuba. The real turning-point 
in the recent history of the West Indies was the Hay- 
Pauncefote treaty of 1901, under the terms of which 
Great Britain relinquished her claim to an equal voice 

265 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

with the United States in the control of an Isthmian 
canal on which she had insisted for half a century. 
While the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was limited in terms 
to the canal question, it was in reality of much wider 
significance. It amounted in effect to the transfer- 
ence of naval supremacy in the West Indies to the 
United States, for since its signature Great Britain 
has withdrawn her squadron from this important stra- 
tegic area. So marked was Great Britain's change 
of attitude toward the United States at this time that 
some writers have concluded that a secret treaty of 
alliance was made between the two countries in 1897. 
The absurdity of such a statement was pointed out 
by Senator Lodge several years ago. England's 
change of attitude is not difficult to understand. For 
one hundred years after the battle of Trafalgar Eng- 
land had pursued the policy of maintaining a navy 
large enough to meet all comers. With the rapid 
growth of the navies of Russia, Japan, and Germany 
during the closing years of the nineteenth century, 
England realized that she could no longer pursue a 
policy of isolation. Our acquisition of the Philip- 
pines, the Hawaiian Islands, and Porto Rico and our 
determination to build an Isthmian canal made a large 
American navy inevitable. Great Britain realized, 
therefore, that she would have to cast about for 
future allies. It was on considerations of this kind 
that she signed the Hay-Pauncefote treaty with the 
United States in 1901, and the defensive alliance with 
Japan in 1902. In view of the fact that the United 
States was bent on carrying out the long deferred 
canal scheme, Great Britain realized that a further 
insistence on her rights under the Clayton-Bulwer 

266 



UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

treaty would lead to friction and possible conflict. 
She wisely decided, therefore, to recede from the 
position which she had held for half a century and 
to give us a free hand in the acquisition and control 
of the canal at whatever point we might choose to 
build it. In signing the Hay-Pauncefote treaty she 
gracefully recognized the fact that the United States 
had paramount interests in the Caribbean which it 
was unwise for her to contest. Since the signature 
of that treaty American supremacy in this area has 
not been seriously questioned. 

The determination to build a canal not only ren- 
dered inevitable the adoption of a policy of naval 
supremacy in the Caribbean sea, but led to the formu- 
lation of new political policies to be applied in the 
zone of the Caribbean — what Admiral Chester calls 
the larger Panama Canal Zone — that is, the West 
Indies, Mexico and Central America, Colombia and 
Venezuela. The policies referred to included the es- 
tablishment of protectorates, the supervision of 
finances, the control of all naval routes, the acquisi- 
tion of naval stations, and the policing and admin- 
istration of disorderly countries. 

The advance of the United States in the Caribbean 
since the Spanish War has been rapid. The acqui- 
sition of Porto Rico and the establishment of a pro- 
tectorate over Cuba were the natural outcome of that 
struggle. In 1903 we acquired the canal zone under 
circumstances already described. The following year 
President Roosevelt established financial supervision 
over the Dominican Republic. In 191 5 the United 
States landed marines in Haiti and a treaty was soon 
drafted under which we assumed financial supervision 

267 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

and administrative control over the affairs of that 
country. In 191 6 we acquired by treaty from Nica- 
ragua an exclusive right of way for a canal through 
her territory and the lease of a naval station on Fon- 
seca bay, and in 19 17 we acquired by treaty from 
Denmark her holdings in the West Indies known as 
the Virgin Islands. These successive steps will be 
considered in detail. 

The methods employed by President Roosevelt in 
the acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone described 
in a previous chapter caused indignation and alarm 
throughout Latin America and created strained rela- 
tions with Colombia. The Colombian government 
refused to recognize the independence of the Republic 
of Panama and demanded that her claim to Panama 
as well as her interests in the canal should be sub- 
mitted to arbitration. Colombia claimed that Presi- 
dent Roosevelt had misinterpreted the treaty of 1846, 
which established mutual obligations between the 
United States and Colombia with reference to the 
isthmus, by construing its provisions as obligations 
to the world at large against Colombia. As the United 
States had always advocated the submission to arbi- 



■1 



tration of questions involving the construction of 
treaties, the demand of Colombia proved embarrass- 
ing, but both Secretary Hay and his successor, Sec- 
retary Root, rejected the demand for arbitration on 
the ground that the questions involved were of a 
political nature. 2 

In January, 1909, shortly before the close of the 
Roosevelt administration, Secretary Root undertook 



"House Doc. No. 1444, Sixty-second Cong., Third Sess., pp. a, 3; 
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., pp. 47, 48. 

268 



UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

to reestablish friendly relations with Colombia through 
the negotiation in the city of Washington of three 
treaties, one between the United States and the Re- 
public of Colombia, one between the United States 
and the Republic of Panama, and one between Colom- 
bia and Panama. In the treaty between Colombia 
and Panama the Republic of Colombia recognized 
fully the independence of Panama, and the Republic 
of Panama made an assignment to Colombia of the 
first ten installments of $250,000, the amount due 
annually to the Republic of Panama from the United 
States as rental for the canal. According to the treaty 
between the United States and the Republic of Pan- 
ama, concluded November 18, 1903, the payment of 
this annual sum was to begin nine years from date. 
It was now agreed that the first annual payment 
should be regarded as due four years from the ex- 
change of ratifications of the said treaty, so that of 
the $2,500,000 to be paid to Colombia, half would 
be paid by the United States and half by Panama. 
In the new treaty between the United States and Pan- 
ama the necessary modification of the treaty of 1903 
was made so as to permit of this assignment of the 
first ten installments to Colombia. In the treaty be- 
tween the United States and Colombia the most im- 
portant provision was as follows: 

The Republic of Colombia shall have liberty at all times 
to convey through the ship canal now in course of construc- 
tion by the United States across the Isthmus of Panama the 
troops, materials for war, and ships of war of the Republic 
of Colombia, without paying any duty to the United States; 
even in the case of an international war between Colombia 
and another country. 

269 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

It was further provided that the products of the soil 
and industry of Colombia should be admitted to the 
canal zone subject only to such duty as would be 
payable on similar products of the United States 
under similar conditions, and Colombian mails were 
to have free passage through the canal zone on pay- 
ment of such duties or charges as were laid on the 
mails of the United States. 3 

These tripartite treaties were of course to stand 
or fall together. The United States and Panama 
promptly ratified the agreements to which they were 
parties, but Colombia rejected the arrangement with 
indignation. In fact, when the terms of the settle- 
ment were made public, the Colombian adminstration 
that urged their acceptance was overthrown, and the 
Colombian envoy who participated in the negotiation 
of the treaties was forced to flee from the country 
with an indignant mob at his heels. Colombia was 
not to be appeased by the paltry sum of $2,500,000. 

The Taft administration made repeated efforts to 
placate Colombia, but without success. On Septem- 
ber 30, 1912, Mr. Du Bois, the American minister 
to Colombia, submitted to Secretary Knox an inter- 
esting review of the whole question in the course of 
which, after referring to the friendly relations that 
had so long subsisted between the two countries, he 
said: 

Nine years ago this was changed suddenly and unex- 
pectedly when President Roosevelt denied to Colombia the 
right to land her troops upon her own soil to supress a 
threatened revolt and maintain a sovereignty guaranteed 
by treaty stipulations. The breach came and it has been 

1 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. i, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., pp. 24-34. 

270 



UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

growing wider since that hour. By refusing to allow 
Colombia to uphold her sovereign rights over a territory 
where she had held dominion for eighty years, the friendship 
of nearly a century disappeared, the indignation of every 
Colombian, and millions of other Latin-Americans, was 
aroused and is still most intensely alive. The confidence and 
trust in the justice and fairness of the United States, so long 
manifested, has completely vanished, and the maleficent in- 
fluence of this condition is permeating public opinion in all 
Latin-American countries, a condition which, if remedial 
measures are not invoked, will work inestimable harm 
throughout the Western Hemisphere.* 

Mr. Du Bois reported that on inquiry of promi- 
nent Colombians of the causes of the rejection of 
the Root proposals he received replies to the follow- 
ing effect: 

Five years after President Roosevelt had taken Panama 
from us with rank injustice, your government, still under 
his chief magistracy, offered us a paltry $2,500,000 if Co- 
lombia would recognize the independence of her revolted 
province, fix our frontier at a further loss of territory, open 
all our ports free to the refuge of vessels employed in the 
canal enterprise, and exempt them from anchorage or ton- 
nage dues, renounce our rights to all of our contracts and 
concessions relating to the construction and operation of the 
canal or railroad across the isthmus, release Panama from 
obligation for the payment of any part of our external debt, 
much of which was incurred in the interest of Panama, and 
enter into negotiations for the revision of the treaty of 1846, 
which five years before had been openly violated by the 
United States in their failure to help maintain the sovereignty 
over the rebellious province which they had solemnly guar- 
anteed. The reply was to this, banishment of our minister 
who negotiated the treaty, and all South America applauded 
our attitude." 



* Sen. Ex. Doc. No. r, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., p. 35. 
6 Ibid., p. 41. 

271 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

Mr. Du Bois then proceeded to state at length Co- 
lombia's claims which he summarized as follows : 
" Panama Railroad annuities, $16,000,000; value of 
railroad, $16,446,942; Panama Canal rights, $17,500,- 
000; cost of Costa Rican boundary arbitration, $200,- 
000; total, $50,446,942. [The total should be $50,- 
146,942.] Besides this sum, Colombia has lost the 
Province of Panama, whose value cannot be readily 
estimated." 6 

In conclusion he urged the importance of a speedy 
adjustment of the differences with Colombia in the 
following words: 

South America is advancing along commercial lines with 
giant strides. The character of the future relations of the 
United States with that country will be of signal importance. 
Friendly intercourse with all Latin America should be care- 
fully developed and maintained, and especially is this im- 
portant with Colombia, which borders the isthmus, has 
fine ports on both oceans, and is destined to become an 
influential factor in the political and commercial life 
of South America, especially in all countries bordering 
on the Caribbean sea. To approach Colombia in a con- 
ciliatory spirit and seek a renewal of her ancient friendship 
would not only be a wise and just move on the part of the 
United States, but as Colombia and all South and Central 
America firmly believe that the government of the United 
States was unjust in the Panama incident, from which has 
come infinite distress to Colombia, it would be a benevolent 
and fraternal act, and the time to move is the present, before 
the canal opens and while the public sentiment of both coun- 
tries is in harmony with the movement/ 

At the time that the above report on relations with 
Colombia was prepared by Mr. Du Bois he was in 

• Sen. Ex. Doc. No. i, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., p. 44. 
T Ibid. 

2y2 



UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

this country, having come home to confer with the 
Department of State as to the program to be fol- 
lowed in the settlement of the differences with Colom- 
bia. On his return to Bogota, Mr. Du Bois sub- 
mitted the following proposals to the Colombian gov- 
ernment: (i) ratification of the Root treaties, involv- 
ing the payment to Colombia of the first ten install- 
ments of the annual rental of the canal zone amount- 
ing to $2,500,000; (2) the payment of $10,000,000 by 
the United States to Colombia for the right to build 
an interoceanic canal by the Atrato route and for the 
lease of the islands of Old Providence and St. An- 
drews as coaling stations; (3) the good offices of the 
United States on behalf of Colombia in bringing about 
an adjustment of the boundary line between Colombia 
and Panama; (4) the submission to arbitration of the 
claims of Colombia to reversionary rights in the Pan- 
ama Railroad assumed by the United States under 
Article XXII of the treaty of 1903 between the United 
States and Panama, estimated by Mr. Taft's secretary 
of war at over $16,000,000; and (5) the granting of 
preferential rights to Colombia in the use of the 
Panama Canal. SK 

The Colombian government promptly rejected these J 
proposals and in reply demanded " arbitration of the 
whole question of Panama or a direct proposition 
on the part of the United States to give Colombia 
compensation for all the moral, physical, and financial 
losses which she sustained as a result of the separa- 
tion of Panama." The Colombian minister declared : 

Should Colombia grant any territorial privileges to the 
United States after the wrong that country has inflicted upon 
this republic, it would result in intense agitation and possible 

273 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

revolution. It seems as though your people have never 
fully realized the enormity of the wrong the United States 
has perpetrated against the Colombian people. 

Mr. Du Bois then asked whether Colombia would 
accept $10,000,000, the good offices of. the United 
States in settling the differences with Panama, arbi- 
tration of the reversionary rights in the Panama Rail- 
road, and preferential rights in the canal, without 
granting to the United States any privileges or con- 
cessions whatever. Receiving a negative reply to this 
proposal, Mr. Du Bois, acting on his own responsi- 
bility, then inquired informally whether $25,000,000 
without options of any kind would satisfy Colombia. 
The answer was that Colombia would accept nothing 
but the arbitration of the whole Panama question. 
Mr. Du Bois was instructed February 20, 1913, to stop 
negotiations. In reporting the matter to the President, 
Secretary Knox said that Colombia seemed determined 
to treat with the incoming Democratic administration. 8 

When the Wilson administration came in, Secre- 
tary Bryan took up the negotiations with Colombia 
where Knox dropped them, and concluded a treaty 
according to the terms of which the United States 
was to express " sincere regret that anything should 
have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of 
cordial friendship that had so long subsisted between 
the two nations," and to pay Colombia $25,000,000. 
The treaty further granted Colombia the same prefer- 
ential rights in the use of the canal which the Taft 
administration had proposed, and in return Colombia 
agreed to recognize the independence of Panama and 
to accept a boundary line laid down in the treaty. 

* Sen. Ex. Doc. No. i, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., pp. 53-79. 

274 



UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

This treaty was submitted to the Senate June 16, 
1914. As soon as its terms were made public ex- 
President Roosevelt denounced it as blackmail, and 
wrote a letter to the chairman of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs requesting to be heard be- 
fore any action was taken on the treaty. During the 
first session of the Sixty-sixth Congress in 19 19 the 
Colombian treaty was reported from the Committee 
on Foreign Relations with important amendments. 
Article I, containing expressions of regret on the part 
of the United States for the events that had taken 
place on the isthmus, was entirely stricken out. The 
clause giving Colombia the right to transport through 
the canal its troops, materials of war, and ships of 
war, " even in case of war between Colombia and 
another country," was amended by the elimination 
of the words in quotations. The sum of $25,000,000, 
instead of being paid in cash, was to be paid in five 
annual installments. The Senate refused, however, I 
to give its consent to the ratification of the treaty 
even in this form, and it is understood that it was 
proposed to cut the payment to Colombia down to 
$15,000,000. 

A great nation like the United States, which has 
always professed to be guided in international ques- 
tions by high standards of justice and morality, can- 
not afford to delay indefinitely the settlement of a 
dispute of this kind with a weak nation like Colombia.; ■ 
President Roosevelt's action in the Panama matter, 
made a bad impression throughout Latin America and 
caused our policy in the Caribbean to be regarded 
with grave suspicion. As to Colombia's rights in 
the matter, Secretary Bryan made the following state- 

275 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

ment in his argument before the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations in support of the treaty : 

It is contended by some that the action taken by the United 
States was based upon the necessities of the case, and those 
necessities, as stated by those who take this position are, that 
Colombia was not able to build the canal herself and was 
not willing to sell to the United States upon reasonable terms 
the right to build the canal. Those who take this position 
put the United States in the attitude of exercising the right 
of eminent domain in the interest of the world's commerce; 
but the exercise of the right of eminent domain does not 
relieve those who exercise it of liability for actual damages 
suffered. Take, for illustration, the condemning of a block 
of ground for a public building. Suppose that every lot 
owner excepting one is willing to sell his land to the govern- 
ment at its market value, but that one of the lot owners, 
whose lot is necessary to the erection of the building, asks 
more than the land is worth. The government proceeds to 
condemn the property, but it does not attempt to escape from 
paying what the land is actually worth, and the actual value 
of the property is not reduced one dollar by any effort that 
the owner may make to obtain for it more than it is worth. 
If it is contended that the price offered by the United States 
prior to Panama's separation was a reasonable one, and that 
Colombia ought to have accepted it, that valuation cannot be 
reduced merely because Colombia was not willing to accept 
the offer. This illustration is based upon the theory adopted 
by those who say that Colombia was entirely in the wrong 
in refusing to accept the offer made by the United States, 
but this theory, it will be remembered, is disputed by the 
people of Colombia, who defend the position their govern- 
ment then took and, as has been said before, they have ever 
since asked that the controversy be arbitrated by some im- 
partial tribunal." 

In 1904 President Roosevelt made a radical de- 
parture from the traditional policy of the United 

• Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., pp. 87-88. 

276 



UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

States in proposing that we should assume the finan- . 
cial administration of the Dominican Republic in 
order to prevent certain European powers from re- 
sorting to the forcible collection of debts due their 
subjects. On September 12, 1904, Minister Dawson 
reported to the State Department that the debt of 
Santo Domingo was $32,280,000, the estimated rev- 
enues from customs receipts $1,850,000, and the pro- 
posed budget for current expenses $1,300,000, leav- 
ing only $550,000 with which to meet payments of in- 
terest, then accruing and in arrears, amounting to 
$2,600,000. About $22,000,000 of this debt was due 
to European creditors. Most of this indebtedness had 
been incurred by revolutionary leaders who had at 
various times taken forcible possession of the govern- 
ment and hastened to raise all the money they could 
by the sale of bonds, leaving the responsibility with 
their successors. The European creditors of Santo 
Domingo were pressing for the recognition of their 
claims. Germany seemed especially determined to 
force a settlement of her demands, and it was well 
known that Germany had for years regarded the Mon- 
roe Doctrine as the main hindrance in the way of 
her acquiring a foothold in Latin America. The only 
effective method of collecting the interest on the for- 
eign debt appeared to be the seizure and adminis- 
tration of the Dominican custom-houses by some for- 
eign power or group of foreign powers. President 
Roosevelt foresaw that such an occupation of the cus- 
tom-houses would, in view of the large debt, con- 
stitute the occupation of American territory by Euro- 
pean powers for an indefinite period of time, and 
would therefore be a violation of the Monroe Doc- 

277 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

trine. He had before him also the results of a some- 
what similar financial administration of Egypt under- 
taken jointly by England and France in 1878, and 
after Arabi's revolt continued by England alone, with 
the result that Egypt soon became a possession of the 
British Crown to almost as great a degree as if it 
had been formally annexed. President Roosevelt con- 
cluded, therefore, that where it was necessary to place 
a bankrupt American republic in the hands of a re- 
ceiver, the United States must undertake to act as 
receiver and take over the administration of its 
finances. 

The policy that he was about to adopt was stated 
as follows in his annual message of December 6, 
1904: 

Any country whose people conduct themselves well can 
count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that 
it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency 
in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its 
obligations, it need fear no interference from the United 
States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results 
in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may 
in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention 
by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere, the 
adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine 
may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant 
cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an 
international police power. 

About the same time Minister Dawson was directed 
by Secretary Hay to suggest to the Dominican govern- 
ment that it request the United States to take charge 
of its customs. As the Dominican government saw 
no other way out of its difficulties, it responded to 

278 



UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

this suggestion, and on February 4, 1905, a protocol 
was signed by Mr. Dawson and the Dominican for- 
eign minister which provided that the United States 
should guarantee the territorial integrity of the Do- 
minican Republic, take charge of its custom-houses, 
administer its finances, and settle its obligations, for- 
eign as well as domestic. In calling the new agree- 
ment a " protocol " instead of a " treaty," the Presi- 
dent had probably not intended to submit it to the 
Senate, but the proposal to depart so radically from 
our past policy created so much criticism that the 
Senate was finally asked to ratify the protocol in reg- 
ular form. This they failed to do, but the President 
did not propose to be thwarted in this way. As the 
Senate would not sanction his appointment of a re- 
ceiver of customs for Santo Domingo, he drafted a 
modus vivendi, under the terms of which the Presi- 
dent of the Dominican Republic appointed a receiver 
of customs named unofficially by President Roosevelt, 
who proceeded to administer the affairs of the re- 
public under the protection of the United States navy, 
whose ships the President could as commander-in- 
chief order wherever he pleased. The President's 
course met with determined opposition both in and 
out of Congress, but as he was bent on having his 
way and continued to carry out his policy without 
the sanction of the Senate, that body finally decided 
that it would be best to give the arrangement a definite 
legal status. On February 25, 1907, the Senate agreed 
to the ratification of a revised treaty which omitted 
the territorial-guarantee clause, but provided that the 
President of the United States should appoint a gen- 
eral receiver of Dominican customs and such assist- 

279 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

ants as he might deem necessary; that the govern- 
ment of the United States should afford them such 
protection as might be necessary for the performance 
of their duties; and that until the bonded debt should 
be paid in full, the Dominican government would not 
increase its debt except with the consent of the United 
States. In the meantime, under the interim arrange- 
ment, conditions in Santo Domingo had greatly im- 
proved, the customs receipts had nearly doubled, and 
the creditors had agreed to compromise their claims, 
so that the total debt at the time the above treaty 
was ratified amounted to not more than $ 17, 000,000. 10 
In spite of the criticism that President Roosevelt's 
policy encountered, the Taft administration not only 
continued it in Santo Domingo, but tried to extend 
it to Nicaragua and Honduras. The five republics 
of Central America had been for years in a state 
of political and economic disorder as the result of 
wars and revolutions. In 1906 there was a war be- 
tween Guatemala and Salvador, in which Honduras 
became involved as the ally of Salvador. President 
Roosevelt invited President Diaz of Mexico to unite 
with him in an offer of mediation, which resulted 
in a peace conference held aboard the U. S. S. Marble- 
head. At this conference the belligerents agreed to 
suspend hostilities and to attend another conference 
for the purpose of drafting a general treaty of peace. 
The second conference was held at San Jose, Costa 
Rica, but President Zelaya of Nicaragua declined to 
send a representative because he was unwilling to 
recognize the right of the United States to intervene 

10 Foreign Relations. 1905, p. 298; Moore. " Digest of Int. Law," Vol. VI, 
pp. 518-529; Am. Journal of Int. Law, Vol. I, p. 287, and Documentary 
Supplement, p. 231. 

280 






UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

in Central American affairs. At this time Zelaya was 
systematically interfering in the internal affairs of 
the other Central American states, and exercised such 
complete control over the government of Honduras 
that Guatemala and Salvador were endeavoring to stir 
up revolutions against him in that state and in Nica- 
ragua. War was about to break out in the summer 
of 1907 when President Roosevelt and President Diaz 
again intervened diplomatically and persuaded the Cen- 
tral American governments to suspend warlike prepa- 
rations and to attend a conference in the city of 
Washington. In November the delegates of the five 
Central American states met in the Bureau of Ameri- 
can Republics and were addressed by Secretary Root 
and the Mexican ambassador. The delegates adopted 
a general treaty of peace, providing for the settlement 
of existing differences and for the establishment of 
a Central American court of justice composed of five 
judges, one to be elected by the legislature of each 
state. The five republics agreed to submit to this tri- 
bunal all controversies of whatever nature that might 
arise between them which could not be settled through 
ordinary diplomatic channels. 

But President Zelaya of Nicaragua, who still con- 
trolled Honduras, continued his interference in the 
affairs of the other republics by encouraging revolu- 
tionary movements and sending out filibustering ex- 
peditions. He was also hostile to the Central Ameri- 
can court of justice, and it became evident that there 
was little chance of permanent peace as long as 
Zelaya remained in power. When, therefore, in Oc- 
tober, 1909, members of the conservative party started 
a revolution at Bluefields against Zelaya's government, 

281 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

the movement was regarded with sympathy in the 
other Central American republics and in Washington. 
Conditions became so intolerable that many people 
in Nicaragua and Honduras appealed to the United 
States to intervene for the purpose of restoring order. 
President Diaz of Mexico was friendly to Zelaya 
and informed the United States that he did not care 
to take any further action. This brought to an end 
the cooperative efforts of the two governments and 
thereafter the United States had to act alone. Noth- 
ing was done, however, until two Americans were 
executed by Zelaya's order in November, 1909. As 
a result of these executions, which were without legal 
excuse and attended by barbarous cruelties, President 
Taft promptly severed diplomatic relations with 
Zelaya's government. In a dispatch to the Nicaraguan 
charge, December 1, 1909, Secretary Knox said: 

Since the Washington conventions of 1907, it is notorious 
that President Zelaya has almost continuously kept Central 
America in tension or turmoil; that he has repeatedly and 
flagrantly violated the provisions of the conventions, and, 
by a baleful influence upon Honduras, whose neutrality the 
conventions were to assure, has sought to discredit those 
sacred international obligations, to the great detriment of 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala, whose governments 
meanwhile appear to have been able patiently to strive for 
the loyal support of the engagements so solemnly undertaken 
at Washington under the auspices of the United States and 
Mexico. 

He added that under the regime of President Zelaya 
republican institutions had ceased to exist in Nicaragua 
except in name, that public opinion and the press had 
been throttled, and that prison had been the reward of 

282 



UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

any tendency to real patriotism. The government of 
the United States was convinced, he said, " that the 
revolution represents the ideals and the will of a ma- 
jority of the Nicaraguan people more faithfully than 
does the government of President Zelaya." " 

This note caused the speedy downfall of Zelaya's 
government. He tried to perpetuate his party in 
power by resigning the presidency to Dr. Madriz, 
but President Taft refused to recognize the Madriz 
government, and a few months later it was over- 
thrown and the revolutionary party came into power, 
first under the presidency of Estrada and then under 
that of Adolf o Diaz. 

The revolution had paralyzed agriculture and com- 
merce and thrown the country into financial chaos. 
In October, 1910, the United States government sent 
Thomas C. Dawson to Managua to investigate con- 
ditions and to straighten out the political and financial 
affairs of Nicaragua. While he was engaged in this 
task, Secretary Knox negotiated at Washington two 
treaties, one between the United States and Honduras, 
signed January 10, 191 1, and a similar treaty between 
the United States and Nicaragua, signed June 6. 
These treaties were intended to place the two countries 
concerned under the financial supervision of the United 
States. They provided for the appointment in each 
case of a collector of customs approved by the Presi- 
dent of the United States, and made the customs re- 
ceipts responsible for loans to be advanced by Ameri- 
can bankers. The collectorship of customs was im- 
mediately established in Nicaragua without waiting 
for the ratification of the treaty by the Senate, and 

11 Foreign Relations, 1909, p. 455. 

283 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

through the efforts of the State Department American 
bankers made preliminary loans to the Nicaraguan 
government. When the Senate rejected the treaty, the 
bankers refused to make further loans, and the situa- 
tion was almost as bad as ever. In October, 191 1, 
General Mena, minister of war and head of a fac- 
tion of his own, was elected by the Assembly president 
of the republic, but as this was contrary to an agree- 
ment which had been made with Dawson, it did not 
meet with the approval of the United States, and 
President Diaz removed Mena from office and forced 
him to flee from the capital. Shortly afterwards Mena 
was taken seriously ill, and the opposition to President 
Diaz fell again under the control of Zelaya's fol- 
lowers. As President Diaz was unable to guarantee 
protection to the life and property of foreigners, he 
asked the United States for assistance. In answer to 
this request American marines were landed at Corinto 
and assumed control of the national railway which 
connected that port with the capital and the principal 
cities. The American minister made a public an- 
nouncement to the effect that the United States in- 
tended to keep open the routes of communication and 
to protect American life and property. This an- 
nouncement was a great blow to the revolutionists. 
Some of their leaders surrendered voluntarily to the 
American marines, while others were attacked and 
forced to surrender positions along the railroad which 
they insisted upon holding. In these operations seven 
American marines lost their lives. Since 1912 a 
legation guard of one hundred marines has been main- 
tained at the capital of Nicaragua and a warship has 
been stationed at Corinto. 

284 



UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

After the revolutionary movement was thus over- 
thrown, Secretary Knox negotiated a new treaty for 
the purpose of helping the Nicaraguan government 
out of the financial straits in which it found itself. 
Great Britain was threatening to force the payment 
of its claims and certain German interests, which were 
operating banana plantations in Costa Rica, were try- 
ing to secure from the Nicaraguan government a con- 
cession for the construction of a canal from the 
Great Lake to the Atlantic along the San Juan river. 
According to the terms of the Knox treaty the United 
States was to pay Nicaragua $3,000,000 in return 
for an exclusive right of way for a canal through 
her territory, a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca, 
and the lease for ninety-nine years of the Great Corn 
and Little Corn Islands in the Caribbean. This treaty 
was submitted to the Senate February 26, 1913, but 
the close of the Taft administration was then at hand, 
and no action was taken. 

The Wilson administration followed the same pol- 
icy, however, and in July, 19 13, Secretary Bryan sub- 
mitted a third treaty with Nicaragua containing the 
provisions of the second Knox treaty and in addition 
certain provisions of the Piatt Amendment which de- 
fines our protectorate over Cuba. This treaty aroused 
strong opposition in the other Central American 
States, and Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras filed 
formal protests with the United States government 
against its ratification on the ground that it would 
convert Nicaragua into a protectorate of the United 
States and thus defeat the long-cherished plan for a 
union of the Central American republics. They also 
claimed that the treaty infringed their own rights. 

285 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

In 1858 Costa Rica had been granted perpetual rights 
of free navigation in the lower part of the San Juan 
river, and Nicaragua had agreed to consult her before 
granting any concessions for the construction of an 
interoceanic canal. Salvador and Honduras objected 
to the establishment of a naval base in the Gulf of 
Fonseca in close proximity to their coasts. They 
also asserted proprietary rights in the Gulf of Fonseca, 
claiming that Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, as 
successors of the old Central American Federation, 
exercised joint ownership over the gulf. Efforts were 
made by the United States to arrive at a settlement 
with Costa Rica and Salvador on the basis of a money 
payment, but without success. Moreover, the Senate 
of the United States objected to the protectorate 
feature of the treaty and refused to ratify it, but the 
negotiations were renewed, and on August 5, 1914, 
a new treaty, which omits the provisions of the Piatt 
Amendment, was signed at Washington. This treaty, 
which was finally ratified by the Senate, February 18, 
19 1 6, grants to the United States in perpetuity the 
exclusive right to construct a canal by way of the 
San Juan river and Lake Nicaragua, and leases to 
the United States for ninety-nine years a naval base 
on the Gulf of Fonseca, and also the Great Corn 
and Little Corn Islands as coaling stations. The con- 
sideration for these favors was the sum of $3,000,000 
to be expended, with the approval of the Secretary 
of State of the United States, in paying the public 
debt of Nicaragua, and for other purposes to be 
agreed on by the two contracting parties. 

In consenting to the ratification of the treaty the 
Senate, in order to meet the objections raised by Costa 

286 



UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

Rica, Salvador, and Honduras, attached to their reso- 
lution of ratification the proviso " that nothing in said 
convention is intended to affect any existing right 
of any of the said states." This reservation did not 
satisfy Costa Rica and Salvador, who took their cases 
to the Central American Court of Justice, requesting 
that Nicaragua be enjoined from carrying out the 
provisions of the treaty. Nicaragua refused to be a 
party to the action, but the court nevertheless as- 
sumed jurisdiction. Its decision in the case of Costa 
Rica was announced September 30, 1916. It declared 
that Nicaragua had violated Costa Rica's rights, but, 
as the court had no jurisdiction over the United States, 
it declined to declare the treaty void. A similar de- 
cision in the case of Salvador was handed down on 
March 2, 19 17. 12 

Neither Nicaragua nor the United States has paid 
any attention to the decision of the Central American 
Court of Justice, which was set up under such favor- 
able auspices by the Washington conventions. As a 
matter of fact, the court had not fulfilled the ex- 
pectations of those who had been interested in its 
establishment, but it was unfortunate that it should 
have received its coup de grace from the United 
States. Furthermore, it has been charged that the 
State Department, under the Knox regime, exploited 
the situation in Central America for the benefit of 
American capitalists, and that the Wilson adminis- 
tration has for years maintained a minority party 
in power through the presence of a body of American 
marines at the capital and a warship at Corinto. On 
the other hand, it cannot be denied that as a result 

" D. G. Munro, " The Five Republics of Central America," p. 257. 

287 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

of American policy, Central America has been freer 
from wars and revolutions for a longer period than 
at any other time in its history. The better element of 
the population appears to be satisfied with the situa- 
tion. 13 

The treaty with the negro republic of Haiti, rati- 
fied by the Senate February 28, 19 16, carries the new 
Caribbean policies of the United States to the farthest 
limits short of actual annexation. Shortly before the 
outbreak of the European war, Haitian finances were 
in such bad shape as the result of internal disorders 
that there was grave danger of European intervention, 
and the United States was considering the question 
of acquiring supervision over the finances of the re- 
public. In June, 191 5, a crisis in the internal affairs 
of Haiti seemed imminent and, at the request of the 
State Department, Read-Admiral Caperton was or- 
dered to Haitian waters. Towards the latter part 
of July the government of President Guillaume was 
overthrown, and he and members of his cabinet 
took refuge in the French and Dominican legations. 
These buildings were entered by a , mob, Presi- 
dent Guillaume was slain at the gate of the French 
legation, his body cut in pieces, and dragged about 
the town. Admiral Caperton at once landed a force 
of marines at Port au Prince in order to protect the 
lives and property of foreigners. An additional force 
was brought from Guantanamo and the total number 
raised to two thousand and placed under the command 
of Colonel Waller. There was but slight resistance 
to the landing of the marines, but a few days later 

18 For recent and authoritative information on Central American affairs, 
see the volume by Dana G. Munro, " The Five Republics of Central 
America." (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1918.) 

288 






UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

a conflict occurred in which two Americans were 
killed. 14 On August 12 a new president was elected 
who cooperated with the American forces in their 
efforts to establish peace and order, and on September 
16 a treaty with the United States was signed at Port 
au Prince. This treaty provides for the establishment 
of a receivership of Haitian customs under the con- 
trol of the United States similar in most respects to 
that established over the Dominican Republic. It also 
provides for the appointment, on the nomination of 
the President of the United States, of a financial ad- 
viser, who shall assist in the settlement of the foreign 
debt and direct expenditures of the surplus for the 
development of the agricultural, mineral, and commer- 
cial resources of the republic. It provides further 
for a native constabulary under American officers ap- 
pointed by the President of Haiti upon nomination 
of the President of the United States. And it ex- 
tends to Haiti the main provisions of the Piatt Amend- 
ment. By controlling the internal financial adminis- 
tration of the government the United States hopes 
to remove all incentives for those revolutions which 
have in the past had for their object a raid on the 
public treasury, and by controlling the customs and 
maintaining order the United States hopes to avoid 
all possibility of foreign intervention. The treaty 
is to remain in force for a period of ten years and 
for another period of ten years if either party pre- 
sents specific reasons for continuing it on the ground 
that its purpose has not been fully accomplished. 

The latest acquisition of the United States in the 
Caribbean is that of the Danish West Indies, or Virgin 

** Secretary of the Navy, Annual Report 1915, pp. 15-17. 

289 



^ 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

Islands. Reference has already been made to the 
treaty negotiated by Secretary Seward in 1867 for the 
purchase of these islands, which was unfortunately 
rejected by the Senate. Another attempt at purchase 
was made by President Roosevelt in 1902. A treaty 
providing for the cession of the group to the United 
States was signed at Washington on January 24 of 
that year and approved by the Senate February 17, 
but this time the Danish Rigsdag refused to give its 
approval. President Roosevelt was moved by the con- 
sideration that the Danish Islands were of great stra- 
tegic importance in connection with the problem of 
guarding the approaches to the Panama canal. The 
commercial value of the islands is also great. More- 
over, the United States was confronted by the possi- 
bility of their falling under the control of Germany 
or some other European power, which might use them 
as a naval base. Had Germany been successful in 
the recent war, she might have forced Denmark to 
sell or cede the islands to her. In view of this pos- 
sibility, negotiations were taken up again with Den- 
mark in 19 16, and on August 4 Secretary Lansing 
concluded a treaty by which the United States ac- 
quired the islands of St. Thomas, St. John, and St. 
Croix, together with some adjacent small islands and 
rocks, for the sum of $25,000,000. This treaty was 
duly ratified by the Senate and the ratifications were 
exchanged January 17, 19 17. 

The rapid advance of the United States in the 
Caribbean, described in the preceding pages, naturally 
aroused the fears of the smaller Latin-American states 
and lent color to the charge that the United States 
had converted the Monroe Doctrine from a policy of 

290 



UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 

benevolent protection to one of imperialistic aggres- 
sion. As a matter of fact, the Monroe Doctrine has 
never been regarded by the United States as in any 
sense a self-denying declaration. President Monroe 
said that we should consider any attempt on the part 
of the European powers " to extend their system to 
any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our 
peace and safety." The primary object of the policy 
outlined by President Monroe was, therefore, the 
peace f and safety of the United States. The protec- 
tion of Latin-American states against European inter- 
vention was merely a means of protecting ourselves. 
While the United States thus undertook to prevent 
the encroachment of European powers in Latin Amer- 
ica, it has never admitted any limitation upon the pos- 
sibility of its own expansion in this region. The 
silence of the Monroe Doctrine on this question has 
been remedied to some extent by President Wilson, 
who, at the outset of his administration, gave the 
assurance that " the United States will never again 
seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." 
This declaration, followed by his refusal to be forced 
into war with Mexico, has done much to remove the 
suspicion with which our recent policies in the Carib- 
bean have been regarded by our Southern neighbors. 
His sincerity was further attested by his ready ac- 
ceptance of the proffered mediation of the ABC 
powers in the Mexican embroglio and by the encour- 
agement which he has given to the Pan American 
movement. 



291 



CHAPTER VIII 

Pan Americanism 

The Pan American movement, which has for its ob- 
ject the promotion of closer social, economic, financial, 
and political relations between the independent repub- 
lics of the Western Hemisphere, has attracted much at- 
tention in recent years. [The Pan American ideal is an 
old one, dating back, in fact, to the Panama Congress 
of 1826. The object of this congress was not very 
definitely stated in the call which was issued by Simon 
Bolivar, but his purpose was to secure the independ- 
ence and peace of the new Spanish-American repub- 
lics either through a permanent confederation or 
through a series of diplomatic congresses. Henry 
Clay, who was secretary of state at the time, was 
enthusiastically in favor of accepting the invitation ex- 
tended to the United States to participate in the con- 
gress. President Adams agreed, therefore, to the ac- 
ceptance of the invitation, but the matter was debated 
at great length in both House and Senate. In the 
Senate the debate was particularly acrimonious. The 
policy of the administration was denounced as dan- 
gerous, and it was asserted that a participation in the 
congress at Panama could be of no benefit to the 
United States and might be the means of involving us 
in international complications. One of the topics pro- 
posed for discussion was " the manner in which all 
colonization of European powers on the American 

292 



PAN AMERICANISM 

continent shall be restricted." The Senate Committee 
on Foreign Affairs objected strenuously to the United 
States in any way committing itself to guaranteeing 
the territory of any other American state. The slav- 
ery question also projected itself into the debate, 
mainly because the negro Republic of Haiti was to be 
represented and because most of the other states had 
proclaimed the emancipation of slaves. The Senate 
finally agreed to the nomination of Richard C. Ander- 
son, of Kentucky, and John Sergeant, of Pennsyl- 
vania, as envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipo- 
tentiary to the assembly of American nations at 
Panama, and Congress made the necessary appropria- 
tion. The delay proved fatal to the plan, however, for 
the American delegates did not reach Panama until 
after the congress had adjourned. 

fin view of the opposition which the plan encoun- 
tered in Congress, the instructions to the American 
delegates were very carefully drawn by Secretary Clay 
and their powers were strictly limited. They were 
cautioned against committing their government in any 
way to the establishment of " an amphictyonic council, 
invested with power finally to decide controversies be- 
tween the American states or to regulate in any re- 
spect their conduct. Such a council might have been 
well enough adapted to a number of small contracted 
states, whose united territory would fall short of the 
extent of that of the smallest of the American powers. 
The complicated and various interests which appertain 
to the nations of this vast continent cannot be safely 
confided to the superintendence of one legislative au- 
thority. We should almost as soon expect to see an 
amphictyonic council to regulate the affairs of the 

293 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

whole globe. But even if it were desirable to estab- 
lish such a tribunal, it is beyond the competency of 
the government of the United States voluntarily to 
assent to it, without a previous change of their actual 
constitution." 

The delegates were also instructed to oppose the 
formation of an offensive and defensive alliance be- 
tween the American powers, for, as Mr. Clay pointed 
out, the Holy Alliance had abandoned all idea of as- 
sisting Spain in the conquest of her late colonies. Con- 
tinuing, he said : 

Other reasons concur to dissuade the United States from 
entering into such an alliance. From the first establishment 
of their present constitution, their illustrious statesmen have 
inculcated the avoidance of foreign alliances as a leading 
maxim of their foreign policy. It is true, that in its adop- 
tion, their attention was directed to Europe, which having 
a system of connections and of interests remote and different 
from ours, it was thought most advisable that we should not 
mix ourselves up with them. And it is also true, that long 
since the origin of the maxim, the new American powers have 
arisen, to which, if at all, it is less applicable. Without, 
therefore, asserting that an exigency may not occur in which 
an alliance of the most intimate kind between the United 
States and the other American republics would be highly 
proper and expedient, it may be safely said that the occasion 
which would warrant a departure from that established 
maxim ought to be one of great urgency, and that none such 
is believed now to exist. Among the objections to such 
alliances, those which at all times have great weight are, 
first, the difficulty of a just and equal arrangement of the 
contributions of force and of other means between the 
respective parties to the attainment of the common object; 
and secondly, that of providing beforehand, and determining 
with perfect precision, when the casus foederis arises, and 
thereby guarding against all controversies about it. There 

294 



PAN AMERICANISM 

is less necessity for any such alliance at this juncture on the 
part of the United States, because no compact, by whatever 
solemnities it might be attended, or whatever name or char- 
acter it might assume, could be more obligatory upon them 
than the irresistible motive of self-preservation, which would 
be instantly called into operation, and stimulate them to the 
utmost exertion in the supposed contingency of an European 
attack upon the liberties of America. 1 

The British government sent a special envoy to 
reside near the congress and to place himself in frank 
and friendly communication with the delegates. Can- 
ning's private instructions to this envoy declared that, 

Any project for putting the U. S. of North America 
at the head of an American Confederacy, as against Europe, 
would be highly displeasing to your Government. It would 
be felt as an ill return for the service which has been ren- 
dered to those States, and the dangers which have been 
averted from them, by the countenance and friendship, and 
public declarations of Great Britain; and it would probably, 
at no distant period, endanger the peace both of America 
and of Europe. 

' The Panama Congress was without practical results, 
and it possesses merely an historical interest. As a 
matter of fact, only four republics, Colombia, Central 
America, Peru, and Mexico, were represented.) Sev- 
eral treaties and conventions were drafted with the 
view mainly of combined defense against Spain, but 
ratification was withheld by all of the states except 
Colombia, which gave only a partial approval to what 
had been done. Before adjourning, the Congress of 
Panama decided to meet again at the town of Tacu- 



1 International American Conference, Vol. TV (Historical Appendix), 
p. 122. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890. 

295 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

baya, near the city of Mexico, and to continue its ses- 
sions at stated intervals. But as the result of the 
failure of the states represented at the congress to 
ratify the agreements arrived at, and as the result of 
internal disorders, the plan was not carried out, al- 
though Mexico issued invitations for another congress 
in 1831, 1838, 1839, and 1840. 

In 1847 the republics of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, 
New Granada, and Peru held a so-called " American 
Congress " at Lima, which drafted a treaty of con- 
federation, one of commerce and navigation, a con- 
sular convention, and a postal convention. These 
treaties were not ratified and, therefore, the congress 
was without practical results. The preamble of the 
proposed treaty of confederation referred to the na- 
tions assembled as being " bound to each other by the 
ties of a common origin, a common language, a com- 
mon religion, common customs, and the common cause 
for which they have struggled, as well as by their 
geographical position, the similarity of their institu- 
tions, and their analogous ancestors and reciprocal in- 
terests." It is evident, therefore, that this particular 
congress was Spanish-American rather than Pan 
American. 2 

In 1856 the republics of Peru, Chile, and Ecuador 
signed at Santiago a treaty of confederation, known 
as " the Continental Treaty," for the purpose of " ce- 
menting upon substantial foundations the union which 
exists between them, as members of the great Ameri- 
can family, which are bound together by the ties of 
a common origin, similar institutions, and many other 



* International American Conference, Vol. IV (Historical Appendix), 

p. 202. 

296 



PAN AMERICANISM 

signs of fraternity." This treaty was not ratified. It 
seems to have been dictated by a spirit of hostility to 
the United States as the result of the filibustering en- 
terprise of William Walker in Central America. 

The question of a " continental " league was dis- 
cussed between Costa Rica and Colombia in 1862. 
After stating that, " There are not always at the head 
of the Great Republic moderate, just, and upright men 
as those who form the administration of President 
Lincoln," Costa Rica continued: 

If our Republics could have the guaranty that they have 
nothing to fear from the United States of North America, 
it is indubitable that no other nation could be more useful 
and favorable to us. Under the shelter of her powerful 
eagles, under the influence of her wise institutions, and 
under the spur of her astonishing progress our newly-born 
nationalities should receive the impulse which they now need, 
and would be permitted to march with firm step, without 
experiencing the troubles and difficulties with which they 
have had to struggle. ... In view of the above considera- 
tions, the idea has occurred to my government that a new 
compact might be draughted by which the United States of 
North America should bind themselves solemnly to respect, 
and cause others to respect, the independence, sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity of the sister republics of this con- 
tinent; not to annex to their territory, either by purchase or 
by any other means, any part of the territory of the said 
republics ; not to allow filibustering expeditions to be fitted up 
against the said nations, or to permit the rights of the latter 
to be in any way abridged or ignored. 3 

In January, 1864, the government of Peru issued 
invitations to all the governments of the Spanish na- 



* International American Conference, Vol. IV (Historical Appendix) 
p. 308, 

297 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

tions of America to join in a congress to be held at 
Lima. The objects of the meeting as stated in the 
invitation were " to declare that the American nations 
represented in this congress form one single family," 
to improve postal facilities, to exchange statistical 
data, to provide for the settlement of all boundary 
disputes, and " to irrevocably abolish war, superseding 
it by arbitration, as the only means of compromising 
all misunderstandings and causes for disagreements 
between any of the South American republics." In 
accepting the invitation to the congress Colombia ex- 
pressed the opinion that " the United States ought not 
to be invited, because their policy is adverse to all kind 
of alliances, and because the natural preponderance 
which a first-class power, as they are, has to exercise in 
the deliberations, might embarrass the action of the 
congress." So far as definite results were concerned, 
this congress at Lima was of no greater importance 
than its predecessors. 

The French invasion of Mexico and the war be- 
tween Spain and the republics on the west coast of 
South America in 1865-66 brought about a realization 
of their danger on the part of the Spanish-American 
republics and a fuller appreciation of the friendship 
of the United States. In the war between Spain on 
the one hand and the allied republics of Peru, Chile, 
Bolivia, and Ecuador on the other, the United States 
declared its neutrality as usual, but at an early period 
of the struggle Secretary Seward offered to mediate 
between the warring nations. Spain refused to ac- 
cept this offer, and the war dragged on in a state of 
" technical continuance " merely. The offer of media- 
tion was again renewed by Secretary Fish, with the 

298 



PAN AMERICANISM 

result that a conference was held at the State Depart- 
ment in 1870 attended by the representatives of Spain, 
Peru, Chile, and Ecuador. While it was found im- 
possible to conclude a formal peace, the delegates 
signed an armistice April 11, 1871, by which the de 
facto suspension of hostilities was converted into an 
armistice which was to continue indefinitely and could 
not be broken by any of the belligerents without three 
years' notice, given through the government of the 
United States, of intention to renew hostilities. 4 

Within ten years of the signature of this perpetual 
armistice, war broke out between Chile, on the one 
hand, and Peru and Bolivia, on the other (1879-83). 
The subject of dispute was the nitrate deposits of 
northern Chile. In 1880 Chile signed with Colombia 
an arbitration treaty which provided that in case the 
two parties should be unable in any given case to agree 
upon an arbitrator, the matter should be referred to 
the President of the United States. Article III of this 
treaty was as follows : J 

The United States of Colombia and the Republic of Chile 
will endeavor, at the earliest opportunity, to conclude with 
the other American nations conventions like unto the pres- 
ent, to the end that the settlement by arbitration of each and 
every international controversy shall become a principle of 
American public law. 

A few weeks later, without waiting for the ratifica- 
tion of this treaty, Colombia issued invitations to 
the other Spanish-American republics to attend a 
conference at Panama for the purpose of securing 
their adherence to the treaty. The failure to in- 

* Moore, " Digest of International Law," Vol. VII, pp. 9-10. 

299 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

elude the United States in the invitation to the con- 
ference was explained by our minister to Colombia 
as being due " to the reason that the position 
assigned to the government of the United States by 
the proposed treaty is to maintain and exercise a 
friendly and judicial impartiality in the differences 
which may arise between the powers of Spanish Amer- 
ica." B The continuance of the war between Chile and 
Peru led to the indefinite postponement of the con- 
ference. 
On November 29, 1881, Secretary Blaine extended 
to all the independent countries of North and South 
America an earnest invitation to participate in a gen- 
eral congress, to be held in the city of Washington on 
the 24th day of November, 1882, for the purpose of 
considering and discussing the methods of preventing 
war between the nations of America." He expressed 
the desire that the attention of the congress should be 
strictly confined to this one great object, and he ex- 
pressed the hope that in setting a day for the as- 
sembling of the congress so far ahead, the war that 
was then in progress on the South Pacific coast would 
be ended, and the nations engaged would be able to 
take part in the proceedings. 6 In this expectation Mr. 
Blaine was disappointed. The war between Chile and 
Peru continued, and the invitations to the conference 
were withdrawn. 

Toward the close of President Cleveland's first ad- 
ministration, the Congress of the United States passed 
an act authorizing the President to invite the republics 



8 International American Conference, Vol. IV (Historical Appendix), 
P 217. 

a Ibid., p. 255. 

300 



PAN AMERICANISM 

of Mexico, Central and South America, Haiti, Santo 
Domingo, and the Empire of Brazil, to join the United 
States in a conference at Washington on October 2, 
1889. Among the subjects proposed for discussion 
were the adoption of a customs union, the improve- 
ment of the means of communication between the vari- 
ous countries, uniform customs regulations, a uniform 
system of weights and measures, laws for the protec- 
tion of patents and copyrights, extradition, the adop- 
tion of a common silver coin, and the formulation of 
a definite plan for the arbitration of international dis- 
putes of every character. When the conference as- 
sembled, Mr. Blaine was again secretary of state, and 
presided over its opening sessions. The conference 
formulated a plan for international arbitration and 
declared that this means of settling disputes was " a 
principle of American international law." Unfortu- 
nately this treaty was not ratified by the governments 
whose representatives adopted it. The most lasting 
achievement of the conference was the establishment 
of the Bureau of American Republics in Washington. 
While the conference was in session Brazil went 
through a bloodless revolution, which converted the 
empire into a republic. Thus disappeared the only 
independent monarchy of European origin which ever 
existed on American soil. 

Scarcely had the Washington conference adjourned, 
when the United States and Chile got into an ugly 
wrangle and were brought to the verge of war over 
an attack on American sailors on shore leave at Val- 
paraiso. During the civil war between President Bal- 
maceda and the Congressional party, the American 
minister, Mr. Egan, admitted to the American legation 

301 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

certain adherents of the President. The people' of 
Chile resented the action of the American minister, 
and were further aroused against the United States 
by the detention of the Itata, a. vessel which left San 
Diego, California, with a cargo of arms for the Con- 
gressional party and was overhauled by an American 
warship. The United States cruiser Baltimore was 
lying in the harbor of Valparaiso when news of this 
incident was received. Members of her crew who 
happened to be on shore leave were attacked by the 
populace and several of them killed. As this attack 
upon American sailors appeared to be due to resent- 
ment against the official acts of their government, an 
apology was immediately demanded, but refused. 
After considerable delay, President Harrison had just 
laid the matter before Congress when a belated apol- 
ogy from Chile arrived, and war was fortunately 
averted. The charge that the United States had in- 
terfered in behalf of one of the parties in a civil 
strife created an unfavorable impression throughout 
Latin America and counteracted, to a considerable 
extent, the good effects of the Washington conference. 
The Second International American Conference 
was held in the city of Mexico 1901-02. This confer- 
ence arranged for all Latin-American States to be- 
come parties to the Hague Convention of 1899 ^ or 
the pacific settlement of international disputes, and 
drafted a treaty for the compulsory arbitration of 
pecuniary claims, the first article of which was as 
follows : 

The High Contracting Parties agree to submit to arbitra- 
tion all claims for pecuniary loss or damage which may 

302 



PAN AMERICANISM 

be presented by their respective citizens, and which cannot 
be amicably adjusted through diplomatic channels and when 
said claims are of sufficient importance to warrant the ex- 
penses of arbitration. 

This treaty was signed by the delegates of seventeen 
states, including the United States of America. 7 

The Third International American Conference was 
held at Rio de Janeiro in 1906. Among other things 
it extended the pecuniary claims convention drafted by 
the previous conference for another period of five 
years, and recommended to the governments repre- 
sented that they invite the Second Hague Conference, 
which had been called for 1907, " to examine the 
question of the compulsory collection of public debts, 
and, in general, means tending to diminish between 
nations conflicts having an exclusively pecuniary 
origin." 8 Added significance was given to the Rio 
conference by the presence of Secretary Root who, 
although not a delegate, made it the occasion of a 
special mission to South America. The series of nota- 
ble addresses which he delivered on this mission gave 
a new impetus to the Pan American movement. 

The Fourth International American Conference was 
held at Buenos Aires in 1910. It drafted treaties re- 
lating to patents, trade-marks, and copyrights. It ex- 
tended the pecuniary claims convention for an indefi- 
nite period. And finally, it enlarged the scope of the 
Bureau of American Republics and changed its name 
to the Pan American Union. 9 A fifth conference was 



7 Second International American Conference, English text (Mexico, 
Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 309. 

8 Third International American Conference, Minutes, Resolutions, Doc- 
uments (Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional, 1907), p. 605. 

8 Bulletin of the Pan American Union, Vol. 31, p. 796. 

303 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

called to meet at Santiago, Chile, in 19 14, but was 
postponed on account of the European war. 

The conferences above described were political or 
diplomatic in character. Besides these there have been 
held two Pan American scientific congresses in which 
the United States participated, one at Santiago, Chile, 
in 1908, and one at Washington, December, 1915, to 
January, 19 16. There have also been held two Pan 
American financial conferences in the city of Wash- 
ington, the first in May, 19 15, and the second in Jan- 
uary, 1920. These conferences have accomplished a 
great deal in the way of promoting friendly feeling 
and the advancement of science and commerce among 
the republics of the Western Hemisphere. The First 
Financial Conference recommended the establishment 
of an International High Commission, to be composed 
of not more than nine members resident in each coun- 
try appointed by the Minister of Finance of such coun- 
try for the purpose of carrying on the work of the 
conference. This recommendation was adopted by the 
various countries, and the Congress of the United 
States, by act of February 7, 1916, authorized the 
establishment of a section in this country. The Inter- 
national High Commission carries on its labors largely 
through the various national sections. Its first general 
meeting was held at Buenos Aires in April, 1916. 

The American Institute of International Law, or- 
ganized at Washington in October, 1912, is a body 
which is likely to have great influence in promoting the 
peace and welfare of this hemisphere. The Institute is 
composed of five representatives from the national so- 
ciety of international law in each of the twenty-one 
American republics. At the suggestion of Secretary 

304 



o 



PAN AMERICANISM 

Lansing the Institute at a session held in the city of 
Washington, January 6, 1916, adopted a Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Nations, which was as 
follows : 

I. Every nation has the right to exist and to protect and 
to conserve its existence ; but this right neither implies the 
right nor justifies the act of the state to protect itself or 
to conserve its existence by the commission of unlawful acts 
against innocent and unoffending states. 

II. Every nation has the right to independence in the 
sense that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is 
free to develop itself without interference or control from 
other states, provided that in so doing it does not interfere 
with or violate the rights of other states. 

III. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of 
every other nation belonging to the society of nations, and 
all nations have the right to claim and, according to the 
Declaration of Independence of the United States, " to as- 
sume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal 
station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God 
entitle them." 

IV. Every nation has the right to territory within de- 
fined boundaries, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over 
its territory, and all persons whether native or foreign 
found therein. 

V. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations 
is entitled to have that right respected and protected by all 
other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and the 
right of one is the duty of all to observe. 

VI. International law is at one and the same time both 
national and international ; national in the sense that it is 
the law of the landJfnd applicable as such to the decision 
of all questions<JnVolving its principles; international in 
the sense that it is the law of the society of nations and 
applicable as such to all questions between and among the 
members of the society of nations involving its principles. 10 



10 Am. Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, p. 212. 

305 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

This Declaration has been criticized as being too 
altruistic for a world in which diplomacy has been 
occupied with selfish aims. 

On the same day that the above Declaration was 
made public, President Wilson delivered a notable ad- 
dress before the Second Pan American Scientific Con- 
ference then in session at Washington. In the course 
of this address he said: 

The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States 
on her own authority. It has always been maintained, and 
always will be maintained, upon her own responsibility. But 
the Monroe Doctrine demanded merely that European gov- 
ernments should not attempt to extend their political systems 
to this side of the Atlantic. It did not disclose the use which 
the United States intended to make of her power on this 
side of the Atlantic. It was a hand held up in warning, but 
there was no promise in it of what America was going to 
do with the implied and partial protectorate which she ap- 
parently was trying to set up on this side of the water, and 
I believe you will sustain me in the statement that it has 
been fears and suspicions on this score which have hitherto 
prevented the greater intimacy and confidence and trust be- 
tween the Americas. The states of America have not been 
certain what the United States would do with her power. 
That doubt must be removed. And latterly there has been a 
very frank interchange of views between the authorities in 
Washington and those who represent the other states of this 
hemisphere, an interchange of views charming and hopeful, 
because based upon an increasingly sure appreciation of the 
spirit in which they were undertaken. These gentlemen have 
seen that, if America is to come into her own, into her 
legitimate own, in a world of peace and order, she must 
establish the foundations of amity, so that no one will here- 
after doubt them. I hope and I believe that this can be ac- 
complished. These conferences have enabled me to foresee 
how it will be accomplished. It will be accomplished, in the 

306 



PAN AMERICANISM 

first place, by the states of America uniting in guaranteeing 
to each other absolute political independence and territorial 
integrity. In the second place, and as a necessary corollary 
to that, guaranteeing the agreement to settle all pending 
boundary disputes as soon as possible and by amicable pro- 
cess ; by agreeing that all disputes among themselves, should 
they unhappily arise, will be handled by patient, impartial 
investigation and settled by arbitration ; and the agreement 
necessary to the peace of the Americas, that no state of 
either continent will permit revolutionary expeditions against 
another state to be fitted out in its territory, and that they 
will prohibit the exportation of the munitions of war for 
the purpose of supplying revolutionists against neighboring 
governments. 

President Wilson's Pan Americanism went further 
man some of the Latin-American states were willing 
to go. A treaty embodying the above proposals was 
actually drafted, but some of the states held back 
through the fear that, though equal in terms, it would 
in fact give the United States a plausible pretext for 
supervising the affairs of weaker states. 11 

President Wilson has not hesitated to depart from 
many of the fundamental ideas which have hitherto 
guided so-called practical statesmen. His handling of 
the Mexican situation, although denounced as weak 
and vacillating, has been in full accord with his new 
Latin-American policy. On February 18, 191 3, Fran- 
cisco Madero was seized and imprisoned as the result 
of a conspiracy formed by one of his generals, Vic- 
toriano Huerta, who forthwith proclaimed himself dic- 
tator. Four days later Madero was murdered while 
in the custody of Huerta's troops. Henry Lane Wil- 
son, the American ambassador, promptly urged his 

11 John Bassett Moore, " Principles of American Diplomacy," pp. 407-408. 

307 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

government to recognize Huerta, but President Taft, 
whose term was rapidly drawing to a close, took no 
action and left the question to his successor. 

President Wilson thus had a very disagreeable sit- 
uation to face when he assumed control of affairs at 
Washington. He refused to recognize Huerta whose 
authority was contested by insurrectionary chiefs in 
various parts of the country. It was claimed by the 
critics of the administration that the refusal to recog- 
nize Huerta was a direct violation of the well known 
American policy of recognizing de facto governments 
without undertaking to pass upon the rights involved. 
It is perfectly true that the United States has con- 
sistently followed the policy of recognizing de facto 
governments as soon as it is evident in each case that 
the new government rests on popular approval and is 
likely to be permanent. This doctrine of recognition 
is distinctively an American doctrine. It was first 
laid down by Thomas Jefferson when he was secretary 
of state as an offset to the European doctrine of divine 
right, and it was the natural outgrowth of that other 
Jeffersonian doctrine that all governments derive their 
just powers from the consent of the governed. Huerta 
could lay no claim to authority derived from a ma- 
jority or anything like a majority of the Mexican 
people. He was a self-constituted dictator, whose au- 
thority rested solely on military force. President Wil- 
son and Secretary Bryan were fully justified in refus- 
ing to recognize his usurpation of power, though they 
probably made a mistake in announcing that they 
would never recognize him and in demanding his elimi- 
nation from the presidential contest. This announce- 
ment made him deaf to advice from Washington and 

308 



PAN AMERICANISM 

utterly indifferent to the destruction of American life 
and property. 

The next step in the President's course with refer- 
ence to Mexico was the occupation of Vera Cruz. On 
April 20, 1914, the President asked Congress for au- 
thority to employ the armed forces of the United 
States in demanding redress for the arbitrary arrest 
of American marines at Vera Cruz, and the next day 
Admiral Fletcher was ordered to seize the custom 
house at that port. This he did after a sharp fight 
with Huerta's troops in which nineteen Americans 
were killed and seventy wounded. The American 
charge d'affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, was at once 
handed his passports, and all diplomatic relations be- 
tween the United States and Mexico were severed. 

A few days later the representatives of the so-called 
ABC powers, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, tendered 
their good offices for a peaceful settlement of the con- 
flict and President Wilson promptly accepted their 
mediation. The resulting conference at Niagara, May 
20, was not successful in its immediate object, but it 
resulted in the elimination of Huerta who resigned 
July 15, 1914. On August 20, General Venustiano 
Carranza, head of one of the revolutionary factions, 
assumed control of affairs at the capital, but his au- 
thority was disputed by General Francisco Villa, an- 
other insurrectionary chief. On Carranza's promise to 
respect the lives and property of American citizens the 
United States forces were withdrawn from Vera Cruz 
in November, 1914. 

In August, 191 5, at the request of President Wilson 
the six ranking representatives of Latin America at 
Washington made an unsuccessful effort to reconcile 

309 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

the contending factions of Mexico. On their advice, 
however, President Wilson decided in October to rec- 
ognize the government of Carranza, who now con- 
trolled three-fourths of the territory of Mexico. As 
a result of this action Villa began a series of attacks 
on American citizens and raids across the border, 
which in March, 191 6, compelled the President to send 
a punitive expedition into Mexico and later to dis- 
patch most of the regular army and large bodies of 
militia to the border. 12 

The raids of Villa created a very awkward situa- 
tion. Carranza not only made no real effort to sup- 
press Villa, but he vigorously opposed the steps taken 
by the United States to protect its own citizens along 
the border, and even assumed a threatening attitude. 
There was a loud and persistent demand in the United 
States for war against Mexico. American investments 
in land, mines, rubber plantations, and other enterprises 
were very large, and these financial interests were par- 
ticularly outraged at the President's policy of " watch- 
ful waiting." The President remained deaf to this 
clamor. No country had been so shamelessly exploited 
by foreign capital as Mexico. Furthermore it was 
suspected and very generally believed that the recent 
revolutions had been financed by American capital. 
President Wilson was determined to give the Mexi- 
can people an opportunity to reorganize their national 
life on a better basis and to lend them every assistance 
in the task. War with Mexico would have been a very 
serious undertaking and even a successful war would 



18 " Affairs in Mexico," Sixty-fourth Cong., First Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 
324. The World Peace Foundation has issued two pamphlets containing 
documents on Mexico under the title of " The New Pan Americanism," 
Parts I and II (February and April, 1916). 

310 



PAN AMERICANISM 

have meant the military occupation of Mexico for an 
indefinite period. President Wilson's refusal to be- 
come involved in war with Mexico convinced the 
world of his sincerity and gave him a hearing during 
the Great War such as no political leader of any nation 
ever before commanded. 

It has been charged that there was a lack of con- 
sistency between the President's Mexican policy and 
his Haitian policy. The difference between the two 
cases, however, was that the Haitian situation, if taken 
in time, could be handled without bloodshed, while the 
same method applied to Mexico would have led to a 
long and bloody conflict. It would be easy enough to 
go into Mexico, but exceedingly difficult to get out. 
The most novel feature of the President's Mexican 
policy was his acceptance of the mediation of the 
ABC powers and his subsequent consultation with 
the leading representatives of Latin America. This 
action has brought the Pan American ideal to the point 
of realization. It has been received with enthusiasm 
and it has placed our relations with Latin America on 
a better footing than they have been for years. 

It has been suggested by more than one critic of 
American foreign policy that if we are to undertake 
to set the world right, we must come before the bar 
of public opinion with clean hands, that before we 
denounce the imperialistic policies of Europe, we must 
abandon imperialistic policies at home. The main fea- 
tures of President Wilson's Latin-American policy, if 
we may draw a general conclusion, have been to pledge 
the weaker American republics not to do anything 
which would invite European intervention, and to 
secure by treaty the right of the United States to inter- 

3" 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

vene for the protection of life, liberty, and property, 
and for the establishment of self-government. The 
test of such a policy is the degree of unselfishness with 
■which it is carried out. 

The loyalty of the Latin-American states to the 
principles of Pan Americanism was put to a severe 
test when the United States entered the Great War. 
When President Wilson announced to Congress the 
severance of relations with Germany and declared his 
intention of protecting our commerce on the high seas, 
he expressed the confident hope that all neutral gov- 
ernments would pursue the same course. He prob- 
ably had especially in mind our Latin-American neigh- 
bors, but if so, his expectation was not fully realized. 
Only eight of the twenty Latin- American republics 
eventually entered the war: Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. 
Five others broke off relations with Germany : Bolivia, 
Peru, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Uruguay. 
Seven remained neutral : Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Salvador, Venezuela, and Paraguay. 18 

Only two Latin-American states, Brazil and Cuba, 
took an active part in the war. At the request of the 
British government in December, 19 17, Brazil sent 
two cruisers and four destroyers to European waters 
to cooperate with the British navy, and a few months 
later a group of Brazilian aviators took their place on 
the Western front. A number of physicians and sev- 
eral Red Cross units from Brazil also cooperated with 
the Allies. Cuba turned over to the United States sev- 
eral German steamships interned in her waters. A 



"Percy A. Martin, "Latin America and the War" (issued by the 
World Peace Foundation, August, 1-919), 

313 



PAN AMERICANISM 

compulsory military service law was passed and a 
number of training camps established. In October, 
19 18, the Cuban government announced that it had 
25,000 troops ready to send to France, but the armi- 
stice was signed before arrangements could be made 
for their transportation. The only active service ren- 
dered by Cubans was in the field of aviation, where 
several individuals won high distinction. 

Of the ABC powers Argentina and Chile re- 
mained neutral. So also did Mexico. Brazil was thus 
the only one of the larger states that actually entered 
the war. The relations between Brazil and the United 
States have almost always been peculiarly close and 
friendly. From the outbreak of the European war 
strong sympathy for the allied cause was manifested 
in Brazil, and a league for aiding the Allies through 
the agency of the Red Cross was organized under the 
presidency of Ruy Barbosa, the most distinguished 
statesman of Brazil and one of the most brilliant 
orators of Latin America. Brazil's experience during 
the period of neutrality was very similar to that of the 
United States. Her commerce was interfered with 
and her ships were sunk by German submarines. A 
few weeks after the United States entered the war, 
Brazil severed relations with Germany and seized the 
forty-six German ships interned in Brazilian harbors. 
In a circular note of June 2 the Brazilian government 
declared to the world that it had taken this step because 
the Republic of Brazil was bound to the United States 
" by a traditional friendship and by a similarity of 
political opinion in the defense of the vital interests of 
America and the principles accepted by international 
law," and because it wished to give to its foreign 

313 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

policy, in this critical moment of the world's history, 
" a practical form of continental solidarity — a policy 
indeed which was that of the old regime on every oc- 
casion on which any of the other friendly sister na- 
tions of the American continent were in jeopardy." 
President Wilson's reply to this note expressed the 
deep appreciation of the United States and the hope 
that the act of the Brazilian Congress was " the fore- 
runner of the attitude to be assumed by the rest of the 
American states." On October 26, 1917, on the re- 
ceipt of the news of the torpedoing of another Brazil- 
ian ship by a German submarine, a resolution recog- 
nizing " the state of war initiated by the German Em- 
pire against Brazil " was adopted by the unanimous 
vote of the Brazilian Senate and by a vote of 149 to 1 
in the Chamber of Deputies. 14 Brazil's enthusiastic 
support of the United States and of the allied cause 
has been recognized by those powers in giving her 
representation on the Council of the League of 
Nations. In fact at the first meeting of the Council 
in London in February, 1920, Brazil was the sole 
American power represented. 

Argentina, the largest and most important of the 
states of Spanish origin, remained neutral throughout 
the war, notwithstanding the fact that a large part of 
the population and some of the leading newspapers 
were strongly pro-Ally. When the United States de- 
clared war, Sefior Drago, the former minister of for- 
eign affairs and author of the doctrine that bears his 
name, issued a statement in which he said : 

The war between Germany and America is a struggle of 



14 Martin, " Latin America and the War," pp. 13-iS- 

314 



PAN AMERICANISM 

democracy versus absolutism, and no American nation can 
remain neutral without denying its past and compromising 
its future. 

About the same time a note was sent through Am- 
bassador Naon stating that " in view of the causes 
which have prompted the United States to declare 
war against the government of the German Empire," 
the Argentine government recognizes " the justice of 
that decision." But German propaganda, which had 
its headquarters in Buenos Aires, and the attitude 
of President Irrigoyen kept the country out of the 
war. Popular indignation was aroused by the Lux- 
burg disclosures, which revealed the fact that the 
German representative, after coming to an under- 
standing with the President, had advised his gov- 
ernment that two Argentine ships then approaching 
the French coast "be spared if possible, or else sunk 
without a trace being left" (spurlos versenkt). The 
Senate and Chamber of Deputies passed by large ma- 
jorities a resolution severing relations with Germany, 
but to the surprise of everybody President Irrigoyen 
expressed himself as satisfied with Germany's dis- 
avowal of Luxburg's conduct and continued his policy 
of neutrality. 

Chile was so far removed from the scene of the war 
in Europe and had so few ships engaged in European 
trade that her government did not have the same 
provocation that others had. Furthermore, German 
propaganda had made great headway in Chile and the 
Chilean army, trained by German officers, was strongly 
pro-German. In the navy, on the other hand, senti- 
ment was strongly in favor of the Allies. This was a 
matter of tradition, for since the days of Lord 

315 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

Cochrane, whose exploits have been described in an 
earlier chapter of this book, the Chilean navy has 
followed English ideals. Under these circumstances 
Chile remained neutral, though before the end of the 
war public sentiment had shifted to the side of the 
Allies. 15 

Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay in severing re- 
lations with Germany proclaimed their adherence to 
the principle of American solidarity. Paraguay's neu- 
trality was due to her isolation. Colombia, still smart- 
ing under the loss of the Isthmus, was not disposed to 
take sides with the United States. In Venezuela most 
of the government officials were under German in- 
fluence. Panama and four of the five Central Ameri- 
can republics declared war on Germany, Salvador 
alone remaining neutral. Cuba and Haiti also de- 
clared war on Germany, while the Dominican Republic 
severed consular relations. Mexico proclaimed its 
neutrality, but permitted its soil to become a hot-bed 
of German intrigue and President Carranza exhibited 
at times a spirit of hostility to the United States which 
tended to increase the tension that already existed be- 
tween the two countries. 

In an article on " The European War and Pan 
Americanism " le Ambassador Naon of the Argentine 
Republic draws the following interesting conclusions, 
conclusions that are all the more interesting because 
his country was not one of those that took the course 
to which he gives his approval. He says : " The politi- 
cal action developed by the different governments of 



"Enrique Rocuant. "The Neutrality of Chile and the Grounds that 
Prompted and Justified It," (Valparaiso, 1919). 

19 Reprinted in International Conciliation, Inter-American Division, 
Bulletin No. 20 (April, 1919). 



316 



PAN AMERICANISM 

the continent in the presence of the European conflict, 
especially since the breaking out of hostilities between 
the United States and Germany, has not been either 
the best advised or the most propitious for achieving 
the consolidation of Pan Americanism." The situa- 
tion created by the European war, he continues, " af- 
fected the entire continent in the same manner and 
with the same political and economic intensity as the 
United States, and both self-interest and moral obliga- 
tions ought to have counseled the consummating of 
solidarity, here and now, by making common cause 
and endorsing the attitude of the United States to the 
extreme limit, until the disturbing force should be 
overcome. The political action of America did not 
take this direction, however. Some of the most im- 
portant governments of the continent, going counter to 
the political aspirations and doubtless to the political 
interests of their own countries, adhered to the policy 
of neutrality. In America this was equivalent to a 
policy of isolation, and thus the solidarity of the con- 
tinent was broken, with consequent prejudice to Pan 
Americanism. Yet even if in those countries, the 
action of the governments could not be counted upon, 
nevertheless, the sentiment, expressed in eloquent 
manifestations of public opinion and in complete dis- 
agreement with that attitude of the governments, per- 
sisted throughout the crisis. Thus the spirit of Pan 
Americanism was saved, and we are justified in be- 
lieving that there will come a reaction which will 
restore the disturbed equilibrium and save the mighty 
interests involved." 

Ambassador Naon believes, however, that Pan 
Americanism has many obstacles in the way of its com- 

317 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

plete realization. Among them he mentions " the 
recognition of politico-intellectual inferiorities " by 
the peace conference at Paris in the classification of 
nations as great powers and small powers. The funda- 
mental principle of Pan Americanism he believes to 
be the doctrine of equality. He further points out 
that as long as American states remain, whether as the 
result of their own shortcomings or not, in these con- 
ditions of inferiority in world politics, " there will 
continue to exist for the United States the causes that 
gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine and consequently all 
its objections will continue to exist." Finally he says 
that " the idea of solidarity is being weakened or 
thwarted by another idea, the unwholesome one of 
Latin Americanism, which is a Teutonic idea in its 
tendencies, and which is trying to replace it, basing it- 
self upon supposed antagonisms of interests and ideals 
between the other countries of America and the United 
States. This purpose, which is anarchical, might 
cause American solidarity to fail if, in virtue of neg- 
lecting to foster this tendency, it should succeed, by 
pandering to paltry prejudices and flattering national 
vanities, in gaining a footing in the thought of the 
other governments of the continent to the extent of 
constituting itself a political force, capable of replac- 
ing the system of solidarity which Pan Americanism 
seeks, by a system of a continental equilibrium : a sys- 
tem which has just failed in the European conflict." 

This summary of the views of the distinguished Ar- 
gentine statesman is sufficient to show that his analysis 
of the situation is correct. The weakness and back- 
wardness of certain states, specifically those in the zone 
of the Caribbean, lies at the heart of the difficulty. As 

3i8 



PAN AMERICANISM 

long as they remain in their present condition the 
United States must continue to protect them against 
European intervention and, when occasion arises, 
supervise their affairs in order to prevent them from 
provoking such intervention. As long as it is neces- 
sary to pursue this course the United States will have 
to rest under the suspicion of having imperialistic de- 
signs on its weaker neighbors, and it is this suspicion 
which perpetuates the spirit of Latin Americanism 
which in turn must be overcome before we can fully 
realize the ideal of Pan Americanism. 



3*9 



CHAPTER IX 

The Monroe Doctrine 

In the foregoing chapters we have discussed the 
origin and the more important applications of the 
Monroe Doctrine. There remain, however, certain 
general aspects of the subject which require special 
consideration. In any discussion of the Monroe Doc- 
trine it is important to bear in mind that it was 
in its origin and has always remained purely an ex- 
ecutive policy. Neither house of Congress has ever 
expressly sanctioned the language of President Monroe 
or attempted to formulate a new definition of the 
policy. On January 20, 1824, a few weeks after Mon- 
roe's famous message, Henry Clay made an effort 
to get Congress to endorse the policy announced by 
the executive, but his resolution was tabled. 1 In 1856 
Senator Clayton, who as secretary of state had nego- 
tiated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, declared that he 
would be willing to vote to assert the Monroe Doc- 
trine and maintain it, but that he would " not expect 
to be sustained in such a vote by both branches of 
Congress. Whenever the attempt has been made to 
assert the Monroe Doctrine in either branch of Con- 
gress, it has failed." And he added, " You cannot 
prevail on a majority, and I will venture to say that 
you cannot prevail on one-third, of either house of 
Congress to sustain it." 2 In fact, the Monroe Doc- 

1 Moore, " Digest of International Law," Vol. VI, p. 404. 
■ Ibid., p. 427. 

320 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

trine never received anything approaching legislative 
sanction until 1895, when, in response to President 
Cleveland's message on the Venezuelan boundary dis- 
pute, Congress appropriated $100,000 to pay the ex- 
penses of the commission which he proposed to ap- 
point. 

For nearly a hundred years we have successfully 
upheld the Monroe Doctrine without resort to force. 
The policy has never been favorably regarded by the 
powers of continental Europe. Bismarck described it 
as " an international impertinence." In recent years 
it has stirred up rather intense opposition in certain 
parts of Latin America. Until recently no American 
writers appear to have considered the real nature of 
the sanction on which the doctrine rested. How is it 
that without an army and until recent years without 
a navy of any size we have been able to uphold a 
policy which has been described as an impertinence 
to Latin America and a standing defiance to Europe? 
Americans generally seem to think that the Monroe 
Doctrine has in it an inherent sanctity which prevents 
other nations from violating it. In view of the gen- 
eral disregard of sanctities, inherent or acquired, dur- 
ing the past few years, this explanation will not hold 
good and some other must be sought. Americans have 
been so little concerned with international affairs that 
they have failed to see any connection between the 
Monroe Doctrine and the balance of power in Europe. 
The existence of a European balance of power is the 
only explanation of our having been able to uphold 
the Monroe Doctrine for so long a time without a 
resort to force. Some one or more of the European 
powers would long ago have stepped in and called our 

321 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

bluff, that is, forced us to repudiate the Monroe Doc- 
trine or fight for it, had it not been for the well- 
grounded fear that as soon as they became engaged 
with us some other European power would attack 
them in the rear. What other satisfactory explana- 
tion is there for Louis Napoleon's withdrawal from 
Mexico, for Great Britain's backdown in the Vene- 
zuelan boundary dispute, and for the withdrawal of 
the German fleet from Venezuela in 1902? 

While England has from time to time objected 
to some of the corollaries deduced from the Monroe 
Doctrine, she has on the whole been not unfavorably 
disposed toward the essential features of that policy. 
The reason for this is that the Monroe Doctrine has 
been an open-door policy, and has thus been in gen- 
eral accord with the British policy of free trade. The 
United States has not used the Monroe Doctrine for 
the establishment of exclusive trade relations with 
our Southern neighbors. In fact, we have largely neg- 
lected the South American countries as a field for the 
development of American commerce. The failure 
to cultivate this field has not been due wholly to 
neglect, however, but to the fact that we have had 
employment for all our capital at home and conse- 
quently have not been in a position to aid in the 
industrial development of the Latin-American states, 
and to the further fact that our exports have been 
so largely the same and hence the trade of North and 
South America has been mainly with Europe. There 
has, therefore, been little rivalry between the United 
States and the powers of Europe in the field of South 
American commerce. Our interest has been political 
rather than commercial. We have prevented the es- 

322 






THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

tablishment of spheres of influence and preserved the 
open door. This situation has been in full accord with 
British policy. Had Great Britain adopted a high 
tariff policy and been compelled to demand commer- 
cial concessions from Latin America by force, the 
Monroe Doctrine would long since have gone by the 
board and been forgotten. Americans should not for- 
get the fact, moreover, that at any time during the 
past twenty years Great Britain could have settled 
all her outstanding difficulties with Germany by agree- 
ing to sacrifice the Monroe Doctrine and give her 
rival a free hand in South America. In the face of 
such a combination our navy would have been of little 
avail. 

Contrary to a widely prevailing opinion the Mon- 
roe Doctrine has undergone very little change since 
the original declaration, and the official statements 
of the doctrine have on the whole been very con- 
sistent. The only important extension was made 
less than two years after the original declaration, 
when, in October, 1825, Secretary Clay, acting under 
the direction of President John Quincy Adams, who 
assisted in formulating the doctrine, notified the 
French government that we could not consent to the 
occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico " by any other 
European power than Spain under any contingency 
whatever." Similar declarations were made to the 
other European powers, the occasion being the fear 
that Spain would transfer her sovereignty over these j 
islands to some other government. President Mon- 
roe had declared that the American continents were I 
closed to colonization from Europe, meaning by colo- 
nization very probably, as Professor John Bassett 

323 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

Moore says, " the acquisition of title to territory by 
original occupation and settlement." 3 He had made 
no declaration against the transfer of sovereignty in 
America from one European power to another. In 
fact he positively renounced any such idea, when he 
said: "With the existing colonies or dependencies of 
any European power we have not interfered, and 
shall not interfere." Here, then, within two years 
we have a distinct advance upon the position taken 
by President Monroe. Yet this advanced ground was 
held by succeeding administrations, until President 
Grant could say in the case of the same islands in his 
first annual message: 

These dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to 
transfer from one European power to another. When the 
present relation of colonies ceases, they are to become in- 
dependent powers, exercising the right of choice and of self- 
control in the determination of their future condition and 
relations with other powers.* 

And Secretary Hamilton Fish said a few months later 
that the President had but followed " the teachings 
of all our history " when he made this statement. 6 

The failure of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to oust 
Great Britain from her interests in the canal under 
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by an appeal to the Monroe 
Doctrine and the successful enforcement of the doc- 
trine by President Cleveland and Secretary Olney in 
1895 nave Deen discussed at sufficient length in pre- 
vious chapters. While the policy of Cleveland and 

•Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XI. p. 3. 

• " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VII, p. 32. 

• Foreign Relations, 1870, pp. 254-260; Moore, " Digest of International 
Law," Vol. VI, p. 431. 

324 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

Olney was vehemently denounced at the time, it is 
now generally approved by American writers of 
authority on international law and diplomacy. 

When President McKinley decided to demand from 
Spain the cession of the Philippine Islands, the oppo- 
sition that the step encountered was based to some 
extent on the fear that it would amount to a re- 
pudiation of the Monroe Doctrine, that if we invaded 
the Eastern Hemisphere we could not expect to keep 
Europe out of the Western. The use of the term 
hemispheres in connection with the Monroe Doctrine 
has, of course, been merely a figure of speech. The 
Monroe Doctrine dealt with the relations between 
Europe and America, and Eastern Asia never came 
within its purview. As a matter of fact, the Monroe 
Doctrine has been more fully and more frequently 
asserted since the acquisition of the Philippines than 
ever before. The participation of the United States 
in the First Peace Conference at The Hague was 
taken by many Americans to mark the end of the old 
order and the introduction of a new era in American 
diplomacy, but, contrary to their expectations, this 
meeting was made the occasion for an emphatic and 
effective declaration before the assembled body of 
European nations of our adherence to the Monroe 
Doctrine. Before the Convention for the Pacific Set- 
tlements of International Disputes was adopted, the 
following declaration was read before the conference 
and the treaty was signed by the American delegates 
under this reservation: 

Nothing contained in this convention shall be so con- 
strued as to require the United States of America to depart 
from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering 

325 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy 
or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall 
anything contained in the said convention be construed to 
imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of 
its traditional attitude toward purely American questions. 6 

Prior to the Roosevelt administration the Monroe 
Doctrine was regarded by the Latin-American states 
as solely a protective policy. The United States did 
not undertake to control the financial administration 
or the foreign policy of any of these republics. It 
was only after their misconduct had gotten them into 
difficulty and some foreign power, or group of for- 
eign powers, was on the point of demanding repara- 
tion by force that the United States stepped in and 
undertook to see to it that foreign intervention did 
not take the form of occupation of territory or inter- 
ference in internal politics. The Monroe Doctrine has 
always been in principle a policy of American inter- 
vention for the purpose of preventing European in- 
tervention, but American intervention always awaited 
the threat of immediate action on the part of some 
European power. President Roosevelt concluded that 
it would be wiser to restrain the reckless conduct of 
the smaller American republics before disorders or 
public debts should reach a point which gave Euro- 
pean powers an excuse for intervening. He held that 
since we could not permit European powers to re- 
strain or punish American states in cases of wrong- 
doing, we must ourselves undertake that task. As 
long as the Monroe Doctrine was merely a policy of 
benevolent protection, which Latin-American states 
could invoke after their unwise or evil conduct had 

• " Treaties and Conventions of the United States " (Compiled by W. 
M. Malloy), vol. II, p. 203a. 

326 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

brought European powers to the point of demanding 
just retribution, it was regarded with favor and no 
objection was raised to it; but the Roosevelt declara- 
tion, that if we were to continue to protect Latin- 
American states against European intervention, we had 
a right to demand that they should refrain from con- 
duct which was likely to provoke such intervention, 
was quite a different thing, and raised a storm of 
criticism and opposition. 

The Roosevelt interpretation of the Monroe Doc- 
trine was undoubtedly a perfectly logical step. It was 
endorsed by the Taft administration and has been ex- 
tended by the Wilson administration and made one 
of our most important policies in the zone of the 
Caribbean. President Roosevelt was right in draw- 
ing the conclusion that we had arrived at a point 
where we had either to abandon the Monroe Doc- 
trine or to extend its application so as to cover the 
constantly increasing number of disputes arising from 
the reckless creation of public debts and loose financial 
administration. It was absurd for us to stand quietly 
by and witness the utterly irresponsible creation of 
financial obligations that would inevitably lead to 
European intervention and then undertake to fix the 
bounds and limits of that intervention. It is inter- 
esting to note that President Wilson has not hesi- 
tated to carry the new policy to its logical conclusion, 
and he has gone so far as to warn Latin-American 
countries against granting to foreign corporations con- 
cessions which, on account of their extended character, 
would be certain to give rise to foreign claims which 
would, in turn, give an excuse for European inter- 
vention. In discussing our Latin-American policy 

327 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

shortly after the beginning of his administration, 
President Wilson said: 

You hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in Latin 
America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capital- 
ists in the United States. They are not granted concessions. 
They are invited to make investments. The work is ours, 
though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not ask them 
to supply the capital and do the work. It is an invitation, not 
a privilege, and the states that are obliged because their terri- 
tory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise 
and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that 
foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs — a 
condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become in- 
tolerable. . . . What these states are going to seek, there- 
fore, is an emancipation from the subordination which has 
been inevitable to foreign enterprise and an assertion of the 
splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they 
have again and again been able to demonstrate. 

These remarks probably had reference to the oil 
concession which Pearson & Son of London had ar- 
ranged with the president of Colombia. This conces- 
sion is said to have covered extensive oil interests 
in Colombia, and carried with it the right to improve 
harbors and dig canals in the country. However, be- 
fore the meeting of the Colombian Congress in Novem- 
ber, 1913, which was expected to confirm the conces- 
sion, Lord Cowdray, the president of Pearson & Son, 
withdrew the contract, alleging as his reason the oppo- 
sition of the United States. 

Prior to the Great War, which has upset all calcu- 
lations, it seemed highly probable that the Piatt Amend- 
ment would in time be extended to all the weaker states 
within the zone of the Caribbean. If the United States 
is to exercise a protectorate over such states, the right 

328 






"'X 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

to intervene and the conditions of intervention should 
be clearly defined and publicly proclaimed. Hitherto 
whatever action we have taken in Latin America has 
been taken under the Monroe Doctrine, — a policy of 
doubtful legal sanction, — which an international court 
might not recognize. Action under a treaty would 
have the advantage of legality. In other words, the 
recent treaties with Caribbean states have converted 
American policy into law. 

The imperialistic tendencies of our Caribbean pol- 
icy, whether they be regarded as logical deductions 
from the Monroe Doctrine or not, have undoubtedly 
aroused the jealousies and fears of our Southern neigh- 
bors. One of the results has been the formation of 
the so-called ABC Alliance, based on treaties between 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the exact provisions of 
which have not been made public. This alliance doubt- 
less serves a useful purpose in promoting friendly 
relations between the three great states of South 
America, and since the acceptance of the mediation 
of these powers in Mexico by President Wilson there 
is no reason to regard it as in any sense hostile to 
the United States. While the United States may 
very properly accept the mediation of other American 
states in disputes like that arising out of the Mexican 
situation, the United States would not feel under any 
obligation to consult other American states or accept 
their advice on any question involving the enforce- 
ment of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States has 
always maintained the Monroe Doctrine as a principle 
of self-defense, and, consequently, on its own author- 
ity. In 1825 the Brazilian government proposed that 
the United States should enter into an alliance with 

329 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

it in order to maintain the independence of Brazil in 
case Portugal should be assisted by any foreign power 
in her efforts to reconquer Brazil. Secretary Clay re- 
plied that while President Adams adhered to the prin- 
ciples set forth by his predecessor, the prospect of 
peace between Portugal and Brazil rendered such an 
alliance unnecessary. 7 

In recent years the proposal has been more than 
once made that the Monroe Doctrine be Pan Ameri- 
canized. This proposal was discussed by Mr. Root in 
his address before the American Society of Interna- 
tional Law in 1914 in the course of which he said: 

Since the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration based upon 
this nation's right of self-protection, it cannot be trans- 
muted into a joint or common declaration by American states 
or any number of them. If Chile or Argentina or Brazil 
were to contribute the weight of its influence toward a similar 
end, the right upon which that nation would rest its declara- 
tion would be its own safety, not the safety of the United 
States. Chile would declare what was necessary for the 
safety of Chile. Argentina would declare what was neces- 
sary for the safety of Argentina. Brazil, what was neces- 
sary for the safety of Brazil. Each nation would act for itself 
and in its own right and it would be impossible to go beyond 
that except by more or less offensive and defensive alliances. 
Of course such alliances are not to be considered. 8 

President Wilson in his address before the Second 
Pan American Scientific Congress in 1916 agreed in 
part with this when he said : " The Monroe Doctrine 
was proclaimed by the United States on her own 
authority. It has always been maintained, and always 
will be maintained, upon her own responsibility." 

7 Moore, " Digest of International Law." Vol. VI, p. 427. 
•"Addresses on International Subjects," Elihu Root, p. 120. 

330 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

The relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the Declara- 
tion of Rights and Duties of Nations, drafted by the 
American Institute of International Law, was dis- 
cussed by Mr. Root in his address before the Ameri- 
can Society of International Law in 1916. He said in 
part: 

Whether the United States will soon have occasion or will 
long have the ability or the will to maintain the Monroe 
Doctrine lies in the uncertain future. Whether it will be 
necessary for her to act in defense of the doctrine or 
abandon it, may well be determined by the issue of the 
present war. Whether when the occasion comes she will 
prove to have the ability and the will to maintain the doctrine, 
depends upon the spirit of her people, their capacity for pa- 
triotic sacrifice, the foresight and character of those to whose 
initiative in foreign affairs the interests of the people are 
entrusted. Whether the broader doctrine affirmed by the 
American Institute of International Law is to be made 
effective for the protection of justice and liberty throughout 
the world depends upon whether the vision of the nations 
shall have been so clarified by the terrible lessons of these 
years that they can rise above small struggles for advantage 
in international affairs, and realize that correlative to each 
nation's individual right is that nation's duty to insist upon 
the observance of the principles of public right throughout 
the community of nations. 9 

It is not probable that our participation in the Great 
War will result in any weakening of the Monroe Doc- 
trine. That principle has been fully justified by a 
century of experience. It has saved South America 
from the kind of exploitation to which the continents 
of Africa and Asia have, during the past generation, 
fallen a prey. It would be strange indeed if the 



• " Addresses on International Subjects," by Elihu Root, p. 425, 

331 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

United States, having insisted on the non-interference 
of European powers in America when it was itself a 
weak power from the military point of view, should 
now in the plenitude of its power relax what has been 
for so many years the cardinal principle of its foreign 
policy. The abandonment of our policy of neutrality 
and isolation does not by any means mean the abandon- 
ment of the Monroe Doctrine. President Wilson 
made this quite clear in his address to the Senate on 
January 22, 1917, when he said: 

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with 
one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the 
doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend 
its polity over any other nation or people, but that every 
people should be left free to determine its own polity, its 
own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, un- 
afraid, the little along with the great and powerful. I am 
proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alli- 
ances which would draw them into competitions of power, 
catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and dis- 
turb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. 
There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. 

The policy of isolation or the avoidance of entan- 
gling alliances, which so many Americans confuse with 
the Monroe Doctrine, is in principle quite distinct from 
it and is in fact utterly inconsistent with the position 
and importance of the United States as a world power. 
The difference in principle between the two policies can 
perhaps be best illustrated by the following supposi- 
tion. If the United States were to sign a permanent 
treaty with England placing our navy at her disposal 
in the event of attack from some European power, on 
condition that England would unite with us in oppos- 

332 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

ing the intervention of any European power in Latin 
America, such a treaty would not be a violation of the 
Monroe Doctrine, but a distinct recognition of that 
principle. Such a treaty would, however, be a depar- 
ture from our traditional policy of isolation, originally 
announced by Washington and Jefferson. 

The participation of the United States in the League 
of Nations would, if that League be considered an en- 
tangling alliance, be a departure from the policy of 
isolation but not a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. 
In order to allay the fears of Americans on this point, 
President Wilson caused to be inserted in the consti- 
tution of the League of Nations the following clause: 

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the 
validity of international engagements, such as treaties of 
arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doc- 
trine, for securing the maintenance of peace. 

This clause did not serve the purpose for which it 
was intended, and a heated controversy at once arose 
as to the meaning of the language employed. When 
the treaty came before the Senate this clause was 
the object of attack, and Senator Lodge included 
among the fourteen reservations which he proposed 
the following one on the Monroe Doctrine: 

The United States will not submit to arbitration or to in- 
quiry by the assembly or by the council of the League of 
Nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any questions 
which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or 
relate to its long-established policy, commonly known as 
the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by 
the United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly 
outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and en- 

333 



UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

tirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said treaty 
of peace with Germany. 

The recognition of the Monroe Doctrine by the 
League of Nations, taken in connection with the 
Senate's assertion of the exclusive right to interpret 
its meaning, has caused some of the Latin-American 
countries to delay joining the League until the 
Monroe Doctrine is clearly defined. In February, 
1920, Salvador brought this subject to the attention 
of the United States in a formal note in which she 
argued that, as the Monroe Doctrine was so variously 
interpreted by prominent thinkers and public men 
even in the United States, it should be officially de- 
fined. 10 In reply Salvador was referred to what Presi- 
dent Wilson had said on the subject of the Monroe 
Doctrine in his address of January 6, 1916, before the 
Pan American Scientific Congress at Washington. 11 
These remarks have already been quoted in Chapter 
VIII. 12 Salvador was informed that no further defi- 
nition was deemed necessary. The speech referred to 
may, therefore, be considered the latest official inter- 
pretation of the Monroe Doctrine. 



10 The New York Times, February 8, 1920. 

11 The New York Times, March 2, 1920. 

12 Ante, pp. 306-307. 



THE END 



334 



INDEX 



ABC Alliance, offers to medi- 
ate in Mexican crisis, 309; 
divided in Great War, 313 ; 
attitude towards United 
States, 329. f 

Aberdeen, Lord, tries to pre- 
vent annexation of Texas by 
United States, 262, 263. 

Abolitionists, oppose admission 
of Texas, 262. 

Adams, C. F., minister to Eng- 
land, views on the Mexican 
situation, 202 ; warns his gov- 
ernment against designs of 
Louis Napoleon on Mexico, 
208; on Mexican policy of 
Great Britain, 209. 

Adams, John Quincy, opposes 
joint action with England, 
70, 71 ; influence on Monroe's 
message of December 2, 1823, 
72; informs Russia that 
American continents are no 
longer open to European 
colonization, 75 ; views on 
Cuba, 86; appoints delegates 
to Panama Congress, 292, 
293. 

Aix-la-Chapelle, conference of 
1818, 58, 59- 

Alexander I, Czar of Russia, 
and Holy Alliance, 61. 

American Institute of Interna- 
tional Law, 304 ; adopts Dec- 
laration of Rights and Du- 
ties of Nations, 305-306. 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 266. 



Arbitration, international, of 
Venezuelan boundary dis- 
pute, 248, 249; of pecuniary 
claims against Venezuela, 
255. 256. 

Argentina, British invasion of, 
23-25 ; beginnings of revolu- 
tion in, 30; remains neutral 
in Great War, 314, 315. 

Assiento, contract for supply- 
ing slaves to Spanish col- 
onies, 12-14. 

Audiencia, in Spanish colonies, 

4, 5; 
Austria, suppresses revolution 
in Naples and in Piedmont, 
59, 60 ; warned not to send 
troops to assistance of Maxi- 
milian in Mexico, 232, 233. 

Balfour, A. J , on forcible col- 
lection of pecuniary claims, 

257- 

Baltimore, U. S. Cruiser, mem- 
bers of crew attacked by 
Chileans, 302. 

Barbosa, Ruy, Brazilian states- 
man, 313. 

Bay Islands, British claims to, 
157, 160, 161. 

Beaupre, A. M., minister to 
Colombia, 186. 

Belize, British claims to, 157, 
160, 161. 

Bell, J. Franklin, in Cuba, 142. 

Belligerent rights, accorded to 
Spanish colonies, 48 ; with- 



335 



INDEX 



held from Cubans, 110-113; 
House resolution, 113; joint 
resolution of Congress, 127. 

Bigelow, John, minister to 
France, 222, 225, 227. 

Bismarck, Prince, on Monroe 
Doctrine, 321. 

"Black Friday," no. 

Black Warrior, case of, 101-103. 

Blaine, J. G., outlines new canal 
policy, 169-171 ; proposes 
modifications of Clayton- 
Bulwer treaty, 172-173; calls 
International American Con- 
ference at Washington, 300, 
presides at opening session, 
301. 

Blanco, Ramon, governor of 
Cuba, 129. 

Bliss, Tasker H., in charge of 
Cuban customs, 140. 

Bolivar, Simon, character, 37; 
joins patriot cause, 38; career 
in Venezuela and Colombia, 
39-42; in Ecuador and Peru, 
43, 44; interest in Isthmian 
canal, 147; summons Pan- 
ama Congress, 292. 

Bonaparte, Louis Napoleon, in- 
terest in Isthmian canal, 148; 
designs on Mexico, 207 ; 
places Maximilian on the 
throne, 214-220; forced to 
withdraw troops, 226-232. 

Bonaparte, Napoleon, invasion 
of Spain, 26-28 ; cedes Louisi- 
ana to United States, 261. 

Bowen, Herbert W., minister to 
Venezuela, 252. 

Brazil, becomes a republic, 301 ; 
stands by United States in 
war with Germany, 312-314. 

British Guiana, dispute over 
boundary of, 238-249. 



British Honduras. See Belize. 

Brougham, Lord, on Monroe's 

message of December 2, 1823, 

77- 

Bryan, William J., favors rati- 
fication of Spanish treaty, 
136 ; tries to adjust differences 
with Colombia resulting from 
Panama Revolution, 274-276; 
negotiates treaties with Ni- 
caragua, 285, 286; refuses to 
recognize Huerta, 308. 

Buchanan, James, proposes 
purchase of Cuba, 92; con- 
nection with Ostend Mani- 
festo, 104, 105 ; recommends 
congressional action on Cu- 
ban question, 106; criticises 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 157, 
suggests abrogation of, 163, 
announces satisfactory ad- 
justment of disputes growing 
out of, 165. 

Buenos Aires, captured by the 
British, 24. 

Bulwer, Sir Henry Lytton, 
signs canal treaty, 154. 

Bunau-Varilla, Philippe, and 
Panama revolution, 187 ; first 
minister from Republic of 
Panama, 189. 

Bureau of American Republics, 
301, 303. 

California, acquisition of, 264. 

Campbell, L. D., minister to 
Mexico, 234-236. 

Canal. See Panama Canal, 
Nicaragua Canal. 

Canning, George, on commer- 
cial relations with Spanish 
colonies, 54-55 ; on recogni- 
tion of, 55-56 ; on European 
congresses, 58, 59; on French 



'336 



INDEX 



intervention in Spain, 63, 64 ; 
conferences with Rush on 
schemes of the Holy Alli- 
ance, 65-67, 72; interviews 
with Prince Polignac on 
Spanish-American situation, 
73> 74> comments on Mon- 
roe's message of December 
2, 1823, 78, 79; decides to 
recognize Mexico and Colom- 
bia, 80, 81 ; opposes French 
occupation of Cuba, 88. 

Caribbean Sea, naval suprem- 
acy in, 261, 264-266; new 
American policies in, 267. 

Carranza, Venustiano, succeeds 
Huerta, 309; recognized by 
United States, 310, permits 
German intrigue, 316. 

Casa de Contratacion, 8. 

Castelar, Emilio, President of 
the Spanish Republic, 115. 

Central American Court of 
Justice, 281-287. 

Chile, liberation of, 32, 33; 
war with Spain, 298; with 
Peru, 299-300; quarrel with 
United States, 301, 302; re- 
mains neutral in Great War, 
315, 3i6. 

Claims. See Pecuniary claims. 

Clay, Henry, advocates recog- 
nition of South American in- 
dependence, 49-51, 82; Cuban 
policy of, 88; views on 
Isthmian Canal, 148; and 
Panama Congress, 292-295 ; 
applies Monroe Doctrine to 
Cuba and Porto Rico, 323. 

Clayton, J. M., secretary of 
state, signs canal treaty, 154; 
criticised by Buchanan, 157 ; 
on refusal of Congress to en- 
dorse Monroe Doctrine, 320. 



Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 154- 
156; disputes arising out of, 
159-165; attempts of Blaine 
and Frelinghuysen to secure 
modifications of, 172-177; 
alleged British violation of, 
178-180; abrogated, 181. 

Cleveland, Grover, transmits to 
Congress correspondence of 
Secretary Fish on Cuba, 125 ; 
recognizes state of insur- 
gency in Cuba, 126; ignores 
resolution of Congress rec- 
ognizing belligerency, 127 ; 
message on Cuba, 128; 
canal policy of, 177; asserts 
Monroe Doctrine in Ven- 
ezuelan boundary dispute, 
238-239. 

Cochrane, Lord (Earl Dun- 
donald), commander of Chil- 
ean navy, 34, 35. 

Colombia (New Granada), war 
of liberation, 39-42 ; signs 
canal treaty of 1846, 149, 150; 
rejects Hay-Herran conven- 
tion, 186; demands arbitra- 
tion of Panama question, 
192; strained relations with 
United States arising out of 
Panama Revolution, 268-276; 
remains neutral in the Great 
War, 312, 316- 

Commerce, British, with Span- 
ish colonies, 53-55. 

Conference. See International 
American. 

Convention of London of 1861, 
providing for joint interven- 
tion in Mexico, 203. 

Costa Rica, protests against 
protectorate over Nicaragua, 
285-287. 

Cromwell, W. N., attorney for 



337 



INDEX 



French Panama Canal Com- 
pany, 187. 

Cuba, British or French ac- 
quisition opposed by United 
States, 84-90 ; annexation 
schemes, 91-106 ; " Ten Years' 
War" in, 107-125; insurrec- 
tion of 1895, 125-129; inter- 
vention of the United States 
in, 130-133; American occu- 
pation of, 136-140; reciproc- 
ity with, 140-142; second 
period of American occupa- 
tion, 142, 143; enters war 
against Germany, 312, 313. 

Cushing, Caleb, mission to 
Spain, 1 19-124. 

Dallas-Clarendon treaty, amen- 
ded by Senate and rejected 
by Great Britain, 161, 162. 

Danish West Indies, annexa- 
tion proposed by Seward, 
264; purchased by United 
States, 289, 290. 

Davis, Cushman K., commis- 
sioner to negotiate peace with 
Spain, 135. 

Dawson, T. C, minister to 
Dominican Republic, negoti- 
ates treaty establishing finan- 
cial supervision, 277-279. 

Day, W. R., commissioner to 
negotiate peace with Spain, 

135. 

Dayton, W. L., minister to 
France, 214, 217, 219, 221. 

DeLesseps, Ferdinand, begins 
construction of Panama 
canal, 146 ; effect on canal pol- 
icy of United States, 167-169. 

DeLhuys, Drouyn, French 
minister of state, 217, 221, 
225, 231. 



Dewey, George, at Manila Bay, 
134; prepared to arrest Ger- 
man action against Venezu- 
ela, 253, 254. 

Diaz, Porfirio, president of 
Mexico, joint mediator with 
President Roosevelt in Cen- 
tral American affairs, 280- 
282. 

Dominican Republic, under 
financial supervision of Uni- 
ted States, 276-280. 

Drago, L. M., Argentine minis- 
ter, on war between Germany 
and United States, 314, 315. 

Drago Doctrine, 257-260. 

DuBois, J. T., minister to Co- 
lombia, efforts to settle dif- 
ferences arising out of Pan- 
ama Revolution, 270-274. 

Evarts, W. M., report on obli- 
gations of United States with 
respect to Isthmus of Pan- 
ama, 169. 

Ferdinand VII, of Spain, de- 
throned by Napoleon, 27 ; res- 
toration of, 29; attempts to 
recover American colonies, 40. 

Filibusters, Cuban, 92-96. 

Financial supervision, over 
Dominican Republic, 276- 
280 ; over Nicaragua, 283 ; 
over Haiti, 289. 

Fish, Hamilton, secretary of 
state, Cuban policy of, 108- 
124; on British infringement 
of Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 
167 ; acts as mediator in war 
between Spain and republics 
on West coast of South 
America, 298, 299. 

Florida treaty, 52, 85, 261. 



338 



INDEX 



Fonseca Bay, naval base on, 
offered to United States by 
Honduras, 153, leased from 
Nicaragua, 286. 

Forsyth, John, secretary of 
state, 90 ; minister to Mexico, 
194. 

France, interest in Cuba, 87, 88, 
97; claims against Mexico, 
197 ; severs diplomatic rela- 
tions with Juarez govern- 
ment, 199; decides on joint 
intervention in Mexico, 203 ; 
supports Maximilian on 
Mexican throne, 220-234. 

Frelinghuysen, F. T., corres- 
pondence with Lord Granville 
on Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 
175, 176; signs canal treaty 
with Nicaragua, 177. 

Frye, W. P., commissioner to 
negotiate peace with Spain, 
135- 

Garfield, J. A., canal policy of, 
169. 

Germany, intervention in Ven- 
ezuela, 249-252; forced to 
withdraw, 252-255. 

Goethals, G. W., in charge of 
construction of Panama 
Canal, 191. 

Gomez, Maximo, leader of 
Cuban insurrection, 125. 

Grace-Eyre-Cragin Syndicate, 
secures concession for canal 
through Nicaragua, 183. 

Grant, Ulysses S., Cuban policy 
of, 108-124; favors driving 
French from Mexico, 227 ; 
proposes annexation of Santo 
Domingo, 265 ; on Monroe 
Doctrine, 324. 

Gray, George, commissioner to 



negotiate peace with Spain, 

135. 

Great Britain, secures monop- 
oly of slave trade, 12-14; 
entertains idea of revolution- 
izing Spanish America, 14- 
22, 26; sends expedition to 
the Plate, 23-25 ; commercial 
relations with Spanish Amer- 
ica, 53-55 ; attitude towards 
Holy Alliance, 60, 63 ; recog- 
nizes independence of Mex- 
ico and Colombia, 80; atti- 
tude towards Cuba, 85, 86, 90, 
97 ; signs Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty, 154; disagrees with 
United States as to interpre- 
tation of the treaty, 160-164; 
refuses to relinquish rights 
under treaty, 174; interferes 
in affairs of Mosquito Indi- 
ans, 178-180; claims against 
Mexico, 196; severs diplo- 
matic relations with Juarez 
government, 199; decides on 
joint intervention in Mexico, 
203 ; grows suspicious of 
France, 207-209 ; withdraws 
troops from Mexico, 212, 
213 ; controversy with Vene- 
zuela over boundary of Bri- 
tish Guiana, 238-249; inter- 
venes in Venezuela for col- 
lection of claims, 249-252 ; 
opposes annexation of Texas 
by United States, 262-263 ; 
attitude towards Monroe 
Doctrine, 322, 323. 

Greytown, British occupation 
of, 157-160. 

Guiana. See British Guiana. 

Gwin, W. M., plan for coloniz- 
ing ex-Confederates in Mex- 
ico, 223. 



339 



INDEX 



Hague Conference of 1907, 
resolutions on forcible collec- 
tion of contract debts, 259-260. 

Hague Court, decision in Ven- 
ezuelan case, 256. 

Haiti, occupied by U. S. Ma- 
rines, 288; agrees to Ameri- 
can financial supervision, 
289; declares war on Ger- 
many, 316. 

Hamilton, Alexander, inter- 
ested in Miranda's projects, 
17-19. 

Harrison, Benjamin, dispute 
with Chile, 302. 

Hay, John, secretary of state, 
negotiates new canal treaty 
with England, 180, 181 ; ne- 
gotiates canal treaty with 
Colombia, 185 ; calls Ger- 
many's attention to Monroe 
Doctrine, 251 ; advises sub- 
mission of Venezuelan case 
to Hague Court, 255. 

Hay-Herran convention, signed, 
185; rejected by Colombia, 
186, 187. 

Hay-Pauncefote treaty, pro- 
visions, 180, 181 ; practical 
recognition of American su- 
premacy in Caribbean, 265- 
267. 

Hayes, R. B., announces new 
canal policy, 168. 

Hepburn Bill, 184. 

Hoar, G. F., on acquisition of 
the Philippines, 136. 

Holleben incident, 252-254. 

Holy Alliance, treaty of the, 61. 

Honduras, Knox treaty estab- 
lishing financial supervision 
over, 283 ; protests against 
protectorate over Nicaragua, 
285. 



Huerta, Victoriano, Mexican 
dictator, 307-309. 

India House, 8. 

Indies, Council of the, 4, 5; 
laws of the, 4. 

International American Con- 
ference at Washington, 300, 
301 ; at Mexico, 302 ; at Rio 
de Janeiro, 303 ; at Buenos 
Aires, 303. 

International High Commis- 
sion, 304. 

Intervention, European doc- 
trine of, 57. 

Isthmian canal, difficulties of, 
144; comparative merits of 
Panama and Nicaragua 
routes, 145, 146; international 
questions involved in, 146, 147. 

Italy, intervention in Vene- 
zuela, 249-252. 

Itata, case of the, 302. 

Iturbide, Augustin de, leads 
revolution against Spain in 
Mexico, 45, 46; proclaims 
himself emperor, 47. 

Jefferson, Thomas, interview 
with Miranda. 20: letter to 
President Monroe on Can- 
ning's proposals, 68-70 ; views 
on Cuba, 84, 87; on recogni- 
tion of de facto governments, 
308. 

Juarez, Benito, president of 
Mexico, 194 ; recognized by 
United States, 195 ; suspends 
payment on foreign debt, 199 ; 
driven from capital by the 
French, 214, 215; urged by 
United States to spare Maxi- 
milian's life, 235; orders his 
execution, 237. 



340 



INDEX 



King, Rufus, correspondence 
with Miranda, 17-20. 

Knox, P. C, investigates title 
of Panama Canal Company, 
185 ; tries to settle differences 
with Colombia resulting from 
Panama Revolution, 270-274; 
Central American policy, 282- 
285. 

Lansing, Robert, secretary of 
state, negotiates treaty for 
purchase of Danish West 
Indies, 200; suggests adop- 
tion of Declaration of Rights 
and Duties of Nations, 305. 

Latin America, and the Great 
War, 312-318. 

Laybach, conference of powers 
at, 59. 

League of Nations, and Mon- 
roe Doctrine, 333, 334- 

Lee, Fitzhugh, consul-general 
at Havana, 129. 

Lincoln, Abraham, views on 
Panama canal, 151. 

Liverpool, Lord, on conference 
at Aix-la-Chapelle, 58 ; on 
French intervention in Spain, 

63. 

Lodge, H. C, on alleged secret 
alliance with England, 266; 
reservation of Monroe Doc- 
trine, 333- 

Lome, Enrique Dupuy de, inci- 
dent and recall, 129, 130. 

Loomis, F. B., acting secretary 
of state, 188, 

Lopez, Narciso, Cuban patriot, 
92-96. 

Louis Napoleon. See Bona- 
parte. 

Louis Philippe, suggested as 
possible ruler for Spanish 

34 



America, 26; and annexation 
of Texas, 262, 263. 
Louisiana, ceded to United 
States, 261. 

McKinley, William, Cuban 
policy of, 128-132; demands 
cession of Philippine Islands, 

135. 

McLane, R. M., minister to 
Mexico, 195. 

Mackintosh, Sir James, on 
Monroe's message of Decem- 
ber 2, 1823, 78. 

Madero, Francisco, murder of, 
307. 

Madison, James, receives Mi- 
randa informally, 20; favors 
joint action with England 
against intervention of 
powers in Spanish America, 
70; views on Cuba, 84. 

Magoon, C. E., provisional 
governor of Cuba, 142. 

Magruder, J. B., accepts office 
under Maximilian in Mexico, 
224. 

Maine, U. S. battleship, sent to 
Havana, 129; blown up, 130. 

Marcy, William L., secretary of 
state, Cuban policy of, 99-105. 

Maritime Canal Company, se- 
cures concessions from Ni- 
caragua, 183. 

Mason, John Y., connection 
with Ostend Manifesto, 104. 

Maury, M. F., accepts office 
under Maximilian in Mexico, 
224. 

Maximilian, Archduke Ferdi- 
nand, suggested for Mexican 
throne, 208-211; offered the 
position of Empev or of Mex- 
ico, 215 ; not recognized by 



INDEX 



the United States, 218, 219; 
career in Mexico, 220-234; 
death, 237. 

Mexico, becomes independent 
of Spain, 45-47; frequent 
changes of government in, 
193; claims of foreigners 
against, 196; joint interven- 
tion of England, Fraace, and 
Spain, 203-212; war with 
United States, 263, 264; re- 
lations with United States 
under Huerta, 307-309; un- 
der Carranza, 309-311; hot- 
bed of German intrigue, 316. 

Miles, Nelson A., occupies 
Porto Rico, 134. 

Miranda, Francisco de, plans 
for revolutionizing Spanish 
America, 15-19; organizes 
expedition in New York, 20; 
attempts to land in Vene- 
zuela, 21, 22; takes part in 
Venezuelan revolution, 38; 
imprisonment and death, 39. 

Monroe, James, attitude toward 
South American struggle for 
independence, 52, 53 ; letter 
to Jefferson on Cannings 
proposals, 67, 68 ; message of 
December 2, 1823, 76, 77. 

Monroe Doctrine, text of mes- 
sage of December 2, 1823, 
76-77 ; and Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty, 157, 159, 175. 176; and 
French intervention in Mex- 
ico, 222, 223 ; asserted by 
President Cleveland in Vene- 
zuelan boundary dispute, 238- 
249; tested by Germany, 249- 
255 ; imperialistic tendencies 
of, 200, 291, 329; President 
Wilson's statement of, before 
Pan American Scientific Con- 



ference, 306-307; an execu- 
tive policy, 320; relation to 
European balance of power, 
321, 322; attitude of England 
toward, 322; consistently in- 
terpreted, 323; does not per- 
mit transfer of American 
colonies from one European 
power to another, 323, 324; 
reservation of, at Hague 
Conference, 325, 326; as ap- 
plied by President Roosevelt, 
326, 327; proposals to Pan 
Americanize, 330 ; probable 
effects of Great War on, 331, 
332 ; distinct from policy of 
isolation, 332, 333; recog- 
nized in covenant of League 
of Nations, 333 ; Lodge reser- 
vation, 333; definition of, 
demanded by Salvador, 334. 

Moore, John Bassett, secretary 
of commission to negotiate 
peace with Spain, 135; on 
Monroe Doctrine, 323. 

Morgan, J. T., advocates Ni- 
caragua canal route, 184. 

Mosquito Coast, Great Bri- 
tain's claims to, 157-159; 
British interference in, 178- 
180. 

Motley, J. L., minister to Aus- 
tria, 232, 233. 

Naon, R. S., Argentine ambas- 
sador to the United States, 
on " European War and Pan 
Americanism," 316-318. 

Napoleon. See Bonaparte. 

New Granada. See Colombia. 

Nicaragua, signs canal treaty 
of 1867 with United States, 
166; canal treaty of 1884 
withdrawn from Senate by 



342 



INDEX 



Cleveland, 177; sovereignty 
over Mosquito Coast, 178- 
180; relations with United 
States under Roosevelt, 280, 
281 ; under Taf t, 282-285 ; 
under Wilson, 285-288 ; treaty 
of 1916, 286. 
Nicaragua Canal, comparative 
merits of Nicaragua and 
Panama routes, 145, 146; 
draft of treaty for construc- 
tion of canal, 152, 153; route 
investigated by Walker com- 
mission, 182. 

O'Higgins, Bernardo, Chilean 
patriot, 32, 33. 

Olney, Richard, secretary of 
state, on Cuba, 127 ; on Clay- 
ton-Bulwer treaty, 180; in- 
terpretation of Monroe Doc- 
trine in Venezuelan boundary 
dispute, 240. 

Ostend Manifesto, 104, 105. 

Ouseley, Sir William, mission 
to Central America, 162-164. 

Palma, T. E., first president of 
Cuba, 140, 142. 

Panama, Republic of, recog- 
nized by President Roose- 
velt, 189; leases Canal Zone 
to United States, 191. 

Panama Canal, comparative 
merits of Panama and Ni- 
caragua routes, 145, 146; 
treaty of 1846 with Colom- 
bia, 149; opened to com- 
merce, 191. 

Panama Canal Company, or- 
ganized by De Lesseps, 167 ; 
reorganization and extension 
of concession, 182; offers to 
sell to United States, 184, 185. 



Panama Congress, 292-295. 

Panama Railroad, 146, 150. 

Panama Revolution, 187-189. 

Pan American Financial Con- 
ferences, 304. 

Pan American Scientific Con- 
ferences, 304. 

Pan American Union, 303. 

Pan Americanism, definition 
of, 292; promoted by Presi- 
dent Wilson's Mexican policy, 
309, 311; put to test in the 
Great War, 312-317. 

Pecuniary Claims, against Mex- 
ico, 196, 197 ; British policy in 
regard to, 198; attempt to 
collect by force from Vene- 
zuela, 249-257 ; Resolutions 
of Second Hague Confer- 
ence, 259, 260 ; considered by 
International American Con- 
ferences, 302, 303. 

Peru, liberation of, 33-37 ; war 
with Spain, 298; with Chile, 
2 99. 300; severs relations 
with Germany, 316. 

Philippine Islands, ceded to 
United States, 135, 136. 

Pierce, Franklin, Cuban policy 
of, 99-105. 

Piatt Amendment, text of, 138- 
139; treaty with Nicaragua 
embodying, defeated by Sen- 
ate, 285, 286; applied in part 
to Haiti, 289. 

Poinsett, Joel R., 49, 53. 

Polk, J. K., and Mexican War, 
263, 264. 

Porter, Horace, presents reso- 
lution to Hague Conference 
of 1907 on forcible collection 
of pecuniary claims, 259. 

Porto Rico, cession of, de- 
manded by United States, 135. 



343 



INDEX 



Quitman, John A., relations 
with Lopez, 93-94- 

Recognition, withheld from 
Huerta, 308. See Belliger- 
ent Rights. 

Reed, Walter, yellow-fever in- 
vestigations, 137. 

Reid, Whitelaw, commissioner 
to negotiate peace with Spain, 

135. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, and Cu- 
ban reciprocity, 140-142 ; 
signs canal bill, 185; de- 
nounces Colombia's rejection 
of Hay-Herran convention, 
186; recognizes Republic of 
Panama, 189; on acquisition 
of Canal Zone, 190 ; creates 
strained relations with Col- 
ombia, 192; on Monroe Doc- 
trine, 251 ; interview with 
Holleben on German inter- 
vention in Venezuela, 252- 
254; refuses to arbitrate 
Panama question, 268; de- 
nounces Bryan treaty with 
Colombia as blackmail, 275 ; 
establishes financial super- 
vision over Dominican Re- 
public, 276-280; Central 
American policy, 280, 281 ; 
attempts to purchase Danish 
West Indies, 290; interpreta- 
tion of Monroe Doctrine, 
326, 327. 

Root, Elihu, author of Piatt 
Amendment, 139; attempts to 
settle differences with Co- 
lombia, 268-270; visits South 
America, 303; on Monroe 
Doctrine, 330, 331. 

Rush, Richard, minister to 
England, conferences with 



Canning on schemes of Holy 
Alliance, 65-67, 72, 73. 
Russia, claims to northwestern 
coast of America, 75. 

Sagasta, P. M., Spanish minis- 
ter, Cuban policy of, 128. 

Salisbury, Lord, reply to 01- 
ney's dispatch on Venezuelan 
boundary dispute, 242 ; agrees 
to arbitration of the boundary 
dispute, 248. 

Salvador, protests against pro- 
tectorate over Nicaragua, 
285-287 ; requests official defi- 
nition of Monroe Doctrine, 
334- 

Sampson, W. T., blockades 
Cuba, 134. 

San Ildefonso, secret treaty of, 
261. 

San Martin, Jose de, takes part 
in Argentine revolution, 30- 
22; liberates Chile, 32, 33; 
liberates Peru, 33-37; rela- 
tions with Bolivar, 43, 44; 
death, 45. 

Santo Domingo, annexation 
proposed by Seward, 264, by 
Grant, 265. See Dominican 
Republic. 

Schenck, Robert C, minister 
to England, 120. 

Schofield, J. M., informal mis- 
sion to France, 227. 

Seward, W. H., views on 
Panama canal, 151 ; favors 
expansion, 165 ; raises ques- 
tion as to binding force of 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 166; 
proposes to assume payment 
of interest on foreign debt 
of Mexico, 200; declines to 
unite with European powers 



344 



INDEX 



in measures against Mexico, 
205, 206; attitude towards 
French in Mexico, 214-231 ; 
efforts to annex Santo Do- 
mingo and Danish West 
Indies, 264, 265. 

Shaw, Albert, and Panama 
Revolution, 189. 

Sherman, John, secretary of 
state, 128. 

Sherman, W. T., selected for 
special mission to Mexico, 

234, 235. 

Sickles, Daniel E., mission to 
Spain, 109-118. 

Slave trade, 12-14. 

Slavery, in Cuba, 89, 90, 106, 
107, HI. 

Slidell, John, introduces bill for 
purchase of Cuba, 106. 

Smuggling, in Spanish colonies, 
II. 

Soule, Pierre, mission to Spain, 
99-105. 

Spain, colonial policy of, 4-12 ; 
revolution of 1820, 56, sup- 
pressed by French army, 63 ; 
revolution of 1868, 107 ; re- 
public proclaimed in, 113; 
treaty of 1898 with United 
States, 136; claims against 
Mexico, 197; decides on joint 
intervention in Mexico, 203 ; 
withdraws troops from Mex- 
ico, 212, 213; extent of colo- 
nial empire at beginning of 
nineteenth century, 261 ; war 
with Chile, Peru, Bolivia, 
and Ecuador, 298, 299. 

Spanish-American republics, ac- 
corded belligerent rights, 48; 
recognized as independent 
by United States, 53, by Eng- 
land, 80. 



Spanish Colonies, revolt of, 28. 

Spooner, J. C, offers amend- 
ment to canal bill, 184. 

Sucre, Antonio Jose de, Vene- 
zuelan general, 42-44. 

Suez Canal Convention, and 
Hay-Pauncefote treaty, 181. 

Sumner, Charles, opposes an- 
nexation of Danish West 
Indies and Santo Domingo, 
264, 265. 

Taft, W. H., proclaims pro- 
visional government in Cuba, 
142 ; tries to settle differences 
with Colombia resulting from 
Panama Revolution, 270-274; 
relations with Nicaragua and 
Honduras, 280-285 ; and 
Huerta revolution, 308. 

Taylor, Hannis, minister to 
Spain, 128. 

Taylor, Zachary, issues procla- 
mation warning Americans 
against aiding Lopez expedi- 
tion against Cuba, 93 ; and 
Mexican War, 263. 

Texas, claim to, abandoned by 
the United States, 261 ; es- 
tablishment of independence 
of, 262; admitted to Union, 
263. 

Thayer, W. R., version of Hol- 
leben incident, 252-254. 

Trade, with Spanish colonies, 
monopoly of, 12-14. 

Troppau, conference of 1820, 

59- 
Tupac Amaru, last of the In- 

cas, 6. 
Tyler, John, and annexation of 

Texas, 262, 263. 



Utrecht, treaty of, 12. 



345 



INDEX 



Venezuela, declares indepen- 
dence, 38 ; war of liberation, 
39-42 ; dispute with Great 
Britain over boundary of 
British Guiana, 238-249; in- 
tervention of Germany, Eng- 
land, and Italy in, 249-252 ; 
neutral in Great War, 312, 
316. 

Vera Cruz, landing of Ameri- 
can Marines at, 309. 

Verona, Congress of, 60-63. 

Viceroy, office of, in Spanish 
colonies, 4, 5, 12. 

Vienna, Congress of, 58. 

Villa, Francisco, Mexican in- 
surrectionary chief, 309, 310. 

Virgin Islands. See Danish 
West Indies. 

Virginius, case of the, 114-118. 

Walker, J. G., head of com- 
mission to investigate canal 
routes, 182; report of, 183, 
184. 

Walker, William, invasion of 
Central America, 163. 

Webster, Daniel, Cuban policy 
of, 90, 97. 

Wellington, Duke of, with- 
draws from Congress of 
Verona, 60. 

Weyler, Valeriano, captain- 
general of Cuba, 125, 126, 129. 



William II, Emperor of Ger- 
many, intervention in Vene- 
zuela, 249-252 ; forced to 
withdraw, 252-255. 

Wilson, Henry Lane, ambas- 
sador to Mexico, 307. 

Wilson, Woodrow, submits 
treaty with Colombia adjust- 
ing differences resulting from 
Panama Revolution, 274, 275 ; 
Central American policy, 
285-287; Haitian policy, 288, 
289; relations with Latin 
America, 291 ; interpretation 
of Monroe Doctrine, 306, 
307 ; Mexican policy of, 307- 
311; Latin- American policy, 
309, 311 ; opposes concessions 
to foreign capitalists in 
Latin America, 328; proposes 
to extend Monroe Doctrine 
to the world, 332. 

Wood, Leonard, military gov- 
ernor of Cuba, 137-140. 

Woodford, S. L., minister to 
Spain, 128, 130, 134. 

Wyke, Sir Charles, British 
minister to Mexico, 198, 199, 
203, 207. 

Wyse, L. N. B., secures conces- 
sion for Panama Canal, 167. 

Zelava, president of Nicaragua 
280-283. 



346 




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